Western Direct Investments in European CMEA Countries in the 1970s and 1980s by Tiusanen, Tauno Juhani
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
WESTERN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN EUROPEAN 
CMEA COUNTRIES IN THE 1970s AND 1980s
Tauno Juhani Tiusanen
Submitted in partial fulfilment Institute of Soviet and
of the requirements for the East European Studies
awarding of the degree of Glasgow University
Doctor of Philosophy April 1990
ProQuest Number: 10983585
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t  u p on  the quality of the co p y  subm itted .
In the unlikely e v e n t  that the author did not send a c o m p le te  m anuscript 
and there are missing p a g e s ,  th ese  will be n o te d . Also, if m aterial had to be rem o v ed ,
a n o te  will in d ica te  the d e le tio n .
uest
ProQ uest 10983585
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). C opyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected  a g a in st unauthorized  copying  under Title 17, United States C o d e
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 -  1346
Acknowledgement
My sincere thanks are due to professor William Wallace the head of the Institute of 
Soviet and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, for his advice and 
encouragement. The atmosphere in the Institute has been stimulating and pleasant.
I also wish to thank Dr. Sandor Richter of the Economic Information Unit at the 
Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Director, Dr. Gerhard 
Fink of the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, and Dr. Klaus 
Schroder, The Research Institute for International Affairs in Ebenhausen for their 
support.
The Foundation for Economic Education in Helsinki, Finland has supported this study 
financially. Without this financial assistance it could hardly have been completed.
I direct my special thanks to my colleagues, Mr. Richard Berry and Adam Novak, who 
have patiently been advising me in difficult matters concerning the English language. 
Without their help the text would be much less fluent than it is now.
I am extremely grateful for Mrs. Pirkko Londen, who has been able to read my 
handwriting and to compile this study into typed form. Her contribution has been 
invaluable.
I reserve my gratitude also for my wife, Ritva, who has been a source of inspiration and 
support throughout my work.
Glasgow, April 1990
Tauno Juhani Tiusanen
WESTERN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN EUROPEAN CMEA COUNTRIES IN
THE 1970s AND 1980s
Page No
Summary 1
1. Socialism and international economics 4
1.1. Missing theory of international trade 4
1.2. CMEA and the international division of labour 8
1.3. State monopoly of foreign trade and bilateralism 10
1.4. The international monetary system of CMEA 18
1.5. Technology exchange and International investments
in intra CMEA-sphere 31
1.6. Summary and conclusions of Chapter One 41
2. East-West trade and co-operation 48
2.1. Main features of East-West trade 48
2.2. CMEA countries and international economic
organizations 50
2.2.1. CMEA countries, technology exchange and
industrial property rights 50
2.2.2. CMEA countries and the multilateral monetary
system (IMF and World Bank) 53
2.2.3. The trade policy of CMEA-countries towards
the rest of the world 61
3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between East and West 68
3.1. General aspects of Western FDIs in CMEA countries 68
3.2. Motives of enacting FDIs across ideological borders 70
3.3. Soviet concession policies during NEP-period 77
3.4. FDIs in CMEA-countries in modern times 79
3.4.1. Romania 79
3.4.I.I. Romanian FDI Regulations 79
3.4.1.2. Experience of FDIs in Romania 82
3.4.I.3. Outlook of FDIs in Romania 88
iv
Page No
3.4.2. Hungary 91
3.4.2.1. The development of Hungarian regulations
concerning FDIs 93
3.4.2.2. Hungary's experience with FDIs 100
3.4.2.3. Overall results of JVs in Hungary in
the 1970s and 1980s 111
3.4.2.4. The outlook for JVs in Hungary 128
3.43. Poland 131
3.43.1. Polish rules for FDIs 133
3.43.2. Experience of FDIs in Poland 138
3.43.3. Outlook for JVs in Poland 141
3.4.4. Bulgaria 143
3.4.4.1. Bulgarian rules for FDIs 146
3.4.4.2. Bulgaria's experience with JVs 150
3.4.43. Outlook for FDIs in Bulgaria 154
3.4.5. Czechoslovakia 156
3.4.5.1. Czechoslovak rules for JVs 158
3.4.5.2. CSSR’s experience with JVs 160
3.4.53. The future of JVs in the CSSR 165
3.4.6. The Soviet Union 166
3.4.6.1. Soviet regulations governing Western FDIs 168
3.4.6.2. Soviet experience with joint ventures 178
3.4.63. Overall assessment of the first FDIs in the USSR 181
3.4.6.4. The future of JVs in the Soviet Union 209
4. Some economic aspects of East-West JVs 227
4.1. Political economy and FDIs between East and West 229
4.2. Economic need for Western FDIs in CMEA countries 242
4.3. The future of Western FDIs in the CMEA-area 245
Conclusions 267
Appendices 271
Bibliography 286
IList of abbreviations
ATS = Australian Schilling
BCP = Bulgarian Communist Party
BNB = Bulgarian National Bank
CBC = Cooperative Central Bank/Austria
CC = Convertible Currency
CHF = Swiss Franc
CIB = Central European International Bank
CMEA = Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
COCOM = Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CPE = Centrally Planned Economy
CPSU = The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DEM/DM = Deutsche Mark
EC = European Communities
ECE = Economic Commission for Europe
EE = Eastern Europe
EEC = European Economic Community
EES = European Economic Space
EFTA = European Free Trade Area
EG ' = Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta
EPT = Entrepreneur's Profit Tax
FDI = Foreign Direct Investment
FEZ = Free Economic Zone
FF = French Franc
FIM = Finnish Mark
FRG = Federal Republic of Germany
FTO = Foreign Trade Organization
GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR = German Democratic Republic
GNP = Gross National Product
GVK = The State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
HSWP = The Communist Party of Hungary
HUF/Ft = Hungarian Forint
IBEC/MBES = The International Bank of Economic Cooperation
IBRD = International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
II
IEO = International Economic Organization
IFC = International Finance Corporation
IIB = The International Investment Bank
IM F = International Monetary Fund
IPS = International Processing System
JV = Joint Venture
JVC = Joint Venture Club (in Hungary)
LDC = Less Developed Country
MFN = Most Favoured Nation
MNC = Multinational Corporation
M TI = Hungarian News Agency
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEM = New Economic Mechanism
NEP = New Economic Policy
NIC = Newly Industrialized Country
OECD = Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC = Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries
PUWP = The Communist Party of Poland
RBL = Soviet Rouble
RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
SAG = Sowjetisch Aktiengesellschaft
SCCF = Standing Commission for Currency and Finance (of the
CMEA)
SDAG = Sowjetisch-Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft
SEK = Swedish Crown
SEO = Self-managing Economic Organization
TR = Transferable Rouble
UN = United Nations
UNCTAD = United Nations Council for Trade and Development
USD/US$ = US Dollar
UWH = Ungarische Wirtschaftshefte
VEB = Vneshekonombank = The Bank for Foreign Economic
Relations of the USSR 
WIIW = Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies
1A note on sources used
In the East plenty of material on "socialist international division of labour" is available. 
This material, which underlines the "anti-imperialistic" stance of the CMEA- 
cooperation, contains very little economic analyses. Therefore, these writings have been 
virtually omitted.
However, Hungary has a long tradition in critical and realistic writing on intra-CMEA 
affairs. By reading Hungarian economists on international economics one can win an 
insight on how foreign trade and other international deals are managed in the East. 
These Hungarian writings, which are easily available in the English and German 
languages, also provide a good picture on the CMEA international monetary system 
based on transferable rouble.
Thus, extensive use of Hungarian sources has been made. Especially two outstanding 
Hungarian scholars, S. Ausch and L. Csaba, have strongly influenced the present study, 
when the international economic framework of the CMEA region has been described.
Undoubtedly, Hungarian writers have also had clear impact on Western thinking on 
intra-CMEA affairs. Among Western scholars three specialists, M. Kaser, J. van 
Brabant and A. Smith, can be singled out as writers, who have most valuably 
contributed to the understanding of the topic of socialist international economic affairs..
Literature on FDIs across ideological borders is not easily available. Most books which 
cover this topic cover the legislation of JVs in the East. In this sphere the writer has 
relied mainly on his own analysis drawn from the legislative texts of Eastern Europe 
governing FDI-rules.
Case studies and details on JVs operating in the CMEA-area have been taken from 
various articles in newspapers and magazines in the turn of the decade 1980-90. 
Writings on this topic have increased considerably. It has been impossible to analyse all 
of that material.
The consulting firm "Business International" has intensively watched and analysed the 
technology exchange between East and West for a long time having a close link to those 
Western companies which are instrumental for this sphere. The writer of the present 
study has previously been deputy director of the Vienna office of Business International. 
Information compiled by Business International form the core of JV case studies 
represented here.
2The German language business letter "Ostwirtschaftsreport" is published by 
Handelsblatt in Diisseldorf in cooperation with Business- International. Also this 
publication has been an invaluable source of information.
Covering economic reforms in every single CMEA country under review (Romania, 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, the CSSR and the USSR) has been extremely problematic 
for two reasons. Firstly, rapid changes took place in political and in socio-economic 
spheres of these countries during the writing of this study. Thus, continuous up-dating 
became necessary. Secondly, the writer is not able to read all of the East-European 
languages.
Thus, the present analysis relies heavily on papers published by The Vienna Institute of 
Comparative Economic Studies (WIIW) which has the highest possible international 
reputation in covering CMEA economic reforms in a brief, up-to-date and qualitatively 
excellent manner. Without WHW-papers finalising this study in two years would hardly 
have been possible.
Basic data on FDIs in Hungary and in the Soviet Union has been easily available. This 
data has been collected during the first half of 1989, and analysed during the second half 
of the same year. The author is well aware that new JV units were established all the 
time during the period of this analysis. It was, however, impossible to consider the new 
establishments all the time. Data concerning FDIs in the other countries under review 
did not allow an overall analysis of the situation in the manner done in the Hungarian 
and Soviet cases.
These two countries under special consideration, Hungary and the Soviet Union differ 
from each other in many important respects. It is easy to conclude that Hungary is going 
through an important transformation period from a CPE toward a mixed economy. The 
same clear judgement cannot be made in the case of the USSR where different 
perestroika models have been presented. Opinions by some outstanding Soviet scholars, 
like A. Aganbegyan, T. Zaslavskaya and N. Shmelyov have been taken into 
consideration as representatives of radical economic reform. More cautions opinions 
from N. Ryzhkov and I. Ivanov who represent the Soviet executive have also been 
brought up because they are decisive for the immediate future of Soviet perestroika.
In order to characterise the variety of Soviet opinions, it can be mentioned that in a 
meeting for some Finnish businessmen in Moscow, February 11-13, 1990, A. 
Aganbegyan was in favour of the Soviet membership in the IMF, while I. Ivanov 
expressed the opinion that no hasty decision in this matter should be made.
3No intensive research has been done on Eastern FDIs in the West. On this topic only 
some most important points compiled from information easily available have been 
mentioned in order to complement the picture of internationally mobile capital across 
ideological borders. Carefully collected and extensively described material of socialist 
FDIs in the global economy would have endlessly complicated the study.
The author has been actively involved in East-West economic cooperation since he left 
Glasgow University in 1974 as a business consultant first in Vienna and then in 
Helsinki. This first-hand experience on the micro-economic level has certainly 
influenced the writing of this study. However, emphasis has been put on macro- 
economic aspects of Western FDIs in the East underlining especially some features of 
the political economy connected with the topic.
The author is well aware that the present theme contains a possibility to cover a 
magnitude of micro-economic aspects including JV book-keeping, management 
problems, marketing strategies, etc. These topics which are not covered here provide 
exciting opportunities for further research also in the academic sphere.
A note on terminology used is necessary here. "Foreign direct investments" (FDIs) is 
used throughout the study in order to describe the activity in which risk capital from one 
country is directly invested in another. FDIs can take various forms; a foreign investor 
sets up a new wholly-owned company in the host country; a foreign investor can set up 
a joint venture with a local partner; a foreign investor can enact an acquisition of a 
company existing abroad, whereby the take-over can be total or partial; a foreign 
investor enacts a portfolio-investment acquiring a stake of a foreign company without 
the aim of getting actively involved in the management of that economic unit. In this 
study Western participation in Eastern JVs is understood as a FDI. A couple of years 
ago all Western FDIs in the CMEA countries were part ownerships in JVs (with the 
exception of "Polonia"-firms in Poland). Now other forms of FDIs except J V -  
partnerships are also possible, with country differences. Especially important in the 
framework of this study is the distinction between FDIs (including investments in the 
JVs) and financial credits granted by Western banks to CPEs. In sum: all Western 
contributions in JVs in the East are classified as FDIs, but not all Western FDIs in the 
CMEA countries are any more necessarily stakes in JVs.
Two appendices have been included. The first one describes the main feature of decision 
making in foreign trade when state monopoly in this sphere is applied using the model 
applied in the Soviet Union in the pre-perestroika period. The inclusion of this text 
which is compiled by the author for business guide-book purposes, is justified because 
it illustrates in short form the main features of the vertical-administrative system in
4CPEs. It is clear that no spontaneous internationalisation of an enterprise can take place 
under circumstances of.the state monopoly of external economic relations.
r  /
The second appendix is taken from Sandor Ausch’s widely recognized CMEA-book. It 
is entirely impossible to find better evidence on the unsuitability of the CMEA currency 
system for advancing FDIs among CPEs than Ausch's text on the Polish-Hungarian 
joint-stock company "Haldex". This text underlines one of the most important points of 
the study: reasonable monetary and currency environment is required in order to 
advance economically reasonable international operations, FDIs included.
Tauno Juhani Tiusanen
1WESTERN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN EUROPEAN CMEA COUNTRIES IN
THE 1970s AND 1980s
Summary
The purpose of this study is to investigate how Western enterprises can participate in the 
development of centrally planned economies (CPEs) of Eastern Europe by making 
foreign direct investments (FDI). Only those East European countries which are 
members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) are included in this 
study, although other socialist countries, like Yugoslavia and China, also allow FDIs on 
their territories. Cuba, which is a full, non European member of the CMEA, and has 
joint venture rules, is excluded. The disregarding of these three countries mentioned is 
justified, because their inclusion would complicate the study unnecessarily.
By the late 1980s all European members of the CMEA, except the GDR, had created 
regulations for FDIs. Therefore, this study covers the Soviet Union,Romania, Hungary, 
Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia as recipients of Western FDIs.
This study comprises four major chapters. The first deals with international economics 
under socialism as well as foreign trade practices within the socialist system. In this 
context an attempt is made to show that Western FDI is something which is 
fundamentally alien to Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, this first chapter tries to point 
out that modem internationalisation of CPEs is extremely difficult to achieve under the 
conditions of the socialist international economic system. As modem 
internationalisation of CPEs within the CMEA cannot be reached, Western FDIs have 
been invited to develop CPEs, even if socialist ideology is hostile towards international 
capital.
The second main chapter concentrates on problems of East-West trade and cooperation. 
This trade experienced a strong boom in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Also various 
forms of cooperation developed in an exciting way.
However, this development did not integrate the CMEA-countries into the world 
economy as strong competitive members of the global scene. The export structure of
2CPEs in Western trade has remained rather primitive and credit financing of trade 
deficits has grown1 more difficult
Thus, the need in the CPEs to accept the rules of the international economic game has 
increased continuously. They have accepted the Paris convention concerning industrial 
property rights, although this convention is based on capitalist principles. Some of the 
CMEA-members have joined the IMF and World Bank, even if these organizations are 
regarded as imperialistic in traditional socialist thinking. The CMEA and EEC signed a 
political declaration in 1988 ending the long-lasting dispute over whether EEC exists at 
all in the eyes of the socialist countries.
These are all important background factors for the functioning of FDIs in the CMEA- 
area. If the CPEs prove able to make their monetary units convertible with the help of an 
IMF-link, Western FDI activity in the East is likely to experience a considerable boom. 
If the CPEs can lower the impact of Western protectionism, this too will be good for 
FDIs flowing into the CMEA-countries.
The third chapter deals with the FDIs between East and West. This is, in fact a two-way 
road. There are some Eastern investments in the Western industrialised countries and in 
the less developed countries (LDCs). However, the main emphasis is on Western FDIs 
in the six European CMEA-countries mentioned above.
Firstly, this third chapter describes the motives which the Western companies have 
when they make their FDIs in general and why they invest in CPEs.The main actors in 
this scene on the Western side are the multinational corporations (MNC).
The first sub-section of chapter three goes back to the 1920s when the Soviet Union 
pursued the so called "concession" policy, giving business permits to foreign 
companies. Foreign involvement in Soviet development remained rather thin and of 
short duration in the early years of Soviet power.
Thereafter, Western FDIs in various CMEA-countries are described. Rules regulating 
FDIs are commented and details on functioning joint ventures provided. '
The material connected to ihe themes of chapter three is extremely extensive. Therefore, 
some limitations are appropriate. The two countries most successful in attracting FDIs, 
the Soviet Union and Hungary, have been handled in more detail than the CSSR, 
Romania, Bulgaria and Poland.
3FDIs have certain economic and ideological consequences. They are economically 
needed by CPEs, but at the same time, Western FDIs are difficult to reconcile with the 
socialist, anti-imperialist tradition. However, it has become more and more clear, that in 
the 1980s economic need has become more important than ideological purity. These 
topics will be dealt with more comprehensively in chapter four.
During the last months of the 1980s serious changes took place in the political and 
socio-economic spheres of CPEs. It can be assumed that these changes will have a 
basically positive inpact on Western FDIs in the East.
In conclusion the following scenarios are mentioned: If Western FDIs in the CMEA 
region grow rapidly, the result will be neo-colonialisation of socialist countries via 
direct influence of MNCs. This process may lead to neo-stalinistic tendencies in CMEA 
countries with a revival of anti-imperialist feelings. If Western FDIs remain thin, there 
is a danger that the reform process in the CMEA countries will lack economic 
dynamism. In this case it is likely that mass movement of labour from the East to West 
will take place. In the ideal case Western FDIs will be important but not dominant in the 
CMEA countries' national economies exercising indirect influence by forcing the local 
economic units to become fully competitive. Only the last scenario will guarantee 
harmonious transformation of CPEs toward mixed economies. .
41. Socialism and international economics
1.1. Missing theory of international trade
Karl Marx himself never produced a systematic examination of the operation of the 
international economy of his time, since he died before starting the fourth volume of 
"Capital", which was to take up the problem. 1) Fundamental for Marxism-Leninism in 
international economic thinking has been the theory of imperialism by Lenin. The 
essential points of imperialism theory are as follows:
The concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that 
it creates monopolies, which play a decisive role in economic life of capitalism
The merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation, on the basis of 
this "finance capital" of a financial oligarchy
Hie export of capital, as distinguished from the export of commodities, has become 
extremely important
-  The formation of international capitalist monopolies aiming at sharing the world 
among themselves
The territorial division of the whole world among the greatest capitalist powers is 
completed.
On the basis of imperialism theory Lenin concludes that:
The world is divided into two camps: the camp of a handful of civilized nations, 
which possess finance capital and exploit the vast majority of the population on the 
global scale and the camp of the oppressed and exploited peoples in the colonies 
and dependent countries, which constitute that majority
The colonies and the dependent countries, oppressed and exploited by finance 
capital, constitute a vast reserve and very important source of strength for 
imperialism
The revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples in the dependent and colonial 
countries against imperialism is the only road that leads to their emancipation from 
oppression and exploitation
The most important colonial and dependent countries have already taken the path of 
the national liberation movement, which cannot but lead to the crisis of world 
capitalism
5-  The interests of the proletarian movement in the developed countries and those of 
the national liberation movement in the colonies call for the union of these two 
forms of revolutionary movements into a common front against the common 
enemy, imperialism
The victory of the working class in the developed countries and the liberation of the 
oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without the 
formation and consolidation of a common revolutionary front
-  The formation of a common revolutionary front is impossible unless the proletariat 
of the oppressor nations renders direct and determined support to the liberation 
movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of its "own country" 
This support implies the upholding, defence and implementation of the slogan of 
the fight of nations to independent existence as states
Unless this slogan is implemented, the union and collaboration of nations within a 
single world economic system, which is the material basis for the victory of world 
socialism, cannot be brought about
This union can only be voluntary, arising on the basis of mutual confidence and 
fraternal relations among peoples .2)
Obviously, the theory of imperialism contains very little theoretical help on how 
socialist states should conduct their foreign trade.
A socialist theory of international economics could hardly develop in Stalin's era in the 
USSR, as Stalin himself proclaimed the doctrine of "socialism in one country", 
formulated towards the end of 1924 against Trotsky and his idea of "permanent 
revolution". The idea of "permanent revolution", formulated by Trotsky before 1917, 
presupposed that the Russian revolution would pass directly into the socialist phase, but 
that its fate would depend on the inevitable world revolution. As the question of the 
"transformation of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist one" had meanwhile lost its 
application, Stalin presented Trotskyism as signifying that socialism could definitely not 
be built in one country -  thus suggesting to his readers that Trotsky's real desire was to 
restore capitalism in Russia. In proclaiming that the Russian revolution was self- 
sufficient Stalin was less concerned with theory than with countering the demoralization 
produced by the failure of world communism. He wished to assure party members that 
they need not to be troubled as regards the uncertain support of the "world proletariat", 
since their own success did not depend on it; he wanted, in short, to create an 
atmosphere of optimism, without, of course, abandoning the consecrated principle that 
the Russian revolution was the prelude to a world-wide one.3)
6However, even before the Stalin era there were some proposals as to how the economic 
relations between socialist countries should look. N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky 
proposed in their book "ABC of Communism", which was first published in 1921 that 
integration among countries in which the proletariat gains the upper hand should be 
extended beyond pure trade relations into factor integration under the direction of a 
common economic plan:
"We must aim not merely at economic exchange with such countries, 
but if possible must collaborate with them in accordance with a 
common economic plan. Should the proletariat prove victorious in 
Germany we should establish a joint organ which would direct the 
common economic policy of the two Soviet republics. It would decide 
what quantity of products the German proletariat industry should send 
to Soviet Russia -  how many skilled workers should migrate from 
Germany (to the Russian locomotive factories for instance) and what 
quantity of raw materials should be sent from Russia to Germany".4)
The Party Programme of the CPSU adopted at the VIII Party Congress (March 1919) 
called for a single unified plan to co-ordinate activities with other socialist countries, 
stating:
"We must promote a close economic collaboration and a political 
alliance with other peoples, simultaneously striving to establish a 
unified economic plan in conjunction with those among them that 
have already established a Soviet system".5)
The institutions created in the USSR after the October revolution in 1917 aimed at 
breaking with the "exploiting" nations, as the official argument of the period ran. The 
target was to build an independent and efficient economy, self contained and self- 
reviving. One of the most significant commitments to economic isolationism came in 
April 1918 with the establishment of a state monopoly of foreign trade. It was a sort of 
barrier through which the government could make, as a matter of exception, the 
necessary provisions iequired for a controlled exchange of goods with the outside world 
in accordance with the interest of the Soviet State. 6)
The controlled and also limited exchange of goods with other states was underlined 
when revolutions elsewhere failed and "socialism in one country" became official 
dogma in the USSR. The only function of foreign trade was to widen bottlenecks in case 
of shortages in home supply. Export had the main task of helping to finance necessary 
imports. This autarky concept seemed reasonable taking into consideration that the
7USSR with its huge natural resources had a high autarky endowment and had the feeling 
of encirclement of hostile Western powers, which tended towards fundamental crises in 
their social systems. In 1939 the foreign trade of the USSR had declined to a mere 12 % 
of its volume in pre-revolution time (1913).7)
The circumstances of creating a new, socialist theory of foreign trade were, as we have 
seen, not favourable in the pre-war Soviet Union. In addition to that, it is questionable, 
whether a new, unconventional trade theory can be created at all, or whether the 
classical theory based on comparative cost advantages is the only right applicable one. 
This theory, which has been modified, and improved since Ricardo, is now commonly 
called the Hecksell-Ohlin or the Hecksell-Ohlin-Samuelson model. The classical 
theory of international trade was accepted also in the USSR in the 1960's.
Obviously, it was the well-known Soviet economist O. Bogomolov, who invented the 
old theory of comparative cost advantages as a guideline for socialist economic 
integration. 8)
Marx’s theory of value has been of little use in international economics, because of the 
enormously complicated set-up of prices on the world market. For example, G. 
Haberler states, that
"in the international sphere the labour theory of value could not be 
applied, this explains why the theory of comparative costs has stood 
up much better than other parts of the old classical theory". 9)
Also professor A. Nove makes the point that Marx died before writing his piece on 
international economics. Therefore, one must imagine what the communist society 
would look like on the international level:
"presumably there would be some kind of world socialist 
commonwealth, in which all would draw freely from the common 
pool of abundantly available products, though one can read into Marx 
the possibility that he envisaged separate socialist communities 
interrelating in some undefined comradely way. It is difficult enough 
to envisage a medium-sized country being planned as one gigantic 
cooperative workshop. The world is bigger yet! It is possible, 
therefore, that the separate but allied socialist commonwealth of the 
imagination might enter into some sort of exchange."10)
81.2. CMEA and the international division of labour
From the point of view of Western FDIs in the CMEA-region it is essential to know the 
basic features of the Eastern economic bloc. It is a well established fact that one of the 
main motives of MNCs in making FDIs is to avoid trade barriers. For example, many 
exporters have found it profitable to establish production facilities within a tariff wall 
which is hampering their direct export.
There is empirical evidence that MNCs based outside of the EEC have increased their 
FDIs within the Community in order to produce inside the trade barriers. This motive 
has been investigated, for example, among US and Swedish MNCs. 11)
The CMEA is neither a customs union.like the EEC, nor a-free trade area, like EFTA. In 
the former case member countries abolish trade barriers among themselves and agree on 
unified tariffs and unified trade policy towards the rest of the world. In the latter case 
too, tariffs are dismantled among the members, but every member of EFTA is still 
responsible for its own trade policy and protective measures vis-a-vis the outside 
world.
It is extremely difficult to define the nature of the CMEA with traditional means. It 
cannot be a customs union, like the EEC, nor a free trade association, like EFTA, 
because the members do not use tariffs as the main means of protection. One cannot 
speak about "a common market" of CPEs, because the members are non-market 
economies.
The Swedish economist G. Adler-Karlsson states that the CMEA was originally 
devised as a new form of economic cooperation between the socialist states, a form 
which was to do away with all the injustice of the Western imperialist system and with 
the exploitation of the huge Western monopolies. This was the message spread during 
the first decade of the CMEA. 12) This statement, however, tells us very little of the 
actual economic nature and functioning of the CMEA.
According to the Hungarian F. Kozma economic cooperation among socialist countries 
can be described as "the community of interests in industrialization".13) His compatriot, 
B. Csikos-Nagy, who has served in Hungarian economic administration, for a long time 
points out that CMEA-countries relied on two main principles of state planning and 
regulation of the economy: the first one was self-reliance, accepting the fact that East- 
West trade would be marginal; the second was the preference given to planning in
9natural units in the expectation that transition from socialism to communism would 
follow soon abolishing commodity production and monetary economy.14)
At the beginning of the 1960s supranational planning for the CMEA-area was proposed 
by the Soviet Union. According to W. Seifert, who has been involved in CMEA affairs 
when living in the GDR, this proposal of N. Khrushchev caused heated controversy and 
eventually that proposal was rejected. 15) However, a document called the "Basic 
Principles of the International Division of Labour" was signed by the member countries 
(June 7, 1962). This document concludes with the statement that the main integrating 
force should be the co-ordination of economic plans without overlooking the legitimate 
interests of the participating countries. At its end this document states that the 
strengthening of mutual economic ties will promote the realization of an objective 
tendency which was outlined by Lenin: the creation in the future of a world communist 
economy directed by the victorious masses of the proletariat according to one plan.
These "Basic Principles" have obviously been interpreted differently in various 
countries. The USSR thought that the one plan strategy was meant to be applicable more 
or less immediately, whereas some other members of the CMEA -  especially the 
Romanians thought that it was to be carried out sometime in the future. In 1963 the 
Soviet leaders quietly agreed to shelve the one plan integration scheme. 16)
These citations show how difficult it is to define the CMEA in economic terms. It is 
clear that the socialist economic group is neither a free trade area, nor a customs union, 
nor an internationally planned economic unit. "Anti-imperialist community" which 
aims at communism or "interest community for industrialization" are terms which are of 
very little help when a Western economic unit plans to make FDIs inside that economic 
bloc.
It is of utmost importance that Western enterprises are unable to penetrate the entire 
CMEA-market from the one country where the FDI is made in the same manner as they 
are made for example, in the EEC. The difficulties of selling on the other CMEA- 
country markets stem from the inconvertibility of the currencies and shortcomings of 
CMEA trade mechanism. 17)
Thus, these two aspects, the inconvertibility of CMEA currencies, as well as the nature 
of the transferable rouble, the international CMEA-money, and the socialist trading 
system must be investigated. Both of these have a decisive impact on Western FDIs in 
CMEA-countries.
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1.3. State monopoly of foreign trade and bilateralism
In this section the main features of the socialist trading system will be discussed in the 
form they emerge in the traditional CPE-model. The target is to clarify how the socialist 
system functions on the international level.
During the last two decades the foreign trade system has been modified, and thus 
differences between individual CMEA-countries can now be observed.These 
differences will be dealt with in chapter three, when the business environment of joint 
ventures in various CMEA-countries is dealt with.
The Soviet system of foreign trade administration was originally developed to cope with 
the organization of trade between a socialist economy and capitalist economies, rather 
than between CPEs themselves. The principal feature of Soviet administration is that the 
state (through the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Trade) has the exclusive right to 
conduct foreign trade transactions. Individuals and enterprises are therefore prevented 
from directly purchasing or selling commodities in foreign markets.18)
The East European countries also adopted a state monopoly of foreign trade very closely 
modelled on that of the Soviet Union. Domestic enterprises are permitted to deal with 
foreign customers and suppliers only through special foreign trade enterprises. When a 
domestic enterprise produces goods as part of an export plan, the goods are sold to the 
foreign trade enterprise at the prevailing domestic wholesale price. The foreign trade 
enterprise sells the goods to the foreign purchaser and receives payment in foreign 
exchange. This exchange is promptly surrendered to the state bank in return for the 
domestic currency equivalent at the official exchange rate. The loss or gain of the 
foreign trade enterprise on the deal is routinely covered by a payment from or to a Price 
Equalization Fund.19)
This traditional planned system of foreign trade carried out by the state monopoly is 
known for its high inefficiency, because it includes an inability to adapt exports to world 
market conditions and involves difficulties discovering the correct trade specialization 
for the national economy. The separation of producer from seller in the monopoly 
system alienates the export producer from the world market as far as price, quality, after 
sales service, etc. are concerned.
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In addition to the problem of adaptation to world market conditions, there is the problem 
of determining the most efficient structure of production and foreign trade. In the 
traditional centrally planned economy, the decision to export is determined centrally on 
the basis of the availability of goods for export. The arbitrary nature of the domestic 
price system, with its lack of relation to the structure of world market prices, and the 
absence of an economically founded exchange rate make comparisons between 
domestic and foreign costs difficult, if not impossible. Only in the late 1950s were the 
first attempts made to establish criteria for the profitability of exports. Since then a 
multitude of indices of foreign currency return per unit of domestic expenditure have 
been calculated.20)
In the traditional system of planned economy there are two levels of economic 
administration. At the top, the planners determine priorities and issue instructions, 
which are executed by the lower level of managers. The task of preparing detailed plans 
has two main parts. First the planners must elaborate a co-ordinated series of balances 
of sources and uses of products. This is functionally equivalent to constructing an ex 
ante input-output model for the entire economy. 21) This plan must be translated into 
compulsory tasks for the branch ministries and the individual managers. From the 
planner's perspective, foreign trade provides a means by which to obtain input into to 
the production process and goods for final consumption. In the main, exports have no 
utility for the planners other than to create the ability to import. This is in contrast to the 
situation in a market economy, where exports are part of aggregate demand and an 
important element affecting the level of economic activity.22)
-Obviously, supply and demand in the external world are beyond the planners' control, 
and therefore, there is a degree of uncertainty in planning for the external sector. 
Unexpected developments in the rest of the world may disrupt the planned balances. In 
order to minimize uncertainty, the planners may conclude long-term and binding 
agreements with foreign partners. The bilateral way of trading thus seems suitable for 
CPEs.
However, bilateralism is not a discovery of socialist economies. It did not originate from 
the Marxist theory of unequivalent exchange nor from imperialism theory. Bilateralism 
has emerged several times and in various forms in the Western world.
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According to the Hungarian economist Sandor Ausch, there have been three kinds of
bilateralism:
1) The clearing agreements and quota systems which came into being in the wake of 
the 1929-33 world depression had the common characteristic that the only limits 
set in advance were on the value of exports and imports by commodity groups. An 
equilibrium balance was ensured by a system of export and import licences, by the 
application of ever changing restrictions in one area or another, and by the related 
measures of foreign exchange policy. The buyer and seller had thus, as far as the 
individual deal was concerned, a more or less free choice as regards the market of 
purchase or sale, and complete freedom in the question of price. Converted at some 
rate of exchange, the price obtained abroad represented the returns of the seller and 
the outlays of the buyer. The deal could be concluded only if the price that could be 
obtained abroad still left some profit margin for the seller over and above the 
domestic cost, and, in the case of the buyer, if the purchasing price paid abroad still 
enabled the realization of some profit in the domestic selling price (taking into 
account the system of subsidies and import levies, which became common at the 
time). Were the exporter unable to sell his product in the other country at an 
adequate profit, he still had the choice of looking for a more profitable outlet in a 
third or fourth country. In this manner, the domestic currency and the clearing 
currency served also -  if only a limited and imperfect way -  as a measure of the 
international value of domestic goods. The credit balances arising were adjusted, 
though in a limited manner, by means of "balance compensation" and with the 
necessary discounts to fulfil the function of an international means of payment and 
purchase.
2) Another type of bilateral clearing emerged from the war economy primarily 
between Germany and its trading partners, but also between other countries. In the 
case of Germany these clearing agreements were characterized by the fact that they 
constituted a suitable way of exploitation of the satellite countries. Their form and 
pattern was determined by the rules of the war economy (fixed domestic prices, the 
control and allocation of materials, fixed wages, etc.). The quotas not only fixed the 
upper limits of exports and imports, but also represented guaranteed deliveries by 
commodity groups on their inter-state level. The compulsory quotas also contained 
inter-state price agreements fixed in some form. Tying clauses were increasingly 
introduced in respect of both the type and quantity of goods to be delivered, and 
their prices. This clearing system thus represented a further qualitative restriction of 
the functions of the clearing currency as against the earlier type of clearing. In this 
system, the principles of the national and international comparability of values and
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profit maximization on the basis of comparative advantages were replaced by 
government instructions in respect of a considerable part of trade. In the market 
thus distorted, the clearing currency became more or less an accounting unit for 
barter trade, with the existing function of money appearing only in the domains 
where the government did not or could not intervene.
3) Bilateral relations of CPEs were based on direct plan instructions. The limitations 
of money functions which occurred in the bilateral clearings of capitalist countries 
were fully asserted also in the particular type of bilateral clearing that emerged 
between the CPEs operating under direct plan instructions. This follows from the 
fact that in CPEs the economic mechanism involves a complete centralization of the 
government decisions regarding the factors of production. In the CPEs the domestic 
prices are institutionally and completely isolated' from external prices. The 
production units are paid for their exported goods at fixed domestic prices and 
similarly, they must pay the fixed domestic price for imported goods. Thus, the 
system cannot permit the existence of such foreign exchange rates in foreign trade, 
as realistically confronting domestic and foreign prices from the point of view of 
comparative advantages. Consequently, in the mutual trade of two or more CPEs, 
no objective value limits exist (neither from above nor from below) for the prices of 
individual goods entering foreign trade.23)
The sacrifices of efficiency and technological standards, which are unavoidable 
concomitants of the policy of economic development and cooperation aimed at regional 
import substitution and regional autarky, were understood relatively early by some 
economists of the CMEA-countries. However, it was rather commonly thought that the . 
negative effects would be offset by the safe and stable framework given by the CMEA 
cooperation to fast economic development, as against the insecurity and incalculable 
nature of relations with the world economy, because of politics and the cyclical nature 
of the capitalist economy. 24)
From the point of view of the smaller CMEA countries this stability basically meant two 
things: firstly that they could safely build their long-range plans on the knowledge that 
they would be able to satisfy the major part of their needs for raw materials from 
sources within the CMEA and, do this on advantageous conditions known well in 
advance. B. Csikos-Nagy even points out that the question of relative scarcity of raw 
materials was not considered before the 1960s. 25)
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Secondly, the CMEA countries had the advantage that products intended for export by 
their quickly developing manufacturing industries could be disposed safely and in large 
volume on the CMEA market. 26)
Kozma points out that the socialist trading system brought about a peculiar system of 
economic protection which is unique in world history. There was strong protection for 
the maintenance and development of the emerging new industries. This holds true not 
only for the international markets of the participating countries, but on the market of the 
whole community as well. Sufficient protection for "infant industries" could certainly 
not have been provided for through any kind of traditional instruments -  customs duties, 
subsidies etc. -  not through the quota system known in the capitalist world. Much more 
drastic measures were needed: the undertaking of mutual selling and purchasing 
obligations. 27) Especially the last point, purchasing obligations, represent a unique 
feature of the CMEA infant industry protection system.
The more the less developed countries wanted to export machinery and equipment to the 
more developed ones, the sharper became the problems deriving from the poor 
technological base, the substandard quality of the product and neglected after-sales 
services. As formulated in classical terms, the products of the new industries in the less 
developed countries were not competitive on the markets of the more advanced 
countries and their use did not sufficiently raise efficiency in the latter countries on 
either national or enterprise level. It seemed to be worth while to produce the products, 
originally "assigned" to the less developed countries parallelly, because domestic small 
scale production -  uneconomical as such -  was still more favourable than the purchase 
of poor-quality products released by the young, inexperienced industries. At the same 
time, the needs of the nearby industrialized countries to export their manufactured 
products became so pressing that they began to render their raw material and food 
supply commitments increasingly dependent on each other. The phenomenon of 
"linking" matched with unwanted exports began to emerge on a massive scale, a sure 
sign that the harmony of mutual interests was upset. The collision of interest was well 
advanced already in the mid-1960s. 28)
- According to Kozma, initial socialist cooperation, with rapid overall industrial growth 
was based mainly on the advantages of adoption: the newly developed industries copied 
the technological level -  and partly also the production pattern -  of the industries of the 
earlier developed countries, they multiplied them in CMEA dimensions. This 
development made its way into the export structures, particularly in the 1960s. At the
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same time with the overall attraction for industrialization, the demand for imports of raw 
and basic materials increased. 29)
The result of early socialist industrialization and international economic cooperation, 
which are very well presented by Kozma, can hardly be surprising. As all of the 
participating countries followed the same pattern of economic growth with high 
investment shares and a favouring of heavy industry over light industry, and managed 
foreign trade according to the "single-core" model (trading bilaterally mainly with the 
Soviet Union), the emerging of parallel economic structures is not an accident. Neither 
is it surprising that the overall industrialization includes relative scarcity of raw 
materials in the economic region. If, furthermore, all of the participating nations apply 
mainly quantitative aims of the activities of the economy (neglecting quality aspects), 
and at the same time apply strong protective measures in  order to send off outside 
competition, it is self-evident that quality problems arise.
Sandor Ausch points out that most of the raw materials needed for the rapidly growing 
industries could be purchased in the framework of guaranteed supplies. All this 
contributed to reducing the balance of payments deficit, most characteristically 
associated with economic growth in this development stage, thus enabling socialist 
countries to avoid many of the well-known economic and political consequences of 
such deficits. In addition, when deficits happened to occur in the bilateral trade between 
any pair of socialist countries, the Soviet.Union frequently helped to balance them, 
under conditions that were, as a rule, very favourable to the interested countries .30)
Thus, the centralized control and guidance of the economy were introduced to support 
the strategy for fast growth in key sectors all over the region. If percentage growth is the 
objective, value indicators are certainly not very important in guiding decision-making 
when the policy makers have already opted for heavy industry as the core of long term 
economic expansion, and when the huge natural resources of the USSR were 
conveniently available for this growth.
As investments were scattered over a large number of industries, and since in particular 
the exploitation of new sources of raw materials involved and required alarmingly 
increasing capital outlays, bottle-necks began to appear more and more frequently, 
especially in the smaller countries, leading to widespread disruptions. By the late 1950s 
it became perfectly clear that continued autarky policies were applying brakes to further 
economic development in the socialist world. It was the Polish economist M. Kalecki 
who first came to the conclusion that failure to expand foreign trade presents a barrier to
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economic growth just as critical as shortage of capital or labour -  and thus rediscovered 
a well-established doctrine of Western economics. In his opinion the continued high 
rate of growth-creates increasing pressure on the balance of payments, and the import- 
replacement investment is usually less profitable than investment outlays for expanding 
exports.31)
The negative consequences of the trade and growth policies for the more advanced 
socialist partners started become obvious in the early 1960s. The Czechoslovak 
economist Ota Sik states:
"Trends in structure of goods produced and exported did not 
correspond sufficiently to the development of goods demanded on the 
worid market. In particular, the structure of our production was not 
fully directed toward the most effective exploitation of home raw 
materials and toward the importation of raw materials that could 
advantageously be processed. Instead raw materials that could be least 
efficiently used were imported and processed. Therefore, the share of 
labour added to the value of imported raw materials (processed and 
re-exported) was small and even began to show a relative decline. To 
surmount the problems of foreign trade, it is essential to change the 
structure of the national economy and make its development more 
flexible, especially to change the proportion between the share of 
domestic and imported input in the value of exports and to increase 
the effectiveness of foreign trade. Of course, this requires a better 
relationship between domestic production costs and prices on world 
markets. And this, in turn, requires that gains or losses from a specific 
development of foreign trade have direct effect on the income both of 
the production enterprises and the foreign trade enterprises -  instead 
of going directly to the state budget".32)
Beside alienating the Eastern European economies from the world market through the 
structural changes caused by CMEA needs, there was another harmful aspect in bilateral 
trade worth mentioning here. The efforts to balance the yearly trade and the concomitant 
exaggeration of the importance of the year-end trade position manifested themselves in 
the disproportionate volume of deliveries in the last quarter, and even in the last few 
weeks of the year. This strange seasonal character of trade is quite independent of the 
seasonal fluctuations in production or consumption. It is due exclusively to the 
techniques of planning and accounting and is entirely unjustified from an economic 
point of view. Its harmful effect cannot be questioned, since the sudden increase in
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shipping towards the end of the year unavoidably led to an undesirable accumulation of 
stocks and to warehousing shortages, and the stocks thus accumulated were absorbed 
only in later periods of the following year. In the opinion of many CMEA economists, 
notably expressed by the Hungarian, Vajda, these automatic results of efforts at 
obtaining equilibrium could not be eliminated without a fundamental change in the 
system.33)
The administrative system of the state's monopoly of foreign trade, in which the 
producer is separated from the export market and in which the end-user of the import 
items is separated from the buying organization, has certain implications in the business 
culture developing in the countries where this system is applied. Also the bilateral 
trading system within the CMEA influences business behaviour in CPEs. This 
behaviour, in which secured markets are often taken for granted by managers must be 
known by Western MNCs intending to make FDIs in CPEs.
The Hungarian economist Laszlo Csaba points out very well how CMEA inter-relations 
influence the whole business behaviour in CPEs:
"The regional economic integration of the East European planned 
economies, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, is a major 
international organization, exerting determinant influence on the 
development of individual member states. Moreover, this statement 
holds not only in relation to the individual member states and their 
community, but also in the relation of both these entities to the 
international economic system. The impacts of external disturbances 
on the CMEA in the last decade made it clear that irrespective of their 
deliberations, the individual CPEs as well as their regional grouping 
are integral parts of the world economy, and the CMEA does not 
constitute in any way a separate economic "world socialist system" 
functioning according to its inherent rules and regulations (as it used 
to be customarily maintained). However, the structural 
interdependences, the common system of regulating intra-regional 
trade, and the nature and forms of regional division of labour has 
evolved in the last three and a half decades, and add up to what in any 
theory can be called integration. This highly specific integration of 
planned economies is on the one hand the extrapolation of domestic, 
national systems of (mostly directed) planning, and on the other hand 
is itself a factor cementing the former. This means among others that 
the behavioural norms and success indicators of enterprises formed
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under domestic conditions are more or less valid in a substantial part 
of foreign economic activity too. In other words, these conditions of 
macro-economic and business activity are determinant, also when 
CMEA countries enter into economic intercourse with other parts pf 
the world. In this sense it can be formulated th a t: while from the real 
economic point of view the CMEA is a function of the world 
economy, from the systemic point of view it is the other way around, 
i.e. it is the institutional structural and behavioural characteristics of 
intra-CMEA relations that determine to a considerable extent the 
ways and means of the individual member states joining world 
economic interaction". 34)
1.4. The international monetary system of CMEA
Communist society will know nothing of money. Every worker will produce goods for 
the general welfare. He will receive no money and he will pay no money to society 
when he receives whatever he requires from the common store. 35) This is what the 
Marxist utopia says about the future society.
No wonder that in socialist societies no serious attention has been paid to monetary 
matters. However, money has always existed in all CPEs in the national economy, and 
there is also international money in the CMEA. From the point of view of Western FDIs 
in CPEs it is essential to know that all those monetary units are inconvertible. As there 
is a general requirement for all JVs operating in the CMEA-area to be self-sufficient in 
convertible currency matters, it is essentia! to know the monetary environment in which - 
they are operating.
Normally money has three functions: the unit of account, the medium of exchange, and 
the store of value.
The introduction of a unit of account in which to express and compare the values of 
different goods and services was as important for economic life as the invention of the 
wheel was for technology. A common unit of account is the sine qua non of the 
emergence of prices.
Prices are essential both for rational economic calculation and choice by the individual 
and for transmitting economic information between individuals. A common unit of
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account, and prices expressed in such a unit, render comparable goods and services not 
otherwise comparable; and such comparability is evidently necessary if the individuals 
choice is to be rational, in the sense of implying transitive ordering of preferences.
The advantage of having a medium of exchange is that with it barter can be avoided, in 
addition to the clumsiness, inconvenience, and inefficiency it entails. Therefore to 
appreciate the advantages of money as medium of exchange, one must first become 
aware of the disadvantages of barter. First, barter is a much more complicated 
transactions than either buying or selling for money. Second, the use of money reduces 
the number of transaction needed to achieve a given degree of specialization. Trading 
partners who would be satisfied with a single barter can seldom be found, because only 
in the rarest cases would the goods and services one person has to offer match exactly 
the particular goods and services another person wants to obtain. The use of money 
saves time and effort by enabling people to sell to one person and buy from another, or 
to sell in one place and buy in another; and the wider the acceptability of money as a 
means of payment, the greater the saving. In short, money makes multilateral trade 
possible. Third, the use of money as a medium of exchange increases the number of 
similar transactions and so enhances competition and the similarity of terms of contract.
While money as a medium of exchange enables a person to buy elsewhere than where 
he sells, or from someone else than to whom he sells, its store-of-value function 
enables him to buy later than he sells. Most people want to delay consuming at least part 
of their earnings; and once consumption is postponed, there are many reasons for also 
postponing the buying of the goods to be consumed. The greater cost and inconvenience 
of storing goods instead of money, the deterioration and obsolescence of goods stored, 
the advantage in an uncertain world of storing general purchasing power instead of 
specific commodities, and the desire to wait and be prepared for later opportunities of 
making a good buy, are some reasons. Money, however, is not the only store of value; 
most financial assets and some real assets as well serve the same function.36)
In spite of the obvious advantages of money in economy, there has been utopian 
thinking in socialism about the abolishment of money. During the so called "War 
communism" when inflation was shaking confidence in money, some theorists thought 
this wass a sign of the withering away of money.37) However, money has normally 
always existed under socialist circumstances.
The Central planning of a socialist economy is traditionally done in physical rather than 
in value terms. Tasks are assigned to managers in physical terms. In practice, however,
20
it has been found convenient to use money for various purposes in CPEs. First, direct 
distribution of consumer goods from producers to individuals is an inefficient means of 
satisfying consumer demand. Thus, money is traditionally issued in the form of wages, 
pensions, etc., and is used by the recipients to purchase consumer goods and services. 
The volume of goods and services made available, however, is not determined by the 
level of effective demand but by an exogenous decision of planners.
Quite distinct from this wage-consumer goods sphere of monetary circulation is the use 
of money by the productive sector. In this sector, money serves as a means of keeping 
accounts, the need for which stems from the lack of detailed information available to the 
planners and their inability to process information coming from the production units in 
the necessary detail. If the manager keeps monetary accounts of his enterprise's 
activities, the planners can perform simple control on the internal functioning of the 
enterprise.3 8)
All foreign exchange is held by the planners who use it to purchase necessary imports, 
which are then allocated domestically either to the production sector or to consumption. 
The consumer who holds money may convert this money into those commodities 
released by planners, but not into foreign exchange or into goods that are allocated only 
to the production sector. An enterprise manager holds accounting money in the name of 
his enterprise. However, since all goods in the production sector have already been 
allocated by the plan, he has no freedom to spend this money. This money simply 
moves from one account to another in response to the planned movement of goods 
within the production sphere.39)
The different form of ownership of means of production and the controlled foreign trade 
system alone cannot explain the different measures of values in various social systems. 
The difference is mainly due to the isolation of the monetary system of the CMEA- 
countries from the rest of the world.
Also in the market economies there are certain price biases caused by subsidies or other 
factors. However, there is always a tendency to evening out country-differences, and 
the flexible exchange rate rule eliminates inflation rate discrepancies in the medium 
term.
• The monetary limits of CPEs normally have systemic features which isolate them from 
the currency development of the outside world. Internal prices often have considerable 
subsidies or surcharges. Input products are priced relatively low, whereas consumer
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goods are priced relatively high. The rather inflexible exchange rate policy emphasizes 
the isolation of the internal price level from that of the world market. However, the 
economic reforms have at least had a tendency to decrease the level of price differences. 
40) In spite of that, all socialist national monetary units are still inconvertible.
A major distinction between the functioning of money in a CPE and its function in a 
market economy is that, in the former, money is frequently described as being 
"passive". In this sense the possession of money alone does not enable the owner to 
acquire resources or goods and services which are allocated by plan instructions. Money 
is thus only a unit of account since predetermined resource flows are followed by money 
flows. If money in that sense is passive, one can say that money is inconvertible even in 
the internal economy. 41)
In socialist international economies the role of money has been discussed for a long 
time. The history of socialist international money is highly interesting.
The settling of accounts in the bilateral clearing manner was globally relatively usual in 
the 1940s and 1950s, but gradually this system was abolished more and more especially 
among market economies. Also among the CPEs already by the mid 1950s views were 
expressed that bilateral balancing unnecessarily restricted trade and economic 
cooperation. These views were based on the fact that the process of negotiating 
compensatory agreements was awkward, time consuming and complicated.
Therefore, it is only natural that in the CMEA region calls for a more rational 
multilateral settlements system appeared. This topic was on the agenda on the 7th 
CMEA session in Berlin, May 1956. One year after that, during the 8th session in 
Warsav/, June 1957, a preliminary recommendation for an agreement was adopted and 
signed bv all eight members of the CMEA.42)
According to this document, bilateral balancing was to remain the basic clearing 
principle in regional trade, but multilateral clearing was permitted marginally. Each 
central bank of the CMEA-countries opened special, interest-free rouble-accounts with 
the newly created clearing house, which was a special department of the Soviet state 
bank (Gosbank), and since 1961 the Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtorgbank). Actual 
multilateral settlements had in principal to be balanced within a year, and the clearing 
house prevented any partner from accumulating debts. Actual trade transactions were to 
be agreed ex ante.43)
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This new multilateral arrangement was only meant for trade peaks, and it was stipulated 
that any member could, on balance owe to the clearing house 3 per cent of the planned 
value of its regional exports. Interest was to be charged if credits exceeded the stipulated 
ceiling. 44)
Obviously the multilateral trade possibility was little used and mainly for selling the 
"softest" commodities -  unsaleable at the world price in normal bilateral trade. The 
1957 agreement stipulated that the final balances were to be settled in "hard goods", 
gold, or convertible currency. Actually, gold or convertible currency has never been 
used for this purpose.45)
The idea of improving the international currency system remained alive in the early 
1960s. The reshaping of the 1957 agreement was on the agenda of the 17th CMEA 
council session in 1962, during which the Standing Commission for Currency and 
Finance (SCCF) was set up with the task of elaborating details for a new multilateral 
clearing system and establishment of a new clearing centre. This standing commission 
was instrumental in the development following. Proposals of the SCCF were examined 
during the 18th Council session in 1963 and a final agreement was signed after the 9th 
executive committee meeting in October 1963 by all CMEA-members.46)
According to the 1963 agreement a new bank -  The International Bank of Economic 
Cooperation (IBEC, or in its Russian initials, MBES) was established and started 
operations in January 1964. At the same time, a new monetary unit, the transferable 
rouble (TR) was created.
The TR is not an actual currency, but merely a collective accounting unit used in intra- 
CMEA foreign trade books. Bilateral trade agreements are denominated in TR, and 
surpluses or deficits, also expressed in TR, between the banks of the CMEA countries 
are settled through IBEC.
The idea of the TR was to allow a country with a positive balance in bilateral trade at 
the en of the year to use its surplus to buy goods outside the bilateral agreement, either 
from the deficit partner or from other CMEA member countries. Therefore, the 
accounting unit is called "transferable" to replace bilateral balancing as the surplus 
country can transfer this claim from one member country to another.
A gold parity of 0.987412 grams of pure gold was nominated for the TR. This gold 
parity is the same as for the Soviet rouble. However, no gold backing has been created
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for the TR, and therefore gold parity is purely nominal: a claim shaped in TR is thus 
actually inconvertible in gold.
IBEC's capital was set at 300 million TR to be paid up; according to quotas in TR, in 
convertible currencies or gold. Each member country's share in the statutory capital was 
determined according to its participation in intra-CMEA trade in 1958-62. 47)
To provide medium and long-term financing for investments of common interest, the 
International Investment Bank (IIB) was established in 1971 with headquarters in 
Moscow. The present membership includes all the CMEA-countries (including 
Vietnam). The basic capital of TR 1 billion was allocated according to each country's 
export volume in mutual trade turnover, with 70 % to be contributed in transferable 
roubles and 30 % in gold and convertible currencies. If mbre convertible currencies are 
needed for approved credits, the IIB has authority to float bonds in the international 
capital markets.
The IIB's purpose is to promote economic cooperation among CMEA-countries. 
Crucial in the financing of a project is the mutual interest of all members in the project. 
IIB board approvals must have a 75 % majority, and each member country has a vote 
regardless of its contribution quota. 48)
Interest charges on TR loans were originally from 4-6  % p.a. and since 1974 3-5 %. 
Interest rates on credits in convertible currencies fluctuate according to the international 
money markets.
IIB's credits are intended for intensifying specialization and cooperation within the bloc, 
with the ultimate goal of achieving top quality products that will be competitive in 
world markets. This is clear from the criteria by which applications for IIB credit are to 
be measured: the technological level of the project; indications that it will reach 
optimum production and be amortized within the optimum period; the output must 
match world standards and be produced profitably at levels corresponding with world 
prices.
In January 1974, the IIB established a TR 1 billion fund (of which TR 100 million was 
initially paid in) to finance projects in developing countries. Loans from this fund are to 
be mainly in transferable roubles, with up to 5 % in convertible currencies if the 
CMEA-countries are unable to supply all deliveries. 49) However, it does not seem 
likely that developing countries will make significant use of the IIB special fund. The
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fact that the transferable rouble cannot in practice be used anywhere outside the bloc, 
narrowly limits the usefulness of the fund, because the members do not offer goods of 
high standard for this currency. The individual CMEA countries will therefore continue 
to seek bilateral accords with developing countries to cover their own need for primary 
products, and in this they will continue to compete with one another in prices and 
payment terms.
In April 1974, Yugoslavia signed an agreement with the IIB under which it can share in 
the financing of CMEA-projects in which it is interested; it is also eligible to receive 
credits from the IIB for CMEA-approved projects within Yugoslavia. 50)
The creation of the TR and IBEC was in technical terms significant, because it finished 
the period of bilateral settlements and transferred all transactions between any two 
CMEA-countries to IBEC, where each member country has one account. This bank, as 
an intermediary, will effect the multilateral clearing automatically for all regional 
payments. Any net claim in any bilateral relation is, in principle, "transferable” for 
purchases from a third country within the region. 51)
The monetary system based on the TR was linked with hopes for a considerable increase 
in the multilateralization of trade in the CMEA-area. However, very soon it became ' 
obvious that the technical improvements included in the 1963 agreement could not bring 
about considerable changes in trade and payments, unless other aspects concerning 
international economy were reorganized.
It is no accident that the Hungarians have become the most outstanding critical 
observers of the TR system. Their economy has the lowest endowment permitting 
autarky in the whole region, and not surprisingly, their economy has felt the limits of 
"extensive" growth early on. Therefore, an important precondition for continued growth 
in Hungary is to make the best possible use of the available resources and become 
competitive in foreign trade.
Ausch wrote in the early 1970s his highly critical comments on the TR system. In his 
view the introduction of the transferable rouble has not changed the bilateral character 
of intra-CMEA trade, and the member countries continue to strive at strictly balanced 
bilateral trade with each of their partners and for every calender year. The TR cannot be 
converted into any currency outside the CMEA clearing system. In other words, the 
foreign trade aspect of the situation is that if a net creditor CMEA country wants to use 
its balance outside the CMEA -  because the goods available in the countries of the
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region fail to meet the requirements of the creditors in respect of quantity, product 
range, quality, price, etc. -  it has no possibility to do so. Thus, the TR, as a financial 
institution taken in itself, has not in the least modified the existing degree of regional 
autarky and protectionism. Should any non-CMEA country have gold or dollars for its 
claims expressed in TR, and if the central banks of the CMEA countries could ask for a 
similar settlement of their positive balances arising within the CMEA clearing system, 
the TR would become suitable for two-way operation within and outside the CMEA, 
and this could put an end to the endeavours at balancing out every country's annual trade 
with each of the others. Should we try to establish links in this way, argues Ausch, this 
would require a continuous feeding of large amounts of gold or convertible currency 
into the CMEA's multilateral system. 52)
As far as the monetary role of the TR as a measure of value is concerned, Ausch is also 
highly critical. In the socialist planned economies operating under direct plan 
instructions, the domestic prices are institutionally and completely isolated from 
external prices. The producing units are paid for their exported goods at fixed domestic 
prices and similarly, they must pay the fixed domestic price for imported goods. 
Therefore, the price situation does not, and cannot, permit the existence of such foreign 
exchange rates as could act selectively on foreign trade, by realistically confronting 
domestic and foreign prices from the point of view of comparative advantage. In the 
mutual trade of two or more countries with the same, planned economic mechanism, no 
objective value limits exist for the prices of individual goods entering foreign trade. 
These prices become independent of both the international value relations and the 
proportions of supply and demand; what is more, their individual deviation from 
international value, though being necessary, is distributed at random. Thus, differences 
as regards the price a country obtains for an identical product on its various clearing 
markets have never anywhere been, as wide as in the mutual trade between CMEA- 
countries. Furthermore, the prices of raw materials and agricultural products are not as 
far above their capitalist world market prices as those of either machinery or of other 
finished goods, despite the fact that the former are in short supply at the agreed price in 
the CMEA-market, and there is a surplus of the latter. Price ratios within the main 
commodity groups are not in harmony with supply-demand relations. Because price 
distortions prevail, multilateral trade and convertible currency cannot be introduced. 53)
According to Ausch, an accounting unit like the TR, which is thus unable to fulfil the 
function of universal equivalent must, obviously, also be unsuited to serve as a general 
means of international purchase, payment, credit or hoarding. This is why an economic 
mechanism based on direct plan instructions must replace genuine foreign trade
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transactions with obligatory quotas instructing each enterprise as to what, where and 
when they have to sell or buy abroad, in other words, by an administrative management 
of trade. In these transactions money can thus fulfil its function only in a formal sense. 
•Therefore, as long as no qualitative changes come about in the basic conditions of its 
functioning, this money cannot be made either transferable or convertible.. Practice 
proves every day, that the TR does not constitute a general equivalent, nor a vehicle of 
credit. It is nothing except a measure of a mass of use values of a definite pattern. It is 
definitely not a means of hoarding or accumulating wealth (the IBEC could not 
purchase anything for all its "capital"). And when money is not money and wealth is not 
wealth, also the rate of interest is only a formality, unable to fulfil its proper function. 
54)
According to Ausch, it is evident that "money", which cannot be termed real money, 
cannot be lent out either; more exactly, it cannot be lent out as real money, i.e. 
something that is a commodity in itself, without being expressed in terms of use-value. 
The accounting and credit system now enforced between the CMEA-countries is built 
on the assumption that their mutual money and credit transactions develop automatically 
in accordance with, or rather, as a consequence of the fulfilment of their mutual foreign 
trade plans. Short and medium-term credits are not "granted" by the credit countries; 
they come about almost automatically as a result of the position of the bilateral trade 
balances, i.e., of the fact that the debtors are not able to pay. No country is interested in 
accumulating claims against its clearing partner. 55)
As there is no international money capable of fulfilling money functions, the rate of 
interest, the "price" of borrowing capital, can play only a subordinate, inactive role. 
Interest to be paid to foreign countries is the concern of the central authority in charge of 
foreign exchange control only. The "interest" mutually paid by CMEA countries on 
"credits" for imbalances of bilateral trade are isolated from the profits of economic units 
as foreign market prices are indifferent to them. Interest is the concern of the central 
bodies only: interest is only an extra income or liability for the Ministry of Finance, and 
is paid to or received from each partner country in the form of commodity deliveries of 
a definite pattern. Within these deliveries, the share of various "hard" and "soft" 
commodities is a result of mutual bargaining. It follows that the rate of interest in itself 
cannot have sufficiently stimulating effects, even if it were substantially raised. 56)
Ausch comes to the conclusion that the "multilateral" clearing system of TR has only 
formally satisfied the requirements of multilateralism. So called multilateral negotiations 
have still been taking place comprising not even 1 % of total trade, concerning the
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"softest'* goods. At the same time, even greater bureaucratic difficulties than before have 
emerged. 57)
Ausch thereafter stipulates the preconditions which are necessary for truly effective 
multilateralism. Firstly, the rate of exchange must establish an unequivocal correlation 
between internal and external prices, in the sense that external prices shall directly 
influence the earnings of enterprises producing for export or using imported goods. All 
the market conditions must be regarded, and thus differences between "hard" and "soft" 
goods must disappear. Secondly, within the limits of government regulations, the 
economic units shall have free choice in respect of a sufficiently wide range of 
commodities to effect their sales and purchases, according to the given market situation 
either at home or in any CMEA country, and be given reasonable freedom in choosing 
the point of time for the transaction as well as in negotiating its terms. The trade quota 
system must be gradually liberalized, and market-oriented prices introduced. After that 
the IBEC crediting activity should be extended and realistic interest rates established. 
58)
Ausch is well aware that his proposal of qualitative transformation, with the abolition of 
the system of direct instructions, must lead to severe structural tensions involving social 
problems (e.g. periodic unemployment). However, he maintains that the strategy 
described by him is a sine qua non condition of multilateralism and convertibility. He 
speaks about a system of "planned and regulated market economy" which is not the 
same as departing from socialist principles in the society.
Kalman Pecsi, another outstanding Hungarian specialist in CMEA-currency matters, 
writes about ten years after Ausch very much in the same manner. Although some 
changes in IBEC policy have taken place in the 1970s, e.g. the interest rates have been 
slightly increased and the IIB has provided long-term credits for some big integration 
projects, the basic set-up of the TR system has remained unchanged. 59)
According to Pecsi, the national economies engaged in CMEA economic cooperation 
are usually characterized by central planning, administrative directives, and control and 
finance of production of the extensive development of the economies. Trade's stagnant 
growth rates in real terms, its lag behind the growth of production, its relatively 
unchanged pattern, will be reflected in difficulties of transition to intensive development 
of the economies and of international specialization. There will also be continuing 
shortages of modem, quality products and a surplus of obsolete, low-quality products 
on the socialist market for machinery. The prevailing international economic model
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does not require the co-ordination of investment plans, and thus, international 
specialization lags behind the development of planning in the national economies. This 
strategy continues to be embodied in the excessively detailed stipulations of deliveries 
by a centrally determined quota system that in some cases disregards quality 
requirements. 60)
There seems to emerge something near to a consensus that multilateralism in planning, 
in trade -  and consequently in accounting -  is mostly formal; in practice, bilateralism 
prevails, and has even been strengthened by the existence of a general shortage of "hard 
goods", and of a parallel over-supply of "soft goods". All this implies a growing 
"naturalization" i.e. "demonetarization" of trade with increasing specification in physical 
forms, bilateral dealing and tying together the trade of specific products. 61)
This also means that -  since the TR reflects trade flows predetermined up to 90% in 
physical units -  the common currency strictly follows the movement of commodities, 
which precludes it from being a separate, anonymous presentation of value. This is 
called the lack of money function for the TR. When Csaba represents this remarkable 
criticism of the TR, he quotes two Czechoslovak economists Ondracek and Chvojka. 
62)
During the co-ordination of plans there is bargaining among national monopolies. 
Consequently they are indifferent to individual costs and benefits and are sensitive only 
to aggregate cost and benefits. From this it inevitably follows that individual processes 
cannot influence production structures. So prices become merely an accounting device 
and play no part in automatic microeconomic adjustment. The spontaneity of the market 
is replaced by miscalculation in planning. 63)
Although there is bargaining among national monopolies, the basis for price-setting in 
intra CMEA trade has always been "borrowed" from the world market. Before the first 
oil crisis CMEA-prices were fixed for the entire 5-year planning period whereby the 
basis was taken from the world market average for the previous 5 years. The new 
method of sliding prices means a yearly revision of values.
According to Csaba, the new pricing system was expected to create an incentive to 
flexibility and to transmit the requirements of the world market by decreasing the 
differences between intra- and extra-CMEA prices. These expectations, however, have 
not been realised. For several reasons the new pricing formula, in fact, had no effect on 
enterprise activity. The main reason is that each CMEA country had to use budgetary
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and other measures to offset the impact on enterprise costs and prices of the changes in 
CMEA contract prices; thus the new formula has led only to a redistribution of national 
incomes through changes in terms of trade. 64)
The annual pricing procedure has in fact introduced an alien body into the whole system 
of economic cooperation within the CMEA, as it comes into conflict with the kind of 
planning practised in member-states -  which requires stability in general and stability 
of prices in particular. Current national economic planning procedures do require 
stability of prices for the period set by the planning horizon. Annually changing prices 
make it practically impossible to evaluate the effect of national participation in a long 
term special purpose program or in a joint investment. Annual pricing also involves an 
enormous extra burden for the financial and foreign trade apparatus without being offset 
by any direct and positive microeconomic advantage. 65)
At the same time, there is one more serious problem in applying international prices in 
the CMEA: as they are external for the region, they don't reflect scarcities in the internal 
market. Considerable differences in cost structure make the "borrowing" of a price 
model highly irrational. 66)
There has always been a remarkable inflexibility in exchange rates in the CMEA. 
Obviously, the consistency of planning requires stability of currency exchange rates. 
However, the lack of flexibility of exchange rates has created a situation, in which the 
exchange rates deviate so strongly from economic realities that official exchange rates 
as such can hardly be applied any more for practically any purposes. Therefore, a whole 
series of coefficients are used for various purpose leading to a complicated and. in many 
senses irrational practice.
Under present circumstances it seems to be absolutely necessary to take some kind of 
guidance from world market values, although it is said to be suboptimal (Csikos-Nagy). 
Otherwise, there would be no economic objectivity at all in intra-CMEA valuations.
When the monetary system of the Transferable Rouble was created, there was a clear 
intention to get non-members of the CMEA involved in the system. This intention is 
mentioned in the introductory paragraph of IBEC statues and in 111/10 of the same 
paper. 67)
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This intention was clarified in the Comprehensive Program of Economic Integration 
signed by the CMEA-members in the Council meeting of July, 1971. Point 7/5 of the 
Complex Program stipulates:
"The collective currency (TR) can in the long run according to its 
strengthened role in payment transactions be used with third countries 
(non-members), whereby it can occupy among other international 
means of payment a position, which corresponds to the role and 
importance of CMEA-member countries in the world economy".
This general statement is supplemented with point 7/12:
"The expansion of the application area of the collective currency (TR) 
with non-members of CMEA must be carried out, not only by the 
measures defined in this Complex Program but' also through active 
measures by foreign trade and banking organizations aiming at 
involvement of third countries, first of all socialist and developing 
countries, in order to get them participating in payments effected in 
the collective currency (TR)".
The 43rd IBEC council session held in October 1976 offered non-members the option 
of employing its unit of account, the TR, in settlements with members. This was stated 
in a document entitled "Procedures for Undertaking Settlements in TR between member 
countries and non-member countries of IBEC". At the same time, outside depositors of 
TR were offered interest rates slightly over the level offered for Bank members. 68)
Obviously, no non-IBEC member has ever joined the TR payment system in any form. 
According to Csaba
"under present regulation not only does an outside holder of TR assets 
face the same problems as an intra-CMEA holder but he would even 
be disadvantaged by joining the multilateral payment system. A non­
member of IBEC is indeed in a better position from the point of view 
of the liquidity of his assets if there is a bilateral clearing agreement 
than if he joins the multilateral clearing system where no one can be 
made directly responsible for the liquidation of claims or assets". 69)
The TR monetary system with all its shortcomings has certain implications for Western 
FDIs in the CMEA-area. Firstly, it is clear, that the local partners of a JV and economic 
policy makers of the host country are unwilling to promote JV product exports to the TR 
area, if payment is to be made in this monetary unit. Secondly, input items which are
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available in, e.g. Bulgaria, and could be used in a JV, e.g. in Hungary, are not self- 
evidently available on intra-CMEA terms, because the Bulgarians probably have no 
incentive to deliver against TR payment. Thirdly, the TR-system, which has been 
established for old-fashioned commodity flows defined in physical units, is hampering 
factor mobility within the CMEA.
The iast point is favourable for Western FDIs in the CMEA-region in so far, as intra- 
CMEA JVs are extremely difficult to establish and run under the monetary 
circumstances governed by the TR system. Competing ventures which involve two or 
more socialist countries are highly unlikely to emerge in any large scale. The CMEA 
financial system is an obvious obstacle for intra-CMEA FDIs.
1.5. Technology exchange and International investments in the intra CMEA- 
sphere
The integration process of European CPEs has been a complex one. Various 
organizations have been set up, specialization programmes stipulated and joint 
investments carried out. JVs in which CMEA-partners share the equity ownership, are 
extremely rare.
The transition period of Eastern Europe after World War Two has normally been 
described by Western observers as an era of Soviet domination based on coercion and 
exploitation. Soviet domination of the new communist states meant a political- 
economic system modelled almost exactly on its own. Soviet policy, which strived to 
gain a complete control over Eastern Europe, completely ignored the historical and 
cultural disparities that divided the countries of the region. In the area of economics the 
communist regimes introduced programmes focussing on high investment and the 
development of heavy industry at the expense of the other sectors of the economy. 
Foreign trade was reoriented towards the USSR on terms generally very unfavourable to 
the East European countries. 70)
Because of the small size of East European countries, except that of the USSR, foreign 
trade is very important to these countries. Despite their considerable participation in 
foreign trade in the pre-war period, the development strategy adopted by these countries 
in the 1940s and early 1950s was essentially autarkic.
Autarky is, however, not necessarily synonymous with complete severance of all 
foreign contacts, although at one time a narrowly defined economic self-sufficiency
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was certainly the prime concern in the socialist concept of best allocation of resources. 
This economic concept means, in fact, that the crucial task of economic policy is the 
creation of a well balanced, diversified industrial economy, which is relatively 
independent of fluctuations abroad. The strategy adopted by the Soviet policy makers in 
the 1930s has for a long time been the accepted example of how to achieve that goal. It 
was transplanted into Eastern Europe because it suited immediate Soviet interests and 
also because the chief mentor of economic policy in post-war Eastern Europe could not 
quickly adapt its own experiences and interests to conditions that differ substantially 
from those in the,USSR. 71)
The original purpose of the CMEA, as spelled out in the communique of its founding 
conference in 1949, was to facilitate the mutual exchange of economic experience, 
technical assistance, and material aid in the form of raw materials, machinery and 
equipment. 72) Given the prevailing cold-war climate, the primary goal in the CMEA's 
early years was to maximize the economic autarky of the bloc through the development 
of indigenous natural resources and the rapid building of industrial capacity, particularly 
in heavy industries.
While intra-bloc trade developed rapidly in the post-war period, this primarily bilateral 
trade between each East European country and the USSR, essentially involved Soviet 
deliveries of raw materials and fuels in exchange for machinery and other manufactured 
goods. This "radial" pattern of integration, centred on Moscow, created an economic 
dependence on the USSR, supplementing the political ties between Communist parties 
and the military alliance embodied in 1955 in the Warsaw Pact.
The CMEA as such played little part in the post-war growth of bilateral trade between 
its member countries. The organization was virtually dormant until the latter 1950s, 
when the creation of the EEC sparked a fresh look at integration possibilities within the 
CMEA. Thus the first 12 Permanent Commissions were created in 1956 and a Charter 
was finally drawn up in 1959 (ratified in 1960) proclaiming the member countries 
determination to work towards an "international socialist division of labour".
The Eastern literature emphasized the new character of the international economic links 
between the socialist countries, free of exploitation, oppression and national 
antagonisms. 73)
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It is not surprising that rules in intra-socialist technology transfer were proposed just 
after the creation of CMEA. The first rules were prepared at the II CMEA Council 
meeting in Sofia, August 1949.
The main points of the "Sofia agreement" of 1949 are:
-  Exchange and delivery of technical documents
-  Exchange of information and licences
-  Mutual exchange of specialists, scientists and skilled workers in the sphere of 
transfer of know-how, training in production and technical assistance
-  Exchange of scientific personnel in the sphere of certain technical problems as well 
as in cases of tests and experiments
-  Education of technical and scientific personnel in universities
-  Organization of scientific-technical conferences for member-countries. 74)
This "Sofia agreement" has been seen as a direct opposite of the "capitalist" Paris 
convention. According to the spirit of the Sofia Treaty, immaterial values are the 
common property of the signatories, and can and should be transferred without payment 
from one country to another.
There is clear evidence that at the beginning of CMEA-activity technical documents, 
results of scientific work and know-how actually were transferred gratis from one 
member country to another. Only the translation costs were to be covered by the 
receiving country. 75)
Pure grants of licences were, however, limited to such results of intellectual work, 
which were already available. In case of new developments the full value of documents 
was charged. 76) However, the spirit of Sofia was obviously functioning in the 1950s 
helping the development of less advanced CMEA-countries. It has been estimated that 
Soviet aid alone given in this form to CMEA-members was some 9-10 billion roubles 
up to 1960. 77)
The period after the signing of the Sofia agreement with free supply of invention is in 
many senses extremely interesting and obviously unique in its economic consequences. 
The handing out of technical documents without payment was namely important 
contribution to formation of parallel economic structure in the CMEA region. It was 
agreed that the receiving country of licences had to limit the sales of licensed products 
to its home market. 78) This clause contributed to the emergence of inefficient small- 
scale production in the documents receiving countries. 79)
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In the light of experience changes to rules were made in the 62nd meeting of the 
executive committee of the CMEA. In the amendment it was stipulated that if the 
documents were received without payment, licensed products could only be used in the 
home market, but export was not prohibited if it was agreed upon by a supplementary 
protocol signed by partners. 80) The Complex Program of the CMEA (1971) stipulates 
that the exchange of scientific-technical documents takes place by agreement between 
the parties interested. Thereby the results of scientific-technical research can be 
exchanged, depending on their level and value, either with or without payment, 
depending on the achieved result in negotiations, whereby the national interests of every 
country involved, as well as the common interests of all member countries must be 
taken into consideration. 81)
Alongside with exchange of intangible assets joint investment projects have been 
carried out in the CMEA region. Csaba speaks of two separate "investment waves".
According to Csaba 82), the first wave of joint investments took place in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s when a great number of investment credit agreements were signed. The 
CSSR, and to a smaller extent, the GDR, were particularly active in this field: beside the 
Soviet Union they granted investment contributions to Poland and Bulgaria, in exchange 
for a long-term stable supply of various kinds of raw materials. Joint effort created such 
exemplary projects as the "Druzhba" pipeline and "Mir" electric grid. In the absence of 
convertible currency it was impossible to calculate the efficiency of joint investments in 
a reliable manner. In 1963 a methodology was introduced which prescribed a way in 
which inconvertible national currencies could be reduced to a common denominator. 
This could only be done in a most complicated manner, through a plethora of 
calculations, since each cost item had to be separately calculated. At this stage it 
became evident that this form of cooperation was in fact a substitute for the market 
clearing function of the price mechanism, and that the final distribution of gains in a 
given deal was much more a function of random factors than in the case of a market 
bargain. 83)
From 1975 huge multilaterally co-ordinated joint projects enjoying political priority 
were undertaken in the framework of the so called Concerted Plan, which received 
preferential treatment in national planning too. During this "second wave" of joint 
investments two approaches came together. On the one hand, the discrepancy between 
nominal CMEA and Western market prices for raw materials and especially fuels 
reached unprecedented magnitudes, which led a number of economists and decision
35
makers to the somewhat perfunctory and hasty conclusions that exporters of the above 
commodities incurred significant losses and/or opportunity costs. On the other hand, the 
impact of the oil shock brought supply security considerations to the fore in the East 
European countries, who favoured long-term agreements as a guarantee of a planned 
way of meeting these strategic needs. This overlap of interests produced the Concerted 
Plan, which differed from standard CMEA practice since a final state-level compulsory 
obligation was undertaken in a multilateral form, and furthermore a finalised agreement 
was signed prior to clarifying technical and financial issues in detail. 84)
According to Csaba there was a temporary spread of approaches advocating in principle 
a massive international flow of capital among CMEA countries. This boiled down in 
fact to an apology for a very specific form of capital flow under physical planning, 
namely investment contribution. In this context there was nothing wrong if, in an area 
with such high political priority as securing energy and raw material supplies penny- 
wise calculations played a tertiary role. The aim of securing supply and maintaining 
dynamism of growth took precedence over adjustment to the world economy. 85)
In the opinion of Csaba the investment contribution in fact constitutes an additional 
price rise for the fuels and raw materials. It can be substantiated by practical evidence 
that investment contributions "are not a theoretically new integration form, a socialist 
version of capital exports, but exclusively a substitute for a sharp rise in prices, under 
the present conditions of the CMEA non-monetary relations". In other words they have 
nothing to do with the peculiarities of the raw materials and energy sector, as they 
spring from the underdevelopment of the regional monetary system. Investment credits 
are granted in the fuel sector because the shortage in this commodity group is most 
keenly felt by the system of physical balances, playing a central role in macro- 
economic planning. Other shortages, for instance in agriculture and foodstuffs, can be 
equally acute, without evoking any reaction by planners. This is partly due to 
industrialization priorities, and partly to the different nature of the two fields from point 
of view of "Planability". Production of basic items can in theory be co-ordinated by a 
system of physical balances, but this is a far cry from balancing supply and demand on 
the consumer market. In the meantime this equilibrium can be achieved in the less 
assortment-sensitive raw material and intermediate product sector. 86) In the context of 
joint CMEA-investments it is important to notice that in both investment waves the 
natural riches and production and transport facilities (pipelines) remained in host 
country ownership. None of these huge projects, to which Csaba is referring, is a jointly 
owned venture by several CMEA members.
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Socialist experiments with JVs and direct capital investments in the CMEA-region are 
rare, but the few cases available are highly interesting. These ventures can be classified 
in two groups, those which were established shortly after World War II, and those of 
later origin.
Those which were established by the Soviet Union in territories of other CMEA- 
countries belong to the first group. The confiscation of previous German property 
formed the basis of these ventures, which became operative in Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and the GDR. The host countries contributed real estate, machinery and 
financial means according to the need to operate these enterprises. It is said that the 
capital shares in these ventures, which were run by Soviet officials, were unevenly 
valued, so that the Soviet share was recorded over its real value. 87)
These economic units had de facto extra-territorial rights in their operations enjoying 
freedom of foreign trade rights (also to the Western markets) and could operate outside 
the national economic plans. In addition, the ventures had priority to obtain imports 
from the Soviet Union and had profit guarantees agreed upon with local authorities. The 
production targets of the ventures oriented strongly towards Soviet import needs. The 
most important among them was obviously Sovrom-Petrol, active in the field of oil 
extraction and refining in Romania. 88)
These ventures were dismantled in the mid 1950s, whereby the host countries were 
obliged to buy the Soviet share. The fully Soviet owned company in the GDR, SAG 
(sowjetische Aktiengesellschaft) Wismut was changed to a JV between East Germany 
and the USSR, and renamed SDAG Wismut (Sowjetisch-deutsche Aktiengesellschaft). 
89)
The Soviet owned, or partly Soviet owned ventures are not often mentioned in the 
Eastern literature. However. Pecsi mentions them in a rather positive way, but states at 
the end:
"The joint enterprises operated in the form of joint stock companies.
All the usual problems of such ventures occurred, that is, transfer of 
dividends, taxation, and so on. Their dissolution came about as a 
result of political, rather than economic, factors. This is why the 
planning and legal, financial, and related problems of operating these 
enterprises under socialist conditions have not been developed 
theoretically". 90)
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The second group of socialist JVs is extremely thin. The first one engaged in production 
is the Polish-Hungarian enterprise "Haldex" founded for exploiting the relatively rich 
coal content of some old Polish pit-heaps, with a process invented in Hungary. Early in 
1959, the joint stock company was founded with equal participation. Although the 
products, coal and its by-products, are homogeneous and easily priced, a mutual settling 
of investments, current costs and profits is extremely complicated. Books are kept in the 
form of two parallel sets of accounts, the first in zloty (Polish monetary unit) the other 
in a fictitious unit of accountancy specially constructed for the purpose, since the costs 
could not be converted either at the non-commercial zloty/rouble rate or at the exchange 
rate between the zloty and the TR applied in the Polish^Soviet trade. The investment 
and current costs are being converted from zloty to the TR with the aid of about sixty 
different "coefficients" (including one serving only for converting telephone costs). 91)
However, "Haldex" has survived and has operated over a quarter of a century. In the 
course of the 25 years of operations this limited liability company, which was formed 
under the provisions of the Polish civil law of 1934, has recovered 7.3 million tons of 
coal from the heaps, and in addition large amounts of materials for the ceramic and 
construction industries. The joint enterprise now operates six coal producing and one 
light-concrete ingredient plant and employs a work force of more than 1,200.92)
The cotton spinning plant in Zawierce, near Katowice, in Poland, which is owned by 
Poland and the GDR, is considered the first joint manufacturing venture between 
CMEA-countries. Haldex and this textile factory were the only producing JVs in the 
CMEA-region with socialist partners sharing the capital before the 1980s.
Rather than build smaller spinning mills in each country the two partners chose to set up 
a common venture because of the clear advantages of economies of scale with two 
adjacent consuming markets. Constructing and equipping the mill went smoothly; it was 
the planning of operations that brought about the serious disagreements.
Reportedly, fixing the relative value of the GDR-mark and zloty posed the most 
difficult task, since both countries have artificial exchange rates. When it came to 
deciding how each should be valued against the other for procurement, sales, and other 
purposes, national pride came to the fore, with each party feeling that "our money is 
worth more". In addition, months of negotiating and arguing about the proper 
accounting system to be used caused considerable delay in getting the project launched.
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These and other problems were eventually ironed out, and production started in the fall 
of 1974. An annual output of 12,500 tons of cotton and synthetic thread is anticipated. 
Equipment for the new plant has been procured almost entirely in Poland, the GDR and 
Czechoslovakia. The cotton will come from the USSR and synthetic materials from the 
GDR. All construction and operating costs as well as profits and products are to be 
divided 50-50 between Poland and the GDR.
In earlier plans, there was to be factory management board with equal representation of 
Polish and GDR industry experts. In view of the novel situation of joint-state 
ownership, it was decided to have a board of directors with eight members -  four from 
each side -  including vice ministers of light industry as well as representatives of the 
foreign trade and • finance ministries of both countries. Central government 
representatives on the board of directors make it possible for the development of this 
unusual organization to be kept under close watch at the highest governmental level in 
both countries. 93)
Alongside with the official CMEA organization, which comprises so called "permanent 
commissions" for various industrial branches, various functional organizations have 
been set up, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. These are the various types of 
international economic organizations (DEO), interstate commissions for the 
implementation of specific tasks, R & D co-ordination, international laboratories and 
scientific research centres. Legally the functional organizations are not part of the 
CMEA structure proper but occupy rather ambiguous ground between the official 
CMEA structure and the individual national structures. 94)
IEOs and the other functional organizations should not be regarded as East European 
multinational companies because they do not operate in a market environment and with 
market categories. However, when the function the IEOs perform within the CMEA 
paradigm is compared with the function of the multinationals in their respective 
environment, then certain important similarities emerge; while the general tasks of 
integration are set by CMEA institutions proper these tasks could not be implemented 
without the microcosm of the functional organizations active at the middle and 
microeconomic levels. The same may be said of the capitalist MNCs. The condition of 
the markets may be harmonised by inter state agreements, but the actual cooperation and 
specialization is undertaken by the companies. 95)
V. Sobell, who has made an intensive study on the functioning of EEOs, concludes that 
their role consists largely of alleviating the consequences of the errors of industrial
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parallelism committed in the early years of the CMEA, in other words, their role 
consists mainly of alleviating the disadvantages of belonging to the CMEA. 96)
The sub-optimality of CMEA integration methods has been discussed widely among 
the member countries in the 1980s. Speaking about the programme of CMEA 
cooperation at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, Leonid Brezhnev 
suggested that the unfolding of direct ties between ministries, associations and the 
formation of joint enterprises were the means of integration he would prefer. 97) This 
idea was accepted in the extraordinary CMEA summit meeting on party leader level in 
1984. In the following year the "Comprehensive programme for scientific and 
technological progress in the CMEA countries until the year 2000" was accepted 
naming the expansion of direct inter-firm relations as the major way of its 
implementation. 98)
In the second half of the 1980s it has become fashionable to direct criticism to the 
insufficient speed of signing inter-firm contracts across national borders. In business 
practice problems involved in this sphere of activity often prove to be insurmountable. 
In most cases the co-ordinary "head organizations" (golovnaya organizatsiya) could not 
even produce an acceptable technical and economic feasibility study for the cooperation 
project. When neither cost nor benefits can be properly calculated, their distribution 
among partners can hardly be quantified. As a result, neither commissioning, nor 
executing parties can be identified, since the determination of actual solvent demand is 
far too uncertain. 99)
The currency system is, in fact, the most important conceptual issue in the discussion of 
the CMEA-countries' internationalization process. In October 1987, the CMEA Council 
Session accepted that national currencies may in fact be used in direct inter-firm 
relations for accounting. This is of very limited scope, since the major element of the 
Hungarian proposal, the obligation to settle the year-end account at least in part (25 %) 
in convertible currency has not been supported by most countries. 100)
Attempts to renew the CMEA financial system and the character of integration, are as 
intentions extremely important. However, the implementation of both decisions is very 
difficult. An important aspect of this difficulty is that economic reforms are at different 
stages in various CPEs. 101)
It is, however, understandable that the CMEA-countries have been looking for new 
methods of economic intercourse in the late 1980s because there are severe constraints
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in the traditional way of trading within the CMEA. This is described by A. Koves in 
very straightforward terms:
"In the past decade and a half Hungary’s relations with the CMEA 
were marked by the narrowing of the purchase opportunities, by 
faltering of the earlier stability of purchase and sale, by a considerable 
deterioration of the terms of trade and of non-price conditions of 
trade. The difficulties can be attributed to a large extent to 
unfavourable developments in the Soviet economy.
The slowdown of growth (in fact, stagnation, in numerous areas, 
regression) which did not spare the traditional heavy industry and raw 
material extraction, sectors, which play a decisive role in exports, the 
structural rigidity of the economy, the increasing technology gap, the 
deteriorating efficiency, including the rapidly diminishing specific 
energy- and material intensity, the worsening agricultural situation in
spite of the gigantic investments etc. All this -  aggravated by the
compelling need of increasing, or at least maintaining, convertible
currency receipts -  increasingly hindered the Soviet Union's exports 
to Hungary and TR accounted exports in general, both in the 
traditional structure and in any other commodity pattern satisfying the 
requirements of the partner. Thus trade with the Soviet Union ceased 
to play the role of dynamizing economic growth in Hungary. All this 
has affected not only Hungary but all CMEA partners of the Soviet 
Union". 102)
Critical remarks concerning CMEA cooperation have not remained the monopoly of 
Hungarian observers.
The Czechoslovak economist L. Rusmich states that countries or groups of countries
with a market of their own, cannot pursue a pricing policy for their own products
independent of prices valid on foreign markets, if they do not want to fall out of step 
with world labour productivity. If a commodity is, in relation to all other commodities 
on the given market, more expensive than on other markets of the world, and can be 
sold here in spite of the fact that it cannot be exported profitably, it is obviously 
produced at an inadmissibly low level of productivity. The continuation of the 
production of such labour-intensive and low-quality commodities reduces, in the last 
resort, the productivity of social labour of all parties in the given market. As a
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consequence, the standards of living of the direct producers of such commodities will 
decline. 103)
However, Rusmich is right when he attacks the old socialist school of thinking, which 
sees commodity-money relations and planning as conflicting categories and writes that 
they (the old school representatives) deprive economic practice of the possibility of 
objective, consistently improving criteria of economic efficiency and incentives for 
further progress. In addition, they serve as a justification for autarky and for poor 
productivity of social labour as compared to world standards. Only a consistent 
understanding of socialist production as commodity production for the market and of the 
link between domestic and international prices can serve as a reliable scientific basis for 
the establishment of an open socialist economy and for the restructuring of the present, 
rather unsatisfactory mechanism of cooperation of the CMEA member countries leading 
to a mechanism of socialist economic integration for which truly efficient value 
categories are needed for fulfilling their functions. 104)
1.6. Summary and conclusions of Chapter One
The first chapter can be summed up by the following points:
-  The theory of imperialism is a very essential point in the basic ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism. According to this theory, there is a competition between 
economic systems, which will at the end be won by socialism. The main economic 
agents of imperialist powers are the MNCs, in which industrial and financial capital 
have merged.
The socialist world system in the framework of the CMEA has been unable to 
create institutions to carry out intensive economic growth via internationalization of 
socialist economies.
Administrative methods of economic management on the international level have 
shown considerable difficulties, because the national interest of CMEA members 
disallow direct supranational planning.
-  "Monetarization" of the economy has been the declared aim of economic reform in 
certain socialist countries. "Monetarization” of international economies in the 
socialist world is extremely difficult to achieve, because the bilateral trade system, 
accounted in the TR unit, has created and maintained uncompetitive industries. A
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sudden change in trade and financial systems would create structural changes that 
could be devastating.
-  Multinational companies, which are the most dynamic part of capitalism, have 
hardly emerged in intra-CMEA activity. The IEOs cannot be described as an 
equivalent of Western MNCs. Therefore, the technology gap between East and 
West cannot be closed.
Foreign trade in volume terms cannot be increased in intra-CMEA activity any 
more. Constraints are so severe that there is no going back to the early years of 
CMEA-cooperation.
-  Summing these points up, there is a clear need to seek cooperation with Western 
countries, including joint investments with Western MNCs. This means alliance 
with the ideological enemy.
From the point of view of FDIs of Western MNCs, the CMEA economic region is a 
very special one. The special nature of CMEA integration framework gives a clear 
disincentive to invest inside the region.
-  Economic reforms in various CMEA-countries alleviate the disincentives of 
Western FDIs. "Monetarization" of the economy in CMEA scale is, however, 
difficult, because economic reforms are not advancing in all CMEA countries in a 
similar manner.
Some features of East-West trade during the last some twenty years speak for the 
necessity of looking for new methods of cooperation, including JV s. This necessity also 
gives the incentive for CMEA countries to approach Western international organizations 
which previously have been damned as imperialistic. These matters will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
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2. East-W est trade and co-operation
The history of East-West trade after World War II is complex. It could be investigated 
from the political angle covering trade policy and embargo matters. That history also 
naturally has economic dimension. In the context of this study, only some major 
features of East-West trade, which are of importance from the point of view of Western 
FDIs in CPEs, will be covered.
In chapter one it was shown that in intra-CMEA trade there are serious constraints in 
respect of increasing mutual deliveries and that qualitative improvements in mutual 
links are difficult to achieve in the international, out-dated monetary environment.
The first part of this chapter deals with constraints in East-West trade. It can be
L
assumed that one of the main reasons for CPEs pursuing FDI-policy with the West is 
the lacking dynamism in technology exchange using conventional trade methods, with 
credit financing.
2.1. Main features of East-West trade
East-West economic relations have been inextricably linked with the ideological and 
political controversy between socialism and capitalism. It is this controversy that has 
made the East-West dichotomy a major division in world relations. In the late 1940s the 
USA steered Western policy towards economic containment of the Soviet Union. A 
common approach to East-West trade was facilitated more by US economic and 
political dominance than by a genuine consensus with the Europeans. As the US linked 
the provision of economic and military aid to the support for its policy of economic 
containment, the West Europeans were obliged to follow the US lead. There was 
however, widespread support among Western allies for the use of COCOM as a means 
of denying the Soviet Union goods and technologies which contributed directly to its 
military effort. 1)
Throughout the 1960s a modus vivendi developed in East-West trade relations as 
controls were liberalized on the Western side and the deeply defensive policy of CPEs 
was giving ground to the policy of a controlled opening. This was characteristic of the 
1960s and the 1970s. 2)
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In the 1960s and especially during the first half of the 1970s there was a considerable 
boom in East-West trade under the umbrella of detente policy. Economic euphoria 
replaced political tension in East-West relations. 3)
The external environment for the CPEs was exceptionally favourable during the 1970s. 
The CMEA countries had access to relatively cheap credits available on Western 
financial markets. The Soviet Union had huge windfall profits as a result of the first oil 
crisis. The impact of energy crises was lessened to the small CMEA-countries by 
CMEA-price-setting procedures. In addition, a relatively decent economic growth in 
the non-socialist world contributed to the growth in demand for CMEA-products, 
although their share in the world convertible currency trade declined between 1970 and 
1980.4)
However, in the turn of. the decade from the 1970s to the. 1980s some unfavourable 
external factors affected the CMEA countries1 integration into global economy. Interest 
rates as well as oil prices increased rapidly and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused 
trade policy measures against socialist states. Polish crises in the social and financial 
sphere curtailed CMEA countries access to Western financial markets. High real interest 
rates boosted the cost of servicing the convertible currency (CC) debt that had 
accumulated as a consequence of "import led growth" strategy pursued by those 
countries in the 1970s. 5) The Soviet Union was thus so far an exception in that it 
profited from the second oil crisis and was thus able to keep its Western debt relatively 
well in check.
Towards the mid 1980s the small CMEA countries managed to consolidate their debt 
position relatively well with the exception of Poland which remained continuously 
credit unworthy. This stabilization of external accounts was, however, achieved mainly 
by cutting down Western imports, rather than by increased competitiveness of small 
CMEA countries' processed goods. 6)
P. Marer concludes in his study on Hungary in the 1970s that this period was the decade 
of illusions. This remark can be applied to other small CMEA countries as well. There is 
strong evidence that economic policies pursued in Eastern Europe rested on the illusive 
conviction regarding the possibility of insulating an economy from the effect of shocks 
in the world economy, of reorienting trade and investment toward the CMEA partners, 
and the belief that their economies may generate CC earnings to service international 
debt without economic reforms. 7)
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Often CMEA countries blame the Western countries of having discriminatory trade 
policy towards Eastern Europe hinting at embargo measures. Csikos-Nagy, however, 
maintains that there has also been "self-discrimination" among CMEA countries. He 
makes the point that CMEA countries have stubbornly kept quantitative growth as the 
main aim of economic policy neglecting quality. Furthermore, the CMEA countries 
have been slow to learn international marketing and to change their economic 
institutions and infrastructure towards the needs of the internationalization of the 
economy. 8)
It is worthwhile^recognising that the "illusion of the 1970s" (the import-led growth and 
debt financing), which was very much present in the CMEA countries in that decade, 
also contained the hope of achieving international convertibility of money, especially in 
Hungary. If that illusion had materialized, there would have been an essentially better 
basis for Hungary (and other CMEA countries) to enter the global economy as a 
"normal" partner offering opportunities for Western FDIs. However, in the 1980s this 
important precondition for flexible JV operations -  the free exchangeability of local 
money -  was absent in Hungary, as well as in other CMEA countries. This is due to the 
fact that in the 1970s and 1980s the CMEA countries were unable to integrate 
themselves into the global economy by essentially improving their competitiveness via 
East-West trade flows.
2.2. CMEA countries and international economic organizations
2.2.1. CMEA countries, technology exchange and industrial property rights
It can be taken for granted that the opening up of CMEA countries since the 1960s has 
brought about certain economic advantages, even if Western imports have had more of 
an import substituting than export drive effect. This positive effect could have been 
greater, had the adaptation capability of CMEA countries been better.
The organizational separation of buying agents (FTOs) from the end-users (production 
enterprises)- has certainly caused large-scale waste. According to an interview with 
Professor W. Wallace of Glasgow in the Soviet magazine "Novoye Vremya" the stock 
of unused imported equipment in the Soviet Union is estimated at almost 5 bn roubles in 
1986. 9) Similar waste affects have certainly been present also in other CMEA 
countries.
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East-West economic ties since the 1960s have not only contained the sales and 
purchase of goods, but also various forms of other business deals. There are more than a 
thousand agreements between East and West which can be classified as technology 
exchange deals. Approximately 5 % of East-West trade flows is conducted on the basis 
of these agreements. 10)
It is not possible to cover all the details of these highly interesting business deals here. 
For the purpose of the present study only some general features of these agreements are 
of interest.
In the purest form of an technology exchange, or co-operation agreement between East 
and West, the Western MNC delivers machinery and equipment, licences, 
documentation, and so on, on credit and receives in exchange products from the plant, 
specified in annual quotas, whereby the East European country retains full ownership of 
the plant and is responsible for the planning of input (including labour) and receives a 
share of the production. These relatively widely used deals are called "buy back" 
arrangements. More diluted forms include subcontracting production, mainly of 
components, from the MNC to the CMEA country on the basis of direct instructions and 
documentation, without direct participation by the MNC in the construction of the plant. 
The East European country is effectively involved in selling domestic value-added to 
the Western MNC but receives only a limited amount of technology .Another form of 
cooperation includes various types of co-production agreements whereby the MNC and 
the CMEA country specialise in the production of specific components which are 
subsequently exchanged and the finished products are assembled in both countries and 
are marketed jointly in third countries and/or separately in predesignated areas. 11)
The cooperation type of trading which spread rapidly in the 1970s has in the 1980s 
slowed down. Due to slow rates of growth and problems of unemployment, Western 
enterprises have not been interested in delivering technology to CMEA countries. There 
have also been some changes in the political background of inter-firm relations. The 
technology exchange development in the 1970s required each participant in inter-firm 
cooperation to keep up with the technological ievel of the partner. This explains why the 
cooperation is often restricted to second-rate technologies rather than first rate products 
or processes. The majority of cooperation contracts are buy back licence contracts and 
machinery deliveries, which block the CMEA partner on the level of the introduced 
technology. 12)
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There have been certain differences between small CMEA countries and the Soviet 
Union in the frequency, volume and structure of cooperation agreements which were 
concluded by trade intensive smaller countries such as Poland, Romania and Hungary. 
Agreements concluded by the USSR though less frequent, as a rule refer to a much 
larger basic transaction as well as to a much greater continued bilateral or multilateral 
flow of goods. The latter agreements have involved investment programmes in some 
key sectors of economy, for example, the chemical industry, and usually involved the 
latest achievements of technology. 13)
The growing interest in technology transfer by CMEA countries since thel960s has also 
made them change their policy towards Western conventions regulating Industrial 
Property Rights. As mentioned above, the socialist countries signed their own 
convention on technology exchange in the late 1940s in Sofia, stipulating that 
innovations can be transferred freely (without charge) from one fraternal country to the 
others. However, in time all European CMEA countries became a party in Western 
"Paris Convention" regulating Industrial Property Rights based on patent protection. 
Also the Western convention concerning Trademarks has been signed by European 
CPEs. 14)
This fact creates an extremely odd situation in East West technology transfer. In the East 
two international conventions, which in their spirit are diagonally opposite, are valid at 
the same time. The traditional business attitude that the person or institution, who made 
an invention, is supposed to have the sole economic advantages out of it, is formulated 
in the Paris convention, as amended in Stockholm 1967. The Sofia agreement stipulates 
that intangible assets are in fact common property of mankind.
There are certain Western firms that are unwilling to sell any licences to CMEA area as 
long as the Sofia agreement remains in force. Their argument is that selling a licence, 
say, to Bulgaria, means that the documents covering the licensed production,could be 
automatically transferred to, say, Hungary, on the basis of the Sofia agreement -  free of 
charge and free of royalties for the Western partner.
Obviously, the Sofia agreement in this context has become an embarrassment for 
CMEA countries' trade officials. They explain that the Sofia agreement has no validity 
in practical terms anyhow. Licences are bought from the West with the motive of 
increasing competitiveness in intra-CMEA trade. Therefore, the articles of the Sofia 
agreement are not applied.
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Trade officials in CMEA countries licensing trade outlets advise Western technology 
sellers to include a clause in every licensing deal stipulating that sub-licensing -  paid or 
unpaid -  is strictly prohibited under all circumstances. In this way the Sofia agreement 
is avoided. 15)
Trademarks are regarded in socialist thinking as a trick of certain capitalists to cheat 
their clients. That intangible asset enables the bearer of a trademark to charge the client 
more than the actual labour- and use-value which that special item presupposes. 
Therefore, a trademark is seen as a part of immoral business activity.
However, Trademarks, as well as Industrial Property Rights have been accepted by 
CMEA countries, because it has been recognised that ignoring Trademarks would 
hamper technology transfer. Certain franchising deals have been concluded between 
East and West. Hotels with international labels have been set up in CMEA capitals, even 
if they are not all JVs. Well-known soft drinks can be obtained in CPEs, made locally 
but bearing a Western Trademark, etc.
Summing up the first sections of chapter 2, one can say, that there has been wide- 
reaching illusion in the CMEA area in the 1970s that credit financing in East-West 
trade combined with technology transfer can be used as a substitute for economic 
reforms. There has also been the illusion that FDIs can be imitated by establishing 
cooperation deals on territories of CPEs involving foreign technology, but excluding 
Western equity participation. The disillusionment in these points is one of the main 
motives, why CMEA countries have started pursuing JVs in the 1980s much more 
vigorously than previously.
2.2.2. CMEA countries and the multilateral monetary system (IMF and World 
Bank)
It has been shown above thai the CMEA countries have their own international 
monetary system based on TR, which is extremely unsuitable for international business 
operations. Evidence has also been cited to show that the CMEA countries have had an 
interest in the international division of labour and the international division of 
technology with the rest of the world. Ai the same time, the CMEA countries have been 
increasingly willing to accept the rules of the technology game, even if some ideological 
obstacles are still present.
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When FDIs are put into operation there are certain factors which motivate the MNCs. 
Rich, local markets, educated labour force and sophisticated infrastructure are normally 
mentioned as preconditions for getting FDIs. Convertible currency in the host country of 
a FDI is an extremely important precondition, which is often not mentioned in this 
context.
From the point of view of classical economics it is surprising that the lion's share of 
global FDIs is made among industrialized countries, inside the OECD area. Only about 
one fourth of global FDIs goes to LDCs. 16)
International flows of capital have been a central concern of international economics, 
and economists working in this field have long tended to explain the MNCs as simply 
an arbitrator of capital between countries where its marginal productivity is low and 
those where it is high. The MNCs profit thus results from arbitrage activity. 17)
Without going into detail on the inconsistency between economic theory and actual 
FDIs, the assumption can be made here, that relative stability of the monetary economy 
(the predictability of inflation, exchange rate oscillations etc.) and convertibility in the 
host country are important elements when FDI-decisions are made in MNCd. 
Therefore, from the point of view of JVs between East and West it is of utmost 
importance how the CMEA countries manage their monetary policy and what their links 
to the IMF are. The relative scarcity of capital, as pointed out above, is necessarily not a 
sufficient precondition for receiving direct investments from more affluent countries.
Since the end of World War II, the dominant international monetary system,-constructed 
at Bretton Woods in 1944, has centred on the International Monetary Fund. This system 
weakened substantially in the early 1970s. In the Bretton Woods system, the rules 
guiding the relations among states were intended to prevent the repetition of the 
international economic conflict of the 1930s, ie competitive devaluation, discrimination 
in foreign exchange dealings and tariffs, lack of convertibility, disorderly flows of 
capital. For unique historical reasons the United States and the United Kingdom had an 
unusually large influence in establishing the system and subsequently controlling it. 
Europe was in ruins; Germany, Italy and Japan were ex-enemy countries. Most 
developing countries were still colonies; only India, Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia and the 
independent countries of Latin America attended the Bretton Woods conference. The 
Soviet Union and other East European countries participated in Bretton Woods, but the 
Soviet Union eventually chose not to join. Poland resigned its membership in 1950 and 
Czechoslovakia was required to withdraw from the IMF in 1954. After the revolution of
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1949 the China that then retained membership did not represent the mainland.East 
European countries gave their main reasons for not adhering to the Bretton Woods 
system as (a) the procedure adopted for allocating votes (b) the requirement to report 
their national gold and foreign exchange holdings and transfer part of them to the US 
where the IMF and the World Bank (IBRD) have their headquarters: (c) the terms on 
which members were allowed credits to correct their balance of payments. An unstated 
reason was the deterioration of international political relations. 18)
The Bretton Woods system was originally intended to include an International Trade 
Organization which was negotiated and adopted in Havana in 1948; but the Havana 
Charter was never ratified by the US Congress. Some of its commercial processions 
were incorporated in the less ambitious General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) of 1948, which was intended as an interim arrangement, but became a 
mechanism which has served as the principal forum for multinational trade negotiations. 
The wider aims, including steps towards organizing commodity markets, were never 
implemented. 19)
The system of international economic cooperation thus established by the industrially 
developed capitalist countries after World War II was based on the following principles:
Every country is interested in the general development of productive forces. Due to 
the international division of labour, economic stagnation in any of the countries has 
an adverse effect on the economy of the other countries.
-  Every country is interested in the convertibility of national currencies. If the 
currencies of all countries are convertible, this promotes multilateral economic 
relations.
-  Every country is interested in equilibrium of the international balance of payments. 
If any one country becomes insolvent and intends to introduce foreign exchange 
and trade restrictions, this diminishes the trade possibilities of the other countries.
-  Every country is interested in currency cooperation to ensure equilibrium in the 
balance of payments by an internationally harmonized foreign exchange policy, 
interest rate policy, gold and credit policy. The equilibrium of the international 
capitalist monetary system would became less secure if these questions were - 
considered only as business of national economic policies. 20)
The last point, ie the right of the IMF to make recommendations on economic policy of 
the member countries, has been traditionally regarded by the socialist countries as 
unacceptable interference into the internal affairs of sovereign nations. Therefore, the
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IMF is said to have an "imperialist” nature. The Soviet Union has usually complained 
about the considerable influence of the USA in the IMF which is based on its quota. The 
obligations to release information on the balance of payments and foreign exchange as 
well as gold reserves to the Fund is also unacceptable to the USSR. Furthermore, the 
USSR dislikes the IMF method of using certain Western currencies as an official 
reserve currency. The Soviet Union has thus appealed for the re-establishment of the 
gold standard in international monetary relations. At the IV UNCTAD conference in 
Nairobi 1976 the CMEA countries signed a petition proposing the re-establishment of 
the gold standard and the abolition of the monopoly position of one or several national 
currencies in the international monetary system. This declaration was not signed by 
Romania, which became an IMF member in 1974. 21)
In spite of the ideological controversy on IMF matters there seems to be a tendency 
toward a more realistic approach to international monetary matters among the CMEA 
countries. Hungary joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1982, and Poland handed in 
her membership application in 1981. 22) Poland became a member of both 
organizations in 1986.
Obviously, the Soviet attitude towards the IMF has not changed in principle. The IMF 
and the World Bank are described as institutions, which create a favourable framework 
for the "expansion of capital" favouring the imperialistic dominance of economy on a 
world scale. Normally this criticism is concentrated on US direct investments abroad.
23)
Joining the IMF does not mean that the monetary unit of the new member country - 
automatically becomes convertible. The rules of IMF only stipulate that the member 
ought to aim to convertibility of their currencies.
Romania, which joined the IMF in 1974 is extremely far away from the convertibility of 
the lei. Nobody believes that Poland will be able to reach zloty convertibility in near 
future after joining the IMF.
Occasionally, the possibility of making the Hungarian forint convertible in the near 
future has been brought up. First Vice President of the Hungarian National Bank, Janos 
Fekete promised during his visit to West Germany in 1985, that the forint would be 
ready for external convertibility during the second half of the 1980s. 24)
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The preconditions for currency convertibility are clear: the exchange rate must be on a 
realistic level, so that the currency will be accepted by outside persons or organizations 
without being afraid of suffering sudden losses due to huge devaluation; there must be 
sufficient currency reserve to guarantee the exchangeability of the currency; the 
currency must be freely usable for purchases of local goods and services, in other 
words, there should be as few limitations as possible in foreign trade administration; the 
exportable goods and services should be attractive for outside buyers as far as price and 
quality are concerned; there must be financial incentive for the outside unit to accept the 
currency, e.g. if somebody has a claim in that money, he expects competitive interest on 
this claim.
The Hungarians often mention the fact that in October 1981 a unified standard exchange 
rate was established for the forint. Since 1st January, 1985 a daily rate quotation has 
been established. As the economic reform has advanced, the state monopoly of foreign 
trade has been modified and many production units have been given foreign trade rights. 
The home market price level has been moving in a market clearing direction.
In spite of all these developments certain direct allotments of goods prevail, and in 
foreign trade transactions are still controlled by central bodies through the permit 
system. Competitivness is certainly not guaranteed in all branches of the economy, and 
subsidies seem to die hard.
A complete assessment of all preconditions of the forint convertibility is not possible 
here. It is sufficient from the angle of this study to point out certain details, which seem 
to be important when the possibility of Hungarian forint convertibility is evaluated.
Some 50 % of Hungarian foreign trade is with the CMEA area. This trade is still mainly 
conducted in the traditional manner, e.g. on the basis of 5-year agreements and yearly 
protocols with compulsory delivery quotas, also containing some "soft” goods, and 
payments effected in TR The maintaining of this system calls for state regulations, in 
order to fulfil the obligations laid down in protocols.
If now on a certain date Hungary declares its forint convertible
even "partially", or financially creating a special monetary unit -  this will mean the 
likelihood, that her CMEA partners will start asking for payment in that monetary 
unit for their exports,’ if that monetary unit accepted by the Western partners as a 
convertible means of payment. West partners must then be able to rely on sufficient 
currency reserves in Hungary
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-  the CMEA partner of Hungary after having earned convertible forints by exporting 
to Hungary, can use that money for purchases from the West. This can easily cause 
serious balancing problems in Hungary's CMEA trade: "soft" commodities are no 
longer accepted, because the CMEA partner can now divert the forints to purchases 
on the world market. At the same time, Western exporters to Hungary who accept 
payment in convertible forints, can divert that money to purchases from other 
CMEA countries. These can either accept it or not. If the CMEA partners do not 
rely on the lasting convertibility of the forint, they naturally can refuse to accept it 
as an alternative for dollars or other Western currencies. In that case an over­
supply of convertible forint builds up causing a presumably rapid depreciation of 
the forint value.
The whole idea is economically viable only in the case that "soft" goods can be 
eliminated at the same time in all subsections of Hungarian foreign trade. How far this 
structural change is going to affect Hungary's commitments in CMEA cooperation is not 
clear. Such changes have a political aspect as the coherence of CMEA cooperation is 
put at stake, and the rigid mechanism of the "socialist division of labour" is endangered. 
This political side, however, is becoming less and less important.
The main question, however, is a psychological one: is it possible at the beginning that 
after declaring the forint (partially) convertible to find Western companies who accept 
their payments in that monetary unit. Very clear evidence of abundant currency reserves 
is required. If conversion to Hungarian goods is unsatisfactory, then financial 
conversion must be guaranteed. Obviously, extra incentive can be given at the beginning 
by providing high interest rates for forint claims. That, however, makes the whole 
business expensive for Hungary.
The exchange rate policy of Hungary has had some highly interesting features. 
According to two Hungarian economists, Katalin Botos and Werner Riecke, the 
exchange rate must simultaneously satisfy three-fold needs:
-  it should reflect the purchasing power parity of forints vis-a-vis the convertible 
currencies
-  it should hinder the imported inflation, and thus, be a means of price stability in the 
home market
it should contribute to the equilibrium of the balance of payments. 25)
The second point seems to have been in the focus of economic policy considerations in 
the 1970s, when the forint was virtually continuously revalued vis-a-vis the dollar, in
59
order to beat worldwide inflation. The opponents of devaluation argue, that because of 
the import structure and the low cost-sensibility of Hungarian enterprises, the price 
elasticity of imports is virtually zero. On the other hand the volume of exports is not 
dependent on the export price level calculated in forints, because high capacity 
utilisation exists in the enterprise sector. This view emphasizes that under these 
conditions devaluation of the forint has no significant influence on the balance of 
payments, but has an inflationary effect on domestic price formations. 26)
Obviously, this rather unorthodox view was predominant in the first half of the 1970s. 
However, it was soon realized (1976), that the deterioration om the terms of trade 
cannot be neutralized by exchange rate policy (by revaluing the forint), and by increased 
state subsidies. In 1979-80, a price reform was carried out (increased raw material and 
energy prices), thus allowing price hikes for manufactured goods. As at the same time 
the prices for export goods to CC area started to decrease, devaluation became 
unavoidable. Currency reserves declined rapidly, and it seemed that the third point in the 
Botos-Riecke classification (the balance of payments consideration) replaced the 
second one (the blocking of imported inflation) in exchange rate policy. 27)
Botos and Riecke also point out that the "Exchange Rate Deviation Index" in Hungary is 
extremely high by international comparison -  over 290 per cent. The exchange rate 
deviates greatly from the purchasing power parity. The high figure of the ERDI-index 
obviously has historical a background: the long period of Hungarian economic isolation 
from the pressures of the world market has essentially contributed to the economic and 
price structure. 28)
Botos and Riecke argue that the exchange rate policy cannot alone create fundamental 
change. This had to be followed by other means of economic policy, ie by austerity 
measures. Austerity may lead to long-term stagnation, unless no favourable means are 
created for increased factor mobility in the social, political and legal sphere. 29)
In the concluding remarks Botos and Riecke make three points:
-  institutional improvements (e.g. capital market) must be carried out. In order to 
change over from present devaluation policies to "hard currency" practice 
(including possible revaluations) is needed to counter inflationary tendencies
-  if the rigidities of the present economic mechanism cannot be overcome, but the 
macroeconomic budget and monetary management is maintained, then the 
continuation of devaluation is unavoidable
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in the worst case scenario the present reshaping of the economy through market 
signals will be halted and replaced by politically founded regulations supporting the 
big enterprises (heavy industry). This scenario would also include the revaluation of 
the forint, not however, because the market situation justifies it, but because the 
exchange rate would be robbed of its role as a macroeconomic orientation figure. 
30)
The two Hungarian experts plead strongly in favour of the first scenario, also using the 
argument that the membership of Hungary in international organizations (IMF, GATT) 
presupposes balance of payments readjustments with the help of orthodox exchange rate 
policy, and not with unorthodox methods involving budgetary export subsidies. It is 
self-evident, that only the successful application of the first scenario can create the 
economic preconditions for the external convertibility of the forint.
The assumption can be made that IMF economic policy recommendations have 
influenced Hungarian external economics in the 1980s. Severe mistakes, like 
revaluations in entirely wrong situations, the consequence of which has been continuous 
waste of energy and raw materials via price biases, have no more occurred.
The Hungarian case also shows how difficult it is to find the "right" or economically 
justified exchange rate (with the correct purchasing power parity) when historical price 
biases exist in the economy. The point has also been made, that individual country 
actions towards convertibility in the CMEA-area are not so simple, because they could 
undermine the whole TR and bilateral trading system in the bloc.
In the summer of 1987, the Central Committee meeting of the CPSU decided that the 
Soviet rouble should be made convertible, at first in CMEA-countries. 31) It is 
extremely unclear how this aim can be accomplished.
The Soviet Union has shown interest in becoming a member of GATT. However, the 
Soviet official attitude towards IMF is still virtually unchanged. The multilateral 
monetary system is still US-dominated and based practically on the dollar. In the IMF 
the US-dominance prevails making the Soviet membership still impossible. 32)
Altogether, in the late 1980s, there has been a strong feeling among CMEA-countries 
that international currency problems must be discussed, and in the long run, also solved 
by creating convertible means of payments. How this proclaimed aim can be reached is 
momentarily not in sight.
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2.2.3. The trade policy of CMEA-countries towards the rest of the world
The willingness of CMEA-countries to accept Western FDIs in their respective 
territories is a sign of opening up towards the rest of the world. At the same time, 
however, the CMEA-countries have been unable to create convertible money. Thus, the 
enterprises doing business inside the CMEA-area with foreign participation are obliged 
to be "self-sufficient in CC terms".
On the basis of this constellation, it is of vital interest for the foreign firms investing 
directly in CPEs, how the products manufactured in the East can be exported to the rest 
of the world, and what kind of protectionism these exports will face.
There are, however, some possibilities to earn CC inside the CMEA-bloc. These 
opportunities can be seen in JV activity.
In all the European CMEA countries there exists a chain of "hard" currency, or so called 
"valuta" shops, which are originally meant to serve Western visitors only, with mainly 
Western high quality consumer goods. However, this special retail network has been 
largely expanded over the time, and rules entering them have been relaxed. For the local 
population it has become easier to have access to these shopping outlets. Only the 
Soviet Union and Romania apply relatively strict rules on rights to enter "valuta"-shops.
It is understandable that the economic mechanism behind this convertible currency retail 
selling are not widely discussed in the Eastern literature. The whole area is extremely 
sensitive from the viewpoint of political economy when capitalist means of payment are 
involved in a socialist planned economy.
One of the most striking facts in this context is, that the socialist countries have started 
to issue money, or quasi-money, which is accepted by local "hard" currency shops, as 
means of payment alongside with all convertible currencies. One of the currency 
coupons, the Polish PKO-cheque or "Pewex"-coupon even carries the US-dollar sign 
($) on it.
In the framework of this "hard" currency business in the CMEA countries a new term of 
international socialist economies has emerged: it is called "internal export". 33) This 
means in.actual fact that certain home-made products are sold to the local citizens for
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foreign (convertible) currency, or equivalent means of payment, that is, coupons which 
can be used for shopping in "hard" currency shop. Items in the "internal export" 
category are extremely difficult or even impossible to acquire with local, "normal" 
money. Internal export items are often produced with Western technology.
In intra-CMEA trade a part of the business is settled in CC. This trade in which the 
seller is normally interested in realising competitive, or "hard" items, is conducted 
outside the bilateral protocol. The question is how the seller’s interest can be reconciled 
with that of the buyer. In principle the matter is simple: if the latter needs a certain 
quantity of a commodity and cannot buy it for TR, he will buy it anywhere for CC at the 
current world market price. In fact, even with quite identical trading conditions he 
might, for reasons of safety, political, or trade policy reasons prefer purchasing from a 
CMEA partner. The rigidity of trade settled in TR is in itself a satisfactory justification 
for the trade settlement in CC in intra-CMEA framework. 34)
CC deals are obviously becoming increasingly important in intra-CMEA activity. 
According to K. Botos, at the beginning of the 1970s, settlements in convertible 
currency in intra-CMEA trade were approximately 1-1.5 per cent of the mutual trade, 
while at the beginning of the 1980s the corresponding figure had grown to some 10-12 
%. She points out that the erosion of the TR system can only be stopped by reforming it. 
35)
Obviously, the "internal export" market and the intra-CMEA trade settled in CC can 
offer some healthy business ideas for JVs situated in CPEs. A jointly built and run hotel 
and/or restaurant can charge the clients in CC, a jointly manufactured TV-set or car can 
be sold in a CC-shop etc. Some products with Western design and technology can be 
sold from one CMEA-country to another for CC.
However, if a large-scale FDI is enacted in the CMEA-area, it is highly probable that 
outside export markets must be found, in order to earn CC. Therefore, the trade policy 
standing of CMEA countries must be investigated. Of special importance in this context 
are the relations of CPEs towards Western Europe, their most important export market.
Initially, after the signing of the EEC founding document in Rome, the Soviet Union 
ideologically condemned the European Community as providing the economic basis for 
NATO policy. In 1957, after the signing of Treaties of Rome the ideological periodical 
"Kommunist" condemned the EEC with marxist-leninist jargon based on 17 points. In 
this context it is defined within the viewpoint of the economic framework of
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imperialism; thus a United States of Europe is seen as either impossible or reactionary 
under capitalistic circumstances. The new community is a treaty of monopolies fighting 
for markets, sources of raw materials and spheres of investments without considering 
the interests of working masses. However, it is predicted, that tensions and 
contradictions between the member states of the EEC are only going to speed up the 
process of capitalistic self-destruction. 36)
In 1962 (August 26th) Pravda published theses called "imperialist integration in 
Western Europe", thus creating an official terminology for all socialist countries, when 
they wrote about the EEC. 37) However, at the same time the EEC is defined to be a 
strong and long lasting organization, and therefore, co-operation between two European 
economic groups (EEC and CMEA) cannot be excluded. Peaceful economic 
competition is not only declared between states applying different economic systems, 
but also between economic groupings (EEC and CMEA). 38)
However, Western Europe's union was not considered to be a de facto "integration" and 
was thus denied recognition in terms of international law. While, originally, this 
recognition issue was the dominant problem, this was replaced in the course of the years 
by a more pragmatic stance. Brezhnev's speech in March 1972 was seen as the turning 
point. He said:
"The Soviet Union by no means ignores the situation that has in fact 
evolved in Western Europe nor does it ignore the existence of an 
economic grouping of capitalist nations such as the Common Market.
We are keeping careful watch on the activities of the Common Market 
and its evolution." 39)
In Eastern Europe there was good reason to watch the development of EEC carefully in 
the early 1970s. In March 1971 the EEC Council of Ministers agreed on the aim of 
establishing common provisions for trade with state-controlled economies. The end of 
1974 saw the expiry of the bilateral trade agreements between the member nations of the 
EEC and those of the CMEA. 40)
It is thus no accident that the first, unofficial meetings between the CMEA and the EEC 
took place in that period. However, no agreement could be reached between the two 
groupings in the 1970s. 41)
At the end of 1974 the EEC sent all CMEA-states a blueprint for trade agreements 
between the Community and individual countries with state-controlled economies.
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CMEA responded in 1976 by presenting a draft framework treaty. However, the 
asymmetry in the scope of authority in the two organizations proved to be a fundamental 
problem from the very beginning.Since, in the EEC view, the CMEA lacked a basis in 
law that would enable it to commit the individual member states in the legally binding 
manner. Thus the EEC was not prepared to enter into a trade agreement with the CMEA 
but only with its individual member nations. In respect of the CMEA, the EEC was only 
prepared to talk about specific sectors such as transport issues, standards and 
environment problems. The detailed CMEA draft treaty of 1976 ran counter to this 
intention; this agreement lays down the official relations between the CMEA and the 
EEC. In addition, the draft treaty contained such provisions as the granting of MFN- 
status, removal of trade restrictions, credits on favourable terms and the development of 
trade in agricultural products. In its reply of November 1976, the EEC was consistent 
and refused to start negotiations on the basis of the CMEA draft. Even so, specialised 
talks continued. Eventually, these contacts lapsed -  not least due to the general 
hardening of East-West conflict. 42)
It was not until June 1988 that the CMEA and the EEC signed a political declaration 
which meant the official recognition of the EEC by Eastern Europe. After that, the 
CMEA countries started having diplomatic relations with the EEC and start trade 
negotiations with Brussels. These negotiations can only be of bilateral nature, every 
single CMEA country on one side and the EEC on the other. In these negotiations the 
Western side has pointed out that mutuality in abolishing trade barriers is extremely 
difficult to reach because of the difference in protective methods. 43)
From the point of view of FDIs in the CMEA-area it is extremely important to realize 
that no all-European free trade zone is created on the basis of the CMEA-EEC 
agreement of 1988. If direct investments are made in the East, the Western 
protectionism concerning goods manufactured in the CMEA-area must be taken into 
consideration.
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3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between East and West
3.1. General aspects of Western FDIs in CMEA countries
It is easy to agree with P. Marer, when he states that
"comparative economies should go beyond the simplistic 
classification of countries as capitalist vs. socialist, or as market 
economies vs centrally planned economies (CPEs), because those 
terms veil important similarities between countries belonging to 
different groups as well as significant differences within them." 1)
It is certainly true, that there are similarities, for example, between the CMEA-countries 
and Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) in their respective industrialization drives and 
protection of infant industries. At the same time, it is impossible to regard the CMEA- 
area as a monolithic economic bloc in the 1980s, where all national economies would be 
supply-oriented and managed by directive planning. •
Therefore, it is appropriate to analyse the CMEA-area country by country, in order to 
see what kind of "investment climate" and what kind of specific rules can be found for
FDIs in each country. Advancing economic reforms, which differ from country to
country, pose a serious problem for this analysis, because no ultimate reform goal can 
be seen.
In this context it is also appropriate to repeat an earlier quotation by L. Csaba, who 
stated that
"... the structural interdependence, the common system of regulating 
intra-regional (CMEA) trade as well as the nature and forms as 
evolved in the last three and a half decades add up to what in any 
theory can be called integration. This highly specific integration of 
CPEs is on the one hand the extrapolation of the domestic, national 
system of (mostly directive) planning, on the other hand it is itself a 
factor cementing the former. This means among other things the 
behavioural norms and success indicators of enterprises formed under 
domestic conditions are more or less valid in a substantial part of 
foreign economic activity too. In other words, these conditions of 
macroeconomic and business activity are determinant also when 
CMEA countries enter into economic intercourse with other parts of 
the world". 2)
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Bearing this in mind, one can say that the "business cultures" in all CPEs under review 
in this study have a similar history. However, the present period is characterised by 
multifarious economic reforms which affect the internal as well as external economic 
behaviour of CMEA-countries.
Therefore, it is justified to maintain, that JVs with equity sharing between East and West 
must try to amalgamate two different business cultures together, the Eastern supply- 
oriented and the Western demand-led.
It is somewhat paradoxical that in the supply-oriented economies of Eastern Europe the 
supply shortages become chronic in the mature phase of planning development. This 
phenomenon of vertically organized administrative economy is analysed thoroughly by 
the Hungarian economist J. Komai.
According to him there are machines at a standstill, frozen stocks of goods and idle 
workers waiting for work, material or machines. What is called labour shortage arises 
when the firm would be willing to offer jobs for more people than are willing to accept 
them. "Unemployment on the job", or an unfavourable labour/output ratio within the 
firm are not only compatible with labour shortage but mutually reinforce each other. 
Disorganization resulting from shortage undermines the discipline and morale of labour. 
Chronic labour shortage has a similar effect, making it more difficult for managers to 
take effective actions against workers who violate factory discipline. Shortage 
phenomena affecting household supplies can weaken the population's enthusiasm for 
work. 3)
Difficulties with adequate supplies are often mentioned as the most serious problem 
facing enterprise managers in the CPEs. This problem is one of the most important 
factors behind the decentralization drive of CPEs in their economic reforms. 4)
Closely linked with the supply problem is the fact that the financial system is based on 
"passive money", where monetary flow follows rather than determines the movement of 
resources. The financial sphere of the economy is designed to service uncompetitive 
economies in which money is not channelled to the economically most viable projects 
but is used to subsidize weak enterprises. In such a system neither the unprofitable 
enterprises nor the banks can ever go bankrupt.
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Successful economic reform must thus contain not only increased consideration for 
supply and demand on commodity market, but also on the financial market. The rigid 
and wasteful mechanism of "passive money" must be replaced by "monetarization" of 
the economy. Instead of being told from which state bank branch it must take out credit, 
enterprise management should be able to choose an alternative bank independent of the 
central instructions; at the same time, the banks should be free to choose their clients 
rather than being told which enterprises to finance. This would require banks to offer 
competitive interest rates and enterprise management that seeks out the best credits 
offered. The banks must, naturally, obtain reliable evaluation of enterprises' viability. 
Enterprises must be given the opportunity to raise funds not only from banks but also 
from elsewhere, by issuing bonds and shares.
Economic reforms in Hungary were running clearly in this direction in the late 1980s. 
Certain elements of initiating Hungarian reform can be observed in other CMEA 
countries.
From the point of view of economic reform Hungary is the most interesting country 
among European CPEs as an object of Western FDIs, because the "business culture" gap 
is becoming narrower between Hungary and Western market economies. In the Soviet 
Union economic reform or "perestroika" was still in a difficult, half way stage in the late 
1980s. In spite of that, in the country-chapters special attention will be paid to the 
Soviet Union (alongside with Hungary), because of her large market and considerable 
natural resources, which make that country especially attractive for foreign investors.
3.2. Motives of enacting FDIs across ideological borders
In the European CPEs that allow Western FDIs, the only possible form allowed is 
normally a JV, in which the local economy is represented by one or several economic 
units. To this main rule certain exceptions exist: in Poland small scale, so called 
"Polonia"-firms, which are wholly foreign owned, exist; in Hungary, according to the 
new law that came into force at the beginning of 1989, wholly foreign owned limited 
liability companies are allowed. Bulgaria and Poland are following Hungary at the end 
of the 1980s.
Certain MNCs strictly refuse to enter into JVs. For example, IBM has constantly 
demanded and secured a 100% ownership in its overseas subsidiaries, even if it has led
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to problems in certain countries. 5) Allowing JVs, but not wholly owned subsidiaries 
thus limits the chances of CPEs receiving FDIs.
Studies in international JVs point out national differences in attitudes towards partly- 
owned subsidiaries. Swedish, British, U.S., Dutch and Swiss MNCs prefer sole 
ownership or a dominant capital share, while the Japanese, French, Italian and German 
firms opt for minority participation in JVs. 6)
JVs are formed above all to acquire skills and know-how not otherwise attainable or 
attainable only at a very high price. 7) Companies enter into JVs for a variety of 
reasons. The following list of aims (or potential advantages) provides an explanation of
the enterprise decision to participate in a JV:
1. To reduce the capital cost (and risk) of setting up new capacity.
2. To penetrate a specific geographic market.
3. To acquire managerial know-how about operating in local market conditions.
4. To enter a new field of business.
5. To achieve vertical integration of existing products.
6. To acquire a manufacturing base or raw material sources.
7. To expand existing product lines.
8. To learn newly developing market needs.
9. To acquire a means of distribution.
10. To improye the effectiveness of existing marketing.
11. To avoid cyclical or seasonal instability.
12. To take advantage of lower input costs. 8)
A study made by ECE on East-West JVs contains a list of objectives the host country
authorities have when approving FDIs:
1. To obtain new technology and/or technical know-how.
2. To expand the export sector and thus increase foreign currency savings.
3. To substitute imports and thus obtain foreign currency savings.
4. To obtain foreign capital.
5. To obtain enterprise management know-how.
6. To modernize host country industry.
7. To introduce new goods on host country market.
8. To create new jobs, raise labour productivity, train host country employees.
9. To economise manpower, material, energy, financial and other resources, increase
profitability. 9)
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The ECE study also provides a list of objectives explicitly stated by CPEs in their JV 
laws, which East-West JVs should pursue:
1. One aim of joint ventures in all CMEA countries studied is to obtain new 
technology and/or technical know-how; the acquisition of management know-how • 
is an objective in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and the Soviet Union.
2. Improving supplies of modem goods and of high quality services is an objective in 
Poland. In the Soviet Union, JVs are expected to satisfy more fully the country's 
requirements in manufactured products, raw materials and foodstuffs. Similar 
objectives are also stated in the laws of other CMEA countries.
3. Expanding the export sector is an objective in most countries for increasing foreign 
exchange earnings or savings.
4. In Romania, raising labour productivity is an objective. Bulgarian law mentions 
economising manpower, material, energy, financial and other resources and 
increasing profitability, as JV aims.
5. Import substitution is specifically mentioned as an objective in both Romania and 
the Soviet Union. 10)
Expanding exports are of top priority to Western enterprises. They aim to facilitate and 
promote exports to the Eastern country in question, as well as to the whole CMEA-area. 
However, the hopes that the product of the JV will be sold in other CMEA countries 
against CC do not always materialize. 11)
East-West JVs usually create a competitive edge in information gathering. The post­
sales service is also important. The public relations effect of JVs cannot be ignored 
either. The exploitation of labour cost advantages -  in general an important motive for 
MNCs in their FDIs also plays a role -  though secondary in importance -  in JVs with 
the East. 12)
One of the advantages of a JV over a simple placing of orders is that it allows the firm 
to influence the management of the production firms, and thus, the quality, design and 
other characteristics of the product. In some cases, JVs are also a means of lengthening 
the life cycle of a product. In the background of all these deliberations on the part of the 
Western partner is the profit motive. As a rule, however, economic gains are not seen 
only in relation to the funds invested, but in the wider context of economic ties with 
CPEs. 13)
73
J. Stankovsky points out that the motives of the participating Eastern firms are less 
clear-cut. In the traditional CPE, firm s' display attitudes ranging from caution to 
aversion towards cooperation with the West, because this co-operation involves greater 
difficulties and risks than sales in the domestic or other CMEA-markets. In his opinion, 
however, economic reforms are likely to bring about improvement by giving incentives 
to firms. 14)
When a multiplicity of participants' interests are involved, contradictions cannot always 
be excluded. Perhaps the most serious problem stems from the conflicting objectives 
that may arise between the two parties, with the Eastern partners, on the one hand, 
seeking to meet planned production targets or gain access to Western markets, and the 
Western partners, on the other hand, interested in maximizing the rate of return on their 
investments and gaining access to Eastern markets. The degree to which the operations 
of the JV must match the requirements of the national economic plans may also be a 
source of difficulty. Questions concerning management control, decision making, 
marketing and cost and price determination may pose potential problems. Non- 
convertibility of Eastern currencies also acts to limit the attractiveness of earning profits 
in the local currencies. 15)
In addition to these points, J. Stankovsky points out that in some cases that have failed, 
on the Eastern side the authorities rather than the firms concerned were committed to the 
undertaking. 16)
The ECE study mentioned earlier, also-deals with survival rates of JVs in the global 
economy by referring to several empirical.studies made on the topic. On the basis of 
information available, the ECE study concludes that there exists a number of 
countervailing factors which either discourage enterprises from forming JVs in the first 
place or lead them to terminate the arrangement prematurely either by liquidation or by 
the assumption of complete ownership and control by one of the venture partners. 17)
Large multinational enterprises, in particular, are liable to perceive conflict between the 
advantages and disadvantages of the JV form for the attainment of their corporate aims. 
The fact that they have become multinational corporations in the first place means that 
they have preferred complete control of foreign subsidiaries. The reasons for this 
preference usually stems from reluctance to share control of intangible assets (chiefly 
technology and Research and Development) together with insistence on complete 
conformity of product quality and presentation. When, however, the legislation of the 
host country seeks to assure national control, there is no alternative for the foreign
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investor but to accept joint venture. The survival of the JV, particularly if one of the 
partners is a high-technology multilateral enterprise, will depend on constant 
monitoring of the perceived advantages listed earlier (above all, market access and local 
marketing know-how) with the disadvantages of sharing knowledge and control. This is 
also true of JVs formed within the same market economy or group of economies and 
may therefore account for the widely held view that JVs are often a transitional form of 
business association.
Some of the above considerations are illustrated by the findings of empirical studies. For 
instance, in a survey of 38 companies which had formed collaborating ventures, 23 of 
them (or 61 per cent of the total) were found to have fallen short of the partners' 
expectations, and were prematurely disbanded or were bought out by one of the 
partners. Only 12 of these JVs (32 per cent) met or exceeded the expectation of the 
partners. The main reasons cited for the failed ventures include misreading of the 
marketplace; cost overruns; unforeseen changes in the economy; and governmental 
actions. 18)
However, not all surveys of JV survival reveal a large percentage of failures or 
disappointing results which led to either liquidation, take-over by one partner, or 
control passing from one partner to the other. A study of 52 joint ventures formed by 
American and Indian firms was carried out from 1966 to 1970 and followed up by 
monitoring published data until 1982. 19) This study found that the majority were still 
in operation in 1980; that eight of the joint companies were no longer joint in 1980, with 
■ ownership of five having passed to the Indian partner (while three had failed for a 
variety of reasons and were dissolved); and that "in many other instances the share of 
ownership by the American partner had been reduced substantially by 1980". The 
study's major conclusion was that over three quarters of the total number of JVs 
survived profitably for a decade or more.
An earlier study of joint venture survival, carried out nearly 20 years ago, was based on 
a sample of 1,100 manufacturing joint ventures entered into by United States 
multinational corporations and their subsidiaries. 20) Of these 1,100 joint ventures, 182 
subsequently became wholly-owned subsidiaries of the parent firms domiciled in the 
United States. Another 84 joint ventures came to an end, either because the American 
partner sold its equity stake to the foreign partner or because the jointly-owned 
company was liquidated by mutual consent. In 46 cases joint ownership continued, but 
control passed from the foreign partner from a 50-50 basis over to the multinational
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firm domiciled in the United States. There were two cases of ownership shift from the 
United States to foreign hands.
In short, 30 per cent of the sample of 1,100 joint ventures formed before 1967 between 
American companies and foreign partners proved unstable because of changes in 
corporate strategy or organization by one partner, or control passed from one partner to 
the other. 21)
An interesting study on joint ventures has been compiled by P. Killing, who classifies 
joint ventures into three categories; shared management, dominant management by one 
partner and independent management of either partner. The author found out that 
independent management out-performs the others and shared management had the 
poorest performance. This suggests a positive relationship in a joint venture framework 
between performance and independence from parent companies. It also demonstrates 
the adverse effect on performance resulting from management conflict inherent in 
different organizational and cultural attitudes in a joint venture. Joint ventures with the 
poorest performance record and highest instability are those in which ownership and 
control are shared equally between the partners. These ventures may operate 
successfully when conditions are good, but may split apart along ownership lines when 
problems arise. 22)
Summing up it can be said that the CPEs of the CMEA cannot receive the most 
advanced Western technologies by using the method of joint ventures. Not only 
politically based restrictions co-ordinated by COCOM hamper the technology transfer, 
but also the economic considerations by some MNCs, can result in refusal to enter into 
joint ownership deals. Only the approval of fully -owned subsidiaries by Western 
companies can cause a change in this respect.
Joint enterprises have had certain difficulties in the global economic scene. Empirical 
studies point out that joint ownership is a rather unstable form of operation. However, 
this form of business operation has not always proven to be unsuccessful.
Allowing fully Western owned enterprises in socialist societies is not only an economic 
but also a political question. If the tradition of Marxism-Leninism has been attacking 
the influence of international capital for decades, it is not a simple task to invite this 
same capital to participate in and also to influence the socialist development without 
local participation.
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As this is done, a severe contradiction in ideology obviously emerges. How is it possible 
to explain in ideological terms, that foreign (Western) capital has received the liberty to 
establish enterprises in a socialist economy, if at the same time it is impossible for the 
local population to set up economic units? Liberalization of the internal economy must 
thus advance hand in hand with the liberalization of rules concerning FDIs.
Conflicting interests between partners in East-West joint ventures are obvious. The 
most obvious ones are the differing motives in marketing; the Western partner wants to 
conquer the local market, while the Eastern partner is interested in QC earnings. The 
out-of-date monetary economy in CPEs on the national, as well as international level 
(transferable rouble) is the main reason for this conflicting situation. In this context it is 
necessary to emphasize the fact, that a FDI in one of the CPEs cannot easily be used as a 
bridge head to other CMEA countries, because of the' transferable rouble payment 
system. Receiving CC payment for selling joint venture products from one CPE to 
another is not self-evident.
The point made by P. Killing, that joint ventures in which ownership and control are 
shared equally between partners have the poorest performance and highest instability, is 
of special importance. In East-West joint ventures there has been a tendency to balance 
the interests of the parties. In global comparison, this formula is not a key to business 
success.
In spite of the relative isolation of CPEs from the global economy, the CMEA-countries 
have enacted some FDIs outside their own economic area. In the mid-1980s CMEA- 
countries' JVs existed in 23 capitalist countries. Such JVs with Western firms are 
usually involved in trade: of 409 JVs studied in the mid 1980s, about 70% were active 
in trade. Transport accounts for 11% and banking for 6%. So far industry accounts for 
some 5% of the overall number of JVs. The overall capital investment of CMEA 
countries in the JVs in the West is not significant. 23)
The motives of CMEA-countries to establish JVs in the West are as follows:
to boost their exports to the OECD area
to improve the structure of imports from those countries
to provide for the necessary conditions in transport and banking
to reduce trading expenses
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to improve the quality of after-sales service
-  to gather experience in labour management and marketing
-  to implement new activities in practice. 24)
With all the conflicting objectives and potential difficulties in setting up joint ventures 
between two different business cultures, there were already many interesting cases at the 
end of the 1980s. The CPEs show clear differences in their ability to attract Western 
FDIs.
3.3. Soviet concession policies during NEP-period
The first example of East-West capital investments were the "concessions" of the 
Soviet Union in the twenties, which arose at the time of the "New Economic Policy". 
The concession was an agreement between the Soviet state and a foreign enterprise by 
which the state leased land or industrial industrial buildings to the enterprise, shared in 
the profits, and determined its business relations with enterprises in other sectors. The 
enterprise was run by the concessionaire. Mixed companies -  another form of 
cooperation with foreign capitalists -  were created by the issue of shares; the Soviet 
state held at least 50 per cent of the shares, collected dividends, and directly participated 
in running the company. The Soviet chairmen of the board of directors had the right to 
decide in case of disputes. 25)
In the early i920s Lenin was prepared to go to almost any length to restore the 
economy. He was convinced that this was essential for survival. He fought hard to 
convince doubting comrades that foreign concessions were an entirely proper way out of 
the problem of reconstruction, and his works and speeches at this time abound in 
references to this subject. Some said: "We chased out our own capitalists, and now we 
call in foreign capitalists". Lenin insisted that, by letting foreign capitalists operate oil 
fields, exploit timber resources and so on, the Soviet state would obtain materials of 
which it stood in desperate need, and some modern equipment would be provided by the 
concessionaires. 26)
The significance of the concessions in the promotion of economic development was 
limited. The number of functioning concessions reached its peak in 1928 when 110 
concession enterprises existed. In 1927-28 the stock of concession capital amounted to 
only 45 million roubles, while the Soviet national economic assets totalled 4,5 billion
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roubles. In October 1928 the concession enterprises employed 20,000 people -  of whom 
10 per cent were foreigners -  and contributed 0.6 per cent of the total industrial output 
in that year. Concession policy did not come up to expectations. 27)
The profitability of concession enterprises was low. In agriculture German enterprises 
all made losses. In addition, there were conflicts between the parties. The Soviet 
arbitration court ruled the English Lena-Goldfields concessionaire to pay a penalty- of 
13 million pounds for violating the contract. Some concessionaires in the Donez-area 
were accused of being involved in espionage and sabotage. 28)
In the early years of Soviet rule some Soviet economic units were set up abroad. The 
main reason for that was that the Soviet state had no normal diplomatic and commercial 
relations with her trading partners. In 1920 "Arcos" (All Russian Cooperative Soc.) was 
established in Great Britain, and in 1924 "Amtorg" in the USA. In 1923 "Russwood" 
(Russian Wood Agency), which is still in operation, was set up in London with an 
English partner. 29) Moscow Narodny Bank, which is a wholly Soviet-owned bank in 
London, with branches in Beirut and Singapore, was established as early as 1919. 30)
The XVI Party Congress (1930) ordered that joint stock companies (and thus also mixed 
companies) were to be liquidated. It was the time of Stalin's rule. The Party Congress 
treated joint stock companies as an example of the forms of administration uncritically 
taken over from capitalism. The Party resolution went on to state that although joint 
stock companies were significant in the first years of Soviet power, they had lost their 
significance since the socialist elements of the economy of this country now 
predominated. 31)
The "concession period" was thus relatively short and economically unimportant. A 
long period of relative isolation of the Soviet economy from the Western markets 
followed. Only some marketing units in Soviet ownership have been established in the 
West since World War II. Contemporary FDIs in the Soviet territory were allowed first 
in 1987.
It is highly interesting that one Soviet analysis of the concession period mentions that 
there were hopes to create planned competition between the state-capitalistic and Soviet 
enterprises in order to improve the quality of the products of the state industries and 
reduce costs. 32) This idea has been revitalized in modem times, when socialists states 
have started accepting FDIs from the West.
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3.4. FDIs in CMEA-countries in modern times
3.4.1. Romania
Romania has already for a long time been regarded as a sort of a maverick member of 
the CMEA. It is not possible to cover all the details of Romania's special position inside 
the CMEA here. From the point of view of this study it is sufficient to mention that as 
early as in the 1960s Romania managed to stake out an impressively autonomous 
position. Thus, in the course of the 1960s* the Romanian leadership insisted that 
Romania be included among the less developed countries at the first session of the UN 
conference on Trade and Development, and increased Romania's activity in the UN. 
Bucharest skilfully diversified its trading patterns, thus* reducing its dependence on 
intra-CMEA trade or on the Soviet Union specifically. 33)
A. Smith argues that Romania has placed great emphasis on the desire to preserve the 
power of domestic central-planning authorities, while simultaneously rejecting attempts 
to introduce any form of supranational authority and integration through market levers. 
As a result, Romania has effectively been forced to seek greater trade links with the 
West. 34)
Romania joined the IMF at the end of 1972. This move was seen as a means of 
emphasizing Romania's independent position from the Soviet Union, as Romania's 
balance of payments did not show any fundamental disequilibrium in the early 1970s. 
Thus, the IMF-membership of Romania hadmore political than economic reasons. 35)
Since the 1960s, there have been contradictory elements in Romania's economic 
development. In external economic policy matters Romania has shown independence, 
while in the internal economy the strictly centralized system has prevailed in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 36)
3.4.1.1. Romanian FDI Regulations
Considering Romania's pursuance of an independent external economic policy since the 
1960s, it is no wonder that this country was the first one among CMEA-members to 
allow joint ventures. Law No 1 of 1971 on Foreign Trade authorized the formation of 
joint ventures by Romanian enterprises with foreign firms.
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Recognizing that the 1971 legislation was only a legal skeleton for the development of 
joint ventures, the Romanian authorities published two more decrees in 1972: Decree 
No 424 on the constitution, organization and operation of joint companies; and Decree 
No 425 regarding tax on profits of joint companies. Decree No 395 of 1976 refers, 
among other things, to duty-free imports of goods for use by joint ventures. 37)
The Romanian joint venture decree 38) does not explicitly exclude any economic 
activity from the sphere of companies with foreign participation. Production and service 
units are thus allowed (art.l). However, the same decree stipulates that JVs ought to 
promote exports. Therefore, one can gain the impression that JVs in tourism, for 
example, are not especially welcome. The introduction of modem technologies is clearly 
emphasized (art. 2).
The Romanian decree does not allow foreign majority share of the JV equity (art. 4). No 
change has been made since on this crucial point. The foreign partner can be juridical, as 
well as a natural person (art. 5). The transfer of the foreign partner's profit share abroad 
is guaranteed after payment of taxes and other contributions under the law and the 
contract (art.7).
Joint companies have to be constituted as joint stock companies or limited liability 
companies (art.9). Apportation of all values, tangible and intangible as well as money is 
allowed (art. 14). The value of the goods contributed by each party must be established 
in currency and the foreign trade price agreed upon (art. 15). The expenses of JVs are 
made in the currency agreed upon (art.21). Supplies and raw materials can be purchased 
domestically also in the currency agreed upon, or can be imported duty free (art. 22). 
Only petty expenses and supplies payment have to be carried out from the account in lei 
(Romanian currency) (art.21).
In practice- fact this means that JV partners must choose a Western currency to run the 
joint company in Romania. Internal and external deals are thus paid for in CC. Even 
wage and salary payments made by a JV must actually be enacted in CC. Article 29 
stipulates that a JV must transfer an equivalent amount in foreign currency to its bank in 
order to obtain lei funds for covering labour costs.
Within the framework of the joint company, the foreign personnel may be employed in 
managing positions (art.33). The partners may agree, by the statutes of the company, to 
take decisions with the unanimity of votes of the members present at the legally
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constituted general meeting of the partners in matters concerning the programme of 
activity, the approval of the balance sheet and of the profit and loss account, the 
distribution of profits, the appointment of the executive bodies of the company and 
establishment of their, competence. The proportion in which the parties are to be 
represented in the management bodies, and the appointment, remuneration and dismissal 
of the executive bodies as well as any other matters, are expressly stated in the Statutes 
(art. 11).
These points contain some liberal elements. It is not stipulated in the decree that 
management must be manner occupied by local citizens in certain. The majority share of 
the host country partner is not necessarily reflected in decision-making. The foreign 
partner can protect his interest by defining matters in which unanimity is required in the 
general meeting of the shareholders. However, the decree on JVs states that the general 
meeting of the working people must appoint their representatives to the board of 
directors (art.34).
The most surprising point of the Romanian JV decree is mentioned in art.8: Joint 
companies must work out annual and five-year programmes of economic and financial 
activity which are to have the approval of and stipulated in the Company's Statutes.
This point clearly aims at integrating ail the JVs into the planning rhythm of the 
Romanian planned national economy. No spontaneous economic activity is allowed by 
JVs alongside the mainstream of planned economy.
Taxation of JVs has been kept stable since the beginning of JV-activity. Decree No 425 
of 1972 regarding tax on profits of joint companies in Romania can be summarized as 
follows. 39): Profits shall be taxed at a rate of 30% before distribution to partners (art.l). 
Profits transferred abroad will be subject to an additional 10% tax (art. 13). 5% of the 
pretax profits shall be assigned to a tax-free reserve fund until the fund reaches 25% of 
the invested capital (art.2). Exemption from the basic profits tax can be granted by the 
Council of Ministers for the first year in which taxable profits begin to be made, with a 
50% reduction for the following two years (art.3). The tax on that part of the profits that 
is re-invested for at least five years in the same JV or other JVs with Romanian 
enterprises is reduced by 20% (art.4). A registration fee of lei 5,000 in the CC specified 
in the company's contract, must be paid by the JV to the Ministry of Trade (art.14).
Altogether, the Romanian legislation concerning JVs is not prohibitive, but it contains 
certain points which act as a disincentive for foreign investors. The 49% clause for
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foreign maximum share is certainly a stumbling block for many a potential Western 
investor. Otherwise, the regulations are fairly liberally formulated leaving much leeway 
for partners to agree upon.
There is one important contradiction in the Romanian JV-decree. On the one hand, JVs 
are singled out of the internal national economy by forcing them to work on the basis of 
a foreign monetary unit, and on the other hand, the JVs are required to integrate 
themselves into the national planning system by providing yearly and five-year plans.
3.4.1.2 Experience of FDIs in Romania
After the launching of JV-regulations in Romania, there was some interest among 
Western companies to invest in that CMEA-country. The maverick position of Romania 
in the Soviet bloc was appreciated by the Western politicians and also by Western press, 
which made Romania a sort of "second Yugoslavia" with independent foreign policy. 
Allowing FDIs was regarded as a sign of that.
Also certain economic factors in the early 1970s helped to make Romania look 
attractive for Western investors. The balance of payments was at that time rather well 
balanced and no debt problem was in sight. Romania has for a long time been an oil 
producing country, and thus, the first oil crisis created the impression that Romania's 
relative wealth is rapidly increasing. Romania applied and got developing country status 
in Brussels from the EEC. It was also thought that Romania had good relations to many 
LDCs, and that Romania could thus provide a convenient bridgehead to those markets 
for Western products via JVs.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the first two joint ventures (Romcontrol Data and 
Resita Renk) were set up as early as 1973. 40) These two pioneering enterprises were 
still in operation in the late 1980s.
Control Data is the only US firm to have entered into a joint venture with Romania. 
Recognizing the difficulty of attracting Western personnel to Romania, the firm worked 
out certain benefits in the agreement with its Romanian partner. Western employees are 
allowed duty-free import of cars, furniture, refrigerators and similar items for personal 
use. The social security deductions made from their salaries -  paid monthly in US- 
dollars -  are deposited in a special bank account and allocated to the retirement or 
benefit system chosen by the US company.
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To handle personnel matters not specifically covered in the agreement, a Managing 
Committee with representatives of the two principals was established. It determines for 
instance, how much of a foreign employee's salary may be transferred abroad in freely 
convertible currency. The committee also establishes the vacation policy for foreign 
employees.
The hiring and paying of local personnel also presented some problems. Some of the 
Romanians received training in the US, but the supply of a sufficient number of 
qualified local staff, the responsibility of the Romanian partner, was more difficult than 
anticipated: labour contracts in Romania are concluded for five years, and dismissals 
before the contract's expiration are extremely complicated. Extended discussions over 
pay, fixed by law in dollars, finally produced a reasonable level, but since then new 
exchange rates for the non-commercial lei have substantially increased expenditure.
Under the terms of the agreement, there is no hindrance to the sale of the joint venture's 
products (peripheral equipment for computers) in the other CMEA countries. In a 
modification of earlier estimates, approximately 55% of production is now stated for 
sale in Romania. Control Data will market the 45% balance elsewhere, mostly in 
Western Europe initially but later also in other East European countries, where the sales 
will be in dollars only. The products will be interfaced with Felix, a Romanian- 
designed computer currently being produced under French licence.
One of the areas requiring the most preparation was accounting. The Romanian joint 
ventures law does not prescribe any particular accounting method, so a 38-page 
appendix to establish accounting practices was worked out between Control data and the 
Romanians. The principal area of difficulty concerned depreciation. Romanian law 
requires that 5% of profits must be accumulated each year until the depreciation reserve 
amounts to 25% of the total equity. Since this is a legal requirement applying to all 
Romanian enterprises, Control Data was obliged to accept it. However, the agreement's 
accounting provisions as a whole follow US practice. Under the agreement, there is no 
limit on the amount of profits Control Data may transfer abroad. Nor is there any 
stipulation that Control Data must reinvest a percentage of its profits in the joint venture.
Control Data has also encountered problems specific to the field of electronic data 
processing. Because of swift changes in technology, initial product lines of card 
punchers and drum-type printers proved to be nearly obsolete for Western markets by 
the time full production was reached. The joint venture was forced to concentrate its
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sales effort on the market for EDP products in the CMEA, with the result that the profits 
hoped for were not obtained.41)
Officials of Renk, a gear manufacturing subsidiary of West Germany’s 
Gutehoffnungshiitte (GHH), seriously doubted whether the joint venture with Romania's 
ICMR Machine Works would ever turn out the industrial gears foreseen when the 
agreement was signed in 1973. Even though GHH enterprises had sold products and 
services worth DEM825 million to Romania over the previous 12 years and knew their 
partners well, the negotiations to establish Resita-Renk (RRR), the jointly owned 
limited liability company located at Resita in southwest Romania, were exceptionally 
difficult. Setting up a manufacturing enterprise operating on capitalist principles in the 
midst of a state-owned economy involved breaking a lot of new ground. Romania's 
socialist government did not want to create something that would disrupt other parts of 
its system, and Renk wanted to be sure that it would make a profit from its DEM10 
million investment.
Most of the problems were finally overcome, and the plant was officially opened in 
October 1976. The volume of business was targeted at DEM30-40 million, and the 
plant staffing called for 300 workers plus 90 white-collar employees, 12 of them West 
Germans. It was planned that 50% of the output would remain in Romania, 25% would 
be shipped to other CMEA countries and 25% to the W'est. All sales were booked in 
hard currency.
The commercial director of RRR is a West German and the technical director a 
Romanian. Three members of the board of directors are Romanian and two West 
German, but the West Germans cannot be outvoted.because all important decisions must 
be by a two third majority. The Romanians put up 51% of the basic capital of DEM 20 
million and the West Germans 49%. Of Renk's 10 million share, DEM7 million was in 
cash and the balance in capitalized know-how. Renk's share of the profits can be 
repatriated but is subject to a Romanian profit tax of 30% and a tax of 10% on the 
amount actually transferred.
Being outside the national plan has protected the new company from interference by 
Romanian government authorities, but at the same time it has made the domestic 
procurement of raw materials and semi-finished products difficult. Enterprises working 
under the plan have first call on domestic production, so RRR has to make special 
efforts to fulfil its need. Since it operates exclusively in Deutschemarks. it can buy raw 
materials and other items abroad, but of course at greater cost. When RRR buys
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something in Romania, it pays the FTO or other supplying organization in D-marks. 
For the FTO, a sale to RRR is similar to an export, deal for which it is credited by the 
Foreign Trade Bank at the tourist exchange rate.
The raw materials problem has never been satisfactorily solved for RRR, and the 
Romanian side has repeatedly suggested that the company be brought under the national 
plan. But this has been adamantly opposed by the West German side.
Another difficult problem in getting the company established and operational was to 
find a mutually acceptable basis for pay-scales for the workers. The Romanians insisted 
from the beginning that, although RRR was a Romanian company, it could not hire 
workers at the equivalent in D-marks of the prevailing local wage level. Instead, it was 
required that wages be set at an average "world market level," obviously considerably 
above the Romanian level. Payments are made in D-marks by the company into a 
special fund managed by the Romanian government. Charges are then made against this 
fund for social insurance, health benefits, subsidized housing and other social benefits 
normally supplied by the government to all Romanians. What is left, which is about 
40% of the original D-mark payments, is paid to the RRR plant workers in local 
currency.
GHH executives have privately expressed their disillusionment and said they would not 
consider further joint ventures until there are major changes in Romanian practices. 
Thus, they refused to participate in the joint establishment of a DEM700 million 
machine tool plant in Timisoara.42)
In the 1970s some other JVs were set up in Romania. Only two of them, Olt-Cit, with a 
French partner, and Rifil, with an Italian partner, have remained in business.
Oltcit, registered in 1977, was set up for the manufacture and distribution of small 
passenger cars. The partners are the French Citroen, with 36% of the Ffr 500 million 
capital, and the Romanian Industrial Central for Truck & Passenger cars and the 
Romanian FTO Auto-Dacia. 43) This JV has just managed to survive. The Romanians 
complain that the French partner obliges them to sell the jointly produced car at a loss, 
while the French criticise the Romanians for their low productivity. Furthermore, this 
venture, which was designed to produce 100,000 car annually, has been able to produce 
only 20,000. 44)
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Rifal, registered in 1973, was set up in Savinesti for the production of acrylic fibres. The 
partners are the Italian Romalfa, which holds a 48% share of USD 2.3 million , and the 
Industrial Central for Synthetic Fibres. Production was started in 1974. 45)
Some other JVs, which were set up in Romania in the 1970s, failed.
Problems encountered by the Japanese Dai-Nippon in its Roniprot joint venture serve 
as a clear warning: although pioneer joint ventures are likely to receive privileged 
official encouragement, unexpected pitfalls may double the time needed for plant 
construction. Work can fall far behind schedule even though experienced company 
officials may think they have anticipated all possible delays when negotiating the 
contract.
In 1974 Dai Nippon established the joint venture Roniprot with the Romanian Industrial 
Central for Pharmaceuticals, Dyes & Paints. Total investment, including land, 
construction and Japanese know-how, was valued at approximately USD 11.6 million, 
42.6% of which was provided by Dai Nippon. Processing facilities were to be 
constructed in Curtea de Arges for the production of protein rich yeast from crude oil as 
a basis for livestock feed.
Initial plans called for plant construction to be completed and production to begin no 
later than the spring of 1977. Yet, despite continued intervention by high officials of Dai 
Nippon, construction lagged to such an extent that the original production target date 
was written off as completely unrealistic. In late 1979 Romanian officials described the 
project as still "in the investment stage" but expressed cautious hope that production 
might start in 1980. 46)
A year after the production started, in late 1980, Dai-Nippon sold its share to the 
Romanian partner while continuing to supply technology to the plant for the production 
of protein rich yeast made from crude and used oil as a basis for livestock feed. 
Explaining its reasons for withdrawing from the joint company, the Dai-Nioppon 
executives at the time cited the lack of adequate educational facilities for the large 
number of Japanese children present near the plant site where their parents were 
employed. 47)
After four years of negotiations, The Dutch-West German VFW-Fokker aerospace 
group and Romanian authorities signed a major joint venture in July 1977. The general 
accord established a joint manufacturing company. Rom-Avia SRL, capitalized at
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DEM20 million, with VFW-fokker holding 45% of the total equity and the Romanian 
industrial central Grupulu Aeronautic Bucuresti the remaining 55%. The contract 
provided for licensed production of a minimum of 100 VFW 614 jetliners specially 
designed to transport 44 passengers on short-haul routes.
The contract was signed at a time when only 16 VFW 614 jetliners had been sold 
elsewhere on the world market. The opportunity of supplying the joint venture with 
three aircraft plus components to produce the following 27 units meant that the Western 
plants had a much better chance of reaching the profit point. Without the Romanian 
deal, it was not certain whether this would have been a realistic expectation. As one 
Dutch financier commented,
"The agreement with the Romanians removed a millstone that had 
been hanging around the neck of VFW-Fokker since it launched this 
particular aircraft."
However, this agreement was never carried out. With sales of the VFW 614 limping 
along in an unsatisfactory manner, the Western partner eventually abandoned it 
altogether. The Romanians, in turn, made a licence deal with British Aerospace for the 
production of BAC 1 - l l s  in early 1980 to meet their needs.
It would be wrong to conclude that the fault in failed agreements always and exclusively 
lies with the Romanian side. One of the main stumbling blocks is the fundamental 
difficulty of cooperation between partners coming from diametrically opposed economic 
systems. Another is Romania's chronic shortage of hard currency and their need to drive 
the hardest possible bargain. Finally, it is fair to say that the financial soundness and 
standard of business practices are not the same among all Western firms.
A pioneer French-Romanian joint venture was duly concluded and registered, but 
eventually collapsed. The joint venture, Elarom, was founded in late 1974 by the French 
company L'Electronique Appliquee and the Romanian Industrial Central for Electronics 
& Data Processing Techniques. The Romanian side held 51% of the equity and the 
French 49%. Elarom was io manufacture electronic heart pace makers and monitoring 
equipment for use in Romania and other socialist countries.
Production never reached the stage of marketing, however. According to the 
Romanians, the failure was not due to shortcomings of the Romanian work-force or the 
enterprise's inability to produce and market complex medical equipment. A spokesman 
for the Industrial Central in Bucharest contended that the Central's production line had a
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favourable reputation in Eastern Europe and pointed out that no Western manufacturer 
would have linked up with the Central if it were not satisfied with the quality of the 
work done there.
The Romanians maintain that the project collapsed because of the French partner's 
financial weakness. Electronique Appliquee entered into bankruptcy December 9, 1976, 
only two years after signing the joint venture contract. The Romanians claim they had 
difficulty obtaining technical documents from the French firm, and no Romanian 
technicians were trained at Electronique Appliquee headquarters in France despite 
provisions in the joint venture contract for such instruction.
According to the Industrial Central's spokesman, the joint venture undertaking 
contributed in no way to the insolvency of the French'company. The Central itself 
invested a large sum of money to make the joint venture a viable business operation. 
Once Electronique Appliquee's bankruptcy was registered, it proved impossible to 
preserve the joint venture under the sponsorship of other Western firms. Companies that 
purchased the major assets of Electronique Appliquee have not been willing to assume 
the obligations connected with the Elarom contract.
Austria's Granz Kohmaier and the Industrial Central for Metallurgical Tools & Lifting 
Machines registered a joint venture in 1975 for the production in Sibiu of precision 
roller chains and conveyor elements. Kohmaier was to contribute 40% of project equity, 
or Sch 58.8 million of the total initial investment of Sch 120 million. However, the 
project never reached the production stage. Differing interpretations of the terms of the 
agreement led to charges and counter-charges. The project eventually collapsed. 48)
3.4.I.3. Outlook of FDIs in Romania
Romania can be described to have been extremely unsuccessful in attracting Western 
FDIs into the country. Only four JVs set up in the 1970s were stilt functioning in the 
late 1980s (Romcontroldata, RRR, Oltcit and Rifal). In the 1980s nothing new has been 
set up in the JV-sphere.
The Western consulting firm "Business International", which closely watches the 
CMEA-market, lists the following difficulties in negotiating JVs with Romanians on 
the basis of companies' experience.
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One US company actively considered signing a joint venture, but after months of 
discussions with the Romanians decided to break off negotiations because of major 
difficulties. Summerized below are the lessons learned:
Excessive demands. The US firm concluded that the prospective Romanian partner 
wanted to receive more than it was willing to give. Although Western partners may hold 
only a 49% minority share in the capital of a joint venture, the US company calculated 
that the actual ratio of its contributions to the Romanian enterprise would have been two 
to one. The Romanian partner.agreed to contribute land, building and personnel, while 
the US firm was to provide the technology, know-how and technical assistance, as well 
as ail manufacturing equipment.
W orking capital. The Romanian negotiators fixed the required working capital at a 
level that the US firm considered greatly exaggerated, and the Western partner was to 
provide 49% of this oversized working capital in hard currency.
Wages. As in other joint ventures in Romania, wages of both Romanian and Western 
staff were to be calculated in hard currency. The US firm, however, felt that Romanian 
pay demands were too stiff. The issue was complicated by the fact that the Romanian 
staff would have received only small salaries paid in local currency while the rest would 
have gone to the government. Thus high pay seemed to bring no additional incentive to 
the actual work force.
Problems with CMEA. What the Western company did not anticipate was the 
surprisingly negative reaction of other CMEA countries to its joint venture plans in 
Romania. Other CMEA FTOs made it clear that rather than using hard currency to buy a 
product from Romania, they would purchase it from the West -  even though at 
somewhat higher prices. Thus a basic lesson learned by the US firm was that a foreign 
company must check out the attitudes of other EE countries before entering into a 
Romania joint venture that was going to supply the whole EE market.49)
The complete standstill in FDIs in Romania in the 1980s can be explained by additional 
factors to those mentioned above in negotiating JV-deals. Romania has used up the 
political goodwill it had in the West by applying ultra-nationalistic policies vis-a-vis 
ethnic minorities in her territory. In the economic policy Romania strictly follows the 
traditional, centrally planned economic system, which does not create a favourable 
business environment for FDIs. There have been serious disturbances in the Romanian 
balance of payments resulting in the rescheduling of Western debt in the first half of the
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1980s. Although Romania's creditworthiness has been reestablished in the second half 
of the 1980s by extreme internal austerity, the confidence in the long-term stability of 
the Romanian economy has not been reestablished in Western business circles. 
Obviously, Romania has been in disarray with the IMF on economic policy matters. 
Nobody in the West takes the possibility of reaching lei convertibility in the near future 
seriously, although the IMF-membership presupposes the aiming at making the 
monetary unit convertible. In addition, no amendments have been made to the JV - 
regulations in order to give more incentives to Western FDIs.
Romania has also continued the verbal war against Western economic units and 
institutions using traditional marxist-leninist terminology. For example, the following 
quotation is from a propaganda book published in the West:
"An indecently large share of the world's trade is held by the MNCs.
The returns of some MNCs exceed the national income of many
developing countries. President Ceausescu says that with this 
enormous power they try to increase their profits at the expense of the 
peoples' sovereignty and national interests, which arouses strong 
antagonisms even in the developed capitalist countries". 50)
Thus, it can be concluded that the psychological, institutional and economic atmosphere 
is extremely hostile for Western FDIs. A radical change is needed, in order to attract 
more viable JVs from the West.
It is striking, that Romania, which is commonly classified as a LDC and the poorest 
member of the European CMEA area, has got more FDIs in the Third World than any
other CMEA-country, including the Soviet Union. As the total number of these
investments by CMEA-countries is some 170, Romania with 45 accounts for about one 
fourth of them all. Most of the Romanian FDIs in LDCs are in Africa (30). Natural 
resources prospecting and development (10) and the agriculture & food industry (9) are 
the main branches of activity in Romania FDIs in the Third World. 51)
In the OECD-area Romania has hardly any FDIs. The best known example of 
Romanian FDIs is the Frankfurt Bukarest Bank AG in West Germany, in which the 
Romanian Foreign Trade Bank has a 52% share. 52)
A complete turnaround is needed in Romanian economic policy, in order to attract 
Western FDIs in any reasonable scale. Money spent abroad for FDIs is needed on the 
home market, in order to improve Romanian infrastructure and market supplies. Special
incentives should be given to potential investors in taxation and other terms. Legislation 
concerning JVs should be liberalized and majority stake possibility should be given to 
the foreign partner.
The results of the 1980s in JV activity show that Romania is not even seriously 
interested in acquiring FDIs from the West. This is true: in 1989 President Ceausescu 
announced that JVs have no future in Romanian economic process, because this form of 
property is not in harmony with socialist principles. Following these statements, one of 
the still existing JVs, Rifal, .was closed down. It was predicted that this case was not 
going to be the only one. Thus, the Romanian JV era seemed to come to an end. 53) 
However, shortly after the closing down of Rifal the Ceausescu dictatorship was 
brought down.
3.4.2. Hungary
Amongst the countries under review Hungary is the one which has the most narrow raw 
material base, and thus, the highest dependence on foreign trade. As a consequence, the 
traditional CPE-system has been extremely unsuitable for a country like Hungary.
It is thus no accident that Hungary started reforming her economy relatively early, in 
1968. The Hungarian road to "market socialism" has been in many senses uneven, 
though there appears to be little chance of returning to a centralised, strictly planned 
economy. At the end of the 1980s, it was evident that Hungary was taking some 
decisive steps towards a mixed economy with strong market orientation.
Without going into details on the Hungarian highly interesting economic reform 
process, it can be maintained that Western FDIs fit into the overall reform scheme. It 
can be assumed that direct investments from abroad tend to advance competition in the 
home market. This is especially important when one considers the position of large 
economic units with monopoly and quasi monopoly positions inherited from the pre- 
reform period.
Hungary allowed foreign direct investments virtually at the same time with Romania. 
Motives, however, have been clearly different. Hungary has pursued a remarkably low 
profile in external policy and economy during the reform process maintaining that a new 
economic mechanism (NEM) is not an export item. Only after the mid-1980s has
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Hungary been advertising the reform more outspokenly as being on the same lines as the 
Soviet perestroika.
There are marked differences also between Hungary and Romania as far as dealing with 
the external debt problem is concerned. Hungary has been able to avoid rescheduling its 
debts, unlike Romania, although the situation has been critical throughout the 1980s. 
Hungary has refused to tackle the debt problem by domestic austerity. Pursuing that 
policy of maintaining or even raising the standard of living as well as servicing the CC 
debt has meant that Western FDIs are vital or even essential for the Hungarian 
economy.
Therefore, it is understandable that Hungary has regularly amended the regulations 
concerning FDIs. With time the Hungarians have also learned, that not only the legal 
framework, but also the whole economic environment is important in attracting FDIs 
into the local economy.
As pointed out earlier Hungary has been talking about the possibility to make her 
monetary unit, the forint, convertible. In November 1981 Hungary applied for 
membership in the IMF explaining that this move was in the line with Hungary's overall 
strategy of integrating itself into the global economy and enlarging its possibilities of 
financing.
The membership in IMF was given soon after the application (May 1982), whereby it 
was stated that the consequent drive towards economic reform in Hungary was a 
decisive factor for acceptance. 54) Since then there has been no conflict between the 
Monetary Fund and Hungary. The newcomer has already used IMF stand-by credits 
and has been following the Fund's economic recommendations in her economic policy. 
55)
However, the Hungarian currency is still inconvertible, although certain preconditions 
for convertibility have been fulfilled. The price level has been moving towards 
equilibrium, as subsidies have been reduced. The exchange rate of the forint vis-a-vis 
CCs has also moved towards the equilibrium rate by repeated devaluations.
In the 1980s Hungary has thus taken important steps towards creating an atmosphere 
favourable for FDIs. Also the rules of FDIs have been strongly modified in order to 
attract Western direct investments.
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3.4.2.I. The development of Hungarian regulations concerning FDIs
In the 1980s Hungary’s attitude towards joint ventures has been the most liberal in the 
CMEA area. The original JV decree passed by the Ministry of Finance in 1972 excluded 
production from the JV area of operations. 56)
After 1972, the JV decree has been amended several times whereby the point 
prohibiting production JVs has been lifted. In addition, in 1982 a joint decree of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Trade on economic associations with 
foreign participation established custom-free zones in respect of JV activity. 57)
The Hungarian JV decree lists five various forms of JVs (unlimited general partnership, 
public limited company, limited liability company, joint enterprise and limited 
partnership) in its first article.
The first option mentioned (unlimited partnership) seems unattractive, as each member 
is jointly and separately liable with their entire property. The second possibility (public 
limited company) is recommended, if a large turnover is expected in the JV, as in the 
case of banking activities. In this case the shareholders (stockholders) are only 
responsible for the liabilities of the company with their shares. The third option (limited 
liability company) is obviously meant for smaller units. In this case each member has to 
make an original contribution as well as other material contributions as determined in 
the Memorandum of Association. The members bear in other respects no responsibility 
for the liabilities of the company. The minimum amount of the original capital is FT 
50,000 and each member's contribution a minimum FT 5,000. 58)
In the fourth case (joint enteiprise) eventual losses must be covered primarily from the 
reserve fund. If the latter is not sufficient each member will be liable for the company 
debts jointly, as sureties, in proportion to material contributions. In the Deed of 
Association or by a unanimous decision of the Managing Council, it may be provided 
that the members must make supplementary payments to cover the losses, in proportion 
to contributions. Such additional payments are not to be higher than the member's 
original stake. In the fifth case (limited partnership) the partnership is liable for its. debts 
with the full amount of its property. 59)
Of these possible company forms the second (the public limited company) and the third 
(the limited liability company) seem to be the most suitable ones. The fifth (the limited 
partnership) is appropriate when really small-scale operations are envisaged.
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The Hungarian JV decree also stipulates (art.l) that
"economic associations with foreign participation may be established 
only with the participation of a recognized firm of sufficient means, 
that has reliable business management and possesses adequate export 
knowledge in the economic or technical field relating to the object of 
the association".
By this rule, the Hungarian side hopes to prevent unstable Western enterprises from 
taking part in JV activities.
In Hungary, it is possible for a foreign partner to have a majority share in a JV, The 
decree stipulates (art.4):
"In the total sum of the contributions (share capital) to be fixed in 
monetary terms the participations of the foreign partner(s) should 
generally not exceed 49 per cent. Departure from the latter condition 
may be granted by the Minister of Finance in the range of finances 
(banking) and services, as well as in warranted cases in other fields."
Hungarian JVs are obliged to set aside a risk fund from profits. At least 15 per cent of 
the annual profit has to be allocated for this purpose. The risk fund must be continually 
set aside each year until its sum is equal to the percentage of the capital for the JV as 
determined in the Memorandum of Association. This sum may be between 10% to 20% 
of the capital (art.5).
In the 7th article of the JV decree it is mentioned that JVs are obliged to pay Corporate 
Tax to be paid out of annual profits and reduced by the sums to be set aside for the Risk 
Fund and Sharing (bonus) fund. The rate of the Cooperate Tax is 40%.
From 1 January 1986, a number of measures have been taken to improve conditions. 
The measures have sought to increase the founder's share of the renevue in the form of 
tax concessions in the case of production joint ventures or in "priority fields". Thus in 
the case of commodity producers and hotels built and operated jointly -  if the stock 
capital is over 25 million forints and the foreigners' share over 30 per cent, the corporate 
tax rate is 20 per cent of the net profit instead of the present 40 per cent in the first five 
years, and becomes 30 per cent from the sixth year.
If they reinvest 50 per cent of one year's profit -  but at least 5 million forints -  they will 
be eligible for a 50 per cent tax reimbursement. If the joint venture reinvests the whole
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annual profit -  but at least 10 million forints -  the reimbursement of tax can be as much 
as 75 per cent.
During the preparation of the sixth Five-Year-Plan (1986-1990), a list of priority fields 
was drawn up. In these fields the additional tax reduction beyond the common deduction 
offered was closely connected with the ideas and investment purposes of the Plan. Joint 
ventures do not have to pay tax in the first five years and tax on the net profit is only 20 
per cent from the sixth year.
The priority fields:
electronics (manufacture and system development) 
vehicle accessories manufacture with Western firms
-  manufacture of agricultural and food industry machines
-  component manufacture
-  development of packing technology
-  manufacture of medicine and fertilizers
development of textile and wearing apparels of high quality
-  development for processing food products
-  industrial investment in order to reduce imports accounted in foreign exchange as
well as promoting the exports of agriculture and the food industry
-  development of the protein base
-  production and turnover of propagating and breeding materials 
technological development in order to save materials and energy
-  development promoting tourism. 60)
For Western companies interested only in making use of Hungary’s low labour costs and 
favourable geographic location, two decrees published in 1982 granted joint ventures 
the right to establish themselves in custom-free zones and conferred extra-territorial 
status on the employees of joint ventures. These off-shore JVs carry out accounting in 
Western currency and all contracts must be concluded in CC. Off-shore ventures are 
treated in Hungary as foreign companies. They pay no import duties on input for use of 
the JV, but customs tariffs are payable, when end-products are sold in Hungary. 61)
The Hungarian Parliament enacted a new enterprise law in the autumn of 1988, which 
came into force at the beginning of 1989. This Act VI/1988 on economic Associations 
(Company Act) 62) is meant to be an important step towards a real mixed economy in 
Hungary.
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The Company Act VI/1988 covers economic associations of natural persons and of legal 
personalties. It establishes rules for unlimited and deposit partnership, union, joint 
enterprises, limited liability companies and companies limited by shares. The Act is 
indifferent to the type of ownership, whether it is private, state-owned or mixed, 
domestic or foreign. Therefore, the legislation of foreign ownership is mentioned 
specifically only when it differs from that of domestic ownership. The Company Act 
does not affect the existing regulations relating to state enterprises, state farms, or co­
operatives in agriculture.
The Hungarian company Act is unique in the CMEA area. It accepts that private citizens 
as entrepreneur and legal entities (state enterprises or cooperatives) have equal 
conditions for competition. The two enterprise forms most common in market 
economies -  limited liability companies and companies limited by shares -  are possible 
now in Hungary. Private persons will be able to form or participate in limited liability 
companies and companies limited by shares.
The Act VI/1988 allows private enterprises and persons to invest their money as capital, 
which means that private capital investment without personal participation is possible. 
Private persons and enterprises (domestic and foreign) will be able to buy shares and 
bonds in other private and non-private enterprises.
As domestic and foreign natural and juridical persons are equal according to the 
Company Act, a foreigner can establish a fully-owned entity in Hungary. The joint 
permit of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade is necessary for companies 
with majority foreign ownership. If the application is not handled within 90 days, the 
permit can be considered granted. Enterprises with foreign minority participation only 
need to be registered.
The Company Act stipulates (Chapter 1, Section 10) that an economic association which 
has exclusively natural persons as members may not employ more than 500 people. This 
provision, however, does not apply to economic associations owned in full or in 
majority by foreigners. A foreigner as an entrepreneur in Hungary is thus more equal 
than his colleague from the host country.
The foreigners' interest (stake) in an economic association enjoys full protection. Profits 
due to the foreigner from an economic association are freely transferable abroad, 
without a permit from the foreign exchange authority, provided, that the money cover is 
available within the association; the transfer is to be effected according to the foreigner's 
relevant instructions and in the indicated currency (Chapter 1, Section 9).
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Some limiting provisions are also included in the Company Act VI/1988. The primary 
stock of any limited liability company cannot be less than one million forints. Every 
member entering this form of a company must invest at least 100,000 forint as a primary 
stake. Upon foundation, at least 30% of the primary stock, and not less than 500,000 
forints has to be paid up in cash.
A one-man company limited by shares can only be founded by a legal personalty. The 
registered capital of any company limited by shares cannot be less than 10 million 
forints. The pecuniary contribution upon foundation may not be less than thirty per cent 
of the registered capital, or at least 5 million forints.
It is further stipulated in the Company Act that only share holding companies can be 
involved in banking and insurance activities. A company with foreign majority cannot 
acquire a controlling interest in another company limited by shares in Hungary.
In spite of these limiting factors the new Hungarian company law can be regarded as a 
major break through on the path towards a mixed economy with the door opened for 
entrepreneurial activity. As far as Western FDIs are concerned, the liberal spirit is 
obvious: fully foreign-owned companies are allowed.
The same document has one extremely interesting novelty: it makes portfolio 
investments in shares possible for foreigners. However, this possibility is more of a 
theoretical than practical nature. As long as the forint remains inconvertible, there 
cannot be much interest in portfolio investments in Hungary from abroad.
Hungary is the only CMEA country with some sort of a capital market. Bonds have 
been issued since the early 1980s. Treasury bills appeared on the Hungarian market in 
March 1988. These bills with nominal values of 5,000,10,000, 50,000,100,000 and one 
million forintss are sold to finance the budget deficit. 63)
Hungarian banks offer various account forms for their clients. For example, the joint 
bank, CIB, offers a "Euro-Call Account" designed for corporate and private clients 
seeking tax free money market interests on their deposits. Secret, confidential and 
attentive personal service is promised in this context. 64)
After the issuing of the new Company Act (Act VI/1988) it has also been possible to 
invest in shares in Hungary, as pointed out above. This.option is open for everybody, for 
domestic and foreign natural and legal persons.
From early 1988, a "stock exchange", was first open every fortnight but by late 1988 it 
was in daily operation in Budapest. 65) This marketplace, which been dealt in various
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bonds and treasury bills, will also begin to trade shares in the 1990s, when the new 
company act show results.
The development of money and capital markets is of extreme importance for the 
investment climate of FDIs. Companies fully or partly foreign owned thus have the 
opportunity to look for various methods of operating their cash reserves, and they can 
also reinvest their profits in securities, if they wish to do so.
It is naturally possible that also international portfolio investors will take an interest in 
Hungarian securities. In the case of stocks, a portfolio investor examines many 
economic indicators in addition to the nominal and current value of stocks. Product, 
market share, profitability, tax and other regulatory conditions, etc. are examined before 
the purchase of stocks. For this purpose, the mandatory publication of the results 
produced by companies must be carried out so that the available information can be 
compared with international norms.
Naturally, the portfolio investor is not only interested in return on his shares, but also in 
an increasing market value of his holding, in order to receive a speculative profit. 
Convertibility of the local currency with a relatively stable exchange rate is an important 
precondition.
However, even if it is assumed that no big rush of portfolio investors can be expected in 
Hungary after the enforcement of the new company law, the Hungarian business 
environment is moving into the right direction making Hungary more attractive for 
Western investors than her CMEA neighbours.
In Hungary the Company Act of 1988 defined clear rules for FDIs. In spite of that, the 
Parliament enacted a separate law on the investments of foreigners in 1988 (Act XXIV 
of 1988 on the Investments of Foreigners in Hungary) 66).
The new Act reiterates and confirms formerly existing guarantees and benefits for 
foreign investors. In comparison to the Company Act of 1988 it establishes few 
novelties.
The essence of the Act XXIV of 1988 is that foreigners in Hungary come under the 
same terms as Hungarian nationals. They may become partners in existing companies or 
establish new ones. In this field, they enjoy equal treatment with the Hungarians. It is 
underlined that companies. may even be fully foreign-owned. There are only two 
restrictions in this area. The first one is that, in case of the foreign share exceeding 50%, 
the joint permit of the Ministries of Finance and of Trade is required, while in the case 
of a share not exceeding 50%, the firm will simply be registered by the Court of
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Registration. The other limitation is that a company limited by shares, in which the 
foreign party has a majority stake, may not acquire a controlling interest in another 
(Hungarian) company limited by shares.
A separate chapter (Chapter IV) deals with off-shore companies. The essential feature 
of the relating provisions is that such firms qualify as foreign companies from the point 
of view of foreign trade, foreign exchange and banking rules. These firms conduct their 
business in any of the CCs; they may freely contract loans either inland or abroad.
Some interesting details can be discerned from the Act XXIV of 1988. Section 12 
defines that the foreign party is obliged to pay his pecuniary contribution in a freely 
convertible currency -  unless an international agreement provides otherwise. A non- 
pecuniary contribution may consist of any kind of assets having an assessable value.
This means in actual terms. that pecuniary contributions in TR or in the national 
currencies of CMEA-countries are basically not welcome. In this respect there is a clear 
difference to the Polish JV law of 1988, which explicitly welcomes the two latter form 
of contributions (see the equivalent Polish chapter).
Section 28 states that the labour-law status of the employees is to be governed by the 
Code of Labour, and -  within the framework of the former -  the company statutes and 
the employment contract. The subsequent Section mentions that the statutory rules 
relating to the regulation of wages and the material interest system of those in leading 
position is only to apply to such companies in which the size of the foreign stake is 
lower than 20%, or, five million forints.
In practical terms these sections of the law mean that foreign companies are able to give 
special incentives to leading personnel (also Hungarians) by offering, for example, part- 
payment in CC. This freedom only concerns companies in which the foreign party owns 
more than one fifth of the equity.
Any share due to the foreign party from the profit of the company is freely transferable 
abroad, provided the company possesses the proper CC cover (Section 32). This point 
makes one of the key questions absolutely clear: profit repatriation in CC form is only 
possible, when the company has the equivalent amount of CC at its disposal.
Furthermore, the Act XXIV of 1988 contains clear rules for taxation. The companies 
with foreign participation pay the same entrepreneur's profit tax (EPT) as other 
Hungarian firms. The rate of the EPT amounts to forty per cent of the tax base not 
exceeding three million forints and fifty per cent on the part exceeding that amount 
(Section 14).
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However, the law grants substantial tax benefits to foreign investors. Firstly, if the 
foreign stake in the company's property at foundation reaches 20 per cent or 5 million 
forints, the company is entitled to a tax allowance of 20 per cent of the calculated tax; 
secondly, if more than half of the company's sales receipts derive from the production 
for hotel construction, or if the company's property at foundation exceeds 25 million 
forints out of which at least 30 per cent is from the foreign party, then the company is 
entitled to a tax allowance of sixty per cent in the first five years and forty per cent from 
the sixth year onwards. Thirdly, if conditions specified in the second point are fulfilled 
and if the company at the same time carries on an activity of special importance for the 
host country economy, the company is entitled to a five-year tax holiday, and can 
receive a sixty per cent tax reduction from the sixth year onwards (Section 15). Special 
tax benefits are given, in the case where the foreign party reinvests his dividends.
Economically important points in Act XXIV of 1988 show clearly that Hungary has 
tried to give real incentives to foreign investors. Legislation since 1972 has been subject 
to fundamental changes.
3.4.2.2. Hungary's experience with FDIs
In Hungary, the economic results in attracting Western FDIs in the 1970s were almost 
catastrophically thin. The first rules covering JVs were regarded by Western companies 
as inadequate. Therefore, only a few JVs were set up, and even some of them failed. In 
the 1980s with the amendments of JV-rules the investment activity of Western 
companies clearly revived making Hungary undoubtedly the most interesting area 
amongst the small CMEA countries as far as FDIs are concerned.
According to the JV register of JVs the first JV in Hungary is Sicontact Limited 
Liability Co, in which the West German MNC Siemens is the Western partner. 67) 
Siemens' Hungarian contact go back several decades. The electric installation of the first 
underground railway built in Budapest in 1896 were supplied by Siemens. Siemens had 
its own manufacturing plants in Budapest in 1913. These plants were nationalized after 
World War II. 68)
Business contacts of Siemens with the socialist Hungary began in the late 1950 and 
accelerated in the 1960s. The first cooperation agency agreement was signed in 1968 by 
the Hungarian FTO Interco-operation. Siemens started negotiations concerning a JV in 
Hungary right after the first JV decree was issued. In m id-1974, Sicontact Ltd started
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operating with a 51% Hungarian (Interco-operation) and a 49% West German 
participation. 69)
The basic activities of the Sicontact JV include cooperation and the servicing of 
Siemens computers installed in Hungary. In some areas, Siemens has an extremely 
important role to play in the popularization and transfer of new technologies. 70)
After the experimental period of the JV, an important step was taken in 1980. Two new 
Hungarian partners (Remix Manufacturing Co for Electronic Components and 
Electromodul, Hungarian Trading Co for Electrotechnical Components) were taken in 
and the basic capital of Sicontact was increased from the original forints 5 million to 
62.5 million. In 1986, the basic capital was further increased, to some forints 80 million, 
whereby a new Hungarian partner (Financial Computer Techniques Institute) was 
accepted. Also after these two events Siemens has remained in minority shareholder 
position, owning only a 49% stake in Sicontact. 71)
The first paid-in capital increase was realized by licence transfer and leasing in the 
manufacturing of passover electronic devices. Under this agreement, Remix started 
manufacturing modem polyethylene and polypropylene condensers and later layer 
condensers and layer resistances. The production capacity ensured by Remix also 
provided export possibilities, besides catering for Hungarian needs. 72)
In connection with the capital increase in 1986 a new computer for the Sicontact service 
department was aquired in order to help find disturbances in the Siemens equipment 
operating in Hungary. For testing and simulating of disturbances a new software 
workshop was established, which provides services for the home market and export. 73)
In 1988, Sicontact employed 115 people. Between 1985 and 1987 turnover was 
doubled. This JV pays yearly dividends of some 20% of the capital, and looks likely to 
remain profitable. 74)
Sicontact is undoubtedly a success story among JVs in Eastern Europe operating with 
Western equity participation. However, the German party has also some critical remarks 
to make. The German manager, R. Schoning, points out, that the limited foreign trade 
rights of Sicontact are hampering business. Western currency shortages can. lead to 
disturbances in service activities, especially when spare parts are not immediately 
available. 75) However, expansion of Hungarian operations, including production JVs, 
is not excluded by Siemens, 76) Sicontact operations are on a relatively modest level 
concentrating on various services and technology exchange, but it is profitable.
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The Swedish car-maker Volvo, was among the first Western companies to set up a JV 
in Hungary.
The Volvo joint venture, Volcom, was founded in 1975 to produce Volvo's Lapplander 
four-wheel drive, crosscountry vehicles. The equity was split as follows: 48% Volvo; 
26% the FTO Mogiirt; and 26% the Cseppel Automobile Works, one of whose plants 
housed the production line for the Lapplander.
Unfortunately, at the time production was beginning in Hungary, Volvo was making a 
number of adjustments to the Lapplander that added to the difficulties inherent in 
merging two radically different conceptions of management and production discipline. 
Adjustments to the model were further delayed by administrative problems. Tools and 
machinery necessary for production could be used only after import permission had 
been granted for each separate piece.
As a result of these problems, mass production began over a year late -  and even then 
fell well below the target of 1000 units per year. In addition, the long delay involved in 
getting production started meant that the Lapplander missed a number of marketing 
opportunities: when production problems were finally ironed out the vehicle was not 
competitive in its class, and sales were disappointing.77)
Consequently, the project was closed down after a few years and the company 
transformed into a marketing agency for Volvo products.78)
Coming International's (USA) JV to manufacture medical apparatus had a similarly 
disappointing start. The JV Radelcor (49% Coming; 41% the electrochemical 
instrument manufacturer Radelkis; and 10% the FTO Metrimpex) failed to start the 
production of blood gas analyzers as arranged in 1976 because a rapid rise in world 
prices pushed the price of the necessary machinery above the sum Coming had put at 
the JV's disposal. While permission to spend more was negotiated; component parts, 
which had to be paid for, remained unprocessed and therefore unsold in the warehouse.
Though the company subsequently made a small profit, the experience of these early 
JV's helped convince Hungarian legislators that new legislation was required if JVs 
were to become significant in Hungary .79)
The Hungarian JV register still includes the name Radelcor with the remark that 
operations are suspended at present.
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At the end of the 1970s, which as a decade certainly was not a very successful one in 
Hungary's JV history, an exciting new venture in the financial field was established. The 
first joint bank with East-West participation operating in the CMEA was established.
Central-Europe International Bank Ltd. (CIB) is a dollar-based off-shore bank 
established on the 9th November, 1979, in Budapest. In operation since 1980, the Bank's 
majority shareholders are leading European and Japanese financial institutions. The 
Bank started its business with an authorized and paid-up capital of USD 20 million and 
a subordinated stand-by loan of USD 15 million from its shareholders.
The Bank is registered under the Hungarian Company Law of 1875 with the approval of 
the Government of Hungary and is empowered to conduct international banking 
business of any kind in and outside Hungary. On the basis of its licence of operation 
granted by the Hungarian Minister of Finance, the Bank enjoys special off-shore 
privileges such as:
Exemption from
the Hungarian foreign exchange laws and regulations 
all Hungarian central bank requirements.
Authorization to
deal directly with Hungarian enterprises and organizations, but excluding 
transactions in forints or in transferable roubles,
maintain its books and make up its balance sheet in US dollars instead of forints, 
have its books audited by international auditors appointed by the shareholders.
The Bank is a profit making venture and serves no national interests of any of its 
shareholders' home countries. Based on its off-shore privileges, the Bank conducts 
business in a geographically neutral manner, influenced only by consideration of the 
risk and return of particular business transactions and its business policies.
The Bank's profile is essentially wholesale banking with retail business limited to 
exchange and deposit services. The latter involves the handling of deposits of private 
and corporate clients in convertible currencies, providing them with tailor-made 
account relations.
Within its wholesale activities, the Bank focuses its attention on financing international 
trade irrespective of the origin or destination of the goods involved.
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Activities on the primary and secondary international loan market, as well as financing 
projects in Hungary and outside, also represent an important sector in the Bank’s lending 
activities. 80)
Altogether, in the 1970s only four JVs were set up in Hungary of-which two actually 
failed. Alongside the development of the economic reform and liberalisation of the JV 
rules, however, in the 1980s FDIs increased considerably. 81)
The JV activity in Hungary shows some highly interesting features. Western companies 
setting up JVs in Hungary have chosen almost exclusively to establish operations 
’’onshore”, to act within the Hungarian economy. ’’Off-shore" JVs in duty-free zones 
have failed to catch on although this option has been pushed strongly by the Hungarian 
authorities. JVs in the Hungarian economy can be used by Western companies as a 
vehicle to penetrate the Hungarian market. Only onshore JVs can perform this function. 
Those operating in duty-free zones are treated as foreign companies for customs 
purposes and must do their accounting and cover their local expenses in hard currency. 
82)
Denmark's Flexplan, which produced prefabricated housing, was the first Western 
partner in an "off-shore" joint venture, making use of low-cost Hungarian labour and a 
Central European location to produce entirely for non-Hungarian markets in Central 
and Southern Europe. 83) This JV went out of business as the Danish parent company 
went bankrupt. 84)
More joint banks have been set up in the 1980s, which unlike the first joint bank CIB, 
operate onshore. This means that these financial institutions are authorized to carry out 
commercial and investment banking activities in any freely convertible currency, as well 
as in Hungarian forints.
Citibank Budapest Ltd was founded in 1985 a with registered capital of HUF 1 billion 
(the equivalent of USD 20 million). The Citibank N.A. New York has a 80% share in 
this venture, and the Hungarian partner, Central Bank of Exchange and Credit Ltd, only 
20%. 85)
Unicbank, was established in Budapest December 10, 1986 as a consortium of the 
German Cooperative Bank (Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank), The Austrian Cooperative 
Bank (Genossenschaftliche Zentralbank AG, Wien) and The International Finance 
Corporation (World Bank affiliate) as foreign partners having 15% of the HUF 1 billion 
equivalent to USD 20 million) capital each. Of 6 Hungarian banks Unicbank is fully 
authorized to carry out commercial and investment banking activities in any CC as well
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as in HUF. The main activities are lending to corporate entities, providing bank services 
related to international trade, and retail banking for non-residents. 86)
The establishment of joint banks in Budapest shows that the international banking 
community has confidence in the Hungarian economy. The two joint banks set up in 
Hungary in the 1980s on the onshore basis refer to the hope that the Hungarian forint is 
believed to became convertible in a not so distant a future. An especially interesting 
detail in Unicbank is that The International Finance Corporation, which is an affiliate of 
IBDR, is a shareholder.
Some well-known Western companies that have brandnames as one of their most 
important intangible assets, have invested in Hungary. These companies have chosen 
the onshore option, because their aim obviously is to conquer the local market with their 
trademark labelled products.
In the first month of operation, the joint venture shop (formed in the mid 1980s), owned 
by Adidas of West Germany (51%), the Foreign Trade Bank (15%), Tricotex (15%), 
Kungarocoop (10%) and Artex (9%), got local currency sales of over DEMI million. 
The shop has imaginative and animated window displays. The Western influence in 
shop design in itself makes the outlet stand out, even if many of the goods inside are in 
fact "made in Hungary".
Adidas' venture into retailing followed a number of years' experience in both buying and 
selling in Hungary. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Adidas made regular and 
substantial sales to Konsumex for retail through the Intertourist hard currency chain.
The joint venture now sells for forints under a formula which allows imports of Adidas 
goods to the amount of up to 50% of all increases in Adidas purchases of Hungarian 
goods. This has resulted in a 30% boost in Adidas' buying in Hungary, although most of 
this comprises goods made in Hungary carrying the Adidas brand.
Some Hungarian authorities are not very pleased with this arrangement. They claim that 
instead of expanding exports, the deal is siphoning off production of trademark products 
from the local market and encouraging more imports.
At least for the time being, officials seem prepared to tolerate the Adidas arrangement, 
particularly in view of the popularity of the Budapest retail shop. With demand for the 
brandname goods far outstripping the present supply, production of existing lines is 
likely to be expanded, and the firm is reportedly considering local manufacture of tennis 
rackets and other sporting goods. 87)
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Levi Strauss has had business relations with Hungarian enterprises for a decade. The 
May 1st Garment Factory and Hungarotex Hungarian Trading Company concluded a 
co-operation contract in 1977 under which the manufacture of jeans was begun in 
Hungary using the know-how of the Levi Strauss firm. The greater part of the amount 
manufactured was sold in the domestic market while the rest was bought back by the 
American partner for its own distribution. The agreement expired in 1987, and it was 
then that the idea was raised of establishing a joint venture based in Budapest for the 
manufacture of the whole Levi Clothing range. According to plans, an independent shop 
chain is to be established for marketing in Hungary.
The Knitwear Factory of Kiskunhalas in Central Hungary, a manufacturing hall with a 
floorspace of 5000 square metres has been taken on lease by the joint venture. This is 
where the modem manufacturing lines and equipment to be supplied by the American 
partner will be located. The machines are worth some 1 million dollars. With the new 
workers numbering some 200, a one-year contract will be concluded, and an extension 
will only be negotiated if the labour force have proved their skills. American organizers 
will direct the installation of the machinery, so that the arrangement of the places of 
work will comply with the requirements of the technology. The joint venture will 
receive finished products not only from the Kiskunhalas plant, but from other Hungarian 
factories. Levi Strauss -  Budapest Ltd. will also endeavour to buy the basic materials -  
as far as possible -  from Hungarian suppliers.
The Hungarian denim will be sold not only in the Hungarian market.. As previously the 
European network of the Levi Strauss firm will buy back a large amount of jeans. It also 
intends to take over significant amounts of articles made of Hungarian basic materials. 
But apart from clothing items, the Levi Strauss firm wants to increase its purchases from 
other manufacturers in Hungary. 88)
The internationally well-known furniture firm IKEA of Sweden spent two years 
negotiating a Hungarian joint venture before it was approved. The delay was due to 
reluctance on the part of the Hungarian furniture industry, which is reported to be 
adverse to IKEA's price and quality competition. Hungarian manufacturers prefer to 
supply the domestic market with its present range of products, according to IKEA. 89)
In December 1987 the agreement on IKEA JV (Burtorker-IKEA Einrichtungs -  
GmbH) was signed. The HUF 25 million capital is shared on a 50-50 basis. IKEA, 
which has been buying from Hungary on the basis of contract manufacturing goods to 
the value of SEK 30-40 million yearly, intends to increase purchases from Hungary's 
JV to SEK 180 million by 1990. A new furniture shopping centre will be erected in 
Budapest with a huge selling area of 11,000 m2, where articles will be offered. The aim
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for annual sales in Hungary is HUF 1 billion out of the local furniture market of 
Hungary of some HUF 12-14 billion. Aggressive marketing in Hungary as planned by 
the IKEA JV is based on the promise of producing a positive convertible currency 
balance in its activities. 90)
When JV-approvals are given by the Hungarian authorities (Ministry of Finance), a 
positive balance in CC activity of a JV is presupposed. However, a working permit can 
also be given, if the JV is able to contribute to convertible currency import substitution. 
91)
The latter case, important import substitution, can be demonstrated by the Kemipur JV, 
in which the West German chemical giant BASF is the Western partner via her 
subsidiary Elastogram. Kemipur was established in 1984 with the original capital of 
DEM 4.4 million, of which the Western partner had 49%. Kemipur was set up to 
manufacture polyurethane foam compositions for application in shoe sole making, for 
insulation in refrigerators and building industries, for the manufacture of bumpers in the 
vehicle industry. 92)
In 1988, this venture still had to import all the raw materials from the West, while the 
local demand for the end-product seemed endlessly high. Although Elastogram had 
agreed to export 20% of Kemipur's production, virtually no exports have taken place 
because of the high local demand. Development of local raw materials is, therefore, 
under consideration. Kemipur plans to invest DEMI.5 million, in order to enhance the 
capacity. 93)
Hungarian authorities have continuously pointed out that in the sphere of tourism there 
are various possibilities for joint ventures. The country has a population of 10.6 million, 
but it is visited by 17 million foreigners yearly. One fourth of them come from the West 
leaving around USD 0.5 billion in Hungary. Eastern tourists, in comparison, spend 
around 0.5 billion roubles in Hungary. 94)
So far, however, JV activity in tourism has been rather modest. It is worth mentioning 
that international hotels in Budapest (Hilton, Intercontinental, etc.) are run on the basis 
of franchising deals.
In 1985 Club Tihany JV was established to construct and run a recreation centre on the 
lake Balaton. In this venture Western shareholders are from Austria (three) and 
Denmark (one), who altogether own only 30% of the venture. Club Tihany Ltd 
comprises 161 bungalows, and a luxury class hotel with 220 rooms and 12 restaurants. 
95)
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A highly interesting JV was set up in 1980, which has been active in gambling since 
1981. Budapest Gambling Casino Ltd runs a casino in the Budapest Hilton hotel and 
since October 1984 also in the treatment hotel Heviz near lake Balaton. The Austrian 
state-owned gambling organization (Osterreichische Spielbanken) is participating in 
this venture with a 40% shareholding. Also three travel agencies, two of which have 
Austrian and one Italian partners have been set up. 96)
In the summer of 1988 an agreement concerning a new treatment hotel joint venture was 
signed in Budapest between Danuvius Hotel and Spa Company and the Finnish 
construction firm Rakennuskunta Haka. The new JV will construct and run jointly a 
treatment hotel with more than 500 beds in Budapest on the Danube. The basic capital 
of the JV is HUF 650 million. The hotel will start operations in mid 1990. 97)
Not all JVs are successful, however. The story of the Bramac joint venture goes back to 
1984 when the Austrian company agreed with VAEV, a building materials cooperative 
in Veszprem, to produce roofing tiles using Bramac machinery and technology. The 
deal seemed logical enough; since Hungary was annually importing some 40 million of 
it total requirement of 135 million roofing tiles, the JV’s planned output of 20 million 
tiles would offer prompt import substitution. Indeed, Bramac itself had shipped about 3 
million tiles to Hungary in 1983 and looked forward to sales of 10 million in 1984.
But the cooperative VAEV had been in financial trouble for some time; in 1985 losses 
reached Ft 300 million (over USD million). Miscalculations in overseas contracts had 
brought considerable losses. When in early 1987 no further credits were available to 
keep the enterprise afloat, the Hungarian Credit Bank, acting under the new bankruptcy 
law, simply applied for VAEV to shut down. Officials agreed, setting the stage for 
Hungary's first major bankruptcy case, involving 2,300 workers.
A key weakness of the JV itself was its unreadiness to handle any large-scale sales 
promotion within Hungary. As long as the construction industry enjoyed a boom, sales 
took care of themselves. But when a slump in major investment projects hit, the JV's 
inventories of roofing tiles soared, at one point reaching a seven-month stock. The 
Austrians pressed for marketing efforts in order to supply tiles for smaller projects. 
VAEV agreed to offer discounts and free delivery. But the shift from a few larger to 
many smaller customers brought accounting problems for the JV. At the same time, 
payment morale in Hungary began to lag and cash-flow problems grew.
Finally, exchange rate differences undermined the joint venture's profitability. Although 
the JV reportedly turned a Ft 90 million profit in 1986, the 38% devaluations of the
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forint against the Austrian shilling took a major bite out of profits. Bramac appealed to 
the Finance Ministry in Budapest.
Bramac claims that the JV’s problems can still be overcome; the firm has declared its 
intent to continue with the JV, not surprising in view of the air-conditioned computer- 
controller plant built in Veszprem. The state has since taken over the Hungarian share, 
and the new partners plan to introduce new tile designs. 98)
Tuomo Halonen Oy (THOy) is a Finnish company producing foodstuffs processing and 
liquid packaging machines. In 1986, THOy set up a JV with the Hungarian dairy 
organization TVT. The JV aimed at manufacturing liquid packaging machines and 
foodstuff processing equipment to complete the product range of THOy. It was decided 
that JV products will be marketed in Hungary, as well as in the Third World, together 
with THOy.
It was agreed between the JV partners that no profits could be paid out during the first 
five years of its operations. The intention was to quadruple the JV resources by 
investing all possible profits. 99)
Shortly after presenting this promising JV case in the 15th International Small Business 
Congress in Helsinki, August 1988, Tuomo Halonen withdrew from the JV by selling 
his share to the Hungarian partner. Obviously, the reason for that was that the Western 
part tried to repatriate his profit by using transfer-pricing, when certain components of 
the end-product were sold to the Hungarian joint venture. The Hungarian side found 
this out by making international price comparisons.
Hungary has also been relatively active in participating in JVs outside the country. 
Under a decree issued jointly by the Minister of Foreign Trade and Finance in 1975, 
Hungarian enterprises can draw on substantial state financing for establishing JVs 
abroad. Ownership and management may be shared by the Hungarian and foreign 
participation, with no mandatory ownership proportion. To encourage Hungarian 
enterprises to venture abroad important tax credit advantages have been also granted. 
100)
According to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce guide-book on JVs
"economic associations with foreign participation are becoming 
increasingly popular in the course of the international division of 
labour. JVs have proved more advantageous, not only as simple sales 
transactions, but also than such types of business like trade with 
intellectual property and licences or production and marketing
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cooperation deals even more effectively and flexibly in respect of 
exploiting comparative advantages and promoting the international 
flow of the factors of production. This particular advantage has long 
been recognized in Hungary. Hungary operates almost 150 companies 
abroad throughout the world with Hungarian capital outlay. The 
establishment and activities of such companies have provided basic 
experience. Founders have become aware of the need to acquaint 
themselves above all with the economic and legal system of the host 
country, as only awareness of and adapting to the local environment 
and customs can ensure successful operation.” 101)
In the late 1980s Hungary had over 200 JVs outside the country. 102) Obviously, the 
big bulk of these outlets are mere marketing organizations selling Hungarian goods in 
the West and in the Third World. Two Hungarian Banks, Central Wechsel- und 
Creditbank in Vienna, established in 1918, and Hungarian International Bank Limited in 
London, founded in 1973, operate in the OECD-area. 103)
Alongside with the Hungarian Bank in Vienna, there are also two production units 
under Hungarian ownership operating in Austria, which have been established before 
World War II. The light bulb manufacturer Tungsram has one factory on its own name 
and the subsidiary, "Patria”, producing in Austria. The pharmaceutical firm Enzypharm 
was established in Austria in 1948 by the Hungarian FTO Medimpex. The steel 
enterprise Metex is owned via two holding-companies in Liechtenstein by Hungary. 
104)
Tungsram is certainly an extremely interesting socialist enterprise which is obviously 
more internationalized that any other manufacturing unit in the CMEA-area. It produces 
electrical lighting products together with the equipment required for their manufacture. 
As one of the largest in this branch in the whole world, it runs 17 factories located in 
Hungary, one in the USA (Action-Tungsram) one in Pakistan (also an electric 
company) 105) and two in Austria.
Tungsram established a new production unit in Ireland in 1980. The electric light bulb 
production capacity came on stream in April 1982. However, the company ceased 
operations in February 1984 for reasons related to over-capacity and supply difficulties. 
106)
In Hungary, Tungsram is running a JV together with Schreder from Belgium. In this 
venture, which produces lighting for streets and industrial facilities, Tungsram has a 
40.5% share, the Hungarian Aluminium Corporation 20% and the Western partner 40%.
I l l
The JV was established in 1983 and production went on stream in 1984, when turnover 
already was HUF 22 million. In 1988 turnover reached HUF 150 million. Tungsram 
point out that the decisive factor in signing the JV contract was that no licence deals for 
street lamp production were for sale on the international market. 107)
3.4.2.3. Overall results of JVs in Hungary in the 1970s and 1980s
Hungary has been by far the most successful small CMEA-country in attracting FDIs. 
According to information from the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, the number of 
JVs licensed till December 1988 was over 270. In the first quarter of 1989 there were 
184 joint ventures in operation. 108)
Data given by Hungarians contains many details . Capital invested in each JV case is 
mostly given (although in 5 cases it is missing). All partners involved are listed, as well 
as the activity of the JVs. Turnover or profits, however, are not mentioned.
Information compiled on the Hungarian JV register allows a comprehensive analysis on 
FDIs in Hungary. According to the register from 1989, a total of 29 units were 
established before the year 1985. In year 1985, 18 new JVs were founded, and also the 
following year 18 new units saw daylight. In 1987 already 40 new ventures with foreign 
participation came into being. In 1988 the corresponding figure was 77 units.
From these figures it can be concluded that Hungary has been able to attract foreign 
direct investments with an accelerating speed during the second half of the 1980s, when 
there has been remarkable amendments into JV legislation. Obviously,: the advancing 
economic reform has also contributed to the increasing number of JVs.
However, the capital invested in Hungarian JVs is still relatively modest. In the 179 
cases in which the invested capital is given, the total equity amounts to 31.4 billion 
forints, which is the equivalent of USD 523 million. 109) From this sum about one- 
third ( Ft 10 billion or USD 167 million) is invested in joint financial institutions. Ft 7.8 
billion or USD 130 million is invested in the capital-intensive hotel business accounting 
for up 25% of the whole investment bulk.
In joint ventures outside the hotel and banking business the total invested capital is thus 
only some Ft 13.6 billion, or the equivalent of USD 227 million, which is less than the 
half (about 43%) of total JV equity sum. Of this sum about half is invested by foreign 
partners, who thus have brought only slightly more than USD 100 million outside of the 
banking and hotel spheres into the host country.(See figure 1/3.4.2.3.)
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Enterprises with small capital predominate the scene among Hungarian JVs. 54 units or 
30% out of 179 JVs, in which the starting capital has been revealed, have less than Ft 20 
million (One third of a million US-dollars) as equity. Almost half (47%) of all 
Hungarian joint ventures are situated in the equity brackets of Ft 20.1 million to 100 
million. These units have a starting capital of between 0.33 million and USD 1.67 
million. Fourteen enterprises have equity between Ft 100.1 million and Ft 200 million 
(USD 1.67-3.3 million), thirteen over Ft 200 million, but less than Ft 500 million (USD 
3.3-8.3 million), and fourteen have over Ft 500 million (over USD 8.3 million). (See 
figure 2/3.4.2.3)
The 138 joint ventures, in which the invested capital is Ft 100 million (USD 1.67 
million) or less, account for no less than 77% of the total. Only 14 units (7.8% of the 
total) have an equity of more than Ft 500 million (over USD 8.3 million).
In the category of large units (equity over Ft 500 million) financial institutions and 
hotels are predominant position. In addition to C.I.B. (Ft 1.2 billion equity), Citibank 
Budapest Ltd (Ft 1 billion) and Unicbank Ltd (Ft 1 billion) mentioned in the previous 
section, two other major financial ventures have been established in 1988. Central- 
European Credit Bank Ltd went on stream with a Ft 1 billion capital. In this venture 
C.I.B. has a share of 92.872%, and it is listed as the Hungarian partner. All the OECD- 
country participants of CIB are shareholders in the new bank with a share of 1.188% 
each. In 1988 Investrade Co started operations with an equity of USD 100 million (Ft 6 
billion). In this venture, which provides services of specialized financial institutions for 
foreign trade, consultancy in economic cooperation and market research, the foreign 
partner is Daewoo from the Republic of Korea. It shares the highest JV investment in 
Hungary with Magyar Hitel Bank (Hungarian Credit Bank) on a fifty-fifty basis.
The same Korean Daewoo has also established a joint venture called "Saint Steven" 
Hotel Co with the same Hungarian partner. This also has an extraordinary by high 
capital of USD 90 million (equivalent of Ft 5.4 billion). Also in this case capital is 
shared 50-50% among the partners. According to a CMEA-bulletin, this company has 
bought Budapest Hilton and is building a new hotel in Budapest. 110)
The Swiss company Hafina Bau AG established a joint venture in Budapest 1988, in 
order to build and manage a spa hotel. This venture, in which the Western partner has a 
share of 38%, has an equity of just under Ft 1 billion. The spa hotel with the Finnish 
participation (Haka), mentioned in the previous section, has an equity of Ft 650 million.
114
So
ur
ce
: 
Ow
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 
ba
se
d 
on 
H
un
ga
ri
an
 
JV 
li
st
TT
i f
Tn
vo
 
9/.Q
 
4 
9 
5
115
Thus, five banks and three hotel enterprises comprise eight out of fourteen large JVs 
(with equity over Ft 0.5 billion), or 56.1 per cent of this big enterprise group. Only six 
major entities are therefore active in manufacturing.
Videoton Automation Joint Enterprise, founded in 1988 has the highest capital among 
non-banking and non-hotel joint ventures. This unit has a starting capital of under one 
billion forints (Ft 945 million or USD 15.8 million), of which Simera AB from 
Liechtenstein owns 31.2%, and Hungarian Videoton Electronic Works the rest. 
Activities include development, production, sales of computer peripherals, industrial 
robots, robot controllers, and flexible manufacturing systems. The Japanese-Hungarian * 
company Agroferm has an equity of Ft 882 million (USD 14.7 million). Two Japanese 
firms own 20 per cent together and IFC 14.5 per cent of this unit, which is establishing 
and running a lysine plant. The end product is an important feed additive protein.
In 1989 Videoton established a joint venture with Thyrsus Trading from Cyprus to 
produce consumer electronics (Hifi). This venture has an equity of Ft 572 million (USD
9.5 million), of which the Western partner has a share of 30.07%.
KBC Manufaktur Koechlin from West Germany has established a textile printing 
factory with Hungarian partners. This unit has a starting capital of Ft 568 million (USD
9.5 million), which is shared 50-50% among the host country partners (39)'and the 
Western participant.
Selectronic joint venture was" originally established between Standard Elektrik Lorenz 
from West Germany, and Skala-Coop, Hungary. This JV was acquired by the Finnish 
company Nokia, when Nokia bought Lorenz. Selectronic, which produces and markets 
mainly Nokia ITT colour TV sets, has an equity of Ft 541 million (USD 9 million), of 
which the Western partner owns 35%.
Ikea from Sweden has obviously decided to expand its operations in Hungary, because 
the equity given in the 1989 JV register of Hungary for Butorken-Ikea is Ft 528 million 
(USD 8.8 million). This is about twenty times more than the original figure in 1988.
Five financial institutions, three hotel businesses, and the six other units mentioned 
make up the 14 JVs with equity over 500 million forints (USD 8.3 million). Two of 
them operate off-shore, the CIB and Investrade, both of which are financial institutions.
Altogether, only 28 Hungarian JVs operate on the off-shore basis, which is 15.2% of 
the 184 units registered. The overall capital invested in off-shore units is relatively 
high, altogether Ft 8.2 billion (USD 137 million). This high figure, however, results 
mainly from two off-shore financial institutions, CIB and Investrade, which together
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have an equity of Ft 7.2 billion. Obviously, CIB has been thinking over its role as an 
off-shore unit, when Citibank and Unicbank were established on the on-shore basis. It 
can be assumed, that the CIB established Central-European Credit Bank in 1988, which 
is 92.872% owned by CIB and which operates on-shore, in order to be fully 
competitive with other joint banks in Hungary.
Among the off-shore units there is one more financial institution, the International 
Investment Agency, in which an Austrian bank and an enterprise from Liechtenstein are 
the Western shareholders (33.3% each). This unit, which provides stockbroking 
services, investment banking consultancy and assistance in international financial 
matters, has a capital of a mere USD 210,000 (Ft 12.6 million). Therefore, the 
International Investment Agency is obviously more of a financial consultancy than a 
full-scale bank.
Alongside with the CIB also the Hungarian Gambling Casino, which was established 
1981 together with the'Austrians, can be regarded as a pioneer in Hungarian off-shore 
business. This unit has an equity of DEM 5 million (Ft 150 million).
If the capital of these four units, two banks, one financial consultant and one casino, is 
deducted from the over all off-shore capital, it can be seen that only Ft 815 million 
(USD 13.6 million) are invested in other off-shore units. Of these units there are 23 
whose capital is known. They have an average equity of Ft 35.4 million (about USD 0.6 
million). From the over all non-banking JV capital these Ft 815 million account for 
3.8%.
Of the 23 off-shore non-financial institution joint ventures 9 have a capital less than Ft 
20 million. Twelve of them have an equity between Ft 21 million and Ft 100 million.
The biggest of these two, Metab Metal Working Ltd Co with an Austrian partner 
produces zinc plating, plastics coating and the lacquering of rolled steel products, as 
weil as building elements. Metab has an equity of ATS 44 million (USD 3.15 million), 
of which the Western partner has 42.5%.
The other off-shore unit with a capital over Ft 100 million (USD 2 million) is TNT- 
Malev Express Cargo Ltd, which flies express cargo transport five time a week at night 
from Budapest to Cologne and back, and provides charter cargo activities on request. 
The Western partner is TNT World-Wide Air Express (UK), which has a 40 per cent 
share in the venture.
It can be concluded, that the off-shore activity in the Hungarian JV scene has not been 
developing too dynamically. Mainly small enterprises have used this opportunity
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outside the banking sector. In 21 cases out of 23 (91.3%) the enterprise capital is less 
than Ft 100 million (less than USD 1.7 million).
Of all the joint ventures active in Hungary 120 units are active in the production sphere 
(two thirds of the 184 units). Classification is difficult, because in some cases the 
activity of the enterprise is not entirely clear.
Tourism, as is well known, is a big business in Hungary. Among the joint ventures 13 
are involved in tourism (7% of the total). When joint venture hotels are counted into the 
total JV equity, the tourist units have a total capital of Ft 8.1 billion (USD 13.5 million), 
or 26% of total JV capital. For the non-banking JV capital, tourism accounts for as 
much as 38.5%. A considerable part of these JV tourism investments aim at the 
development of treatment travelling. (See figure 3a/3.4.2.3.)
Construction material production is the most popular activity of Hungarian JVs in the 
production sphere. This branch accounts for 24 of the 120 productive units (20%). The 
chemical industry, agro-business and food processing and engineering and equipment 
comprise 17 cases each (14.2% each). The electro-technical and electronics branch has 
13 cases (10.8%) and textile and clothing 11 (9.2%). Non-classified cases comprise 21 
ventures, including book printing and bicycle assembling.
In high tech areas the picture of Hungarian JVs is rather interesting. Many of the small 
units are active in computer software, but some solid investments in high tech have also 
taken place. Videoton Automation Joint enterprise produces computer peripherals, 
industrial robots and flexible manufacturing systems. This enterprise, in which Simera 
AG from Liechtenstein is the Western partner with a 31.2% share, has an equity of Ft 
945 million (USD 15.8 million). Behind the Liechtenstein company is probably some 
bigger Western firm. Nokia's TV and video production unit has an equity of over half a 
billion forints. Videoton produces consumer electronics together with Thyrsus from 
Cyprus in a joint venture, in which the equity is also over half a billion forints. Videoton 
also produces discs and data bearers and data storing equipment together with a Dutch 
company in a joint venture with a Ft 250 million equity (USD 4.2 million).
It is not surprising that in the agro-business and food processing the Western interest 
has been relatively high, resulting in 17 joint units. The same can be said about the 
chemical industry in which joint ventures have been concentrated especially in light 
chemicals (pharmaceuticals).
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The machine and equipment building branch has more joint ventures (17) than textiles 
and clothing. The relatively poor performance of the latter (11 cases) shows, that in the 
labour-intensive area of textile and clothing it is not easy to attract FDIs, although 
labour costs are relatively low in Hungary. Investments in this area can find still more 
advantageous costs in developing countries. (See figure 3b/3.4.2.3).
Foreign partners in Hungarian JVs come overwhelmingly from Western Europe.. 
Companies from Northern Europe (Scandinavia) have not shown very great interest in 
investing in Hungary, but still this area is represented in 8.7% of Hungarian JV cases. 
Thus, Western Europe taken together is involved in about every four cases out of five. 
This involvement is actually even higher, because in the most of those JVs, in which 
there is more than one foreign party, the alien firms are West Europeans. North America 
has a small, six per cent share only. Asia and the CMEA are both represented with a 
small share of 2.2%. Latin America has scored 0.5% of the cases by one participation 
from Panama. (See figure 4/3.4.2.3.)
Altogether, 203 Western companies participate in the 184 joint ventures active in 
Hungary. Neighbouring Austria has been the most active among Western investors 
participating in 51 cases (28% out of 184). After Austria is the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which is a part of 36 Hungarian joint ventures (including one from West 
Berlin). Both also participate in other joint ventures, the partners of which are from 
more than one country (Austria 9, West Germany 7).
Austria has invested a total sum of Ft 1,616 million (about USD 27 million) into the 
Hungarian economy. This result must be rather disappointing for Hungarians, who have 
been expecting high input from their Western neighbour. In average, the Austrian 
capital share per JV unit is a mere Ft 28 million (less than half a million dollars). The 
banking sector is excluded from these figures.
Only in three cases the Austrian capital contribution in Hungarian joint ventures exceeds 
Ft 100 miliion (USD 1.7 million). The highest Austrian investment has been made into 
VEAV-Bramac enterprise, in which the Austrian partner Bramac Dachsteinwerk owns 
49 per cent out of the total capital of Ft 299.5 million. This unit, which mainly produces 
concrete roof tiles, has been in difficulties, because of the bankruptcy of one of the 
Hungarian partners (see previous section). Probably because of that, a new JV was set 
up by Bramac, in which Veszprem county construction work is no more a party. The 
■ new JV, Duna-Bramac Building Materials Ltd Co also produces roofing tiles, with an 
equity of Ft 202 million, of which the Western partner owns 30.01%. It is not known 
whether both JVs are in operation.
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The second most important Austrian investment is in the hotel business. Stuag Bau-AG 
from Austria owns 40% of Hotel Liget Public Ltd Co, which has a total capital of Ft 295 
million. The aim of this JV is to build and operate a three-star hotel in Budapest.
Metritechnic Commercial and Servicing for Automation Co Ltd is an Austro-Hungarian 
JV, in which the Austrian company Festo Maschinenfabrik has a 55% share of the Ft 
211 million capital. This unit, which was established in 1982, represents Festo's 
products in Hungary, but is also involved in the designing and production of pneumatic 
and electronic systems.
West German companies have invested a total amount of Ft 1,073 million (USD 17.9 
million) in Hungarian JVs, excluding the banking sector. This makes a capital 
contribution of only Ft 25.5 million, per JV participation which is even less than in the 
Austrian case. These figures can hardly be satisfying from the Hungarian point of view.
In addition West Germany has only three cases, in which the Western capital share 
exceeds Ft 100 million. The biggest single investment has been made by KBL 
Manufaktur Koechlin, which together with Hungarian partners runs a textile printing 
factory. This unit has a capital of Ft 568 million, of which the Western partner owns 50 
per cent (Ft 284 million or USD 4.7 million).
Artificial yams are produced in Sopilen Chemical Fibre Work Ltd, in which the West 
German Geco has a 52% share of a Ft 310 million (USD 5.2 million) capital.
Two German companies S.E.S. and Deuma together own 49% of MD Engineering and 
Commercial Ltd JV with a capital of Ft 222.6 million (USD 3.7 million). This venture 
produces dividing doors, but is also involved in designing and construction of-buildings 
and structural engineering.
From Western Europe Switzerland participates in 19 Hungarian JVs, Sweden in 10, the 
Netherlands in 8, Great Britain in 5, Finland and Italy in 4 each, Denmark and 
Liechtenstein in 2 each and others (France, Belgium, Portugal, Greece) in one each. 
Some of the countries are involved also in joint ventures in which the partners are from 
more than 1 country.
According to the Hungarian Joint Venture register, the United States are involved in 16 
Hungarian joint ventures. This information is in so far misleading, as three cases of IFC 
involvement (International Finance Corporation), which is a World Bank affiliate, are 
included. US companies are thus involved in only 13 cases, of which only in 11 cases 
they are the sole foreign partner. The far most important American investment is in
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banking, as Citicorp Overseas Investment Corporation from the USA owns 80 per cent 
of the Ft 1 billion capital (USD 17 million) of Citibank Budapest.
Outside the banking sector the US firms have invested a total sum of Ft 285 million 
(USD 4.75 million). When this sum is divided by the number of participations (12), the 
average US capital contribution in Hungarian JVs is only Ft 24 million or USD 0.4 
million. This figure is even lower when compared to Austrian and German investments.
The highest capital contribution among US joint ventures in Hungary is by the 
Schwinn-Csepel Bicycle Company, in which two US companies together own a share 
of 51 per cent out of total capital of Ft 158.4 million (USD 2.6 million). In Qualiplastic 
Co Ltd Joint venture with a total capital of Ft 142 million (USD 2.4 million) ALM 
Holding Corporation from the USA has a 49 per cent (Ft 70 million) share. This unit, 
which was established in 1982 produces thermo-plastic basic material and packaging 
material out of them. The third most important US investment in Hungary has been 
made by McDonald's Restaurant operations. This joint venture with a Ft 120 million 
(USD 2 million) of which McDonald's has 50 per cent, produces raw materials required 
for the fast food chain, and runs a Hamburger restaurant in Budapest.
Technology exchange between the USA and Hungary in the framework of JVs is thus 
almost nonexistent. Coming Medical Corp obviously only uses its Hungarian JV 
established already in 1975 for selling and servicing instruments manufactured by 
Coming. In the 1980s no new high tech units with substantial capital have developed 
between Hungary and US.
Japanese companies have been reluctant to invest in Hungary. Japan is involved in only 
five JV cases, two of which are in the banking sector; two Japanese banks are 
shareholders in CIB and CIB's subsidiary bank, Central-European Credit Bank. 
Actually, there is only one JV in which Japan is the sole foreign partner.
All three non-banking Japanese JVs in Hungary are in production. Poli-foam Plastic 
Processing Co. Ltd produces specialized lattice-polyethylene foam strips. This venture, 
in which there are two Japanese shareholders, has an equity of Ft 160.4 million (USD
2.7 million). Foreign partners together have only a 14.3% share of the capital, or about 
Ft 23 million (less than USD 400,000).
Agroferm JV, which produces feed additive protein, has a Ft 882 million (USD 15 
million) capital. Two Japanese companies together have a 20.5 share of it, which makes 
Ft 176 million or USD 2.9 million. IFC is involved with a 14.5% share.
124
In respect of the Salgotartjan producing glass wool venture three Japanese companies 
together own 26% of the Ft 390.3 million (USD 6.9 million) capital. IFC is a co-owner 
with a 17% share.
In the last case the Japanese share is Ft 101 million, and thus, the Japanese contribution 
in these three non-banking JVs add up just to Ft 300 million (USD 5 million). The 
average JV contribution of Japanese companies is therefore much higher (Ft 100 million 
per case) than that of Austrian, German or US JVs.
Nevertheless, Japan has been extremely cautious when investing in Hungary, which can 
be seen in the number of JV cases. Also the involvement of IFC as a shareholder in two 
out of three cases is a sign of caution.
By far the most interesting case among Hungarian JV partner countries is South Korea, 
which in 1988 enacted two huge investments in Hungary;, the financial institution 
Investrade has with Ft 6 billion (USD 100 million) a much higher capital than the 
previous joint banks. Hotel venture "Saint Steven" with Ft 5.4 billion has a more than 5 
times higher capital than Thermal Hotel Aquincum, which was set up with a Swiss 
partner with an equity of Ft 980 million.
Joint ventures with Korean participation have thus a capital sum of Ft 11.4 billion (USD 
190 million), which is more than one third (36%) of the total capital investment in 
Hungarian joint ventures. From this huge cake the Korean side has just one half, or Ft
5.7 billion (USD 95 million).
Interestingly enough, Hungarian joint ventures with the Soviet Union are listed in the 
same catalogue. The USSR has four joint ventures in Hungary. No other socialist 
country participates in JV activities in Hungary.
Intermos Microelectronics Ltd plans, develops, produces and sells electronic products. 
The capital of this venture is Ft 55.8 million, which is divided between Hungary and the 
USSR on a fifty-fifty basis. Thus, the Soviet contribution is Ft 27.9 million (less than 
USD 0.5 million).
Also in the Mikromed JV, which produces medical and other electronic devices the 
capital is shared 50-50 between the Hungarian and Soviet side. In this case the equity is 
essentially higher, Ft 474 million (USD 7.9 million). The Soviet contribution is Ft 237 
million (USD 3.95 million).
In energy machinery there is the Soviet-Hungarian JV Energotechno with only a Ft 
25.1 million capital, of which the foreign partner has 49% or Ft 12.3 million (USD 0.2
125
million). Small capital of Ft 23.5 million is also involved in the fourth Soviet- 
Hungarian JV GSFV Marketing of Diamond and Tools Ltd Co. The Soviet side has 
49% of this unit.
Thus, only one of the Soviet Hungarian ventures in Hungary seems to have some 
substance estimated on the basis of capital invested. Mikromed with a capital of just 
under half a billion forints is one of the bigger production JVs in Hungary.
In these four cases the Soviet Union is involved in only 2.2% of the Hungarian joint 
ventures. The total capital invested in their four ventures is Ft 578.4 million (USD 9.6 
million), which corresponds to 1.8% of the Hungarian JV capital stock. From the non­
banking sector JV capital stock the equivalent percentage is 2.7%. (See figure 5/3.4.2.3.)
Some further information can be extracted from the Hungarian JV catalogue. In most of 
the cases listed in the booklet, there is more than one Hungarian partner involved (in 
104 out of 184 or in 57% of the cases). The Western partners however, prefer to be the 
only foreign party (in 154 cases or 84%).
Hungarian banks have been active in promoting JVs with foreign partners. They have 
frequently participated in JVs as shareholders also in the non-banking sector, as well as 
in all JV financial institutions.
Hungarian banks have a share altogether in 42 JVs (23% of all cases). Normally, they 
participate with a relatively modest share, but bank investment can also be substantial. 
For example, in the "Saint Steven" Hotel enterprise the only Hungarian partner is 
Magyar Hitel Bank (Credit Bank) which has invested no less than USD 45 million.
A new economic phenomenon has emerged with the participation of Hungarian banks in 
the JVs as shareholders. Hungarian financial institutions have thus collected for 
themselves portfolios of shares, which make them co-owners of enterprises outside the 
banking sector.
Foreign trade organizations (FTOs) in Hungary have previously had a monopoly 
position in business contacts with foreign firms according to the general socialist dogma 
of the state monopoly of foreign trade. They have now, thanks to decentralisation in the 
1980s, been looking for new business opportunities. Hungarian FTOs have been 
developing as a kinds of trading houses, which perform an intermediary function in 
respect of commercial foreign trade deals.
One of the new activities of FTOs is to bring potential JV partners together. Often 
Hungarian FTOs have even participated as shareholders in JVs established in Hungary.
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FTOs participate that way in no less than 64 JVs out of 184 units. Thus, they are 
shareholders in more than one third (35%) of the Hungarian JVs in operation.
In these cases normally the capital contribution is small and the share of FTOs low. 
However, FTOs may be contributing valuable marketing know-how. It is possible, that 
the FTO, which is shareholder in a JV, has special knowledge eg. in respect of some 
LDCs, where the Western partner is not active.
Many well-known international companies can be found among Western JV partners in 
Hungary, eg. Siemens, Volvo, Nokia, McDonald, Levi-Strauss, Adidas, McCann- 
Erichson Advertising, Voest, IKEA, Citibank, Henkel, Schwarzkopf, etc. Many of them 
bring in the Western commercial culture including important brand names.
JV activity in Hungary is relatively highly concentrated in the capital city,- Budapest. 
Almost two thirds (64%) of the Hungarian joint ventures operates only in Budapest, 
which thus hosts 118 partly foreign-owned companies. Some (eleven) of the remaining 
66 JVs have an office in Budapest, while their main activities are elsewhere.
At the end of the 1980s the joint venture scene in Hungary was very interesting. 184 
companies with partners from 24 different countries produce a variety of goods from 
deep-frozen bull sperm (Bos Genetic Ltd with a partner from FRG) to Walt Disney's 
Micky Mouse (Egmont-Pannonia Film Publishing Ltd with a partner from Denmark). 
Hard currency credits and hamburgers are provided by joint ventures. Levi Strauss jeans 
"made in Hungary" are available. Western commercial culture has become more and 
more visible via joint enterprises with Western firms.
However, the overall economic substance of investments in joint ventures in Hungary is 
still rather meagre. Only a bit more than half a billion dollars are involved, of which 
approximately one half is foreign capital. If investments in financial institutions and the 
hotel business are excluded, the capital invested in JVs is pretty narrow, and the 
majority of the units very small.
It can thus be concluded, that international companies have not moved parts of their 
activities into Hungary in such a manner as to allow the Hungarian company to become 
an integral part of the company's global strategy producing certain products or 
components on a large scale for the world market.
It seems to be obvious that Western companies are not using JVs in Hungary as 
bridgeheads to jump to East-European and Soviet markets. Information on this point is 
still scarce, but the CMEA bilateral trading network and the TR payment system is a
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stumbling bloc in this strategy: Western subsidiaries in Hungary can hardly get involved 
in socialist bilateralism.
There is unfortunately no possibility of estimating how much of the JV capital brought 
in by foreign partners is apported to machinery and know-how, and how much of it is in 
cash. Obviously, in financial JVs the contributions are in the form of money . Other 
joint enterprises cannot be judged in this matter.
The estimated total value of imported JV capital in Hungary is some USD 200-250 
million, some of which is apported machinery and know-how. This sum must be 
compared with the Hungarian net CC debt, which was USD 16 billion at the beginning 
of 1989. I l l )  If imported joint venture capital was at the same time some USD 200 
million, it is the equivalent of 1.25% of the net debt.
This Western debt was accumulated in the 1970s and in the early 1980s. At the same 
time little attention was paid to attracting FDIs. This is evidenced by the very poor JV 
results. A better balanced capital import between FDIs and bank loans would have been 
economically feasible. In the late 1980s CC debt servicing posed serious problems, 
while the macro-economically important FDIs were still scarce. Had FDIs been 
favoured since the early 1970s, Hungary would be much better integrated into the global 
economy than it is now.
Ideological considerations have certainly played a major role in the development of this 
bias. According to common belief in the CMEA area, bank loans were regarded as the 
best solution for technology imports, because credits create -  according to this belief -  
less economic dependence than FDIs. This belief has had a high price in economic 
terms.
3.4.2.4. The outlook of JVs in Hungary
In Hungary, better than elsewhere in the CMEA-countries, it has been recognized that 
the intensification of participation in the international division of labour is indispensable 
for the realization of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth. This is 
only natural, because Hungary has low autarky endowment due to her scarce natural 
resources. 112)
It has been widely realized in the 1980s that Hungary is not a country of economic 
miracles, although the reform process starting in 1968 brought about plenty of goodwill 
for Hungary in the Western media in the 1970s. The decade which has passed since
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mid-1970 has been a critical period in the Hungarian economy. Between 1975 and 1978 
the accumulated debt of the country in CCs advanced in excess of the total debt increase 
during the previous 30 years. After 1978, when economic policy had to stop the 
avalanche of indebtedness, longlasting stagnation set in for the first time in the history 
of the planned economy while domestic consumption decreased considerably. Real 
wages have declined and the investment rate has fallen drastically. These processes 
meant a drastic change from the golden age of growth, which followed the 1968 reform. 
113)
Without going into further details on Hungarian economic development and economic 
policy, it can be stated, that in the second half of the 1980s it has become more and 
more evident in Hungary that large scale foreign credits cannot be acquired as 
previously, and thus, that there is no other way of receiving capital than through FDIs, 
Liberalization of joint venture rules, therefore, must be regarded as a major element of 
economic policy-making in the 1980s.
Joint venture regulations are, however, only one side of the coin. The second, very 
important one is the business environment, in which JVs are actually run. In that 
respect, remarkable changes have been taking place in the late 1980s.
On January 1,1987 a comprehensive banking reform was launched. The banking sector 
was substantially transformed and a two-tier banking system was established. A major 
objective of the banking reform was to introduce greater competition into the financial 
sector by allowing a broader range of financial institutions to compete in the 
mobilization and allocation of financial savings. The two-tier banking system allows 
the National Bank of Hungary to focus on macro-economic policy issues, leaving credit 
allocation to commercial banks. Customers have free choice among different banks, 
which forces banks to compete for business. Thus the relation between banks and clients 
became considerably more flexible. The variety and quality of services improved and 
the credit assessment function became more efficient. In this regard, banks forced many 
firms with low efficiency to restructure their business, thus contributing to the 
enforcement of the new bankruptcy legislation. 114)
At the beginning of 1988 the Ministry of Foreign Trade and that of Internal Trade were 
merged. At the same time a decree was issued allowing virtually all economic units to 
become involved in foreign trade independently, if they wish to do so. In this context it 
is, however, extremely important to realize that the state currency monopoly has been 
maintained. In the case of imports economic units must still apply for the right to use 
currencies. 115)
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Altogether, the institutional reforms and the monetarization of the economy are certainly 
favourable for JV development in Hungary. Certain institutional innovations are directly 
aiming at helping the establishment and running of JVs.
In 1987 a special joint venture club was founded under the auspices of the Hungarian 
Chamber of Economy (previous the Chamber of Commerce). This club (JVC) has 
regular meetings with Hungarian or foreign managers involved in the JV business.
JVC has been operating as a lobby of JVs vis-a-vis local authorities. JVS has already 
been helping the JV community to solve everyday problems like car registering for 
foreigners, payment arrangements in forints for services, which are normally paid for in 
CC by foreigners, tax matters etc. 116)
Hungarian Creditbank (MHB) has created a subsidiary (VszVTL) to help organise and 
finance JVs. This outlet can provide consulting services for Hungarian as well as 
foreign firms, that intend to enter JV activity. 117)
Undoubted, the increase of JV activity in Hungary during the 1980s, and especially in 
the second half of that decade is remarkable. At the same time, it is worthwhile noticing 
that the overall sum invested by Western companies (some USD 200 million) is 
relatively modest. 118)
The Hungarian market is not very large. Therefore, the potential Western partners think 
in terms of overall CMEA markets proposing to use the Hungarian JV as a bridgehead. 
This is, however, only in exceptional cases possible when clients in the CMEA-area are 
ready to pay in CC for JV products. 119)
These limiting factors overshadow the future of Hungarian JVs. However, in the 
internal economy Hungary was advancing towards a real mixed economy at the end of 
the 1980s by launching the new enterprise law. In the autumn of 1989 the ruling 
Hungarian socialist Workers' Party changed its name and renounced its communist past 
in preparation for free parliamentary elections in 1990. At the same time, there were 
plans to discontinue bilateral trade enacted in TR with the Soviet Union, in order to cut 
down production of "soft items". This means that trade with the Soviet Union is 
: scheduled to go over to a CC basis, presumably by some kind of step by step method.
Taking these factors into account, at the end of the 1980s the investment climate 
experienced radical change. This new situation may cause a considerable boost of FDIs 
in Hungary during the 1990s.
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3.43. Poland
Poland's socialist economic history is a sort of trial and error game of crises and 
reforms. Only some main points of that interesting history in the 1970s and in the 1980s 
can be mentioned here.
After Gomulka had been forced to resign in December 1970 because of the failed 
attempt to restrict consumption, the new leadership under Gierek resorted to foreign 
indebtedness in order to finance investment as well as consumption increases, and to 
avoid a reform of the centrally planned economy. 120)
The core of the Polish problem seems to be the continuous tendency to over­
investment. This problem was analysed in the late 1950s by M. Kalecki, the most 
prominent Polish economist. He concluded that growth had been held in check by a 
number of barriers. In particular, these were the limited scope for imports, the shortage 
of a number of raw materials and the shortage of trained personnel in the construction 
industry. As a result, a number of major investment projects remained half finished or 
unusable. This had catastrophic repercussions throughout the industry as the output 
from these new projects had been counted on for other parts of the economy. A lower 
level of investment would therefore have prevented a great deal of this waste of 
resources and thereby enabled the economy to grow more rapidly. 121)
The economic policy of the Gierek years did not, however, lead to change in the 
command-rationing system of management. The existing economic structure was 
perpetuated, due to the undertaking of new investment in the metallurgy, fuel, energy 
and electrical engineering industries. In the 1970s the acceleration of growth under 
inefficient management meant pumping enormous investment outlays into an inefficient 
and wasteful system, which reacted with the creation of absorbtion barriers and lower 
effectiveness of investment projects. Due to over-investment, internal disproportions in 
the economy, upsetting of cooperation links and lavish use of imported and domestic 
means acquired through the directive allocation system, the rate of growth slowed down 
and since 1979 the national income has started to decrease in absolute terms. The crisis 
fully erupted in August 1980, leading to the downfall of the Gierek leadership. 122)
In the turn of the decade 1970-1980 the Polish debt problem emerged. The fundamental 
causes for the balance of payments difficulties lie in the mistakes committed in 
economic policy in the 1970s which were responsible for borrowing exceeding safe 
limits and irrational use being made of a part of the foreign credits. The situation was 
seriously aggravated by the socio-political commutations of 1980-81, which led to a 
growing destabilisation of the economy. One of their effects was a steep plunge in CC
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earnings: from USD 8 billion in 1980 to USD 5 billion in 1982. The credit- 
unworthiness of Poland was established. 123)
In the early 1980s economic reform was announced, but it began with the system's 
retreat towards traditional solutions. The reform programme had been elaborated, and 
new acts on self-management of enterprises put into force in consultation; but under 
martial law it now became a reform imposed from above. It began to be fully controlled 
by the state political authorities and by the central administration. Despite the formal 
validity of legal regulations on autonomy and self-management of enterprises, these 
regulations did not enter into economic practice. This was due to the militarisation of the 
most important branches of the economy. 124)
After the Party conference in the spring of 1986 the reform seemed to be dying; in their 
speeches the leaders again stressed the role of central planning. The provisional 
regulations of the martial law regime -  mainly the instrument of governmental orders -  
were to have become lasting elements of a more centrally controlled economy. 
However, the documents of the X Party Congress in Summer 1986 and the Plenum of 
the Central Committee in December 1986 indicated a turn in the leadership's intentions, 
namely the speeding up of the reform process and the restoring of market equilibrium -  
the so-called second phase of reform. 125)
Economic reform was needed to overcome the stagnation trends in the economy in the 
mid-1980s. The newly received membership in the IMF and the World Bank called for 
economic reform, in order to qualify for credits from these institutions. Economic 
reforms^ also had wide support among the population, including legal trade unions, the, 
Patriotic Front, the Polish Economic Association and even some Party groups, 
influenced by the new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev. 126)
However, in the late 1980s confidence in successful economic reform in Poland 
diminished. One experienced specialist on Polish affairs made the following statement 
in the middle of 1988:
"The failure of the concept of a second stage of the economic reform 
must be anticipated. Briefly, the concept encompasses, initially, price 
and income policy measures for restricting private demand, and only 
after the achievement of market equilibrium are substantial systemic 
changes to be introduced. That concept had already been defeated in 
November 1987, when a plebiscite failed to muster a qualified 
majority. Workers in particular feared a further worsening of their real 
incomes. The government, instead of forgoing the socially rather
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problematic measures and first introducing systemic changes, reacted 
by slightly softening and deferring the planned price increases and 
accordingly postponing the truly substantial measures. One of the 
most important reforms -  to facilitate state, cooperative and private 
economic activities by dismantling bureaucratic barriers -  was 
postponed from March 1988 into the indefinite future". 127)
After the reshuffle of the Polish government in the autumn of 1988, in which key 
positions were given to reform-minded individuals in Rakowski's cabinet, there was 
once more some optimism among Western observers concerning the continuation of 
Polish economic reform. 128)
Obviously, it is extremely difficult to judge, on the basis of the experience of the 1980s, 
whether the economic reform will succeed or not in Poland. Thus, it is also virtually 
impossible to foresee what kind of investment climate for FDIs is going to take shape in 
that country.
However, it is good to bear in mind that Poland is the most populous CMEA country 
and the largest in area next to the USSR -  endowed with great economic potential for 
activity in primary, secondary and also tertiary sectors of the economy. Therefore, 
Western FDIs in Poland cannot be excluded, even if the socio-economic situation 
continues to be unstable.
3-43.1. Polish rules for FDIs
In the 1970s the Polish strategy of economic miracle relied heavily on foreign credits 
which made possible large-scale imports of capital goods, new-technologies and 
supplies for means of production and for consumption. Maximum growth was not 
separated from the optimum growth in practice, only in the theories of Kalecki.
Alongside with borrowing from the West, JVs have legally been possible in retail trade 
services and handicrafts since 1976 and in manufacturing industries since 1979. 
However, when Western companies, saw the regulations, most of them backed off. A 
separate law for the so-called Polonia-companies was passed in 1982.129)
The actual JV law was passed on April 23, 1986, after several years of preparation. 
Obviously, the delay was caused by ideological discussions raised by orthodox party 
members. However, the law was finally accepted, as it became clear that JVs provide
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virtually the only potential possibility of obtaining Western technology, when the 
credit-unworthiness of Poland continued. 130)
JVs in Poland can choose the form of limited liability or stock company (art. 2.). 
Transfer of shares or stock between partners on the accession of a new partner to the 
company, require a permit (art.5.).
A permit for a JV is granted when it introduces modem technology and management in 
the national economy, supplies goods and services for export, and improves the supply 
of modem* quality goods to the domestic market (art.5.). This means that all JVs are 
obliged to participate in export business.
In the Polish JV law of 1986 it is stipulated that the host country partner must have the 
majority stake (51%) of equity. In certain cases exceptions from this rule can be allowed 
(art.8.). Contributions to the company's capital may be made both in cash or in kind, 
which is usual in all JV laws in the CMEA area.
It is further stipulated that the JV manager, as well as board president, must be Polish 
citizens and permanent residents of Poland (art.17.). JV employees elect one member to 
the supervisory council of the company, which must be appointed (art.18.).
Financial provisions of the Polish JV law have some tricky points. According to article 
21-22, profits can be transferred if they have been earned in hard currency,: but only 
after 15-25% of the total of the hard currency earned income has been changed into 
zloty. It is also stipulated (art.22.) that CC earnings must be divided between partners 
according to their equity share. The Polish partner may only keep a portion of CC _ 
earnings. The rest must be remitted to the state. All JVs are obliged to maintain a 
reserve fund to cover possible losses; 10% of the annual net profit must be transferred to 
this fund, until the reserve fund equals 4% of the annual total operating costs (art.19.).
JVs are due to pay 50% income tax on their profits. The tax rate is decreased by 0.40% 
for each 1% of the value of production or services exported by the company. Exemption 
from this income tax is allowed on that part of the profit which is reinvested.
It is visible from the JV law text how eager the Polish authorities are to earn CC for the 
host economy via Western FDIs. At the same time, it is hardly recognisable, what 
incentives are given for Western partners to invest in the Polish economy.
A new law concerning FDIs was prepared in Poland relatively shortly after the JV law 
of 1986. The new legal document was published in December 1988, and came into force 
on January 1, 1989. The new law states (article 53) that the law of April 1986 is
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repealed. 131) At the same time (December 23, 1988) with the law on FDIs a law on 
economic activity was adopted by the Polish parliament making the conduct of business 
possible for all Polish citizens. 132)
Economic activity may be undertaken by foreign companies, banks, foundations and 
other organizations with a legal status and domiciled abroad, as well as natural persons 
domiciled abroad.. A Polish citizen permanently domiciled abroad is also a foreign 
investor. The law establishes the same principles for investors from the West and the 
East. The contribution of a foreign party domiciled in a member country of the CMEA 
may also be made in TR, or in the national currency of one of these countries (Article 
16).
A foreign investor can establish a limited liability company in which he holds 100 per 
cent of the shares, or he can participate in a limited liability or joint stock company with 
the equity contributed by the founders (Polish or foreign) jointly (Article 2). A foreign 
party can also, together with other foreign and/or Polish parties, establish a joint stock 
company, with equity raised through a public subscription of shares (Article 8). 
Interestingly enough, a foreign party can also enter business in Poland through the 
acquisition of shares or stock in the existing Polish limited liability or joint stock 
companies. If these companies did not have foreign shareholders, the purchase of shares 
or stock by foreign parties is conditional upon the increase of the equity of these 
companies (Article 41). After such an increase in the company's equity the provisions of 
the 1988 law apply to these companies.
It is underlined by Polish legal experts that limited liability companies and joint stock 
companies with foreign involvement are formed under the provision of the Commercial 
Code of 1934. The regulations in this code are based on the classical models of both 
kinds of companies, shaped in continental Europe between the two World Wars. Both 
kinds of companies have a legal personality. 133)
Companies with foreign participation do not have to pay corporate income tax, which 
the law of 1988 sets at 40 per cent of taxable income (investment outlays and donations 
for social purposes are deducted from the taxable income). A company is exempt from 
corporate income tax during the first three years of its business activities (Articles 27- 
28).
These provisions have certain improvements in comparison to the 1986 rules, in which 
the corporate income tax was set at 50 per cent and tax holiday at two. years. The point 
in the 1986 law, that the tax rate is decreased by 0.40 per cent for each 1 per cent of the 
value of sales exported by the company, is maintained in the 1988 law.
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The 1988 law defines that the income of a foreign shareholder is subject to an income 
tax of 30 per cent, unless international agreements concluded by Poland provide 
otherwise (Article 29). This extra tax on profits to be repatriated is not mentioned at all 
in the 1986 rules.
According to the new rules, companies with foreign participation are still obliged to sell 
part of their CC earnings to a Polish bank. Previously (1986), the percentage was 
defined as 15-25% and now it is 15% of the export proceeds. This inconvenient rule is 
still there, now only in clearer form than before (Article 19).
Altogether, the new law of 1988 cannot be accused of bringing about excessive financial 
incentives for the foreign investor. The tax burden is still high and the compulsory CC 
exchange is rule still present. Article 28, however, stipulates that the tax holiday may be 
extended for an additional three years if the company enters one of the preferred sectors 
of the economy.
In this context it is worth while looking at Article 35 of the 1988 law, which defines that 
the company has to pay the tax for the exemption period, if the company is dissolved 
during the tax holiday or within three years after such a period has expired. Quick, 
short-term, tax-free profits are thus disallowed.
Article 17 of the 1986 law, which says that the company's manager, and in the case of a 
board of management its president, should be a Polish citizen the permanent resident of 
Poland, is omitted in the 1988 rules. This is a considerable improvement of the FDI 
legislation in Poland.
From the point of view of concrete business operations of a company with foreign 
participation, Articles 23-24 of the 1988 law are of importance. Article 23, paragraph i  
states that a company may purchase goods and services for foreign currency on the 
domestic market from the licensed entities; paragraph 2 mentions that a company may 
sell goods and services, within the scope of its business, on the domestic market wholly 
or partially for foreign currency, after it obtains a foreign exchange permit.
Thus, Article 23 of the new Polish law concerning FDIs in principle allows "internal 
imports" and "internal exports": a company registered in Poland can effectuate business 
operations in CC. The 1986 XV law stated only that in particularly justifiable cases the 
company might obtain a foreign exchange permit to effectuate foreign currency 
purchases on the domestic market (allowing "internal imports" in special cases). 
"Internal export", ie. the selling on the domestic market for CC, was not mentioned 
explicitly in the 1986 law text.
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Companies with foreign participation purchase raw materials and supplies in the 
domestic market in accordance with the regulations applicable to socialized economic 
entities. That is stated in Article 24.
These two Articles (23, 24) of the new law are obviously contradictory to each other. A 
foreign party presupposes that his company is entitled to receive supplies on the home 
market against payments made in zloty, as local enterprises generally, when he reads 
Article 24 in the 1988 law. However, the previous Article (23) gives him the possibility 
to pay in CC.
In the latter case he may be satisfied, because making payment in foreign currency (CC) 
probably gives him preferential treatment in deliveries in short supply. However, the 
company with foreign participation may have excess zlotys, and is thus eager to spend it 
on local supplies. In that case the local supplier, who is normally eager to earn CC by 
"internal export", might refer to Article 23, which allows the company with foreign 
participation to clinch the deal with a CC payment. The client can refer to Article 24 
asking for "normal" (zloty payment) treatment. Material for serious conflict situations is 
thus provided by the law.
The Polish 1988 FDI law contains some further interesting details. Article 5 lists the 
wishes of the host country in FDI context including the introduction of modem 
technology and management know-how, improved export performance and better home 
market supply. These points have also been listed in the 1986 law, but the new version 
contains one more detail; protection of the environment. The traditional CPE system in 
Poland has not only created serious economic biases, but also environmental damage to 
be mended by Western FDIs.
A special Foreign Investment Agency responsible for the setting up and guiding of FDIs 
was established by the 1988 law. Obviously, it is intended to give the impression that 
red tape has been cut down by establishing this special agency to deal with foreign 
direct investments.
Companies with foreign participation may sell foreign currencies at the foreign 
exchange auctions, according to the 1988 law, Article 23. This is a novelty in the law, as 
are the currency auctions, which started in.1987. In these auctions the supply of CC has 
been meagre, and thus, exchange rates vis-a-vis the zloty high. Therefore, this point of 
the law is favourable for foreign investors, in cases where the zloty is for some or other 
reason needed, local money is available approximately at the black market exchange 
rate in the auctions.
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In sum, the 1988 law is a clear improvement in comparison to that of 1986. Especially 
the permission to have wholly foreign owned entities in Poland led by foreign managers 
forms an entirely new bases for Western FDIs. Also the possibility of acquisition -  the 
allowing of foreign persons to purchase shares of, or ownership interests in existing 
Polish companies -  is an important qualitative novelty of the 1988 law.
However, some questionable points have been included also in the new law. Transfer of 
shares or ownership interests in the company requires a permit (Article 5). The foreign 
investor must define the duration of his activity when applying for a permit. A reserve 
fund must be formed from after-tax profit.
In the economic sphere incentives for foreign investors have been slightly improved. 
Corporate income tax has been dropped from 50 per cent (1986) to 40 per cent. The tax 
holiday has been prolonged from 2 to 3 years, with the amendment that in special cases, 
which are important for the Polish national economy, a supplementary 3 years' tax 
freedom can be provided for.
However, the foreign shareholder is subject to an income tax of 30 per cent by the 1988 
law, a point which is missing in the 1986 rules. In case the foreign investor is domiciled 
in a country with which Poland has an agreement on avoiding double taxation the rate 
varies between 5 and 15 per cent depending on the content of each convention. Poland 
has tax conventions with 21 countries. 134)
Compulsory selling of CC export proceeds to a Polish foreign exchange bank has been 
maintained in the 1988 law. This point, which is clearly disliked by foreign investors, 
has only been clarified in comparison to the 1986 law.The old law defined the rate as 
15-25 per cent, whereas the new law sticks to 15 per cent, only. It would have been 
advantageous to drop this point altogether from the new law.
3.4.3.2. Experience of FDIs in Poland
The Polish intention, when the legislation of 1976 was enacted, was to get ethnic Poles 
of foreign nationality to invest in Poland. Thus the name Polony firm. The interest in 
this form of business, however, was small at first; only 19 firms of this type existed in 
1979, 68 in 1981. Therefore, the regulations were amended in 1982 allowing investors 
of all national origins to start business in Poland. The operations of these firms are 
restricted to small scale production, but this restriction has been interpreted liberally. 
The capital share of foreign investors may be as high as 100%. 135)
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In the 1970s only a few FDIs were made in Poland. The Kore International Trade and 
Investment Co (US), headed by M. Koblinski, concluded a USD 50 million hotel deal in 
Warsaw. The equity share of the Western partner was only 3%. Other deals concluded 
in the 1970s were jeans-wear manufacturing and a retail outlet with a Canadian partner, 
an Austrian zipper producer and a self-adhesive label manufacturer and an automatic 
car wash firm with a West German owner.136)
In the second half of the 1980s there were altogether some 700 firms in the Polony 
sector. Constant changes in legal and fiscal regulations as well as routine attacks in the 
national press have contributed to undermining the confidence and business security of 
enterprises owned by foreign capital in Poland. Under the guise of closing legal 
loopholes and blocking opportunities for profiteering, Polish authorities have 
systematically tightened regulations covering the activities of this sector. In 1983, 
Polony companies were suddenly obliged to share 50% of their CC earnings with the 
Polish state. In 1985, the income tax was raised from 50% to between 75-85%. 
Companies were obliged to reinvest at least one third of their annual profits if they 
wished to get the three-year tax-holiday promised to them for the first three years of 
their activities. 137)
All this has contributed to the worsening of the investment climate in Poland, also 
having repercussions on investments to be made on the bases of the 1986 JV law. The 
first JV under that new law came into being that same year. The new company, LIM JV, 
brings together the Polish airline LOT, the Austrian construction company Ilbau GmbH 
and Marriott the US hotel chain. The venture's capital is worth Sch 15 million (about 
USD 1 million) with LOT holding 52% and the two Western partners 24% each. 138) 
Probably, the initial capital is much higher, Sch 1.2 billion.139)
LIM will compleie the LOT terminal and hotel in Warsaw, and then run the terminal 
and hotel complex, with a casino. Construction will comprise the finishing of the 40 
storey skyscraper, which has been uncompleted since the early 1980s, when the Western 
builder, Cementation International (UK) pulled out of the project following non­
payment of invoices. 140) This project corresponds directly to the hopes of Polish 
authorities, when they passed the law for "true'' JVs, that Western investors could make 
use of Polish "investment ruins", left over from the Gierek era. 141)
The first production JV, established in the second half of the 1980s, is Tecnodiamant 
which produces special machine tools to handle hard materials. The Western partner in 
this venture with a 45% equity share is FCT et Metaux (Belgium), which itself is a JV 
where Polish FTOs DAL and Impexmetal are shareholders. In this venture the capital 
share of the Western partner is only 28 million zlotys (USD 116,000). 142)
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In m id-1988 the Polish officials announced that altogether 29 JVs had been established 
after the' passing of the 1986 JV law. As three of them were established with Soviet 
partners, only 26 are between Poland and the West. 143) In at least three other cases 
alongside Technodiamant, there are Polish enterprises which are registered in the West 
among the Western partners. In the JV Interhothin A.J. vos en Zen and Agropol, both 
Western partners are Dutch. The latter, Agropol, is an international trading house which 
is a Polish JV, marketing Polish foodstuffs. Agropol is a shareholder also in the Polish 
JV Voukpol together with the Dutch firm Vouk Food. Voukpol is in the dairy business.
Anglodal is a trading house active in London and owned by several Polish FTOs. It is 
marked as a Western partner alongside with Active Technologies (UK) in a JV called 
Digital Laboration in Poland. This JV, which is active in computers, has shared the 
capital on a 50-50% basis. In another JV, also active in computers (software), the 
Western partner from France, has with 51.25%, the majority share of the equity. 
Obviously, this branch is regarded so important from the point of view of Polish 
economic development, that an exceptions from the 1986 law main rule on the Polish 
partner having at least 51%, has been made.
Many of the first JVs (8) are active in the foodstuff sector (one of them in cattle 
transport). West German partners appear in the list of Polish JVs more often than firms 
from other countries, accounting for nine cases. There are among Western partners also 
firms from Austria, the Netherlands, USA, the UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, 
France, Denmark, Belgium and Liechtenstein. It is noticeable that no well known MNCs 
with famous brands are involved in Polish JVs. Marriot, which is a partner in the LIM 
hotel project, is the best known firm name investing in Poland.
Polish FTOs have been active in setting up joint ventures abroad, especially in Western 
Europe. In West Germany there are over 50 (53) companies wholly or partly owned by 
Polish companies, which is more than any other CMEA country. Also in the UK and 
Sweden the Polish companies is in the lead over the CMEA competition as far as the 
number of companies are concerned. In the Third World Poland is participating in 24 
ventures, which is less than Romania (45), the Soviet Union (34) and Hungary (32).
. 144)
Most of the Polish ventures abroad are just marketing outlets promoting the sales of 
Polish products in the world market. Business International gives a good mark for some 
of these ventures, like Agropol in Japan, Canada and the Netherlands, by saying that 
they work flexibly and efficiently. This is based on the feedback coming from the 
clients. 145)
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Hardly any manufacturing outlets have been built up by Poles abroad. In USA, Polish 
machine tools are constructed with a local partner in a JV called Megatool. 
Manufacturing JVs are also operating in Kenya, Iran and Nigeria. 146)
3A3.3. Outlook of JVs in Poland
The Polish economy suffered with many sorts of malaise in the 1980s. The Polish 
authorities tend to put the blame for the outbreak of the crisis on Western sanctions and 
credit restrictions, ignoring the fact that these measures were taken only when Poland 
had already lost her creditworthiness. 147)
One of the main questions in solving the economic malaise in Poland is naturally, how 
the debt problem (some USD 35 billion net debt in 1989) can be settled. The liquidity 
squeeze hampers the development of export branches, which in its turn hampers the 
solving of balance of payments problem. A vicious circle is evident.
One theoretical solution can be found in the "debt for equity" method. If a part of the 
debt is transformed into ownership of shares of Polish enterprises, in accordance with 
the new Polish JV law, interest payment obligations are transformed into profit 
transfers. The burden of servicing the debts is reduced, whereas the new problem of 
profit transfers becomes a burden of joint responsibility. Of course to be efficient this 
solution via JVs, requires suitable systemic solutions. 148)
In other words, the debt for equity strategy calls for clear incentives for FDIs in the 
legislative and economic sphere, in order to be efficient. Advantages needed for JVs are 
not in sight: Polish authorities obviously try to maximize the short-term benefits of JV 
activity for the State ignoring incentives for foreign investors.
A. Muller counts a number of difficulties confronting foreign entrepreneurial activity in 
Poland resulting from:
1) Negative reactions on the part of other socialist countries;
2) Strong resistance of internal pressure groups (the political, military and economic 
establishment and the state administration);
3) Attitudes of large enterprises and producers' associations enjoying a monopoly 
position in the economy. They fear both the loss of their position and direct 
confrontation with the foreign sector which would be more competitive than the 
Polish firms are;
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4) The possibility that the best employees would move to foreign firms if the latter 
operated more effectively and guaranteed higher wages than the domestic 
enterprise;
5) On the other hand, it should be recognized that, in its present shape, the Polish 
economy is not an interesting area for FDIs.
The reasons are numerous: inadequate economic infrastructure in transport, repair and 
maintenance service, etc; insufficient capacity of local enterprises to cooperate with 
foreign firms; the foreign firm's distrust of the policy of socialist countries. The MNCs 
who undertake FDIs desire huge complementary projects which should be financed by 
the host countries. Poland is not able to put up appropriate outlays for the benefit of 
those firms, and therefore, there is no great hope for FDIs to Poland. 149)
The first point made by Muller is of special interest. Indeed, there is a certain amount of 
antipathy against Poland in the CMEA area deriving from the feeling that a part of the 
economic bill caused by the Polish crisis is being presented to the brother countries for 
payment. Some authorities in the CMEA countries openly express the opinion that the 
Polish debt problem is worsening their possibilities for acquiring Western credits, by 
creating an attitude that socialist countries generally are unable to take care of debt 
servicing.
The last point made by Muller is noteworthy. Poland is certainly only in a very limited 
manner able to take care of the development of her infrastructure. This is a strong 
disincentive for the flow of FDIs to Poland.
Also the Polish newspaper Polityka maintains that Poland is not offering enough 
incentives for FDIs. The paper mentions the lacking creditworthiness of the country, 
outdated industrial structure, the low level of technology, and the relatively high level of 
corporate tax as disincentives for FDIs. Further Polish enterprises seem rather reserved 
as far as JV cooperation with Western firms is concerned. It is more convenient and also 
more profitable for them to operate only for the home market. In an opinion poll 
organized by the Polish Chamber of Commerce among Polish firms asking whether they 
were interested in JV activity, out of 1500 enterprises only 200 cared to answer. Not all 
the answers had a positive attitude toward JVs. 150)
A new political situation emerged in Poland, when the opposition won the election in 
the summer of 1989, and a new coalition cabinet with a non-communist Prime Minister 
was set up. Although this new political situation has been welcomed in the West, and 
some economic help is being provided by market economies, economic uncertainty 
prevails making foreign investors cautious.
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Even if a new kind of crisis management and introduction of a market economy is 
promised by non-communist forces in Poland, no rapid improvement of the investment 
climate can be expected. The difficult negotiations to form a new government after the 
1989 elections indicate that a political impasse situation with socio-economic 
repercussions cannot be excluded in the medium-term perspective.
Potential Western investors are waiting for economic stabilization, while in Poland 
Western investments are regarded as an important partial solution to curing the Polish 
disease. Thus, for Poland at the end of the 1980s there seems to be the chicken and the 
egg problem -  which one comes first?
3.4.4. Bulgaria
Bulgaria is the smallest country under review with less than 10 million inhabitants. 
Traditionally, socialist Bulgaria has relied on the Soviet connection in her external 
economy. For example, in the years 1985-87, Bulgaria’s exports to the Soviet Union 
amounted to some 6.5 billion roubles (appr. USD 9 billion) per year, while exports to 
the West were only about 1 billion USD a year in the same period. In the trade with the 
West there is a tendency towards deficits (over USD 1 billion yearly in 1985-87), and 
therefore, the net CC debt has grown, reaching some USD 5 billion, the equivalent of 5 
years' exports to the West. 151)
In Bulgaria there is thus an economic need to attract FDIs from the West, because the 
deficit financing of trade is growing more difficult. JVs have been possible since 1980, 
but only in the late 1980s has their importance been realized.
During the 1980s Bulgaria has been experimenting with economic reforms originating 
in the project for a New Economic Mechanism (NEM) drawn up in 1981.
The basic reform document is the so called "Regulations for Economic Activities", a 
decree by the Council of Ministers. The first version, adopted in 1981, was subject to 
major amendments only two years later. The next version, prepared for 1985 and never 
published, was apparently rejected and never actually passed. Around the mid-1980s 
official criticism (also headed by Todor Zhikov himself) became more poignant. It was 
aimed at the inadequate performance, lack of efficiency and poor quality produces of the 
Bulgarian economy (joined, in this last respect, by unexpected Soviet criticism). It 
blamed the "conservative” behaviour of State and Party bureaucracy as well as of 
management organs. The practical failure of earlier reform attempts was officially 
admitted and calls for radical change became obvious in 1986. Milestones of this were a
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plenary session of the BCP's Central Committee, the 13th Congress of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party (preceded by major government reorganizations and personnel 
reshuffles in top Party and government ranks), the adoption of a new Labour Code, 
laying the foundations for self-management institutions in the economy, and a new 
version of the "Regulations for Economic Activities", that came into force at the 
beginning of 1987. Its main importance was that it indicated a change in line of reform 
policy towards more clearly pronounced features of market-orientation motivated by 
the failure of earlier reform attempts to improve economic performance, by the 
"Gorbachev effect" and certainly by internal political considerations, where outside 
observers have to rely on speculations. 152)
The main lines of current economic reform attempts may be outlined as follows:
1) Decentralization -  the enterprise is to become the basic decision-making unit, 
endowed with enlarged rights to choose suppliers and outlets at home and abroad, 
and to organize JVs with Bulgarian and foreign partners; enterprises are to be put 
on a self-financing basis, including foreign currencies, and subject to bankruptcy; 
they are to have more say in price formation and investment decisions; competition 
between enterprises is to be enhanced (including split-ups of monopolistic 
structures).
2) Self-management within economic units -  directors are subject to election by the 
enterprise staff and subsequent appointment by the State organs.
3) Abolition of central plan directives for output (to be replaced by State "contracts" 
for a transitory period and for a limited range of products), gradual elimination of 
central allocation of input to be replaced, in the longer run, by a wholesale trade 
system.
4) Increasing economic state guidance as opposed to administrative instruments, a 
strategy supported by efforts to streamline central administration.
5) Domestic price formation to take international prices into account, which requires 
the establishment of an economically sound exchange-rate system.
6) Tighter linkage of wages to performance leading to growing wage differentiation.
7) Increased control and guidance functions for the banks (in the course of the reform 
of the banking system).
8) Revival of private and cooperative forms of economic activity. 153)
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A number of non-specialized commercial banks, planned to be independent and profit- 
oriented, were established in Bulgaria in 1987. The competences to grant investment 
credits have been transferred from the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) to the 
commercial banks.
The National Bank will continue to perform the following commercial operations: it will 
be the only bank holding the current accounts of enterprises; it will perform banking 
operations with the service sector; extend working capital credits; and settle payments 
between the commercial banks.
Bulgarska Bunshnoturgovska Banka (Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank) will remain the 
only bank settling payments resulting from foreign trade. In 1987 the bank together with 
Bayrische Vereinsbank, Munchen, established a new bank called Bayrisch-Bulgarische 
Handelsbank. It is situated in Munich.
Banking services for the population will continue to be supplied exclusively by 
Darzhagna Spestovna Kasa (State Savings Bank) and by savings cooperatives and 
savings associations.
The commercial banks can extend credits to enterprises and accept enterprise deposits in 
both domestic and foreign currencies. Commercial banks are even allowed to place 
foreign currencies in banks in the West and to accept convertible currency credits from 
Western banks. But minimum and maximum rates of change in liabilities and assets are 
given to the banks annually by the National Bank.
The National Bank influences the volume of credit extensions by commercial banks 
through prescribed ranges of change in the total assets of the commercial banks, and in 
net assets in convertible and in non-convertible currencies. The National Bank will also 
prescribes minimum and maximum rates of interest to be applied by the banks. The 
National Bank influences the volume of bank liability through refinancing credit. It 
seems that the share of National Bank refinancing in bank liabilities is even larger in 
Bulgaria than in Hungary, which makes changes in the volume of re-financing a very 
powerful National Bank policy instrument.
To summarize, in contrast to Hungary, in 3ulgaria commercial banks are burdened with 
administrative functions, and National Bank control over the credit extension of banks is 
stricter than in Hungary.154)
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3.4.4.I. Bulgarian rules for FDIs
Bulgaria issued the basic decree governing JVs in 1980 (Decree 535/1980). This decree 
was supplemented by the Council of Ministers decree 31/1987 and the State Council 
decree Nr 2242/1987 concerning economic activities in free trade zones. 155)
JV Decree No 535 mentions two possible forms of JVs in Bulgaria: a partnership, which 
is not a juridical person and a partnership which is a juridical person. The first form is 
not clearly defined in the decree.
The Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce guidebook on JVs clarifies the difference 
between these Wo partnership forms. The first one (partnership which is not a juridical 
person) is a company in which the partners have unlimited liability, whereas the second 
form (partnership which is a juridical person) is a limited liability company. The 
guidebook flatly states that only the latter has any meaning in practical life. 156)
Decree 535 allows JV activity in virtually all spheres of economy, in production and 
services, tourism included. The joint activity can be carried out in Bulgaria or in other 
countries (art.2).
Material as well as immaterial values can be capitalized in the JV capital. It is 
mentioned in the first JV decree that the share of foreign participation may exceed 50% 
(art.9).
The chairman of the management board and the chairman of the board of directors must 
be Bulgarian citizens (art. 10) The decisions of the partnership bodies are taken 
unanimously (art.35).
It is also stipulated in the Bulgarian JV law that a reserve fund must be formed, without, 
however, mentioning the size of that fund (art. 24). The annual profit is taxed at the rate 
of 20%. The profit share of the foreign partner is taxed at the rate of 10% if it is 
transferred abroad (art. 37). Tax holidays may be given for 1-3 years for JVs (art. 38).
Decree 31/1987 is virtually only a restatement and clarification of decree 535. The need 
for this new decree No 31 originates obviously from the internal economic reform 
which defines the economic units in Bulgaria as "self-managing economic 
organizations" (SEO).
Decree 31 emphasizes the need dor feasibility studies when SEOs enter into JVs with 
foreign firms. Full self-support in levas and in CC must be ensured and possible 
competitive offers of foreign companies investigated (art. 8). To make this certain,
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another article (10) underlines that economic activity with foreign investment 
participation is organized and effected on the basis of self-financing in CC and levas.
Decree 31/1987 also includes an interesting article, which can be seen as a special 
incentive for JVs (art. 23). It stipulates that
"when new construction for the JV's economic activity, and other 
needs is called for, the respective people's council's executive 
committee give priority to the Bulgarian JV participant".
In plain language this means that JVs have a priority position when internal resources 
are allocated.
In the same 31 decree, there is also one article which is potentially harmful for JV 
activity: art. 25 stipulates that
"when concluding contracts with the JVs, the Bulgarian economic and 
other organizations may stipulate payment in foreign currency for 
goods and services."
The economic result of articles 23 and 25 may, thus, be that priority is given for JVs in 
resource allocation, but only in the case that payment is effected in CC. The delivering 
SEO has the right, according to decree 31, art 25 to ask for payment in CC when 
supplying a JV, which is, therefore, obliged to use CC even in Bulargian internal 
business.
The issuing of decree No 2242/1987 in Bulgaria means that the Hungarian idea of off­
shore JV activity has been copied. The off-shore rules comprise virtually all economic 
activities, including banking and insurance (art. 17). Off-shore activity can be created 
by special marking in Bulgaria.
All off-shore activity is effected in CC (art. 5). When an off-shore outlet exports or 
imports something, it is exempted from Bulgarian duty (art. 13). When an off-shore JV 
sells its goods or services to Bulgaria, import duty must be paid (art. 14).
In the West, the Bulgarian JV rules have been regarded as relatively liberal and 
progressive, especially the point that a foreign company can have a majority stake in a 
Bulgarian JV according to the original FDI rules. However, JV activity in Bulgaria has 
not been especially lively.
In January 1989, Bulgaria adopted a new decree on economic activity, which meant the 
.beginning of corporatism in that country. This complicated and lengthy document,
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which is published with regulations for its application, is in its core and spirit 
comparable to the Hungarian company law of 1988. 157)
In official Bulgarian interpretation this new State Council Decree No 56 supersedes the 
initial Decree 535 on economic cooperation between Bulgarian juridical persons and 
foreign juridical and physical persons from 1980, and Decree 3420 of 1987 regulating 
JV taxation. 158)
The new Decree establishes a variety of property forms for those entitled to engage in 
economic activity; they can be state-owned organizations, cooperatives, JVs 
(associations), foreign firms, individual citizens and joint-stock companies. All have 
equal rights under the law. 159)
The Decree authorizes the establishment of state and public firms, joint-stock 
companies, limited and unlimited liability companies, cooperatives, and individual 
citizens' firms. Economic activity in Bulgaria is opened to foreign firms which can set 
up their subsidiaries (branches) and participate in JVs with local companies. 160)
Foreign persons can perform economic activity on their own with permission from the 
appropirate state body. This body decides which activities do not require a license. 
Before embarking on economic activity in Bulgaria, foreign persons are required to 
submit a declaration. But when the activity is performed jointly with a Bulgarian firm 
or other juridical person, it is the duty of the Bulgarian partner to secure the license and 
submit the declaration. Foreign entities can also set up their subsidiaries with the 
permission for the appropriate state body. These branches are juridical persons which 
can perform only the economic activities indicated in its license; they are registered at 
the district court of their permanent seat. Commercial representations can also be set up 
by foreigners in Bulgaria. Permission is needed from the state body in question, 
whereby it must be shown that at least one half of the employers are Bulgarian citizens. 
Representations are not juridical persons. 161)
Foreign persons are entitled to acquire personal shares and set up joint-stock companies 
in Bulgaria. When foreign participation exceeds 20 per cent, permission is required. 
When foreign persons hold shares in a Bulgarian joint-stock company, it is also 
possible for foreign nationals to be on board of management. It is also stated that foreign 
citizens can be presidents of management boards and managers of the state and other 
firms. 162)
The new Company Decree of Bulgaria also allows issuing of bonds by local companies. 
These bonds may be bought by Bulgarian physical and legal persons and transferred
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between them. Bonds may not be taken out of the country. 163) Consequently, a 
foreign legal or physical person, who has become a legal person in Bulgaria, may 
acquire Bulgarian bonds that cannot be exported.
"One or two years ago it would have, seemed almost blasphemy to 
associate stock shares with the Bulgarian economy. But today there 
are both shares and bonds."
This is written by D. Deliiski commenting on the new company decree 164). He also 
states that foreign legal and physical persons are granted alleviations, mostly in taxation. 
Their profit tax is much lower than that for Bulgarian companies and tax free if they 
decide to reinvest the profit. Moreover, part of the salary of Bulgarian employees in 
companies of foreign persons is paid in CC. The companies' revenues from the sale of 
goods in the Bulgarian market in levs will be paid to them in the respective CC at the 
international market exchange rate. 165)
The writer does not specify the difference in taxation between various legal entities. 
Neither does he give details of CC payment arrangements for the local work force, nor 
about lev conversions into CCs.
Supplementing the State Council Decree 2242, which ruled into existence free economic 
zones on Bulgarian territory, the Council issued an ordinance in November 1988, for the 
adaptation of regulations on the administration of the Vidim and Rousse free economic 
zones. These territories are set aside for the handling of duty-free goods, imported into 
the zones and intended for export. Trading is allowed within the free zone, and this 
involves, agencies, organizing the manufacture of goods, and performance of services, 
transport, procuring cargo for ships on international voyages, as well as the performance 
of banking, crediting and other financial operations and insurance. These activities can 
be performed by foreign juridical or physical persons and by Bulgarian organizations 
through JVs with foreigners. 166)
Payments for goods and services within the zones or from the zones to the country are 
effected in CC, also concerning payments under contracts of Bulgarian economic 
organizations. Administrative services and control are carried out by the administrative 
boards which exercise customs control and supervision, maintaining public order, 
issuing permits for the stay of foreign citizens, registering enterprises, firms, and banks, 
and exercising financial and tax control. Customers of the zones are provided upon 
request with the necessary workers, electric power, water, steam and office materials. 
The customers of the zones are expected to pay contract-specified wages in CC to the 
zonal administration for Bulgarian workers. By agreement with the zonal
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administration, the customers can also employ foreign citizens who are qualified 
specialists, up to one third of the total staff of specialists employed in one given activity. 
167)
It is quite clear that the Bulgarian officials have been dissatisfied with the FDI results 
achieved in the 1980s. Therefore, it was correct to improve incentives for foreign 
investors. Especially the Company Act, which seems to be an important, decisive 
milestone in Bulgarian economic reform, means a qualitative improvement in 
investment climate by giving leeway for local and foreign business initiative.
Direct investments can now according to the new rules take a variety of forms, 
including portfolio investments in shares and bonds. Rules concerning foreign 
management have been liberalized and free-zone activity clarified.
Thus the legal framework for FDIs in Bulgaria was, roughly speaking, as liberal as in 
Hungary at the end of the 1980s. In both countries it is underlined that foreign 
investments stand on an equal footing with local investments. An exception from this 
rule is mentioned in the Bulgarian case, in which the company decree stipulates that 
foreign persons and firms of foreign individuals' cannot participate in an unlimited 
liability company (Article 41) 168) This point has hardly any practical meaning, because 
foreigners certainly have no interest in this company form.
3.4.4.2. Bulgaria's experience with JVs
The first JV in Bulgaria was set up shortly after the passing of the JV law in 1980. The 
Japanese company Fujitsu Fanuc invested half of the L 700,000 (L 1 = USD 1.06) 
capital in Machinex company which service numerically controlled (NC) machine tools 
built with Japanese technology in Bulgaria, in other East European countries as well as 
in Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. In the second year of operation, the JV activities 
were expanded to engineering and system design services for plant automation. 
Additional components were built under Fanuc licences in Bulgaria, with the JV 
handling project engineering. 169)
Fanuc Machines invoices its maintenance services for NC machine tools in other CMEA 
countries in CC. In this way the JV generates sufficient CC income to pay licence fees 
to the Japanese parent company for technology transferred to Bulgaria. A part of this 
CC income is also repatriated as the Japanese partner's share of the JV profit. On the 
other hand, the engineering services provided by the JV to local enterprises are bought 
in levas to be used to cover local input and operating costs. 170)
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The Tangra JV was established in 1981 by Tangra Ltd (Switzerland) and Neftokhim 
Burgas and the FTO Khimimport in Burgas. It produces utensils as well as plastic and 
metal products, imports goods necessary for their production, and exports the finished 
articles. The original production goal was 15 million ballpoint pens a year for the local 
market and exports to Western Europe and the Middle East, with projected expansion to 
53 million pens a year. The Swiss firm has a 20% share of the capital, with the other 
80% held by the Bulgarian partners. Each partner has one representative on the three- 
man board, and the managing director is Bulgarian. Production equipment has been 
delivered by Swiss and Italian companies. The marketing is done by the Swiss partner. 
171)
In mid-1982 Mitsukoshi Ltd, the largest Japanese department store chain, and a 
Japanese trading house concluded an agreement with 11 Bulgarian enterprises for the 
production of new-style consumer goods in Bulgaria. The Japanese are supplying the 
know-how and helping streamline the Bulgarian distribution system. The Bulgarian 
enterprise produces the consumer goods. The Japanese side reportedly provided 49% of 
the USD 100,000 working capital. Sofia Mitsukoshi emphasizes that its charter is 
extremely flexible, allowing it to engage in jobbing contracts, trading services and other 
activities on behalf of the Western and Bulgarian trade partners. 172)
Set up in early 1984 between Dow Chemicals (US), Khimimport and Khimkomplekt, 
Chimtrade is a rather unusual JV operation in that the framework for joint activities was 
set up, with only a nominal capital investment, before any specific activities had been 
designed. Chimtrade was established with the right to engage in practically any field of 
activity of potential interest to the two partners. These fields included production, trade, 
import, export, technical assistance, engineering, marketing and representation activities 
in the chemical, pharmaceutical, agricultural, construction, commercial, transportation 
and service sectors. All these are specifically included in its JV contract and have been 
approved by the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.
Both sides have hinted since the JV's inception that it would eventually take on some 
production duties, possibly involving catalysts or other small-tonnage chemicals. So far 
however, the JV appears to have restricted itself to trading activities. 173)
Honeywell (US) (40%) formed the Systematics JV in 1984 together with three 
Bulgarian partners in the chemical industry: FTOs Khimimport and Khimkomplekt and 
the Ministry of the Chemical Industry's management and computer science center -  at 
the time called GHZ (and now operating under the name Sistemkhim). Honeywell views 
the JV as an extension of its cooperation agreement signed with Bulgaria in 1979.
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Through Systematic, Honeywell has succeeded in expanding its marketing, engineering, 
technical assistance and training activities in Bulgaria, not just in the chemical industry 
but also in automation projects and systems control for the steel sector, food, tourism, 
cement production and other areas. 174)
In this JV activity there are also problems. The Western side complains that Bulgarian 
clients do not make proper cost-benefit calculations when ordering services. They have 
the tendency to opt for the cheapest, conventional solution which is not always the most 
profitable one. It is, however, hoped by Systematics specialists that this problem will be 
overcome alongside with the economic reform, which underlines profitability, and thus, 
making fiill-service deals offered by Systematics more attractive from the point of view 
of client firm managers. 175)
Futex was established in 1984 between Fukazawa Chemical Laboratory (Japan) and the 
FTO Tehknika. The JV was organized in order to manufacture the additive ''Aboil" for 
liquid fuels for marketing in Bulgaria and third countries. It was also supposed to 
participate in marketing of other products, including raw materials, machinery and 
equipment. However, very little has been heard about this venture in the meantime. The 
crash in world market oil prices may have caused the partners to postpone the project.
A JV project formed in 1984 between Sormel (France), the FTO Elektro-impex and the 
Elprom combine, ESE engages in engineering activities for complex automation of 
assembly processes in electrical engineering and electronics, tool-making and related 
activities, including engineering studies, complete supply, assembly and commissioning 
of equipment, staff training and other service and commercial activities.
APV-Bioinvest is one of only two Western majority-owned JVs in Bulgaria, with 55% 
belonging to APV International (UK) and the remaining share belonging to Bioinvest, 
the Bulgarian FTO for biotechnology. The JV has been having a bit of trouble starting 
up, but it is planning to begin producing filtration and ultra-filtration equipment, 
energy-saving evaporation and refrigeration machinery and other food and 
pharmaceutical industry technology. The APV's initial investment came to only GBP 
100,000, but the firm hopes that in the long run operations can be expanded, leading to 
exports of biotechnical equipment not only within Bulgaria but also to the USSR, other 
CMEA countries and LDC markets. 176)
APV is, so far, an unusual Western company in that it has JVs in two separate CMEA 
countries, in Bulgaria and in Hungary. Both offsprings were bom in 1985 by 
capitalizing British know-how, but they are run exclusively by host country personnel. 
According to the Western side, the Hungarian JV has been working excellently, while
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there have been problems in Bulgaria. The difference is in management: it was easy to 
find suitable persons with technical skills in Hungary, but in Bulgaria previous FTO- 
people were set in. According to APV management, a high-tech firm cannot be run by 
people without technical knowledge.177)
Medicom was established in 1986 as a JV between Tokyo Maruichi Shoji (Japan), the 
FTO Tehknika and the Institute for Technical Cybernetics and Robotics at the 
BAN/Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Tokyo Maruichi, already involved in the Sofia 
Mitsukoshi JV listed above, is contributing its marketing and other resources to this new 
project. Medicom conducts research and production of equipment, apparatus and 
software for the medical field. Aside from sales of equipment, the JV is also involved in 
technology transfer, technical assistance, services and other back-up operations.
FESTO-Machinex was established in September 1987 as a JV between FESTO 
Maschinenfabrik (55%) of West Germany -  through its Vienna office -  and four 
Bulgarian organizations: the Khidraviika trust of Kazanluk (30%), the
TsNIKA/Technological Centre for Complex Automation in Sofia (5%), the Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank (6%) and the FTO Mashinoeksport (4%). In early 1988 the JV 
partnership was expanded, as the Sistemkhim management centre (partner in the 
existing Bulgarian-US JV Systematics) purchased a 3% share from the Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank. The JVs initial capital is L800,000 or Sch 13 million, and each 
partner's initial investment is in the form of a financial contribution in either hard or soft 
currency. 178)
It is extremely interesting to see that in the list of 15 JVs, active in Bulgaria, four are 
with Japanese partners. 179) Three UK companies are involved, and two_ US 
companies. Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Belgium are a 
party in one JV each. Especially striking is the weak interest by West German firms, 
which normally are quite active in East-West trade and cooperation.
It is not clear how many of the Bulgarian JVs are actually involved in production. 
Obviously, the main activity is in technical services. Really big investments have not yet 
taken place in JV operations.
It is also striking that no JVs have come up in tourism so far. There are Western built 
hotels in Bulgaria, but they have been erected without Western equity investments.
Bulgaria's investments abroad in the West, of which there are some 50 cases, follow the 
general line of the strategy in the CMEA countries: most of them are just marketing
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outlets of Bulgarian export goods. However, Bulgaria has also been involved in certain 
takeovers of Western production units, which has occasionally had spectacular features.
In 1983, Bulgaria bought together with a West German company, an aluminium car 
wheel factory in Alsace, France, in a 50-50% partnership deal. 180) In a total 
acquisition Bulgaria took over Neunkrichner Schraubenwerke, an Austrian screw 
factory. 181) In Hamburg, Bulgaria bought a majority stake in a company, which 
produces machines for soft drink production and employs some 500 people. 182)
Occasionally, there is political opposition to Bulgarian takeovers. The best known case 
was probably the Bulgarian attempt to buy Fenwick Manutention (France) in 1983. 
Bulgaria's Balkankar was interested in acquiring Fenwick, the leading French forklift 
truck manufacturer, in order to gain production technologies and expand its marketing 
in France. French political interest proved adamently opposed to the idea of a socialist 
state gaining a controlling interest in such a large firm, however, and another rescue 
attempt had to be organized for the endangered company employing 2000 people. 183)
Bulgaria frequently acquires firms that are in bankruptcy proceedings or otherwise close 
to failure, in order to gain the technology, the business contacts and other advantages at 
a low buying price. The problem has proved to be that not all rescue operations by 
Bulgarians have been successful, but valued out companies have found their way back 
into bankruptcy. However, the Bulgarians have argued that operating a Western 
Company exerts a valuable influence on Bulgarian economy as a whole. By tying the 
newly purchased Western firm to Bulgarian sub-suppliers, the suppliers are made 
acquainted with the quality needs, deadlines and technical specification required under 
Western market conditions. This, in turn helps them adapt their production skills to the 
requirements of other Western organizations. In addition, the Western production 
facilities serve as a useful base for introducing Bulgarian managers to management 
conditions in the West. 184)
Bulgaria has not been especially active in FDIs in the Third World. According to 
information from 1985, Bulgaria is participating only in 14 JVs in LDCs. Three of them 
are in manufacturing. 185)
3.4.4.3. Outlook of FDIs in Bulgaria
According to official statements, all JVs in Bulgaria formed with Western firms are very 
much alive, either in full operation or in the process of starting up. 186) No failures are 
among the few JVs set up in Bulgaria in the 1980s.
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Bulgarian officials are relatively reserved as far as information about JVs is concerned. 
This is especially so in comparison with Hungary. For example, equity shares are not 
completely disclosed in JVs already registered.
In Fanuc-Mechines and in Futex (both with Japanese partners) equity is shared on a 
50-50 basis. In APV Bioinvest (with a British partner) the Western company has a 
majority. In other cases listed in the ECE-study, in which equity share is given, (4 
cases) the Western partner is in a minority position, in the Tangra-case with only a 20% 
stake. 187)
It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that the Bulgarian original legislation, which since 
1980 has allowed a Western majority share in JVs, is offering a vast incentive for 
Western companies to invest in Bulgaria. Obviously, more incentives are needed in 
order to speed up JV activity. Clear success in economic reform may speed up Western 
interest.
In the second half of the 1980s Bulgarian officials realized that attracting FDIs calls for 
institutional innovations. Issuing off-shore regulations for JVs in 1987 goes in that 
direction. It is, however, too early to judge, whether the off-shore option, which in 
Hungary has been of very modest meaning, will attract Western investors.
In decree 31/1987 article 29 paragraph 2 stipulates that
"by agreement between the participants in the JV the share of the 
foreign participants’ profit may be paid (entirely or partially) with 
goods and services of the JV's economic activity or through the 
purchase of other goods and services."
This point can be taken as a supplementary incentive. Goods or services for export can 
be bought and paid in Levas that have been earned in a JV supplying the local market. 
This, however, is an attractive option only in the case that the Bulgarian economy is 
becoming more competitive offering a wider range of products saleable on the Western 
markets.
The new rules for company activity in Bulgaria at the end of the 1980s show clearly, 
that there is need to revitalize economic reform and attract Western FDIs in the new, 
Hungarian manner. At the same time, it became clear in 1989 that Bulgaria would start 
to pursue political reforms on Polish and Hungarian lines. This reformism in economy 
and policy is a good combination when Western FDIs are sought for Bulgaria.
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3.4.5. Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak economy entered a period of stagnation in the early 1960s causing a 
reform discussion. This discussion led to the formulation of reform measures, better 
known in the West as the "Prague Spring" (1966-68), which was crushed by Soviet 
intervention in August 1968 after some conservative opponents of the reform within the 
leadership of the CSSR communist party had appealed to the Soviets for help. The 
"normalization" policies of the Husak leadership turned the CSSR into a highly 
centralized economy with intensive trade links with the CMEA.
In the early 1980s the Czechoslovak economy experienced a clear stagnation once 
agian. During the period of "normalization", when special cooperation treaties were 
signed with the Soviet Union, the terms of trade of the country deteriorated 
considerably. At the same time, the share of Western trade in the foreign trade of the 
CSSR dropped considerably, from over 22% in 1970 to some 15% in the mid-1980s. 
188) Czechoslovak economy had become alongside with Bulgaria the least open to the 
West.
In the mid-1980s the Czechoslovak situation was highly interesting. Internal economic 
pressure for economic reform was evident, and at the same time, Moscow started a far- 
reaching economic reform. Gorbachev's plea for supporting his reform measures at the 
working Summit meeting of the CMEA Party leaders in autumn 1985 brought also the 
Czechoslovak Party leader Husak on the side of those who advocated the introduction of 
reform measures tailored according to the Soviet example. In 1987 a document on the 
comprehensive reconstruction of the economic mechanism to be introduced by stages 
was drawn up. 189)
The concept envisaged requires a newly defined relationship between the economic 
centre, represented by the government and its functional and sectorial bodies, and the 
enterprises. The old relationship of subordination of the enterprise sphere under the 
directives of the planning machinery should be exchanged by a division of tasks and 
functions. 190)
At the same time with the launching of the new reform programme, important changes 
in the leadership have taken place. Experienced Western specialists in the Czechoslovak 
economy are extremely cautious when they judge the reform-mindedness of the new 
Party leader. Friedrich Levcik, for example, writes:
"The conservative core within the leadership was strengthened by the 
dismissal of G. Husak as Party leader and the installation of M. Jakes, 
one of those who invited the Soviet Army in 1968". 191)
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At the October 1988 plenum of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak communist 
Party, Prime Minister L. Strougal, who was reputed to be the most ardent advocate of 
reform in the leadership, submitted his resignation and also left the Politburo. This event 
was assessed as a clear victory of the conservative forces with the CSSR's leadership by 
Ota Sik, the Minister of economic affairs at the time of the "Prague Spring". 192)
In the opinion of Sik, Czechoslovakia has managed to avoid large Western debts, which 
does not mean that her economic development has been stable or effective. It only 
means that for many years now the CSSR has been unable to expand its exports 
significantly. Czechoslovak products are becoming less competitive in the world market 
all the time; they can only be sold at a great loss; given this state of affairs, the 
government has had to put a brake on imports. The result is that foreign trade with the 
West is relatively well balanced but the country has not been able to import the Western 
goods that it needs to modernize its industrial base. As a result, the CSSR's industrial 
base is thoroughly outdated and bears no comparison with Western industries. The 
country is falling behind and sinking to the level of a LDC. 193)
The reform experiment was continued in the autumn of 1988. In 1988 more enterprises 
were put on the self-financing principle; about 100 production enterprises were given 
foreign trade rights; a price refoim was scheduled and a new exchange rate for the 
Czechoslovak crown with uniform rate stipulated; new rules for JVs were announced. 
194)
The implementation of the reform programme represents, however, a big question mark. 
As F. Levcik puts it:
"We have the peculiar situation that the most violent opponents of the 
reform in the 1960s are now charged with introduction of a 
comprehensive reform of the economic mechanism. This situation is 
casting shadows on the sincerity of the reform intentions, the more so 
now that the bureaucratic machinery of the planning authorities is 
charged with implementation of the reform measures." 195)
However, even if the fate of economic reform is uncertain, Czechoslovakia is in many 
senses a potentially interesting object for JVs. The country has a long industrial 
tradition, and thus, technical and technological skills, as well as a relatively developed 
infrastructure. Landscape and cultural monuments offer an excellent basis for 
cooperation in tourism, both in holiday and health-treatment trips.
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3.4.5.I. Czechoslovak rules for JVs
In Czechoslovakia, the principles regarding the creation and activities of a JV in that 
country had not been codified before the mid-1980s. However, in August 1985, the so 
called Principles Governing the Establishment and Activities of Joint Companies were 
enacted. They embrace general, financial and economic principles, setting forth a 
framework within which such joint companies may be established and run in 
Czechoslovak conditions. 196)
The first JVs have also been set up in the framework of these "Principles”. The main 
points of this document are described below.
The original document allowed JVs only in the field of industrial production. This 
restriction was removed on February 1,1987, when JVs were allowed also in the sphere 
of tourism.
Point 1.3. of the Principles defines that the legal form of a JV can be either a company 
limited by shares, or an association. The latter possibility is left unclear with references 
to other legal documents.
Point 1.4. stipulates that relations between the partners will be regulated in the 
memoranda and articles of incorporation in accordance with the CSSR's legislation, 
mentioning, however, that a foreign partner cannot hold a share of more than 49% in the 
corporate capital. The foreign share may consist of practically everything having a 
property value.
The parties have considerable freedom in shaping the bodies and the decision making of 
the JV. There is only one important restriction: the leading staff of the JV must be 
recruited from Czechoslovak nationals (point 1.6.).
JVs must make a contribution into corporate funds (reserve fund, cultural and social 
fund, remuneration fund etc.) (Point I I 1). Corporate tax is 50%. Dividends is taxed at 
25% (Point II 4).
In addition the JV Principles stipulate that CSSR's legal rules are applied to persons 
employed with the JV (Point II 9). Customs duties are collected on all imports of JVs, 
but exemptions may be given from this rule (III 11).
The Czechoslovak Principles covering JV activity cannot be described as liberal. 
Therefore, it is understandable that a law on JVs taking incentives for Western capital 
into consideration has been drawn up. 197)
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The Czechoslovak law concerning FDIs was drafted in 1988 and came into force 
January 1, 1989. In the law, foreign investors are given the opportunity to operate in all 
spheres of the economy with the exception of sectors important for the defence and 
security of the state. 198)
Undoubtedly, the most important change vis-a-vis previous rules is that the majority 
holding principle of the host country is not embodied in the 1989 law. Article 5, 
paragraph 4 states that the capital shares between parties are not predetermined by any 
rules. Article 7 mentions that when the permit is issued the respective shares of the host 
country and foreign parties will be considered.
This means in actual fact, that central authorities have the final say in matters of foreign 
participation. It is not explicitly said that wholly foreign-owned companies are 
disallowed, but it is likely that they will not be given the permit to operate. Therefore, 
the 1989 law can be defined as a JV Iaw: and not rules for FDIs in any other form.
Article 9 of the new Czechoslovak JV law defines that no obligations may be given to 
mixed companies operating in the CSSR, under the central economic plan. Thus, the 
JVs will operate exclusively on the basis of agreements between the supplier and 
customer. However, JVs must work in the economic environment of the host country, 
taking local prices regulations, etc into account.
It is defined (Article 12) that JVs must make contributions to the risk fund, cultural and 
social fund, a bonus (remuneration) fund. A JV may also establish a development 
(investment) fund, and other funds, financed from the after-tax profit, from which 
contributions to socio-cultural and bonus funds have been deducted. All means in the 
JV funds can be used by the enterprise itself independently, and these funds cannot be 
confiscated.
It is surprising that the JV law of 1989 does not contain any special article on tax rates, 
which were set very high in the 1986 decree (50 per cent corporate income tax, 25 per 
cent dividends). Article 11 only states that JVs pay taxes according to local legislation.
Transfers abroad are formulated in a rather liberal manner: profit repatriation, earnings 
of foreign staff, and payments for their insurance policies are all freely transferable in 
CC form. However, the law underlines (Article 21, paragraph 4) that the source of these 
transfers can only be the CC means of the JV itself. This point was actually missing in 
the 1986 rules.
The 1989 law, which has obviously been prepared over a long time, clarifies the CSSR's 
policy towards FDIs to a certain extent. All economic spheres, including all services,
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like banking and the hotel business, are now in the frame of FDI legislation. It also 
shows that the host country is not sticking to the majority stake rule, and does not want 
to allow wholly foreign-owned companies either.
No binding plan directives can be given to JVs, but at the same time they are affected by 
many local regulations, which are mainly unknown to potential foreign investors. The 
enterprise fund system, which is so typical of traditional CPEs, is applied also in Czech 
JVs. It is rather surprising that no tax rates are given by the law. The foreign party must 
go and find them out on the spot by investigating local tax laws.
Czechoslovak officials emphasize the liberal features of the 1989 law by pointing out 
that the ratio of capital shares is a matter of mutual agreement between the parties and a 
major share of the host country party is no longer prescribed; likewise, the participation 
of the foreign partner in the JV management is a matter to be agreed on by the two 
sides. The enterprise's independence is explicit in its economic functioning. Its only duty 
is to pay taxes to the state and contributions to the prescribed funds. The foreign partner 
may transfer his share of profit abroad from the CC funds available to the JV 199)
3.4.5.2. CSSR's experience with JVs
It is only natural that since the publication of "JV Principles" in 1985 the interest in 
establishing JVs in the CSSR has been rather weak among Western companies. The first 
rules were not regarded as liberal, taxes were set high for JVs and the economic 
environment with the "normalization" atmosphere looked unattractive. It can also been 
anticipated that some companies have been waiting for proper JV legislation before 
signing any agreements.
It can be taken for granted that inside of Czechoslovakia there has been resistance on 
allowing JVs with Western participation at all. Dr. B. Klein, the Director of the legal 
department of the CSSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry's said in the spring of 
1988 that two years earlier JV had been a dirty word; a year earlier there had still been a 
strong division of opinion; now (in 1988) there is a kind of bandwagon effect with 
supporters in a majority and gaining strength. 200)
However, the first TV in Czechoslovakia, Tessed, was set up already in 1986 between 
Senetek (Denmark), a subsidiary of Senetek (UK), and Tesla MLP enterprise of Brno.
The Danish branch of the Senetek company, set up in the UK in 1983 as a commercial 
distributor of products in the biology and biotechnology field, had been a leading
161
cooperation partner of the laboratory-instruments factory of the Tesla MLP enterprise 
prior to setting up the JV. The proposal to form a JV was made initially by Senetek in 
February 1986. Following difficult negotiations, which included an in depth assessment 
of cooperation to date, a JV agreement was signed in August 1986 and came into effect 
in October of that year.
The JV's mandate involved achieving better use of existing technology, researching the 
market and developing and producing new products in the field of chromatography.
Under the terms of the JV agreement, Senetek is to hold a 49% stake in the venture and 
be responsible for financing and equipping a research laboratory at Aarhus, Denmark. 
The Czechoslovak side will handle actual production. It is foreseen that development of 
new products will take place at the laboratory in Aarhus, with all manufacturing to take . 
place in Czechoslovakia.
The foundation capital of the venture on January 1, 1987, the JV's official starting date, 
was set at USD 2 million. Tesla's share amounted to USD 1.02 million and Senetek's 
USD 980,000, giving the Czechoslovak side a 51% majority ownership. The 
contribution of the Czechoslovak side consisted of non-monetary assets, including 
industrial patents, buildings, equipment and know-how. Tesla's participation in the 
undertaking has been guaranteed by the Czechoslovak State Bank.
Tessek is to employ some 26 persons in the technical, management and commercial 
field, 39 production workers, seven non-production workers and eight auxiliary 
personnel. One Czechoslovak citizen will work with a six-man research team in 
Denmark. The Czechoslovak researcher's salary is paid in hard currency. Senetek will 
also provide a person to represent the company in Prague, but no decision has been 
made on how Senetek employees in the CSSR will be paid.
The remuneration of employees of the JV is covered by Czechoslovak regulations, but 
with certain essential differences. The basic wages are somewhat higher than in other 
Czechoslovak enterprises, and individual earnings depend on the fulfilment of two 
target indicators. The enterprise has instituted a quality-control policy whereby 
occasional defects are directly reflected in the payment of each individual worker. In the 
words of one local manager,
"employment conditions at Tessek are rather tougher than we are used 
to, but good work is rewarded as it merits."
The venture is managed by a seven-member governing board, chaired by the General 
Director of Tesla Brno. The deputy chairman is the President of Senetek. The
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Czechoslovak side has four representatives on the board; the Danish side has three. As 
the highest organ of the venture, the board has the right to make decisions on all matters 
affecting the JV.
Tesek has been placed virtually outside the national economic planning and 
management system, and must meet all expenses and payments through its own 
earnings. The JV has its own hard-currencv account with the Czechoslovak State Bank, 
but requires a foreign currency permit to have access to this account. The bank initially 
required a foreign exchange permit for every single transaction carried out by the JV on 
its account -  a very cumbersome procedure. This problem has apparently been cleared 
up in subsequent negotiations. 201)
April 14, 1987, Philips, Tesla Spotrebna Elektrotechnika Konzem Bratislava, and FTO 
Transakta formed the JV "Avex" for producing and retailing videocassette recorders and 
components. Under the agreement, Tesla holds a 70% stake in the venture, to be based 
in Bratislava, Philips' share is 20% and Transakta's is 10%. Philips will contribute 
manufacturing facilities and production know-how, Tesla is responsible for the 
industrial infrastructure and Transakta will carry out the commercial activities. The JV 
was registered as a legal subject in August 1987 and obtained foreign trade rights in 
October of that year.
Financing for the venture, at least in part, has been made possible through credits 
granted by the Austrian Genossenschaftliche Zentralbank. According to spokesmen for 
the bank, Avex now has credits in various convertible currencies at its disposal.
The JV was a logical outgrowth of successful cooperation between the partners. In 
1985, Philips signed an agreement with Tesla for the regular delivery of "semi-knocked 
down" kits, consisting of mechanical desks, printed circuit boards, wiring, cosmetic 
parts and packing materials, for assembly at Tesla's plant in Bratislava. These kits would 
be used at Philip's production site in Vienna. Supply was based on normal delivery 
contracts, with payment in hard currency. 202)
Tourinvest: Formed in December 1987 between Warimpex (Austria) and the 
Czechoslovak state tourist authority, Cedok, for building or renovating hotels in the 
country. Warimpex is to hold a 49% stake in the venture, with Cedok to hold 51%. 
Under the terms of the deal, worth an estimated USD 80 million, four projects will be 
carried out. The first concerns renovation of the old Palace Hotel in downtown Prague. 
Construction is to take 18 months and cost between USD 23-25 million. The other 
projects include the renovation of the 70-room Sova Mills hotel near Prague, 
modernization of the stable and residence at Hluboka and Vltava, Southern Bohemia,
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and the construction of a new 600-bed hotel in Prague. The new hotel is expected to be 
finished by 1990. The firm has previously constructed and financed two hotels in 
Prague: the Panorama which opened in 1981; and the Forum, in June 1988. 203)
Hotelinvest: Set up in February 1988 between the Campenon Bernard group, a 
subsidiary of Generate des Eaux (both French), and Cedok to construct a 750-bed, 
four-star hotel in Prague and renovate a 360-bed hotel in Bratislava. Under the terms of 
the JV agreement, the French firm is to have a 40% equity stake in the venture, with 
Cedok to hold the remainder. The French Banque de l'Union Europeenne also took part 
in the negotiations. Foundation capital was set at Ffr 75 million. The total estimated 
value of the two hotels has been set at about Ffr 1 billion.
Balnex: Formed in February 1988 between the Austrian firm Warimpex and the 
Czechoslovak health-resort authority, Balnea, for constructing and renovating health 
spas in the country.
Recoop Tour: Set up in March 1988 between the Grassi company (Austria), the state 
agency Tradex and the Rekrea cooperative travel agency to build a hotel and air 
terminal near the Leninova subway station in Prague.
Luwex: Formed between an unidentified Austrian company and the Czechoslovak 
Manufacturing Work of Air Engineering Installations at Milvesko for producing air- 
conditioning and ventilation equipment.
!
MSZ: Set up between a West German firm and the Dolni Nemec cooperative farm for 
breeding livestock.
China-Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping: Formed between a shipping line of the People's 
Republic of China and Czekoslovenska Namomi Plavba (Czechoslovak Ocean 
Shipping) 204)
If Czechoslovakia, as a late-comer into the JV business, is compared with Romania and 
Hungary in the 1970s, when those two countries started allowing JVs, the beginning is 
not too bad. However, FDIs were not macroeconomically significant in the last few 
years of the 1980s.
Czechoslovakia has not been investing abroad very actively. In Austria, there are only 6 
firms with Czechoslovakia equity holding, including the pen factory Koh-i-Nor, which 
has been inherited from the pre-war period. In West Germany there are only 12 units 
with Czechoslovak participation, all in the trade or agency branch. In Great Britain there
164
are only 9. In developing countries there are no more than 16 Czechoslovak JVs, three 
of which are in production. 205)
In the summer of 1989, there were 20 JVs registered in the CSSR. Actually, very little 
information is available about these units. Just half of the existing JVs are active in hotel 
and tourism, which was excluded from FDIs until February, 1987. 206)
There are two good reasons for the concentration of JVs on tourism. Firstly, 
Czechoslovakia offers excellent conditions for foreign visitors in city-holidays, winter 
tourism and health-treatment trips. Secondly, tourism offers a convenient way to earn 
hard currency on the spot from Western visitors. Among the 17 million foreign tourists 
visiting the CSSR annually, only 7 per cent (1.2 million) are from the West. Thus, there 
is certainly much potential to develop the CC tourism considerably by providing more 
and better hotels and other services.
Seven out of ten JVs active in the hotel and tourism business have their Western partner 
from neighbouring Austria. The Austrian firm Warimpex, which was the first Western 
party to invest directly in Czechoslovak tourism by establishing the Hotelinvest JV with 
Cedok, is also in the Balnex JV, active in spa tourism. Grassi from Austria is the 
Western party in no less than three JVs operating in Czechoslovak tourism. 
Genossenschaftliche Zentralbank (Cooperative Central Bank) from Austria is in two 
similar units.
The French enterprise CBC is in three separate Czechoslovak JVs, active in the tourism 
business. Thus, ten JVs active in the CSSR's tourist business involve only four Western 
partners, one from France and three from Austria.
The first productive JV established after the pioneer enterprises Tessek and Avex is 
Luwex, which produces air conditioning. Among the three Western partners, all of 
whom are from Austria, are Warimpex and Grassi. Obviously, these enterprises have 
needed this production unit in the CSSR, in order to supply their hotel and restaurant 
projects with air conditioning.
Only two West German firms are involved, one producing and trading in metal 
products, one in animal production. Alongside Senetek from Denmark, the Western 
partner of Tessek, a Danish firm (Naturgas Syd) produces plastic pipes together with a 
Czech partner.
Two British firms are involved in the CSSR's JVs. One (Vitrea) is active with a 
Yugoslav firm in the construction company Pozimos, which aims at CC financed
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projects in the host country. The other is a party in the Flatex JV, which produces 
special textiles for the furniture industry.
A firm from Belgium (Belevo) participates in chemical production in the CSSR. An 
Austrian firm has a 30 per cent stake in Inko JV producing ceramics.
Altogether, the invested capital in Czechoslovak JVs was no more than the equivalent of 
some USD 30-40 million, of which the host country owns more than half. Thus, FDIs 
in the CSSR have a total value of only some USD 15-18 million.207)
This sum is extremely low. One of the reasons for this is that the CSSR is a late-comer 
among CPEs in JV activity.
Investors from only seven Western countries have participated in the CSSR's JV 
activity. Japan and US A are absent.
Concentration of FDIs on hotel and tourism has not brought about high capital input in 
the CSSR's JVs. Units active in this sphere obviousiy work mainly with borrowed 
money. High FDIs, as in Hungary in this sphere, have not taken place. No JV financial 
institutions were set up before the summer of 1989.
3.4.5.3. The future of JVs in the CSSR
Czechoslovakia is not a very populous country with only some 15 million inhabitants 
and it does not have plentiful natural riches at its disposal. However, as an old 
industrialized country it certainly has some attraction for Western investors, provided, 
that JV rules are liberalized and economic reform gains strength.
Radical changes took, place in the CSSR's political life during the last months of 1989 
after mass demonstrations against the stringent party rule. In December 1989, the 
Communist party expelled its former hard-line leader, M. Jakes from its ranks, due to 
gross political mistakes in tackling social tensions. At the same time, the party ordered 
the rehabilitation of thousands of reformers, including A. Dubcek, the party leader in the 
"Prague Spring", who were evicted after 1968. 208)
Mr. L. Adamec resigned as Czech premier December 8, 1989. The next evening the old 
President Gustav Husak -  installed by the Soviet invasion of 1968 -  went on TV to say 
he would resign as soon as a new government was formed. In the new cabinet the 
communists still have ten places against eleven for non-communists. But two or three 
of the communists -  most notably Mt. Komarek, a rebellious economist who is deputy
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prime minister -  are little more than nominal members of their party. 209) A new era of 
reform started in the CSSR in the turn of the decade 1980-1990.
One extremely important factor in this context must be taken into consideration. Soviet- 
Czechoslovak trade, like Soviet trade with other CMEA countries as well, entered a new 
phase in the late 1980s. The decrease of energy prices in the mid-1980s is affecting the 
intra-CMEA trade scene with a time-lag resulting from the price formula agreed upon 
in 1975. This phenomenon is likely to improve the terms of trade of the small CMEA- 
countries vis-a-vis the USSR. In actual terms it means that there is no more the need to 
export as much to the Soviet Union as in the early 1980s in quantitative terms to balance 
the trade. This does, however, contain the danger of spare capacities in the production 
spheres which are not very competitive.
Therefore, there is one more incentive to restructure and modernize industries in the 
CSSR (and in other CMEA countries as well), in order to be able to find other export 
markets than the Soviet one. The extensive growth, on the basis of deteriorating terms 
of trade is no longer possible.
The CC debt of Czechoslovakia (some USD 4 billion in 1988) has always been well 
under control, as pointed out previously. Therefore, economic reform can be backed 
with technology imports from the West by credit financing without immediately 
catching the Polish disease. At the same time, there is naturally no urgent need to 
maximize CC earnings via JVs.
Summing up, it can be said that Czechoslovakia is certainly not going to be of little 
interest to Western investors in the 1990s. Much depends on the economic policy, in 
which there are several options open, when the whole socio-economic and political 
scene is under reconstruction.
3.4.6. The Soviet Union
The Soviet economy has always been highly centralized and rigid until the mid-1980s, 
although several reforms attempts have previously been launched. The continuation of 
the extremely wasteful, costrinsensitive system has been possible because the Soviet 
Union is the richest country of the globe, as far as resource endowment is concerned. 
This fact has allowed the country to apply an extensive means of economic growth 
without causing a serious balance of payments problem.
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Furthermore, the Soviet Union is undoubtedly one of the winners of the two oil-crises. 
Even if the USSR has never been a member of OPEC, it has been able to profit from the 
oil price hikes in the 1970s and early 1980s. The windfall profits derived from the 
improvement in terms of trade have been impressive allowing considerable import hikes 
without critically increasing the CC debt.
However, the mid-1980s earmarks an interesting turning point in the Soviet economy. 
The new and dynamic Party leader, M. Gorbachev, decided to revitalize the economic 
management with his economic reform, or perestroika. At the same time, the situation 
on the world energy market changed radically, when the oil price started to slip down. 
Soviet export earnings, especially in Western trade, experienced a severe blow.
During the first years of perestroika and glasnost it has become quite obvious that the 
foreign trade structure, especially in Soviet-Western trade, is primitive, as far as exports 
are concerned. Exports to the West consist almost entirely of raw materials and some 
semi-manufactured goods. In imports from the West foodstuffs have a large share.
Thus, it is understandable that the new leadership in the Soviet Union, which is 
emphasizing intensive economic growth, and therefore, modernization of the Soviet 
industry, also mentions the need for increasing competitiveness and improving external 
economic links. It is thus understandable that Western FDIs have been allowed. Large- 
scale technology purchases on a turnkey basis are no longer as easy to make as during 
the years of high oil price.
Western companies are fascinated by the large Soviet market and by the local natural 
resources. This interest has been increased by Western media coverage of the economic 
reform in the USSR. Decreasing tension on the East-West political scene is, on its part, 
helping to create a favourable climate for Western FDIs in the Soviet Union.
In the early 1990s it is still impossible to judge what the ultimate outcome of 
Gorbachev’s perestroika will be. It has been advancing very slowly in practical life 
during the first five years of the new leadership. Therefore, it is likely that JVs to be 
established in the Soviet Union, will be confronted with a business environment, which 
has peculiar features consisting of predominantly centralized administration methods 
mixed with some market elements.
Talk of reaching Rouble convertibility in the near future is premature, even if it has been 
declared to be an official goal of Soviet economic policy. In the meantime, Western 
companies planning JV operations in the Soviet Union, must face the problem of
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double-money dealing with CC and the inconvertible Rouble at the same time. "Hard 
currency self-sufficiency" in JV operations is a major aim of the Soviet side.
In the early 1970s, when Romania and Hungary had issued their first rules on JVs, the 
Western business community expected a similar opening in the Soviet Union. In that 
period Soviet officials vehemently and aggressively denied the possibility of allowing 
Western direct investments in any form ever in the Soviet Union. Some one and a half 
decades afterwards the Soviets issued the first rules covering Western FDIs.
3.4.6.I. Soviet regulations governing Western FDIs
By a Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers dated January 13, 1987 (decree No 49) 
on the Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and operations of JVs with the 
Participations of Soviet Organisations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing 
Countries, Western FDIs are allowed in the USSR. In addition, a Resolution of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers dated September 7, 
1987 on Additional Measures to Improve the Country's External Economic Activity in 
the new Conditions of Economic Management (decree No 1074) introduced some 
supplements to the January decree. Both decrees together form the first legal framework 
of JVs in the USSR. 210)
The January decree (No 49) stipulates (clause 2) that foundation documents, including a 
feasibility study, have to be submitted by the Soviet organizations concerned to the 
Ministries and government agencies, under which they operate. Ministries and 
government agencies of the Union Republics must submit such proposals to the Council 
of Ministers of their Republics. These organizations have to agree on the proposals with 
the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the USSR Ministry of Finance and 
other Ministries and agencies concerned. JVs must be registered with the USSR 
Ministry of Finance (clause 9).
The aim of JVs has to be satisfying domestic needs for products more fully, attracting 
advanced technology, management expertise, and additional material and financial 
resources to the USSR and expanding exports, as well as reducing imports (clause 3).
The share of the Soviet side in the JV capital is not be less than 51% (clause 5). No 
provisions are made on possible exceptions from this rule.
Contributions to the JV authorized fund may include material, as well as immaterial 
values. Money assets in any form are also accepted (clause 11).
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JVs are governed by a Board consisting of persons appointed by the partners. Its 
decision-making procedure is defined by the founding documents. The operational 
activities of a JV are governed by a Management Board consisting of Soviet and foreign 
citizens. The Chairman of the Board and the Director-General have to be citizens of the 
USSR (clause 21).
Clause 22 of decree 49 stipulates that a JV is not allowed to enter into relations with 
central state authorities of the USSR and of the Union Republics through authorities 
superior to the Soviet partner in the JV. However, a JV is independent in developing and 
approving its business operation programmes. State bodies of the USSR are not allowed 
to fix any mandatory plans for a JV nor do they have to guarantee a market for it 
products (clause 23). Thus, a JV operates outside the planning system.
Foreign trade transactions of a JV can be transacted independently, but licences 
(permits) for them are needed according to the legislation of the USSR. These 
operations may also be effected through Soviet FTOs (clause 24).
JVs operating in the Soviet territory must be "self-sufficient” in CC terms. All foreign 
currency expenditure of a JV including transfer of profits and other sums due to foreign 
partners and specialists have to be covered by proceeds from sales of JV products on 
foreign markets (clause 25).
Decree No 49 stipulates that all business transactions on the local market have to be 
effected via Soviet FTOs using the rouble as a means of payment. Prices used must be 
world market values (clause 26).
JVs are required to form a reserve fund. Deductions from profits must be added to this 
fund until the latter totals 25% of the JV capital (clause 30).
Decree 49 guarantees that the foreign partner's share of the JV distributed profit is 
transferable abroad in foreign currency (clause 32). In this context one must bear in 
mind the provision of clause 25 which states that all foreign currency expenditure, 
including transfer of profits, must be covered by proceeds from sales on foreign 
markets.
The JV tax rate is 30% of the profit remaining after deductions to the reserve and other 
funds. The two first years of operation are tax-free. The Ministry of Finance can reduce 
the tax and allow tax holidays (clause 36). In addition, the part of the profit due to a 
foreign partner in a JV must be taxed, if transferred abroad, at the rate of 20% (clause 
41).
170
The personnel of a JV must consist of mainly Soviet citizens, who are paid on the basis 
of collective agreements with the trade union organization formed at the JV. The 
contents of these agreements including provisions for the social need of the personnel 
are defined by Soviet legislation and by the foundation documents of the JV (clause 47).
Decree 49 does not provide for too many outright incentives for foreign investors. 
However, clause 34, which covers the construction needs of JVs, stipulates that orders 
from JVs must receive priority both as regards limits on construction/assembly work to 
be carried out by Soviet organizations, and as regards material resources required for the 
construction.
The September Resolution (decree No 1074/1987) introduces some interesting 
amendments. The approval procedure of JVs has been simplified by significantly 
reducing the number of bodies required to be consulted. The September Resolution 
provides that the ministries and departments of the USSR and the Councils of Ministers 
o l  Union Republics are granted the right to take decisions independently on setting up 
JVs.
The practical effect of this provision is that JVs, in which the local partner is 
subordinated to one of the all-union industrial branch ministries, only needs approval 
from that ministry; in cases where the Soviet partner is subject to republic 
subordination, the approval is required from the Council of Ministers of the Union 
Republic concerned.
It is also worth mentioning that the September Resolution emphasizes JV activity in the 
sphere of services by mentioning the fields of science and technology, trade, finance, 
services, tourism and advertising, design, repair, purchase of shares, bonds and other 
securities, their issue and floating. It can be concluded that, for example, establishing a 
joint bank is allowed under these rules.
Clause 26 of the January decree (no 49) has been revised by the September Resolution 
(No 1074). It defines that a JV by agreement with Soviet enterprises and organizations 
has to determine the kind of currency to be used in settlements for products sold and 
goods purchased. The JV must also determine the procedure for selling its products on 
- the Soviet market and for shipping goods from this market. In practice, it means that the 
JV must not use Soviet FTOs as intermediaries in business deals on the local market and 
that CC and rouble payments can be used when dealing with Soviet organizations. A JV 
may buy and sell on the Soviet domestic market either ihrough a FTO or directly with 
the Soviet supplier or end-user concerned. Such sales and purchases may be made in 
foreign currency if the parties so agree.
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These provisions of the September Resolution allow a JV to possibly increase its CC 
earnings by "internal export", and thus, enhance its chances of profit repatriation. 
However, the January decree (No 49) stipulates, as mentioned, (clause 25) that all CC 
expenditures by a JV, including profit repatriation, must be covered by proceeds on 
foreign markets.
Obviously, it is a matter of bargaining, whether or not the CC income from "internal 
export" can be counted as "real" CC revenue for JVs to be used for profit repatriation. 
The valid rules (decrees 49 and 1074) do not give a clear-cut answer to that point.
Anyhow, the September Resolution gives a clear supplementary incentive to Western 
investors by stipulating that it is possible to exempt JVs from paying tax on profits 
during the first two years from the moment they show declared profits. The January 
decree offers tax holiday on JV profits during the two initial years of operation (clause 
36). If now, say, the first two years bring losses, and then, say, the following two years 
bring profits, the tax-free time, according to the September decree, is altogether four 
years. 211)
Obviously, Soviet authorities are willing to develop further the legal base of JVs, with 
imperfections still pushing away some potential Western investors. 212) For the time 
being, for example, in the Soviet Union there is no corporate law in effect. No special 
legal forms-joint stock company or limited liability company are provided for either in 
decree No 49 or in general Soviet legislation. However, it seems possible that a 
corporate law will be elaborated in the USSR in the near future. 213)
On December 2, 1988 the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a resolution 
(postanovlenie) on the development of external economic links. 214) In this document it 
is stipulated that in order to activate JV business in the Soviet territory relative capital 
shares of partners are negotiable. This point means the abandonment of the previous 
requirement that foreign partners cannot take a majority share in a JV. Furthermore, it is 
allowed for a foreigner to become the chairman of the board, and managing director of a 
JV.
In addition to these two extremely important points, the same document stipulates that 
the principle questions concerning the JV activities must be solved in the board 
unanimously. In labour management relaxation is foreseen: hiring and dismissing 
workers as well as bonus systems are negotiable between partners. Reduced customs 
tariffs on JV imports are offered. Payments made in roubles for alien workers are 
allowed in order for them to be able to cover their local expenses.
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Tax consessions are offered for JVs to be established in the Far East regions. The 
Ministry of Finance has the right to reduce JV taxes in certain cases.
Potentially important for foreign investors is point 28 in the December 2, 1988 
resolution. It stipulates that Soviet construction firms are allowed to participate in bids 
in the Soviet territory, when projects are carried out with CC allocations by the state. 
The most favourable offer, foreign or not, will be selected. If under these new 
circumstances a JV located in the Soviet Union is regarded as a Soviet constructor, this 
point 28 may give a boost for FDIs in the construction branch. A project getting CC 
allocation can be located via JV better than directly from the West. Bids containing 
Western engineering and Soviet labour under JV management might be highly 
competitive.
Rules concerning JVs were amended in a very important manner in March, 1989 
(postanovlenye Sovieta Ministrov SSSR ot 7 marta No 203). 215) This Ministerial 
decree, which is mainly concerned with the registration of foreign trade rights, customs 
and licensing (permitting) certain import and export items, states clearly (Article 8) that 
JVs in the territory of the USSR may only export products (work, services) which are 
created within the JV activity, and import items (work, services) only for their own 
need.
In plain language it means that Decree 203 prohibits JV trading activities. The aim of 
these new rules is to prevent speculation in foreign trade, as the specialist G. Petrov 
from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relation states. Western firms regard this 
new Decree as a serious set-back for JV activity. After these regulations it is no more 
possible to help Soviet clients, who are willing to buy JV products for CC to earn this. If 
a JV is, for example, providing equipment for the pulp industry, it is no more able to 
mediate pulp exports to the West, in order to help the client to earn the necessary CC. 
216)
Discussion on Free Economic Zones (FEZ) has been going on in the Soviet Union after 
the issuing of the Decree allowing FDIs. Basically, a positive attitude towards FEZs has 
been taken. There are for example, comments that FEZs in various forms are pretty 
common in the global-economy: 30% of global output is produced in about 2,500 FEZs. 
217)
The Soviet Union is naturally interested in the experience gained with FEZs in other 
socialist countries. The relatively good results in China have been mentioned, but the 
CMEA-countries of Europe have had only very narrow experiences in the 1980s. 218)
173
Ivan Ivanov, who is in charge of relations with OECD-countries in the GVK, 
represented a paper in m id-1989 on FEZ in the Soviet Union. It can be assumed that 
this paper will form a basis for future FEZ rules in the USSR. Therefore, the main 
points of Ivanov's paper are worthwhile listing here. 219)
In the first section of Ivanov's paper it is stated that FEZs normally have weak links with 
the national market and are predominantly export oriented. This model is only partially 
applicable in the USSR, which is seeking solutions to national economic problems 
rather than specific problems of external economics.
Thus, it is stipulated that a FEZ would work for the internal Soviet market by 
contributing to its supply of modem technology and high-quality consumer goods and 
provide managerial skills and new forms of economic organizations. Accordingly, such 
zones should be created and operated as an integral part of the Soviet economy. It is 
further suggested that several types of FEZs should be created.
Section two deals with the establishment and status of FEZs. In it is suggested that the 
basic elements of the economy of zones should be unified for the whole territory of the 
country and codified in special legislation. Individual zones would be created on the 
basis of a special decision of the Council of Ministers, which would take into account 
the legal regime, the specific economic objectives and policies of respective regions.
Realistically, Ivanov's paper states, that the size of the territory selected for the zone 
should be sufficiently large and should be provided with adequate infrastructure, 
availability of labour resources, local construction materials, convenient internal and 
international communication facilities and well established links with the rest of the 
Soviet economy.
The FEZs are economic rather than political entities, as Ivanov's paper states. This point 
can be interpreted as implying that capitalists can invest their money in Soviet FEZs, but 
are not allowed to transplant their political system into the zones. To be sure that this 
does not happen, it is stated that all-union. and respective republic legislations are 
applied within the zones; legislative exceptions relate only to economic and social 
issues. To make this point quite clear, it is stated that FEZs are territories subordinate to 
national level also in economic terms. A market economy cannot be brought in by 
Western investors either, without the acceptance of the all-union administration, if 
Ivanov's point is understood correctly.
The third section, which deals with the economic mechanism of the zone is highly 
interesting. Firstly, it is defined in general terms that a FEZ functions as an autonomous
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self-accounting entity. Its relationship with the state plan and budget, as well as the 
requirements of self-financing and self-accounting, are determined for the zone as a 
whole. In its external relations, the zone operates as a territory which is open to all kinds 
of foreign economic activity in which the most favoured treatment for JVs and foreign 
investments is provided. The state and the Republic (region) where the zone is located 
should provide back-up support to its operations. The zone's orientation towards the 
solution of national and regional problems is to be ensured through economic methods.
These general definitions of Ivanov's paper concerning the economic mechanisms of 
FEZs allow some important conclusions. Firstly, the FEZs are seen as economically 
independent units, which however, are part of the national economy. Secondly, the 
zones aim at providing the most favoured treatment for JVs and foreign investments. 
This indicates that, not only JVs, but also FDIs wholly-owned by foreigners will be 
allowed. Thirdly, administrative regulations and interference are going to be minimized 
in the zones, because economic levers are emphasized in the section on FEZ 
management.
However, it is further stipulated, that as a part of the Soviet economy, the zone is 
centrally prescribed to adhere to: volume and structure of state order; funds and 
allocations of supplies, state investment and construction works; rates of taxation and 
currency deductions to the state budget. It is recommended that the overall share of the 
state order should not exceed 50 per cent of the volume of production of individual 
goods. In addition, it is stated that, material supplies are to be allocated to the zone in 
volumes and structures specified by Gosplan and Gossnab. With regard to the rest of its 
needs, the zone is to be covered by contractual arrangements with Soviet suppliers, 
through its own production and impoits.
These quotations from Ivanov's paper show clearly how difficult it is to create models 
for FEZs in an economic environment which is still mainly based on CPE principles. It 
is, on the one hand, stated that the zones should be managed by economic methods, but, 
on the other hand, there is the need to integrate them into the planning system via state 
orders and centrally planned supplies. For potential foreign investors these proposals are 
rather confusing.
Section four of Ivanov's paper deals with economic incentives listing first those which 
are common to the Soviet and foreign economic residents of the zone:
-  exemption of exports and imports of the zone from customs duties and non-tariff 
restrictions
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-  reduction of customs duties imposed on imported products of the zone by the 
internal market of the USSR
-  assurance of material supplies from centralized (regional) funds
-  supply of labour force and introduction of simplified recruitment and dismissal 
procedures
-  provision of infrastructural services and determination of amortization periods
-• application of free market prices in marketing products within the zone
utilization of insurance schemes for protection against commercial risks existing in 
the zone
-  exercise of the right to participate in the management of the zone.
Some comments on these points are needed. The first one is clear: FEZs in the Soviet 
Union are going to be custom free areas in the traditional sense fo the world. The second 
point means, that while the FEZ is not directly a part of the internal market of the host 
country territory, the host country's protectionism treats FEZ products in a more 
favourable manner than actual imports from abroad. In materials and labour input the 
zone's residents are in a better position than average Soviet enterprises. Amortization 
periods can obviously be handled flexibly.
The last point on the list is of special interest. It states that enterprises located in FEZs 
have the right to participate in the management in the zone. This point is clarified in 
section six, paragraph two, which suggests that the administration of a FEZ will include, 
in addition to Soviet citizens, foreign experts including those recommended by business 
circles of the zone. If this recommendation is carried out, it means that alien persons will 
be involved in Soviet administration on the local level.
An extra incentive list concerning only foreign investors in the zone is also prepared in 
the Ivanov paper:
-  exemption from taxes on the repatriation of profits made in the zones;
additional investment protection measures including provision of guarantees of 
conversion of the rouble component of profits which are not covered by hard 
currency self-financing, into foreign currency at the market rate of a zone bank of 
the zone;
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-  introduction of a simplified procedure to enter and reside in the zone to be provided 
for foreigners;
-  provision of guarantees in the USSR market for products manufactured against state 
orders;
-  free selection of financial sources for its operations in the FEZ including attracting 
funds from the international money market;
-  provision of additional measures to protect industrial property.
The first proposal in this list means that if Ivanov's paper is put into practice, there is a 
clear incentive for FDIs to choose FEZs as a location when investment decisions are 
made. The second proposal is of fundamental importance, if it is carried out in the final 
legislations concerning FEZs. By this proposal as it stands, the obligation for Soviet JVs 
to earn CC is cancelled. Rouble profits too can be repatriated, after converting them into 
CC.
However, this proposal must be read carefully. It says the conversion of the rouble 
component of profits into CC must be made at the market rate of a bank of a FEZ.
The December 2, 1988 resolution concerning foreign economic links in the Soviet 
Union (mentioned above) stipulates that currency auctions can be organized. Ivanov's 
paper is hinting at that point: rouble conversion is made at the market rate of the bank of 
the zone.
Thus no economic unit operating in Soviet FEZs will be able to foresee the real value of 
rouble profits to be repatriated. If a foreign investor offers roubles in an auction 
organized by a zone bank, there is no guarantee that anybody will offer a conversion 
into CC. If somebody does offer that kind of conversion, the exchange rate will not 
necessarily have anything to do with the official exchange rate. It is likely that a 
potential foreign investor who offers roubles for sale in currency auctions will get an 
extremely low exchange rate, because in FEZs there will be no real incentives for any 
economic units (local or foreign) to offer CC for conversion. At the same time, it is 
likely that roubles in large amounts will be offered for sale.
Ivanov's proposal further deals with currency and customs regimes as well as 
management of FEZs. It is noteworthy that primarily rouble transactions are proposed, 
although all the economic units of a zone will have the right to have CC accounts. Every 
FEZ is supposed to have its own bank, in which Soviet and foreign banks can be
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shareholders. It is mentioned that the Bank will be involved in buying and selling CC at 
official rates and in auctions at the market rate of the rouble.
The work done for Ivanov's paper is a clear sign that the Soviet Union is seriously 
interested in the FEZ idea. Prolonged preparation of rules concerning them has 
certainly hampered FDI into the Soviet economy, because presumably many potential 
investors have waited for the ultimate creation of FEZs.
It is assumed that the first such zone is to materialize between Vyborg, near Leningrad 
and the Finnish border. Other areas, for example in the Far East and on the Black Sea 
coast, are under consideration.
The development of Soviet rules concerning FDIs has been a trial and error process. 
One Soviet observer, A. Polyukhov writes, that few countries have no laws governing 
their foreign economic activity. The USSR is one of them. Resolutions and other acts 
are not taken seriously in the West. In his opinion, business always involves a certain 
amount of risk, but real businessmen are not willing to take stupid risks: show us the 
law, they say, which formally lays down the legal status of a foreign entrepreneur in the 
USSR and of the special economic zones on the Soviet territory, and then we shall think 
about cooperation. 220)
The same writer adds:
"Bureaucrats have assured us that as soon as we open the door to the 
West by as much as a crack, Western millionaires would come 
nishing in to help build socialism in the USSR at their expense. No 
such invasion seems forthcoming, although the door has been flung 
open". 221)
Even if comments made by Polyukhov describe the Soviet situation concerning FDIs in 
the late 1980s by and large correctly, there has been considerable interest among foreign 
investors to utilize the opened door policy, although final legislation including FEZ 
rules has been missing.
In the autumn of 1989 Ivan Ivanov stated that the Soviet Council of Ministers 
(government) has taken the decision to establish three FEZs in 1990. One of them will 
be in Nahodka (Far East), one in Vyborg and one in Novgorod. In each region 
mentioned the local authorities and population support the new idea of FEZ. It is also 
stated by Ivanov, that experience collected in the three regions mentioned will constitute 
a first phase, whereafter more similar zones will be established.222)
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3.4.6.2. Soviet experience with Joint Ventures
Of the 18 JVs formed with Western partners in the USSR by the end of 1987, the 11 
industrial undertakings have a relatively high capitalization compared with JVs 
established elsewhere in the CMEA area in recent years. For example, the joint 
company set up by Sandoz A.G. of Switzerland with the Union of Soviet Dyes Factories 
(Soyuzanilprom) has an equity capital of S F 10 million.223)
A Soviet-Italian JV, Sovitalprodmash, formed by the FATA European Group of Turin 
and the Soviet production association Volzhskprodmaxh, has an initial equity capital of 
USD 30 million, of which 85 per cent will be borrowed from a consortium of Italian 
banks. The joint undertaking plans to produce industrial refrigeration and deep-freezing 
equipment. 224) By comparison, the Soviet-French JV Technicord set up by a 
subsidiary of CEA Industries and a Soviet institute has an initial equity capital of FF 4.0 
million. It plans to have an annual turnover of FF 25 million from the sales of hot metal 
spraying systems.225)
The flexibility in managerial arrangements permitted by the Soviet legislation is evident 
in the JV by Finnair and Intourist. The Finnish partner's desire to maintain a high 
standard of service led it to negotiate the right to appoint line management for the hotel, 
including the hotel and restaurant managers, the kitchen chef, and the managers for 
marketing and reservations. As the Soviet partner has a 51 per cent shareholding, it 
appoints the majority of the board and the general manager. 226)
According to the FATA agreement, each side is required to invest only 12 per cent of 
their nominal equity; the balance will be borrowed in the name of the joint company 
from the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Relations, which thus takes most of the risk 
of financing the formation of the JV. It should be added that the USSR Bank for Foreign 
Economic Relations and the USSR State Bank have set up a joint working group with 
several west European banks to examine the possibility of establishing a jointly-owned 
bank in the USSR for lending to East-West JVs. 227)
The initial-capital of some JVs in the service sector is of a considerable magnitude. The 
joint enterprise formed by Finnair and Intourist to refurbish and operate a hotel in 
Moscow has an authorized capital of 10.2 million roubles. 228)
Finnair based its initial calculation of return on its 40-45 million Finnish markka (FIM) 
capital on an eight-to-ten year period. 229)
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One of the first Finnish-Soviet JVs is between Sadolin (a subsidiary of Nobel, Sweden) 
and Estkolhozstroi in Estonia. Sadolin has some 10 years of experience on the Soviet 
market. In 1984, Sadolin sold the production licence and production line of various 
wood impregnation agents to Estonia. This production line is now put at the disposal of 
the JV, on a leasing basis. 230)
Sadolin has 40% of the JV capital. The annual general meeting consists of the 
management board, which has four members from each side. Responsible to this Board 
is the Directorate, which is equivalent to a Board of Directors in a western-type joint 
stock company. This structure may be considered more efficient in managerial terms 
because a relatively small number of key executives from each side, operating at two 
levels of decision-making, replace the more cumbersome annual general meeting. 231)
Homatek JV was established by Ordzhonikidze Machine Tool Factory in Moscow and 
the West German Heinemann in 1987. These partners had previously cooperated for 
many years. In 1988, Homatek started manufacturing metal-working machine tools, 
producing 20 pieces in 1988 and 50 in 1989. A new production building will be erected 
for the JV. 232)
Two long-standing partners, the January Uprising Heavy Crane Factory in Odessa and 
the West German Liebher established their JV in the autumn of 1987. A new building 
for assembling high capacity cranes is under review. 233)
Lenwest is a JV in Leningrad, in which the well-known West German shoe-factory 
Salamander is the Western partner. The agreement was signed in 1987, and after that an 
old plant in Leningrad has been modernized and production started in 1988. In the same 
year Salamander concluded the second Soviet JV agreement. 234)
The Soviet-Italian R & D firm Sinion has been formed in Moscow. Its founders are the 
Giprokauchuk research institute, the Sintez-Kauchuk production amalgamation, and the 
Italian Press-industria, an old trading partner of Soviet FTOs.
Sinion is to develop and improve ecologically clean production processes, special 
equipment for petrochemical synthesis and, particularly, equipment for manufacturing 
synthetic rubber.
The Bakmil JV has been set up to meet the requirements of the consumer goods market; 
its partners are the Bakkonditsioner production amalgamation in Baku and the Italian 
design firm Merloni Progetti, a division of the Merloni group. Bakmil is to manufacture 
modem, rather scarce household electric appliances (mincing machines, food mixers, 
coffee grinders) and small electric motors for articles of this kind. The JV has all the
180
prerequisites of success: Bakkonditsioner's experience and export of household electric 
appliances and Merloni's ability to manage the manufacture and marketing of this kind 
of product.
The Baku works -  their new workshop will come into operation at the beginning of 
1990 -  will annually manufacture 1.5 million micro motors and 750,000 compact 
household electric appliances. The JV's share capital is as follows: Bakkondisioner 
contributes 72% and Merloni Progetti 28%. Moreover, the Soviet partner will supply the 
site and ensure the factory's construction, and the Italian firm will deliver the production 
lines for the complete manufacturing cycle, organize production and train personnel.
Guidance documents have been signed with the Italian firm Rest-Ital to set up a JV in 
Alma Ata to produce and export fashionable astrakhan clothes.
Soviet-Canadian mutually beneficial economic cooperation has resulted in the JV 
Tavria Magna. Its partners are AvtoZAZ, the Zaporozhye motor vehicle production 
amalgamation and Canadian Magna-International. Tavria Magna is to produce and 
market medium- and large-sized moulds for plastic products and apply the latest 
technology, advanced management methods, material, economic and moral incentives to 
its work. The Canadian firm’s experience in management, manufacturing and marketing 
moulds should prove to be a great asset.
AvtoZAZ's share is an industrial and office building, basic and auxiliary equipment and 
financing in roubles.
Magna-International is to invest in the purchase and delivery of manufacturing 
equipment, transfer know-how and train personnel.
Agreements have been signed to set up a Soviet-Swiss JV, Diaplus, in Moscow with a 
view to manufacturing and marketing medical instruments for immunity diagnosis. Its 
founders are the research and production amalgamation Biotechnologia of the USSR 
Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry and the Swiss Hoffman la Roche. The 
purpose of the JV is to improve the methods of diagnosing some diseases. It will 
manufacture immunity diagnosis instruments to protect mother-and child health and 
fight against cancerous and infectious diseases. 235)
Negotiations on establishing the first joint bank in the Soviet Union started in June 
1988; and an agreement concerning the creation of International Bank of Moscow was 
signed in February 1989. In this first joint financial institution on the Soviet soil there 
are five participants from the West, all of which are from Western Europe:
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-  Credit Lyonnais (France)
-  Banka Commerciale Italiana (Italy)
-  Creditanstalt-Bankverein (Austria)
Bayerische Verensbank (West Germany)
Kansallis-Osake-Pankki (Finland)
All the five Western banks participate in the joint bank’s basic capital of Rbl 100 million 
with an equal share of 12%. In addition, there are three Soviet banks as shareholders, 
Vneshekonombank with a 20% stake, Promstroibank and Sberbank with 10% each.
International Bank of Moscow will be dealing with roubles,as well as with CC. 236) 
Therefore, the first join bank in the Soviet Union can be described as an on-shore bank, 
unlike the first joint bank in Hungary (CIB) which started business on an off-shore 
basis.
The basic joint bank capital of SUR 100 million (some USD 150 million) of which SUR 
40 million will be immediately paid, is extremely high in comparison to the average 
capital of the other JVs established in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. 237) This is 
not surprising: also in Hungary financial institutions established with foreign partners 
have much higher initial capital than JVs in average.
Two interesting further observations can be made in connection with the first joint bank 
on Soviet territory. Firstly, the Soviet side is in minority position among the 
shareholders. Secondly, not only the VEB (Vneshekonombank), which has the 
monopoly position in CC dealings, in the Soviet Union is among the Soviet 
shareholders, but also the Bank for Industrial Construction holds shares. In fact the 
Soviet banks are looking for new ways, in order to get involved in the CC business. 
Joining JV-banks provides an opportunity for that.
3.4.6.3. Overall assessment of the first FDIs in the USSR
The Soviet economic weekly "EG" has published lists of established JVs in the Soviet 
Union. In January, 1989, 200 JVs were already established.
This result, after only two years after the coming into force of the first Soviet JV rules, 
is rather encouraging. Compared with Hungary, the most successful small European 
CMEA-country in JVs, the Soviet results in the first two years are striking; in Hungary 
it has taken almost two decades to attract about 200 FDIs, during which the legislation 
has been radically improved.
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However, among the first 200 units in the USSR small units are in a predominant 
position: 42.5% of the JVs have an equity less than one million Roubles (USD 1.56 
million). 238) About one third of the Soviet JVs have a starting capital of Rbl 1-5 
million (USD 1.56-7.8 million). In almost one fourth of them the equivalent figure is 
over Rbl 5 million. In cases of JV-partners coming from other CMEA-countries the 
equity is given in TR; these cases account for 2.5% of the total equity of the first 200 
Soviet JVs (See figure 1/3.4.6.3).
Among the 200 cases there are 26 units (13%), in which the founding capital is Rbl 10 
million or more (over USD 15.6 million). The highest single investment is Rbl 47.7 
million, in the Homatek machine tool venture, in which West German Heinemann has a 
32% stake. After that there are two units a with Rbl 30 million equity; in one of them, 
Usolyefarm, the foreign partner is from Bulgaria (chemicals), and in the other, Altair, 
from France (machine tools).
There are in addition to these three ventures six more with a founding capital of over 
Rbl 20 million (USD 32 million). Sovplastital with Rbl 23.6 million involving Alma 
Rose from Italy (22%) is active in plastic consumer goods; Pilenga Godo. JV, in which 
the Japanese firm Hokne Godo, participates in fish processing with a 49% stake. This 
JV has a capital of Rbl 21.6 million; The Sedin-Shiss engineering company, with the 
West-German party Schiess AG (49%) has a starting capital of Rbl 20.5 million; 
Volmag JV, also in engineering, has a capital of Rbl 27.8 million, of which MAG from 
Austria owns 30%; Sovpolijuplas, a plastic consumer goods unit, has a capital of Rbl 
28.6 million, 49% owned by Yugoslav Pancevo; Sovbutital JV is 30% owned by Italian 
Pressindustria, and produces chemicals with a starting capital of Rbl 38.3 million.
The average size of investment in the first 205 Soviet JV was Rbl 1.63 million (USD 2.5 
million). Only around 30 of them were known to be fully operating in mid-1989 239).
In almost half (99 cases) of the 200 first Soviet JVs the foreign party had a stake of less 
than 49%, which had been the maximum foreign share before the December 1988 
Decree. It is rather amazing that in about half of the cases the foreign partner has been 
satisfied with less than this 49% of the equity.
In one case, the foreign party has a clear majority (54%), in the Varian JV, which is 
partly owned by the Pravets combine from Bulgaria. In three more cases the capital is 
shared fifty-fifty; in two of them the foreign party is Bulgarian, and in one case Polish.
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Most of the Soviet JV partners come from Western Europe. Out of 200 units 121 
(60.5%) partners are from this area. Scandinavian companies are involved in 29 cases 
(14.5%). (See figure 2/3.4.63.)
Two West European countries, West Germany (26 participations), and Finland (25) 
have had the most active companies involved in establishing JVs on Soviet territory. 
These two countries have traditionally been the most important Soviet trading partners 
among the OECD-countries, alongside Japan. (See figure 3/3.4.6.3.)
Quite clearly German and Finnish firms have been confronted with difficulties in their 
exports to the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s, when oil price cuts have 
negatively affected Soviet purchasing power. This negative tendency has been 
especially clear in Finnish-Soviet trade, which traditionally is conducted on a bilateral 
clearing basis.
Thus, it is only natural that German and Finnish firms have been intensively looking for 
new methods to develop their Soviet business. They are trying to maintain their 
competitive positions through direct investments.
A bilateral clearing payment system is certainly not optimal for international factor 
mobility. This has been experienced by Finnish companies in JV activities on the Soviet 
market.
According to the rules of the Bank of Finland (Central Bank), FDIs in clearing countries 
need authorisation. In permit applications three points must be considered: firstly, the 
capital share may either be transferred in the form of CC or via the clearing account, or 
in natural form, whereby a combination of these is allowed; secondly, JV products 
exported to Finland must be paid for via the clearing account; thirdly, repatriation of 
profits must in all cases take place in CC form. The same is true when the capital share 
is repatriated or sold to a third party and capital brought back to Finland. 240)
The authorities in Finland maintain that capital transfer from Finland to the USSR is 
allowed in CC, in spite of the clearing arrangement between the two countries. If at the 
same time CC exports to Finland from a Finnish-Soviet JV is allowed on a CC basis, 
the result would be the subversion of the whole clearing system.
From the point cf view of the Finnish companies these rules of the Central Bank are 
naturally unpleasant. Exports to Finland from JVs operating in the Soviet Union add 
nothing to the CC account of the JV, making profit repatriation a difficult task. The 
Finnish-Soviet JVs must therefore earn CC either by internal export or by exports to 
third markets, in which payment is in CC form. One additional possibility is naturally to
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use transfer pricing: the Finnish parent company buys cheaply from the Soviet 
subsidiary, or the parent company sells dearly to her Soviet JV. In both cases the 
Finnish participant of a Soviet JV may get the calculated profit in proper form (FIM).
In the Finnair hotel case mentioned before, the method of internal export is used. JV 
hotel capacity will be sold to Western business people, mainly from Japan, who pay in 
CC. Thus, the clearing problem can be avoided.
Rsuma-Repola is one of the most international firms in Finland. It has established 
Lenraumamebel JV in Leningrad together with Sevzapmebel. This JV has started 
operating a furniture factory in Leningrad, in which the total investment is over Rbl 30 
million. About 80% (Rbl 25 million) of the investment is financed by bank loans. The 
capital of the venture is Rbl 5.4 million.
Machinery for Lenraumamebel is provided by Swedish Kahrs Maskiner, which is a 
subsidiary of Rauma-Repola. End-products of the JV -  furniture components -  will be 
partly sold to Sweden, probably to IKEA. No exports to Finland are under 
consideration. 241) This case shows how international operations come into picture, 
when Finnish companies invest in the USSR, aiming at profit repatriation in CC form.
After the December 1988 Decree on Soviet foreign trade currency auctions are possible 
in the USSR. Thus, there is a theoretical possibility for the Finno-Soviet JVs to sell 
earned Finnish-Soviet clearing against CC in deals with other Soviet firms. Experience 
from these auctions is still meagre. The big question in this context is, v/ho in the Soviet 
Union is ready to exchange CC for anything else, that is, for any other medium of 
payment. If this theoretical case materializes, it is clear that the price of Finnish-Soviet 
clearing is certainly not favourable to the seller, when the exchange rate vis-a-vis CC is 
formed under the influence of supply and demand.
It is, thus, understandable that investments made by Finnish companies in the Soviet 
Union are mainly small ones. The Finnair hotel has the highest capital, over Rbl 10 
million. Raute and Schaumann produce plywood in Novgorod in a JV with a Rbl 6.3 
million capital. Lenraumamebel, the third largest unit, and Nokia's cable unit both have 
a capital of over Rbl 5 million, while the other 21 JVs have a really small capital.
West German companies, which participate in 26 of the first 200 Soviet JVs, have also 
made only a few large investments. Heinemann’s outlet, mentioned before, with about a 
Rbl 48 million capital is the biggest among them. Schiess AG has a share in a company 
with Rbl 20.5 million. Mineralol-Rohstoff Handel is a party in a chemical JV with Rbl 
9.4 million capital and Durkopp Werke in a engineering venture with a Rbl 7 million
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capital. It is thus obvious that also German firms are reluctant to start JV business in the 
Soviet Union with a high capital stake.
Among the German-Soviet JVs there is one special case worth mentioning. It is called 
Mezhnumizmatika, in which the "Western" party is Ost-West Handelsbank in 
Frankfurt, which is a wholly Soviet owned financial institution. In Mezhnumizmatika, 
which obviously provides sendees for those who collect coins and banknotes, Gosbank 
has a 45% share, Vneshekonombank 50% and the "German" party, Ost-West 
Handelsbank, 5%.
After West Germany and Finland of West European countries Italy (16 JVs), Austria 
(12), Switzerland (11), and the UK (10) have been the most active in establishing JVs in 
the Soviet Union (regarding the first 200 cases). France (6), Luxemburg (3), 
Liechtenstein, Cyprus (2), Sweden (2), Denmark (2), the Netherlands (1), Ireland (1) 
and Spain (1) have also invested directly in the Soviet economy.
Italian firms have a stake in several relatively big investments, such as the biggest 
Italian JV Sobtutital in Tynmen with a Rbl 38.3 million capital, of which Pressindustria 
SpA owns 30%. This venture is active in the chemical industry.
There are also some Austrian firms in some larger projects. JV Volmag, which operates 
in engineering, has a starting capital of Rbl 27.8 million, of which the Austrian company 
MAG has 30%.
The highest starting capital in a Soviet JV with a Swiss partner, is Sadko in consumer 
goods production. The equity is Rbl 17.6 million, of which the Western party, Hopf Ltd, 
owns 49%. Firms from the UK are not participating in any bigger equity ventures. For 
example, Rank Xerox JV has a starting capital of only Rbl 0.7 million.
Both the USA and Japan have been investing in Soviet JVs very modestly. The former 
non-European country is a partner in 11 cases and the latter in 8 cases among the first 
200 Soviet JVs.
Combustion Engineering (US) has a 40% stake in a chemical venture, in which the 
starting capital is Rbl 5.15 million plus USD 8 million, or altogether some Rbl 10.5 
million. Management Partnerships International (US) has a 21.8% share in a Soviet 
electronics venture, in which starting capital is Rbl 15.4 million. The fast food giant 
McDonalds is participating in a Rbl 15 million venture in Moscow, but in this case the 
partner is the Canadian subsidiary of McDonalds.
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Japan has been remarkably slow in starting JVs in the Soviet Union. From 8 ventures 
the two biggest ones are active in fishing and fish processing, one with a Rbl 21.6 
million and the other with Rbl 7 million starting capital. For the host country the 
Japanese investments have been disappointing in quantitative, as well as in qualitative 
terms; no clear high-tech areas are involved in Soviet-Japanese JVs.
From non-European OECD-countries Canada is involved in 6 and Australia in 2 cases. 
From NIC and the developing countries Singapore, India, Syria, Kuwait, Venezuela, 
Panama and Brazil have invested in the Soviet Union. Brital from Brazil is involved in 
the medical field in two Soviet JVs, both of which have a considerable starting capital: 
in one case USD 15 million (about Rbl 10 million) and in the other USD 20 million 
(about Rbl 13 million).
From the other CMEA countries Bulgaria has been the most active in the Soviet JV 
business, participating in seven outlets out of 200. It has been mentioned above that a 
chemical JV with Bulgarian participation is one of the biggest JVs with a Rbl 40 million 
starting capital.
Hungary has a stake in six cases, of which none are spectacularly big judged on the 
basis of starting capital. Sovventekstil JV with a 33% Hungarian share has a starting 
capital of Rbl 7.2 million.
Poland is involved in two cases and the CSSR in one. All three cases are extremely 
small, with starting capital less than Rbl 1 million in each.
Yugoslavia, China and North Korea are also parties among the first 200 Soviet JVs, 
Yugoslavia in 6 cases and China and North Korea in one each. Yugoslav investments 
are relative large, the largest being the polyethylene factory for consumer goods 
mentioned before with starting capital of almost Rbl 30 million.
In addition, there are 17 cases in which there are partners from more than one foreign 
country. In 33 (16.5%) cases there is more than one foreign party participating in a 
Soviet JV, and thus, in 16 cases there are two or more partners from the same country.
Among these cases there are highly interesting ones, in which enterprises from both 
socialist and capitalist countries share the foreign stake in a Soviet JV. Hungarians 
especially are involved in these combi nations, being a party in four JVs together with a 
Western partner. Internationalization of capital is really advancing in all possible 
combinations.
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It was already mentioned that the Soviet owned bank in Frankfurt is the "Western" party 
in one Soviet JV. In the Finest Hotel Group, an JV in Estonia, there are three parties 
from Finland, Arctia (a hotel chain), Suomen Rakennusvienti (a constructing company) 
and Saimaa Lines (a travel agency). The last one is a Soviet owned Finnish company. In 
Sherhotel JV (Moscow) there are parties from France (2), Belgium and the UK. The UK 
party is Moscow Narodny Bank, the Soviet owned financial institution in London. 
These cases give evidence of the internationalization of the global economy, with Soviet 
economic organizations outside of the country participating in JVs inside the USSR.
It is extremely difficult to classify the field of JV activities in the Soviet Union on the 
basis of local information. The following picture, however, cannot be far from the truth. 
The consumer goods branch (including food processing) is in the lead with 17.5% of the 
200 cases under review. This branch has, naturally, a huge, endless demand on the 
Soviet market, and therefore, the leading share is understandable. (See figure 4/3.6.4.3.)
Second place is taken by projects, consulting and education. This group with 13.5%, as 
well as the next one, "other services" with a 13% share, include a multitude of activities, 
not, however, including computer software and hotel and restaurant services.
Engineering is certainly a field where cooperation is very much hoped for by local 
authorities. This branch is rather well represented with 12% of the JVs. As was pointed 
out above, large, solid enterprises have been created among Soviet JVs in this important 
branch.
Electronics and various computer services seem to be a favourite branch of joint 
venturing in the Soviet Union. Hardware accounts for 9% of the JVs, combined hard 
and software activities for 5% and software alone for 4%, which makes 18% altogether. 
It must, however, be beared in mind, that these figures are counted on the basis of JV 
units. A considerable number of these units are small, and with little economic 
substance judged on the basis of the capital invested in them.
Construction and construction materials are branches which form bottlenecks in the 
traditional Soviet economy. These branches account for 5.5% of Soviet JVs. The reason 
for this relatively small share seems to be obvious: in the internal market the prospects 
for construction with CC financing have deteriorated since the mid-1980s with the oil 
price drop; construction materials are expensive to transport; the Soviet labour force is 
not easily transferred to export markets. Taking these points into account, one can say 
that the JVs active in this sphere have no easy task to earn CC income.
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The chemical industry is surprisingly thinly represented among the first 200 Soviet JV, 
with only 5%. However, in this branch the investments are relatively large, in average 
over Rbl 11 million, in comparison to the Rbl 1.6 million average equity overall.
The chemical industry has naturally a tremendous potential for joint venturing, when the 
Soviet raw material base is combined with foreign capital and know-how. It was 
pointed out earlier that in technology exchange between West and the Soviet Union, the 
chemical branch played a leading role before the JV era, normally taking the form of 
direct compensation (buy-back) deals. Large, muitimillion dollar projects were carried 
out in this way .
Extremely large deals have been under discussion in the JV business, for example, with 
A. Hammer’s Occidental Petroleum. Final JV agreements in these large projects have, 
however, not been signed during the first two years of validity of the Soviet JV 
regulations.
Previously, there was no really active and visible environmentalist group in the Soviet 
Union. Now under perestroika and glasnost the opposite is true: various groups have 
emerged and writings about the protection of nature have appeared in the Soviet press. 
A part of these writings is directed against the Western capital ready to participate in the 
exploitation of Soviet natural riches just in the field of the chemical industry.
An excellent example of these writings is provided by the famous novelist Valentin 
Rasputin, who points out:
"The West is glad to curtail energy consuming and ecologically 
hazardous production in their own countries, while turning the USSR 
into a world supplier of polymer raw materials and the Tynmen 
Region into a world toilet. None of the industrialized countries are 
major exporters of polymers, because of the unprofitability of 
exporting them... Europe and America, by the way, are scrapping all 
such production and large-size petrochemical plants and moving them 
further away from their own borders. But we, by offering a warm 
welcome to them, have made ourselves vassals and demonstrate our 
inability to look into the future ancb consider the well-being of 
generations to come". 242)
\
This quotation shows clearly that the previous gigantomania in the Soviet Union is 
becoming old-fashioned, or at least, that it is not shared by everybody any more, while 
the environmental lobby is gaining importance. It is not possible to go into detail in
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discussing the issue of Soviet environmental problems here. It is sufficient to point out 
that, according to an opinion poll made in the USSR, pollution is considered the most 
burning problem by Soviet citizens (by 87% of the interviewed), coming before 
shortages and bad quality of foodstuffs, and accommodation problems. 243) Thus, V. 
Rasputin is not alone with his critical remarks, which are directed against huge FDIs in 
the chemical field.
Economist V. Sheetov brings up a similar viewpoint to Rasputin's in the magazine New 
Times:
"Addressing the congress of People's Deputies of the USSR 
(parliament), writer Belov read out a letter from the voters in which 
they asked him to submit legislation to the Supreme Soviet asking it to 
abolish all the deals on leasing out parts of the Soviet territory to 
foreign and joint companies, on banning such deals in the future and 
abolishing all concessions and leaseholds" 244)
Sheetov himself is in favour of FDIs, but the example given by him shows that there is 
popular resistance against all FDIs in the Soviet Union.
Hotels and restaurants are represented with a surprisingly low percentage of only 4% 
among the first 200 Soviet JVs. Some of these ventures have a relatively high starting 
capital (McDonalds about Rbl 15 million and Finnair about Rbl 10 million), but no 
really huge sums are involved like in certain Hungarian cases. It can be assumed that 
ventures in this branch are thus relying heavily on credit financing. It can also be 
assumed, that this field has had a slow start, but that revival is to be expected, because 
in the hotel and restaurant business the huge advantage of being able to earn CC 
conveniently is given.
The geographical distribution of the first 200 Soviet JVs shows clear concentration in 
the capital city of the USSR: 52% of the JVs are active in Moscow. Leningrad, the 
second most important industrial centre, has been able to attract only 7.5% of the first 
200 JVs. Tallin, which is in the Soviet framework a relatively small city with some 0.5 
million inhabitants, comes next with 7%. Here the special cultural and linguistic link 
between Finland and Soviet Estonia has played a decisive role. Almost all the JVs in 
Tallin have a Finnish partner. (See figure 5/3.6.43.)
The Soviet writer D. Blagutin has received similar results by analysing the first 207 
Soviet JVs. 245) According to him, 99 JVs are operating in Moscow, and 14 in
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Leningrad. Other parts of the European RSFSR have 22 units, Baltic republics 21 and 
Ukraine 12. The Far East and Siberia have only 10. (See table 1/3.6.4.3.)
Table 1/3.6.43.
Region Number of JVs
Moscow 99
Leningrad 14
European part of the RSFSR 22
Baltic republics 21
Ukraine 12
Far East and Siberia 10
Georgia 9
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan 3 each
Armenia and Byelorussia 2 each
Kazakhstand and Moldavia 1 each
Source: D. Blagutin: The Technological Spectrum of JVs on Soviet Territory. Foreign Trade 
(Soviet) No 4/1989
Blagutin has a slightly different grouping of the activity of JVs. His analysis shows also 
that electronics, informatics and computers have the highest share, 19.3% of all. 
Mechanical engineering and the light industry account for 12.1% each. The food 
industry is taken into the same group as restaurants, giving 11.6% for this branch. The 
chemical industry's relatively low share of 8.2% is visible also in his statistics, (see table 
2/3.6.4.3.)
Table 2/3.6.43.
Group
1. Electronics, informatics 
and computing machines
2. Mechanical engineering and 
metal-working
3. Chemicals and petrochemical 
industries
4. Light industry, manufacture 
of consumer goods, leisure­
time and sports industry
5. Construction and manufac­
ture of building materials
6 Food industry, national- 
cuisine restaurants
7. Mediatory after-sales and 
publishing services
’"Based on the List of Joint Ventures Registered with the USSR Ministry of Finance (207 ventures as 
of January 17,1989)
Source: D. Blagutin: The Technological Spectrum of JVs on Soviet Territory. Foreign Trade
(Soviet) No 4/1989
Number of JVs Percentage
in a group of the
total number of 
JVs
40 19.3
25 12.1
17 8.2
25 12.1
22 10.6
23 11.6
55 26.6
196
The same Soviet observer points out that two thirds of the JV partners come from 
Western Europe. Socialist country partners are involved in 13.5% of all the 207 cases, 
(see table 3/3.6.4.3.)
Table 3/3.6.43.
Group From From EEC From CMEA
No W.Europe countries countries 
Yugoslavia 
PRC, DPRK
1 25 15 11
2 21 13 3
3 11 6 4
4 19 12 4
5 15 4 1
6 12 7 1
7 36 19 4
Percentage
of the total
number of JVs 67.1 36.7 • 13.5
Source: D. Blagutin: The Technological Spectrum of JVs on Soviet Territory. Foreign Trade 
(Soviet) No 4/1989
Blagutin complains that some Western partners are not willing to transfer the most 
progressive technology as their contribution to JVs. This attitude causes, according to 
him, complications when JV products are sold on the world market. As a potential 
solution he recommends that export responsibility be placed on the Western partner. 
However, he remarks that his solution cannot be universal, because exporting JV 
products is already experienced as problematic by Western partners, small and medium­
sized above ail. 246)
Undoubtedly, the main problem of Soviet JVs has been touched here. The highest 
possible levels of know-how are wanted by the Soviets, whereas the Western partner is 
supposed to take over the responsibility for CC earnings of the JV. No optimal and 
general solution is in sight for this dilemma as long as the inconvertibility problem of 
the host country money exists.
The first comprehensive Western study of Soviet JVs was made by the American firm - 
PlanEcon. 247) Some interesting details are included in this study.
Firstly, PlanEcon registers a clear acceleration of JV registration in 1988, and expects a 
further acceleration for 1989. However, it is estimated that at the end of the 1st quarter 
of 1989 no more that 20-30 JVs were fully operational.
For the first 205 JVs the average size of foreign investment was-Rbl 1.63 million (USD 
2.7 million). This average size has tended to decline with time. According to PlanEcon
197
only three JVs among the first 258 registered before February 16, 1989 involved 
Western investment in excess of USD 20 million.
Of the 205 JVs registered, the majority -  162 (79%) -  were with OECD countries, 
while 24 (11.7%) were with partners from socialist countries (including Yugoslavia), 12 
(5.8%) with partners from the Third World and 7 (3.4%) involved partners both from 
the developed West and socialist countries, or from the developed West and the Third 
World. 248)
PlanEcon has calculated that in terms of size, JVs with socialist countries were typically 
of above-average size both in terms of average capitalization (Rbl 6.0 million) and 
average size of foreign investment (Rbl 2.6 million), while the corresponding figures in 
JVs with Western participation were Rbl 4.3 million and Rbl 1.6 million respectively. It 
is correctly stated that exchange rates are distorted undervaluing Western capital 
contributions in terms of hard currency as compared with socialist country investments 
in TR. 249)
PlanEcon has developed its own sectorial/industrial branch classification for Soviet JVs. 
Focusing on JVs involving Western partners (including those from the Third World and 
Yugoslavia), of the total of 172 JVs concluded as of December 29, 1988, the largest 
(19) number was in business services (consulting, organizational services, forwarding, 
export-import operations, advertising, etc.), followed by engineering services (13), 
general engineering (13), manufacturing of computers and related equipment (12), 
chemicals and petrochemicals (11), design and production of computer software (10), 
construction services (10), manufacturing of miscellaneous consumer goods (9), food 
processing (9), leather, fur and shoes (9), tourism services (8), public dining (6), 
miscellaneous consumer services (5), etc.
According to the calculations of PlanEcon focused on Western investments totalling 
USD 441 million, the largest portion went into chemicals and petrochemicals, followed 
by general engineering. (See figure 6/3.6.4.3.)
The average size of Western investment per JV was highest in metal-work followed by 
fishing and chemicals. 250)
There is some confusion in PlanEcon figures, when countries of origin of Western FDIs 
are tabulated. In particular, the figure for Austria seem to be overestimated with 26 
cases tabulated. The list of JVs given by PlanEcon includes Austria only in twelve 
cases. Highly interesting is the calculation in terms of value of FDIs in Soviet JVs by 
partner country. The largest source of FDIs is West Germany, followed by Italy.
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Finland, which has approximately the same number of JV participations as West 
Germany, has invested only USD 36 million altogether. Thus, the Finnish investments 
are in average only about the half of the size of West German capital contributions.
When analysing the regional distribution of Soviet JVs, the PlanEcon study finds it very 
surprising that the bulk of them -  141 out of a total of 191 -  were concluded in the 
Russian Republic. The poor showing of the Ukraine is regarded as a real surprise. It is 
maintained, on the bases of regional data, that the real entrepreneurial spirit in the Soviet 
Union lies above all in Estonia and Georgia. When the average for the USSR as a whole 
was one JV per 1.48 million people, in Estonia there was 1 JV per 110,000 people and 
in Georgia 1 JV per 660,000 people. (See figure 7/3.6.4.3.)
PlanEcon draws some conclusions from .the analysed data. Firstly, the initial capital of 
some JVs is rather low by design, as most of the capital is raised through borrowing: 
indirect Western investments supplement FDIs.
Secondly, it is noted that the initial capitalization in a JV is a very imperfect measure of 
the JV. Gross revenue earned would be a better measure of size, especially if one could 
also obtain information on employment and gross asset value. Thirdly, the JV activity of 
individual Western countries corresponds closely to the relative importance of these 
countries in Soviet trade, with the notable exceptions of Japan and the US.
In connection with the last point, PlanEcon assumes that Japan and the US tend to 
negotiate relatively large JVs with the USSR needing more time for negotiations, and 
that they will, in the long run, start catching up with West Germany. No clear evidence 
is provided, however, to support this hypothesis.
At least one book on JVs has been published in the Soviet Union in 1989. This book 
251) which has listed almost 300 Soviet JVs, is more a juridical guide-book than an 
economic analysis of JVs. At the end of the book it is stated that socialist countries have 
a relatively small share in the number of JVs established on Soviet territory. The author 
sees the main reason for the reluctance among socialist countries to make FDIs in the 
lacking harmonization of the tax systems. The obvious main handicap, the lack of 
convertible currency in the CMEA payment system, is entirely disregarded.
From the material available on Soviet JVs at the end of the 1980s it can be concluded, 
that the number of JVs has been increasing fairly rapidly since 1987, when the first rules 
for FDIs were released. One of the main reasons for this positive development certainly 
lies in the large market of the Soviet Union with nearly 300 million people fascinating
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many Western companies. Perestroika and glasnost also seem to be factors, which will 
improve the business climate between East and West.
An interesting study among Western companies about their Eastern business deals has 
been made by HR & H Consensus Research International. In this study altogether 688 
companies in ten different OECD-countries were interviewed. 75 per cent of the 
companies questioned trade with the Eastern Bloc at present, and over 80 per cent of 
companies have had some trading experience. 252)
Some details of this HR & H study are of utmost interest from the point of view of the 
present topic. Firstly, a vast majority of Western companies (over 80%) see that the 
changes will improve the overall prospects for trade in the 1990s, while just 17% see the 
changes as actually inhibiting business. Glasnost is seen as an positive factor by 29% of 
the companies. (See figure 9/3.6.4.3.)
The Soviet Union is regarded as the most important trading partner in the East. About 
30 per cent of the companies which trade with the East, expect trade with the USSR to 
increase over the next two years, just one per cent expect it to decrease. Confidence in 
other Eastern markets is not as high. (See figure 10/3.6.4.3.)
The most interesting part of the HR & H study deals with business methods used in 
East-West trade. The most common form is personal visits, followed by appointed 
agents, licence agreements and corporate offices. Out of 506 actual East-West traders 
11% currently use JVs in their business dealings with the East. 15% of the same sample 
have business contacts in the East via their corporate offices. (See figures 11/3.6.4.3.)
When these Western companies with actual business deals with the East were 
questioned what new methods they were considering in their economic links with the 
CPEs, nearly 40% mentined joint ventures. Figure 12/3.6.4.3. shows clearly that a JV is 
considered the far most important alternative among fresh ways in dealing with CPES.
These quotations from an empirical study show that Western companies have more 
confidence in the development of the Soviet market than that of other Eastern partners. 
It is also a remarkable finding that 39% of Western companies active in Eastern 
business consider the JV a suitable alternative way of developing business. The much 
easier method of technology exchange -  licencing -  is considered suitable by only 16% 
of the companies. (See figure 12/3.6.4.3.)
It was mentioned above (section 3.3.) that some Soviet economic outlets were 
established in the West during the first few years of Soviet power. Some of the mixed
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companies set up abroad in the 1920s, like Russian Wood Agency, Anglo-Soviet 
Shipping, Moscow Narodny Bank, etc., still exist today.
In the late 1980s, the USSR was involved in 125 companies in 35 different countries. 
More than a third of them (45 units) are wholly Soviet owned, and in an additional third 
(43 units) the Soviet side has a majority share. In 19 cases there is parity participation, 
and thus, in only 18 cases (14.4%) the Soviet side have a minority stake. (See table 
4/3.6.4.3.) 253)
Table 4/3.6.43.
Participation of Soviet Economic Organizations in the Capita! of Mixed Companies Abroad
(as of December 1,1988)
Share Parity Share Fully
- in partici­ capital owned Total
capital pation over (100%)
under 50-50% 50%
50%
Number of companies 18 19 43 45 125
Proportion (per cent) 14.4 15.2 34.4 36.0 100
Source: N. Dracheva: Going Shares with Foreign Partners. In: Foreign Trade (USSR) No 8/1989 p. 42- 
45.
Information on Soviet investments abroad has normally not been easily available in. 
Soviet publications. Thus, professor Natalia Dracheva's comprehensive article on this 
topic in "Foreign Trade" is an encouraging sign of glasnost. According to her up-to - 
date information, most of the Soviet ventures (105) abroad are situated in Western 
industrial countries, mainly in Europe (FRG 13, Great Britain 11, Italy 10, France and 
Belgium 9 each). Only 20 units are thus in LDCs, 55 per cent of which are set up by 
Ministry of Merchant Marine and Ministry of Fishing. 254)
Prof. Dracheva states that the overwhelming majority of the Soviet ventures abroad is 
engaged either directly in the promotion of Soviet export products or they help realize 
them. The production sphere is mainly represented by the catching and processing of
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fish. (See table 5/3.6.4.3.) The first production venture in an OECD-country was set up 
in 1988 in Australia to manufacture vermiculite with Soviet equipment. 255)
Table 5/3.6.43.
Types of Mixed Companies Abroad with the Participation of Soviet Economic Organizations
(as of December 1,1988)
Principal type Number of Percentage
companies of the total
1. Commercial activities 57 45.6
2. Trade in scientific
and technical knowledge 5 4.0
3. Services
including transportation and
forwarding operations 33 32.0
4. Extraction and processing
of raw materials 14 11.2
5. Financial transactions 9 7.2
Total 125 100.0
* Source:N. Dracheva: Going Shares with Foreign Partners. In: Foreign Trade (USSR) No 8/1989 p. 42- 
45.
The same writer points out that there are 28 Soviet engineering companies abroad, 
including 12 units dealing in transport vehicles and tractors; 10 based on machines and 
equipment; 5-6  for consumer durables; 19 sell raw materials; 6 of which are involved in 
oil and oil products; 5 in wood and wood processing industry products and 4 in selling 
chemicals. In recent years companies selling oil and oil products have accounted for 
about 85% of the total turnover of Soviet outlets abroad. 256)
Prof. Dracheva lists advantages of using Soviet companies abroad:
"They make for a better study and use of market conditions, establish 
contacts with local firms and firms in third countries, organize 
advertising activity, obtain fuller and more trustworthy commercial 
information, draw on the services of foreign partners, who orientate 
themselves in local conditions better than others; all this no doubt 
tends to raise the level of commercial activity." 257)
Altogether, the internationalization of the Soviet economy is in the light of figures given 
by Dracheva extremely primitive. The total number of Soviet companies abroad is very
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low, and the majority of them are involved in the marketing of Soviet made goods. The 
lion's share of turnover in these companies is taken up by primary products (oil) and 
semi-manufactured goods. Actual manufactured goods sold by these companies have 
thus only very marginal importance.
In the sphere of financial institutions only the Soviet-owned companies abroad have 
some substance. The London based Moscow Narodny Bank with branches in Beirut and 
Singapore is ranked at about 250th in the world banking league in terms of total assets. 
258) The Soviets have banks also in Frankfurt, Vienna, Zurich and Teheran. Insurance 
companies are active in Vienna (Garant-Versicherungs AG), in London (Black Sea and 
Baltic General Insurance Company), and in Hamburg (Schwarzmeer- und Ostsee 
Versicherungs AG). 259)
Prof. Dracheva is well aware that the USSR has not been using FDIs in an optimal way:
"Although the effectiveness of our companies abroad primarily 
depends on the manufacturers of export products, nevertheless, a great 
deal may be done to improve the work of these companies and their 
management. Soviet participants are in need of greater economic 
independence. They should be granted the right to risk, thus giving 
them flexibility in using the changing market situation so as to raise 
the effectiveness of their export transactions. It is perhaps necessary to 
reduce the excessive number of plan indicators and compulsory 
extensive book-keeping". 260),
This statement makes it clear that the traditional Soviet system has been responsible for 
the extremely low internationalization of the Soviet economy, and that perestroika with 
decentralization of decision-making may improve the situation. It is, however, clear that 
risk-taking in the sphere of FDIs cannot increase rapidly, although Dracheva, clearly 
hopes for this to happen.
She makes a couple of interesting points about the recent development of Soviet FDIs. 
Firstly, she mentions the first Soviet production unit in Australia. Secondly, she states 
that until recently the USSR has set up only wholly-owned banks abroad, but in 
October 1988, the first JV bank was established in Zurich. In this joint bank, Eurasco 
Zurich AG the shareholders are: Vnesheconombank (30%), the Austrian Donaubank 
(wholly Soviet owned bank in Austria 30%), Landerbank Rheinland-Pfalz FRG (20%) 
and the Swiss Ziiricher Industriekredit AG (20%). Thirdly, she makes a highly 
interesting proposal by asking Soviet companies abroad to seek Western partners
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willing to enact FDIs in the Soviet Union, especially in port areas, whereby improved 
products could be turned out and marketed together in the West. 261)
The last point is of special interest. Dracheva sees FDIs as a two-way road, in which 
Soviet companies abroad could gather information concerning Western business 
methods, and at the same time, find out, how these methods could be taken into 
consideration in joint production on Soviet territory. After that, joint marketing of the 
improved products could be enacted, and the structure of Soviet export thus improved.
According to two radical Soviet economists, Nikolai Shmelyov and Vladimir Popov 
(both of them are also MPs at present), optimists estimate that only 17-18% of the 
Soviet manufactured goods are competitive on the world market. Pessimists estimate 
that the corresponding figure is only 7-8%. These two observers of the Soviet economy 
also mention that the "Lada" car, one of the leading export articles of the Soviet export 
industry, has been found to be the qualitatively worst car among the 73 cases tested in 
the West German market. 262)
New ideas put forward by N. Dracheva are badly needed if the Soviet Union wants to 
play a major role in the global economy economy as perestroika stipulates. At the end of 
1980s, the actual state of the Soviet FDIs abroad answers the question asked in the title 
of the book by G. Hamilton referred to several times (Red multinationals or Red 
Herrings?): Soviet FDIs abroad are more of red herrings than mighty red multinationals.
3.4.6.4. The future of JVs in the Soviet Union
"You can't stay out of a country the size of the Soviet Union and stay 
a major international marketer"
said Donald M. Kendall, former chairman of Pepsico, in the autumn of 1987. Pepsico 
has 19 bottling plants in the Soviet Union on franchise agreements, and is planning JVs. 
263) Many Western company executives agree with this opinion of a veteran in East- 
West business. The size of the Soviet market holds considerable fascination.
The second important incentive for Western FDIs in the Soviet Union is the resource 
base of the host country. Especially, in the chemical sector there are huge possibilities 
for JVs, as pointed out the in previous section.
The Japanese company Tariku Trading has set up a JV near Irkutsk for timber 
processing. In the 1970s Japan participated in the development of the Siberian wood
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processing industry on a buy-back basis by providing machinery and credits and taking 
timber as compensation. The Soviet chemical industry, as pointed out above, was 
developed in the same manner, especially with the help of American companies, above 
all Occidental Petroleum.
The JV activity of the late 1980s does not differ essentially from the direct 
compensation deals of the 1970s. In both cases the Western partner provides technplogy 
and other means of production, and the host country natural resources. Jointly produced, 
goods normally with little value added, serve as a meedium of paiyment, for the Western 
partner's efforts. Only the terminology of the 1980s is different.
It was pointed out in the previous section that discussion on the indirect effects of 
investment has started in the Soviet Union. Contributions by Rasputin to this discussion 
give ample evidence of how aggressive arguments can be used, in order to protect the 
environment from the effects of investments in the USSR. It is naturally extremely 
difficult to judge, how much influence these new, critical arguments have. One can state 
that warnings about turning Soviet territory into the toilet or backyard of the 
industrialized world do not improve the investment climate for FDIs.
"Internal export" provides certain special opportunities in the Soviet Union, as well as 
elsewhere in the CMEA-region. This possibility has been realized by some Western 
companies.
For "normal" JVs, however, matters look a bit different. The most important, if not the 
only one, is the inconvertibility of the rouble. This problem of currency is universal in 
the CMEA area, but in the case of the Soviet Union it is of special importance: as the 
leading economic power of the CMEA area the Soviet Union should make its currency 
convertible.
This problem has clearly been recognized in the Soviet Union. A. Aganbegyan, who is 
one of the most important architects of perestroika and an economic adviser of 
Gorbachev writes:
"The absence of a convertible Soviet rouble complicates the 
organization of JVs. For various countries and goods different 
exchange rates have been set. But the great number of these rates and 
the intricacy of the calculations makes matters difficult and 
complicated."
After that statement, however, he continues with an optimistic statement:
"I believe, all the same, that effective forms of JVs will gradually be 
found ".264)
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Aganbegyan also reviewed the Soviet currency policy:
"At the June 1987 Meeting of the Central Committee, the question of 
the convertibility of the rouble was presented as a long-term 
objective. When the new pricing system has been established in the 
• Soviet Union, it is my opinion, that this question will be addressed 
more closely. Firstly it will be possible to establish a convertible 
rouble in relation to the currencies of the socialist countries, made 
easier by their similar types of economies and the existing processes 
of economic integration. As to a convertible rouble in relation to the 
capitalist countries, this can hardly be resolved in the near future, 
since such a resolution is linked to structural changes in the 
development of the Soviet economy. But I believe that eventually this 
question also will have to be answered.. "265)
After that realistic statement by Aganbegyan it can be concluded that JVs must live with 
the very special monetary circumstances of the Soviet economy for rather a long time.
The aim of the Soviet perestroika is obviously the substitution of direct planning 
command by indirect economic methods. Therefore, it is understandable that a banking 
reform has been carried out.
According to N. Garetovski, the Chairman of the Board of the USSR State Bank 
' (Gosbank), the banking reform of the late 1980s is unprecedented in scope and scale. 
Five new specialized banks have been established. The Industrial Development Bank, 
the Agroindustrial Bank, the Municipal Services and Social Development Bank, the 
Personal Savings and Credit bank and the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the 
USSR (the previous Vneshtorgbank, Bank of Foreign Trade). Garetovski states, that the 
primary task is to make the banks an instrument of powerful leverage to influence the 
state of affairs in the economy and thus speed up the building of an efficient economy, 
to raise product quality and to improve the living standard. 266)
The areas of responsibility and the scope of activities of these five banks match their 
specialization. Only the State Bank of the USSR does not have any specialization, but 
rather enjoys the status of a central bank. It is also the central bank of money issue in the 
USSR, which regulates credit and monetary relations in the economy. It coordinates the 
banking policy of the USSR, handles the planned management of the credit and 
monetary system and ensures a coordinated state policy in the field of monetary 
circulation, crediting, financing, cash payments and currency transactions. 267)
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This statement of the Chairman of the Board of the Gosbank reveals two important 
aspects of the Soviet banking reform. Firstly, it resembles of the two-tier banking 
system, which has been carried out in Hungary. Secondly, the planned management of 
the credit and monetary system in the Soviet economy remains in force, whereby 
obviously Gosbank has the power to dictate the credits given by banks according to the 
economic plan.
However, Garetovski states, that although Gosbank does supervise the performance of 
the five banks, it does not order them around. Each of the newly formed banks is 
independent and does its work and conducts its relations with clients on the basis of full 
cost-accounting and self-financing. 268)
The major areas of activity of the Industrial Investment Bank (Promstroibank) are, 
according to the Chairman of the Board, M. Zotov, the economic analysis of the 
production performance by bank's clients, and the joint search for and the 
implementation of effective economic decisions that can intensify the production 
process. He states that earlier it was predominantly the bank which profited by charging 
interest. But now enterprises are also entitled to profit -  they can lend a portion of their 
idle funds to the bank and receive interest.269)
Such banking operations involving credit are essential rudiments of the future 
commercial activities of Soviet banks. In the opinion of Zotov, banks will be able to 
start real commercial operations on a wide scale when, upon accumulating the necessary 
funds, they get down to cooperative projects on a share basis. In addition, the Soviet 
banks will also have the unpleasant task of declaring bankruptcies and switching loss- 
making firms to a special credit system. 270)
According to V. Bukato, who is the Chairman of the Board in the USSR Municipal 
Services and Social Development Bank (Zhiisotsbank)the former Capital Investment 
Bank, this bank is responsible for financial policy and investments in social 
infrastructure. Its clientele embraces state-owned enterprises, agencies and institutions 
in the service sector as well as cooperatives and individual businesses, including citizens 
in need of loans for housing. 271)
The Agroindustrial Bank (Agroprombank) has been built on the basis of the respective 
departments of the Gosbank. According to the Chairman of the Board, A. Obozintsev, 
the Agroprombank is in the position to grant a total of 250 billion Roubles worth of 
credits and other financial services, nearly two thirds of the bank loans available for the 
national economy. According to Obozintsev, in earlier times, agricultural debtors could 
hope to get more credits, while having their older ones indefinitely rescheduled; now
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there is no such prospect for them any longer. The Agroprombank has profit and loss 
accounting as its operating principle and so it cannot afford to be a charitable institution. 
The bank bases its relations with the farms on credit agreements. 272)
These statements of three Soviet bankers, who all lead newly established financial 
institutions, show clearly, that there is a tendency towards "monetarization" in the 
Soviet economy. How decisive the banking reform will be for the whole economic 
development, will be seen after some decades. It is naturally still possible that in 
economic units the "soft budget constraints" will continue to exist. It is still possible, 
that enterprises in financial difficulties will be bailed out by authorities, when 
unemployment becomes a real option. This bailing out has been observed by Komai in 
Hungary, although intention to go over to "hard budget constraints" have been 
announced repeatedly in the enterprise sector since 1968. ,
Anyhow, in the late 1980s the financial scenery in the Soviet Union has led to some 
interesting novelties. Two industrial associations in Leningrad (Tekhnokhim and 
Energomash) have established their own, in-house banks providing investment credits
rJ
and account settlements at commercial rates, as well as issuing bonds. 273) In the same 
city fourteen local economic units have created their own "innovation Bank" 
(Leningradsky Innovatsionnyi Bank, LIB) operating as a "venture capital" institution on 
the basis of contributions of the founding enterprises. 274)
The Lvov "Konveier" firm, which produces automatic loading systems for container 
transport, issued shares paying a fixed rate of dividend and offered them to "Konveier" 
workers, with obvious success. 275) Even if these "shares", or industrial bonds as 
would be a better name for them in Western terminology, were only available for 
"Konveier" workers, the experiment was revolutionary. It shows that capital raising in a 
new form is becoming possible in the Soviet Union.
JVs in the Soviet Union can get credit in roubles from Gosbank, Promstroibank, 
Agroprombank, Zhilsotsbank or Vnesheconombank on commercial terms. CC credit can 
be obtained from Vnesheconombank, or from Promstroibank, Agroprombank and 
Zhilsotsbank, with the permission of Vnesheconombank. CC credits can also be 
obtained from foreign banks or enterprises. 276) Monetary assets of JVs in CC and 
roubles must be deposited either in Gosbank or in Vnesheconombank. The interest of 
rouble accounts is paid according to Gosbank regulations and on CC accounts according 
to interest level on international monetary markets. 277)
These rules given in a Chamber of Commerce and Industry guidebook do not give too 
many exciting possibilities for JV financial managers. Obviously, there is little point in
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going shopping for "cheap money". Real competition must be created between the 
newly created banks, before there are differences in the price of the money. When a JV 
invests its spare monetary means, the low interest rate for deposits according to 
Gosbank norms is obviously the only possibility. No diversified exciting portfolio of 
"Konveier" shares, or other securities can be compiled.
In spite of all this, the abolition of the mono-bank system and financial innovations in 
Leningrad and Lvov are encouraging signs of introduction of an economy, where money 
plays a more active role than before. This tendency will somewhat improve the 
"investment climate" which in the Soviet Union is still suboptimal for FDIs as far as the 
monetarisation of the economy is concerned.
215
Chapter 3
1 P. Marer: Comparing... op.cit. p. 183.
2 L.Csaba: CMEA in a Changing... op.cit.pp.218-219.
3 J. Komai. Growth, Shortage and Efficiency. Oxford 1982. pp.97,109.
4 See, for example: "What's on the counter of our economy? Most business managers say supplies
are Problem No 1. In Moscow News, No 41/1988 p. 12.
5 A. Negandhi: International... op.cit. p. 205.
6 H. Hauser: Joint ventures: Sonderlosung fiir Einzelfalle oder allgemein verwendbare Instrumente 
der intemationale Kooperation. Aussenwirtschaft No 2/1981, Zurich.
7 Ibid.
8 Economic Commission for Europe(ECE): East-West Joint Ventures. United Nations, New York, 
1988. p.3.
9 Ibid. p. 3.
10 Ibid. p. 40.
11 J. Stankovsky: East-West Joint Ventures. In G. Fink (ed): Socialist Economy and Economic 
' Policy. Wien, New York 1985. (WIIW) p.206, and footnote 9. p. 212.
12 Ibid. p. 206.
13 Ibid. p. 206.
14 Ibid. p. 206.
15 Business International: Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, Geneva 1980. pp.3-4.
16 J. Stankovsky: East-West...op.cit. p.207.
17 ECE: East-West... op.cit. p.8.
18 Peter R. Scanlon: Collaborating Ventures. The Journal of Business Strategy (N.Y.), Vol.6, No 3, 
Winter 1986, pp.81-83.
19 Reported in John I. Reynolds: The "Pinched Shoe" Effect of International Joint Ventures, in 
Columbia Journal of World Business (N.Y.), Summer 1984, pp. 23-29.
20 L.G. Franko: Joint Venture Survival in Multinational Corporations (New York, Paeger Publishers 
1971), 217 p. The sample excluded joint ventures entered into by petroleum companies and by the 
18 firms added to the original 170-firm sample after June 1968. This sample was the basis of the 
Havard Business School Project: J.M. Stopford and L.T. Wells: Multinational Enterprise and the 
Nation State. Managing the Multinational Enterprise, (New York, Bowie Books, 1972) 250 p. The 
authors directed the Havard project.
21 Ibid. pp. 8-9.
216
22 P. Killing: How to Make a Global Joint Venture Work. Harvard Business Review. May-June 
1982. pp.120-127.
23 E. Yakovleva: Joint Companies, their practice and prospects. CMEA Economic Cooperation No 
3/1988. pp.38-40.
24 Ibid pp. 38-39.
25 A. Koves: The CMEA countries... op.cit. p. 22.
26 A. Nove: An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. Harmondsworht 1972. p. 89.
27 A.Koves: The CMEA Countries... op.cit. p. 25.
28 G. Leptin: Zur Frage direkter Zusammenarbeit mit sowjetischen Betrieben. Osteuropa 7-8/1988. 
p. 697.
29 L. Feonova-M. Postolenko -  S. Nikitin: Organizatsiya i Tehkhnika vneshney torgovli SSSR. 
Moscow 1974 Part IV chapter 8.
30 M. Hill: Soviet and East European company activity in the United Kingdom and Ireland. In. G. 
Hamilton (ed.): Red Multinationals or Red Herrings? London 1986. pp. 53-54.
31 Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU. (In English) Toronto 1974. vol. III. p. 62.
32 E. Yufereva: Leninskoye uchenie o goskapitalizme v perekhodnyj period k sotsializmu. Moscow 
1969. pp.85-87
33 P. Pissulla: Der IWF und... op.cit. p. 99-101.
34 A. Smith: The Planned... op.cit. p.179.
35 P. Pissulla: Der IWF op.cit. p.100.
36 M. Friedlander: Moves towards Reform in the CMEA Area. In WIIW Mitgliederinformation 
1987/4, p.5.
37 ECE: East-West... op.cit. p.38.
38 English translation of Decree 424/1972, in ECE: East-West... op.cit. pp.172-177.
39 Ibid. pp.178-179.
40 J. Stankowsky: East-West... op.cit. p.210.
41 Business International: Joint Ventures... op.cit chapter IV pp.9-12.
42 Ibid. chapter IV,pp.9-12.
43 Ibid. chapter IV. p. 16.
44 Le Figaro. January 9 1987.
45 Business International. Joint ventures... op.cit. chapter IV, p.16.
46 Ibid chapter IV, p. 12.
217
47 ECE: East-West... op.cit. p. 67.
48 Business International... op.cit. chapter IV, pp.14-15.
49 Ibid chapter IV p.13.
50 R. Govender: Nicolae Ceausescu's Vision of the New International Economic Order. London
1987. p.59.
51 E. Zaleski: Socialist multinationals in developing countries. In: G. Hamilton (ed) "Red 
Multinationals... op.cit. pp. 156-182.
52 P. Knirsch: Soviet and East European Firms in the Federal Republic of Germany. Ibid pp. 126- 
127. In private discussions Romanian officials have stated that investments in LDCs are generally 
unprofitable, The Bank in Frankfurt, however, is said to be profitable.
53 Rumanien: Absage an Joint Ventures Ostwirtschaftsreport, No 23/1989, p. 460.
54 P. Pissulla: Per Internationale., op.cit. p.103.
55 Ibid.
56 L. Borbely: Joint ventures in Hungary. Capital for modem economy. Budapest 1988. p.3.
57 Both decrees are in a book published by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce: In: Tamus Sugar 
(ed.) Joint Ventures in Hungary. Budapest 1986.
58 Ibid. pp. 15-17.
59 Ibid. pp. 18-19.
60 L. Borbely: Joint Ventures in Hungary... op.cit. p. 6.
61 Decrees mentioned are in Chamber of Commerce guidebook on Joint Ventures in Hungary, op.cit. 
pp.53-60.
62 English translation in: Hungaro Press, Economic Information. Special Edition. Act V I1988 on 
Economic Associations. Budapest, Autumn 1988.
63 Malev Magazin No 2/1988, p. 8.
64 CIB advertising; ibid, p. 14.
For details on CIB see par.3.4.2.2. p. 115.
65 V. Gerasimov: Bond, shares, stock exchange and the forint. New Times No 51/1988, pp. 32-33.
66 English text of this Act is provided by Hungaro Press. Economic Information. Special Issue,
February 1989.
67 Joint Ventures in Hungary with Foreign Participation (Register). Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce 1987. p.10.
68 M. Farkas, Director of Siconact. In: International Herald Tribune Conference in Budapest. 
Conference paper, year 1976.
69 Ibid. p. 76.
218
70 Ibid. pp.76-77.
71 R.Schoning (technical director of Sicontact): Sicontact GmbH weiterhin erfolgreich. In. 
Ungarische Wirtschaftshefte (UWH) No 2/1988 p. 26.
72 M. Farkas, op.cit. p.77.
73 R. Schoning: op.cit.p. 27.
74 Ibid. pp.27-28.
75 Ibid. pp.27-28.
76 Ibid. p. 28.
77 Business International, Joint Ventures op.cit.III-7.
78 ECE: East-West...op.cit.p.36.
79 Business International. JVs op.cit III—7.
80 Central-European Intemational.Bank.Annual Report 86. p.4.
81 I. Major: Hungarian Experience in East-West Joint ventures. In: Proceedings of the 15th
International Small Business Congress; August 8-11.1988, Helsinki, p.611.
82 Business International: Doing Business with East Europe. Geneva 1988. Volume: Hungary, 
Chapter 10, p. X-6. 7
83 Ibid. p. X - l l .
84 L. Rochina: Socialist-Capitalist Joint Ventures. Foreign Trade (USSR) No 10/1988. p. 16.
85 The National Bank of Hungary: Banking System in Hungary. Budapest 1988, p. 27.
86 Unicbank, Annual Report 1987, Budapest, p. 1.
87 Business International: Doing Business... Volume: Hungary, p. X -12 ,13.
88 Z. Ban: Denim in Demand. Hungarian Trade Journal No 6/1988 p. 25.
89 ECE: East-West Joint... op.cit. p. 36.
90 L. Sandor (Director of IKEA JV): IKEA-Start in Ungam. Ungarische Wirtschaftshefte No 2/1988 
pp. 34-35.
91 F. Persanyi: Gegenwart und Zukunft der Gemeinschafs-uhtemehmen in Ungam. Ibid p. 39.
92 BASPs Hungarian Joint Venture. New Hungarian Exporter No 2/1985 p.32.
93 BASF JV in Ungam -  Gewinntransfer ohne Westexporte. In: Ostwirtschaftsreport No 13/1988. p. 
256.
94 J. Czegledi: Gute Kapitalanlage: Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen im Fremdenverkehr. Ungarishe 
Wirtschaftshefte No 1/1988. pp. 39-41.
95 Ibid. p. 41.
219
96 Ibid. p. 41.
97 Press release by Haka in Finnish, June 1988.
98 Business International: Doing Business... Volume: Hungary, op.cit. p. X-13.
99 Tuomo Halonen Case: In: Proceedings... op.cit. pp.615-621.
100 Business International: Doing Business... Volume: Hungary, op.cit. p. X-7.
101 Joint Ventures in Hungary (1986) op,cit. p.4.
102 Ungarische Joint Ventures im Westen. Ostwirtschaftsreport 2/87, op.cit. p. 29.
103 The National Bank of Hungary: Banking System... op.cit. p. 29.
104 J. Stankovsky: Kapitalbesitz der Ost-staaten in Osterreich.WIIW reprint-serie No 71/Juni 1984. 
p.40.
105 M. Hill:Soviet and EE company activity in the UK and Ireland. In: G. Hamilton ed.: Red 
multinationals... op.cit. p.81.
106 Ibid. pp. 80-83.
107 O. Schwarz (director of Tungsram-Schreder): Tungsram-SchredenFusion von zwei gut 
klingenden Namen. In: UWH, No 1/1988. pp.26-27.
108 Joint ventures in Hungary/Register/Hungarian Chamber of Commerce. Budapest 1989.
109 In calculations following exchange rates from summer 1989 have been used 1 USD = 60 
Hungarian Ft; 1 USD = 14 Austrian Shillings (ATS); 1 USD = 2 DEM; 1 USD = 1.6 CHF. In 
some cases capital has been defined in DEM, ATS or CHF.
110 Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV, No 4/89, p. 197.
111 WIIW Mitgliederinformation 1989/3, p. 11.
112 See in this context, e.g. G. Biro: Ungars Uebergang zu einer weltmarktorietierten 
Wirtschaftspolitik. In: Osteuropa Wirtschaft No 1/1987, pp.23-27. J. Bognar: The External Factor 
in the Development of the Socialist Economy. In: The New Hungarian Quarterly No 102/1986, 
pp.47-55.
113 L. Antal: Hungary's Economic Policy in the 1980s. Restrictive economic policy -  uncertain, ill- 
assorted reforms. WIIW-Forschungsberichte No 148/1988.
114 The National Bank of Hungary: Banking System..., op.cit. pp.6-7.
115 P. Naray: Organisatorische und institutionelle Reform des ungarischen Assenhandels UWH No 
2/1988. pp.21-25.
116 J. Toldy-Osz: Die ersten neun Monaten des Joint-Venture-Clubs, In UWH No 1/1988, pp.42-45.
117 F. Bartha: Wir denken langfristig. In: UWH No 1/1988, pp.31-33.
118 T. Beck: Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen im Spiegel der Ungarischen Reformprozesse. In: UWH No 
3/1988, pp.4-7.
220
119 Ibid, p.7.
120 H. Gabrisch: The Prospects of Poland’s Economy. WIIW Mitgliederinformation No 4/1987, p. 21.
121 M. Myant: Poland: A crisis for Socialism. London 1982, p. 39.
122 A. Muller: Structural Change and Economic Reform in Poland. WIIW Forschungsbericht No 
133/1987, pp. 7-8.
123 W. Brien: Poland's Debt. Polish Perspectives No 4/1984, pp. 23-25.
124 C. Jozefiak: The Polish Reform. An Attempted Evaluation. WIIW Forschungsbericht No 
116/1986, pp.10-11.
125 H. Gabrisch: The Prospects ...op.cit. p. 27.
126 Ibid. p. 28.
127 H. Gabrisch: Poland: Economic Reform Concept about to Miscarry. WIIW Mitgliederinformation 
5/1988. p.3.
128 Polen; Grunes Licht fur Reformpolitik Ostwirtschaftsreport, No 22/1988, p. 425.
129 Business International: Doing Business with Eastern Europe op.cit.. Volume Poland, Chapter X, 
pX-3.
130 The law text is in English in ECE: East-West... op.cit.
131 English translation by Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade: The Law on Economic Activity with the 
participation of Foreign Parties (The Polish Foreign Investment Law') Warsaw, December 1988.
132 A. Burzyniski: Comments on Foreign Investment Law of 23rd December 1988. Polish Chamber of 
Foreign Trade, Warsaw 1989.
133 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
134 Ibid, p. 10.
135 J. Stankovsky: East-West...op.cit pp. 210-211.
136 Business International: Joint Ventures ... op.cit p. V - l l .
137 Business International: Doing Business ... Volume: Poland op.cit. pp. X-13-14.
138 Ibid. Volume Poland op.cit. p. X-13.
139 East European Markets, February 6,1987, pp. 11-12.
140 Business International: Doing... Volume Poland op.cit., p. X-13.
141 Stankovsky: East-West... op.cit. p. 211.
142 Mehr Interesse an polnischen JVs. Ostwirtschaftsreport: No 5/1987, p. 86.
143 Liste der polnischen JVs. In: Ostwirtschaftsreport No 14/1988, pp. 274-275.
144 See G. Hamilton: Red Multinationals... op.cit. various articles in the book..
221
145 Business International: Doing... Vol.Poland op.cit.pp. X-15-16.
146 Ibid. p. X-17.
147 H. Gabrisch: The Prospects ... op.cit. p. 21.
148 W. Trzeciakowski: Can the Polish Debt Problem be Solved? WIIW Forschungsbericht No 
128/1987, p.19.
149 A. Muller: Structural Change... op.cit p. 26.
150 Politika nennt Grunde fur geringe Zahl von JVs. Ostwirtschaftsreport No 15/1987, p.295.
151 WIIW Mitgliederinformation No 5/1988, pp. 19-23.
152 I. Grosser: Economic Reforms in Bulgaria, WIIW Mitgliederinformation No 4/1988, p. 11.
153 Ibid, p. 12.
154 M. Friedlander: Changes in the Banking System in the CMEA area. Ibid pp. 28-29.
155 These three decrees are in English in: ECE: East-West ...op.cit pp. 124-139.
156 Bulgarische Handels- und Industriekammer: Gemischte Gesellschaften in Bulgarien. Sofia 1986, 
pp.7-8.
157 Regulations for the Application of the Decree on Economic Activity in the People’s Republic of 
Bulgaria. In English by Sofia Press, 1989.
158 Economic News of Bulgaria, No 1 1989, p. 1 and 4.
159 Ibid, p. 1.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid, p. 4.
162 Ibid.
163 Regulations for the Application... op.cit Article 108, p. 35.
164 Sofia Bulletin No 7/1989, p.l.
165 Ibid.
166 Economic News of Bulgaria, No 2/1989, p.l.
167 Ibid.
168 Regulations for the Application... op.cit, p. 16.
169 Business International: Doing... Volume Bulgaria op.cit. pp. X - l l ,  12.
170 ECE: East-W est... op.cit. p. 50.
171 Business International: Doing... Volume Bulgaria op.cit., p. X-12.
222
172 Ibid, p. X-12.
173 Ibid, p. X-13.
174 Ibid, p. X-13.
175 Bulgarien: Verstarkte Wirtschafts-kooperation in einigen Schliisselbereichen erwiinscht, 
Ostwirtschaftsreport No 12/1988 p. 235.
176 Business International. Doing... Volume Bulgaria op.cit. pp.X-13,14.
177 Joint Venture Vergleich: Ungam besser als Bulgarien. Ostwirtschaftsreport No 1/1987 pp. 17-18.
178 Ibid. pp. 17-18.
179 ECE: East-West ...op.cit. p.75.
180 Financial Times, June 1,1983.
181 Die Presse. April 27,1985.
182 Handelsblatt, January 29,1986.
183 Business International.. Doing... Volume Bulgaria op.cit., p. X-18.
184 Ibid, pp. X -17 ,18.
185 E. Zaleski: Socialist... in Hamilton. Red Multinationals, op.cit. p. 162.
186 ECE: East-West... op.cit.. p. 36.
187 Ibid. p. 75.
188 F -L - Altmann: Die tschechoslowakische Volkswirtschaft und der RGW. Osteuropa Institut 
Miinchen. Working Papers No 115/1986. J. Slama: Wachtstymsaussichten der 
tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaft in den 80er und 90er Jahren. Same series, Working Paper No 
116/1986.
189 F. Levcik:Economic Reforms in Czechoslovakia. WIIW Mitgliederinformation No 4/1988, p.18.
190 Ibid, p. 19.
191 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
192 Reform and Trust. An Interview with Ota Sik. RFE/RL Research. November 11,1988, p.l.
193 Ibid, p.3.
194 Tscheckoslovakische Reformen: Fortsetzung oder Stillstand? Ostwirtschaftsreport No 24/1988, 
pp.461-462.
195 F. Levcik: Economic Reforms in Czechoslovakia, op.cit. p. 19.
196 These Principles are included in Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry guide-book 
"Joint Ventures in Czechoslovakia”. Prague 1987, pp. 13-20.
223
197 Interview with J. Nemec, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister. In Rude Pravo, October 11,1988. 
Translation into English provided by Embassy of the CSSR in Helsinki.
198 Gesetz fiber das Untemehmen mit auslandischer Vermogensbeteiligung (German text provided by 
the Embassy of the CSSR in Helsinki).
199 Interview with H. Ruzicka (Ministry of Foreign Trade) in Czechoslovak Life No 4/89, p. 4.
200 Joint Equity Venture Policies Liberalized. The Journal of Commerce No 22/1988, p.4.
201 Business International. Doing Business with... Volume Czechoslovakia op.cit. pp. X-10-13.
202 Ibid, o. X-19.
203 Ibid, p. X-9.
204 Ibid, p. X-10.
205 G. Hamilton: Red Multinationals... op.cit. various articles.
206 Ostwirtschaftsreport, No 13/89, p.257, and No 14/89, p. 275-276. op.cit
207 Ibid
208 Financial Times, December 8, p.24.
209 The Economist* December 16-22,1989, p.51.
210 Both decrees are in English and in Russian in: International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) -  The 
USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry: Guide to Joint Ventures in the USSR. Paris 1988.
211 In this point there is an incorrect translation in the ICC guidebook, p. 66, when it reads in English
(September Resolution) that tax exemptions can be made during the first two years of JV
operations.
212 I Oleinik: Management Development for Joint Ventures. Seminar "Management in JVs", Helsinki, 
October 5,1988, p.3.
213 N. Voznesenskaya: The Soviet Legal Framework for the Establishment of Joint ventures. The 
same seminar, p.4.
214 Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR "O dalneyshem razvitii vneshne-ekonomicheskoy 
deyatelnosti gosudarstvennykh, kooperativnykh i inykh obschestvennykh predprijatiy, 
obyedineniy i organizatsii. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No 51/1988, pp. 17-18.
215 EG, No 13,1989, p. 21.
216 Kauppalehti, June 9,1989, p.6.
217 Leningradskaya Pravda, July 7,1989.
218 I. Savelova: Spetsialnye ekonomicheskie zony. Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnechestvo Stran-chlenov 
SEV No 4/1989, pp. 103-107.
219 I.Ivanov: Informal Brainstorming Meeting on FEZ in the USSR> Moscow, June 16,1989. USSR 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
224
220 A. Poluykhov: A free enterprise zone. New Times No 29/1989, pp.32-34.
221 Ibid.
222 Izvestia, September 20,1989.222222222222
223 ECE: East... op.cit. p. 28.
224 I. Oleinik: Management... op.cit. p. 1.
225 ECE: East... op.cit. p.28
226 Ibid, p. 65.
227 Ibid, p. 56.
228 Ibid, p. 28.
229 Ibid, p. 46.
230 Maailma ia Me, No 9/1987, pp. 24-25. (MM is Novosti (APN) periodical in Finland)
231 ECE: East... op.cit. p. 65.
232 Ye. Goygin: Economic Cooperation Between the USSR and FRG. Foreign Trade (USSR) No 10
1988. p.26.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
235 Joint Enterprise Gaining Strength. Ibid p. 32.
236 KOP:n sijoitus yhteisyritykseen on Suomen suurin, Idankauppa, No 6-7,1989, p. 6.
237 K. Vehkonen: Case International Moscow Bank. Final Report of AIESEC seminar on 
The Future of East-West Economic Relations,Helsinki, August 1989, p.39.
238 Exchange rate 100 $ = 64,26 Roubles, according to EG, No 29/1989.
239 East-West Trade/Perestroika in the 1990s International Herald Tribune, June 6,1989, p. 9.
240 Bank of Finland: Regulations for application of permit to establish JV in the Soviet Union. 
January 16,1989 (In Finnish language).
241 O. Hyvonen: Lannen kautta itaan (Via West into the East). Talouselama No 17/1989, pp. 42-43.
242 V. Rasputin: Giants: Hard on the People the Pocket-book and the Environment. Moscow News 
No 15/1989 p. 15.
243 Kommunist No 4/1989, cited in Sosialismin teoria ia kaytanto (APN) No 33/1989, p.27.
244 V. Sheetov: Do we need consessions today? New Times No 25/1989, p.26.
245 D. Blagutin: The Technological Spectrum of JVs on Soviet Territory. Foreign Trade (Soviet) No 
4/1989, pp. 25-28.
225
246 Ibid.
247 PlanEcon Report: Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union. March 24,1989, Washington DC.
248 Ibid, p.3.
249 Ibid, p.3.
250 PlanEcon has counted some JVs which produce, for example, plastic consumer goods, in the the 
chemical branch.
251 V. Kashin: Rubl + Dollar. Kak organizovat’ sovmestnoye predpriyatye. Moscow 1989, pp. 155- 
172.
252 HR & H Consensus International: An Analysis of Trade between Countries of the Eastern Bloc 
and the Western Industrial Nations for the 1990*5. London 1988. Western countries involved are: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, UK, USA, West Germany.
253 N. Dracheva: Going Shares with Foreign Partners. In: Foreign Trade (USSR) No 8/1989 p. 42-45.
254 Ibid p. 42.
255 Ibid, p. 42.
256 Ibid, p. 44.
257 Ibid, p. 43.
258 M. Hill: Soviet and East-European...in G. Hamilton (ed): Red Multinationals... op.cit., pp. 53-54.
259 P. Knirsch -  J. Stankovski: Soviet and East European firms in Austria. Ibid pp. 146-147.
260 N. Dracheva: Going... op.cit. p.45.
261 Ibid, pp. 43,45.
262 N. Schmelyov -  V. Popov: Na perelome: ekonomicheskaya perestroika v SSSR. Moscow, 1989. 
p.305.
263 The New York Times. November 19,1987.
264 A. Aganbegyan: The Challenge... op.cit. p. 152.
265 Ibid, p. 155.
266 N. Garetovski: The USSR State Bank: the country’s Major Bank. The World of Banking. July- 
August 1988, p.4.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
269 M. Zotov: Industrial Investment Bank & The Soviet Economy. Ibid, p.5.
270 Ibid.
271 V. Bukato: Developing the Social Infrastructure. Ibid. p.5.
226
272 A. Obozintsev: Agroprombank: An Expanding Role. Ibid, p.6.
273 Reuters. August 10,1988.
274 Ekonicheskaya Gazeta No 34/1988.
275 Moscow News. No 11/1988.
276 Vremennaya tipovaya metodika opredeleniya ekonomisheskoi effektivnosti sozdania i 
deyadelnosti na temtori SSSR sovmestnykh predpriyatii. Soviet Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. Moscow 1988, p.6.
275 Ibid, p. 7.
227
4. Some economic aspects of East-W est JVs
When the first CMEA countries started experimenting with Western FDIs in the 1970s, 
the progress was extremely slow. In the 1980s, the idea of allowing Western FDIs 
spread in the CMEA region and considerable improvement in rules governing JVs has 
taken place. However, the economic substance of FDIs was still rather thin at the end of 
the 1980s. In spite of that it can be maintained that Western FDIs in the CPEs have 
come to stay.
There is a clearly uneven distribution of FDIs among small CMEA-countries. As far as 
the number of JVs is concerned, Hungary is clearly in the lead with some 200 units in 
1989. While Hungary leads the league of countries under review with this number, the 
invested capital, is much lower than either the economic potential allows, or the 
Hungarian government desires. 1)
However, it can also be maintained, that Poland with some 700 Polonia-firms 2) is in 
the lead in the number of Western FDIs. Obviously, the economic meaning of these 
small units is rather negligible.
A comparison between Hungary and Romania is especially interesting. Both countries 
started experimenting with JVs virtually at the same time, though the results are 
strikingly different. In Romania, which has kept to the original JV rules within the 
highly centralized economic system, the results are extremely poor: only a few JVs have 
come into operation since the 1970s. No new ones have actually come up in the 1980s. 
In Hungary, a clear acceleration of JV activity has been registered since the mid-1980s.
The Soviet Union with its huge market and rich resources is a special case. In 
September 1988, less than two years after the issuing of the first JV decree, about 100 
units had been set up. 3) One year later there were already 800 units established. 4) 
Bulgaria, the CSSR and Poland have been rather unsuccessful in attracting Western 
firms to participate in JVs with local firms.
As pointed out in section 3.2., the internationalization of CMEA 5) countries' economies 
is still rather narrow in quantitative terms. Only a few exceptions of socialist JVs in the 
West are involved in production. JVs in the West are mainly marketing outlets of 
Eastern products. In the Third Woiid the CMEA involvement in FDIs is also of a 
narrow nature.
However, the interest of CMEA countries in participating in the global economy with 
the help of FDIs has clearly increased in the 1980s, during which FDIs have been
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regarded as a two-way road between East and West. At the same time, intra-CMEA 
activity is under serious reconsideration. Direct links between socialist enterprises are 
demanded more loudly than previously. Socialist JVs are under discussion, and some 
have been established (chapter 3).
Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to reform the CMEA and the framework of 
cooperation between her members. The CMEA has already been described, and thus, 
there is no need to repeat it all here. It is sufficient to say here that the CMEA in its 
current structure is the product of a centralized command -  and -  central allocation 
model, which dominated all socialist countries. While significant changes have been 
made in many of the member countries, the organization itself has not undergone much 
of a transformation. The overall pace of economic change in the CMEA countries has 
not been quick but in the CMEA itself the change has-been even slower. To some 
extend the lack of change has been determined by the conservative attitude in the Soviet 
Union.
In the second half of the 1980s, the emphasis of integration was shifted downwards, to 
enterprises, associations and other basic-level units. No genuine integration, however, 
will come about, unless there is genuine cooperation at the bottom, unless joint bi-state 
and multi-state enterprises are set up. The integrated market still remains a theoretical 
concept alone. This, of course, means that currency problems are the most important 
issue to be solved at the state-to-state level. The experience of creating East-East JVs 
indicates that there will not be any meaningful advance in the absence of a proper price 
system, currency exchange fates, and at a further stage, convertibility of national 
currencies.
These facts are increasingly better understood in CMEA countries. In the 43rd 
(extraordinary) session of the CMEA (October 1987) a new plan of integration was 
adopted stipulating the creation of a new monetary-, financial- and credit system, 
which allows cooperation at the enterprise level within the CMEA. Old methods of 
socialist integration based on bilateral, trade and commodity quotas defined in natural 
terms are regarded as outdated.6)
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At the same time, economists in the CMEA area have started realizing that CPEs have 
lost a lot of time by making the mistakes mentioned above.
If there had been economic reforms earlier on at national and international levels, the 
CMEA aim of a "common market" would have been easier to reach. Only some 7-10% 
of products entering mutual trade are made in socialist cooperation while the equivalent 
figure in the EEC is 40%, The energy intensity of CMEA economies (energoyemkost) is 
twice as high as in the EEC, and the use of materials per production unit is 70% higher 
than in the West (EEC). 7) The 1980s have been characterised by the failure of finding 
optimal efficiency in internal as well as in external economy.
4.1. Political economy and FDIs between East and West
From the point of view of political economy the question of FDIs across ideological 
borders is extremely interesting. An essential part of Marxism-Leninism is the theory of 
imperialism, the highest and the last stage of capitalism. According to Lenin
"the Bolsheviks are establishing completely different international 
relations which make it possible for all oppressed people to rid 
themselves of imperialist oppression". 8)
Capitalist FDIs enacted by international monopolies are supposed to cease to exist.
A standard Soviet textbook of political economy describes the modem capitalism in the 
West as follows:
"Imperialism is moribund capitalism, it is the eve of the socialist 
revolution. By expanding the sphere of their influence, the monopolies 
tend to accelerate the development of the social character of 
production. This tends to run into contradiction with the monopolies' 
self-seeking purposes. The capitalist relations of production 
increasingly slow down the development of the productive forces. The 
contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the 
handful of monopolies and the bulk of the population is intensifying.
The contradictions among the monopolies, among the imperialist 
countries, and between the imperialist countries, on the one hand, and 
the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries, on the other, are 
being aggravated. Imperialism pushes to an extreme all the 
contradictions of capitalism and creates all the objective prerequisites 
for the socialist revolution. That is why it is decaying capitalism, an 
eve of the socialist revolution".9)
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If Western capital has created contradictions in the internal, as well as in the external 
economy, why then, is it necessary for the socialist states to cooperate with that private 
capital in the most intimate form of collaboration, in joint enterprises? If capitalism is in 
the eve of collapsing, why are the socialist states making long-term deals with capitalist 
firms in the form of JVs? The political economy of socialism is hardly able to answer 
these questions.
In the sphere of external economic links the new approach with liberal attitudes towards 
FDIs is bound to run into conflict with orthodox ideology. This conflict can be shown 
conveniently with some references to the "New Programme of the CPSU” from 1961. 
This document is a suitable starting point, because it contains all the main arguments of 
traditional Marxist-Leninist "Weltanschauung" and is thus called "The Communist 
Manifesto of the 20th Century". The Programme 10) is also of special interest in 
context of this study, as it contains special historical importance for the 1970s and 
1980s.
The topic of the first chapter of the Programme is the transition from capitalism to 
communism. It states:
"The process of concentration and centralization of capital, while 
destroying free competition, led in the early 20th century to the 
establishment of powerful capitalist monopoly associations which 
acquired decisive importance in the economy, to the merging of bank 
capital and immensely concentrated industrial capital, and to intensive 
export of capital. The trusts, which encompassed entire groups of 
capitalist powers, began the economic division of a world already 
divided territorially among the wealthiest countries. Capitalism has 
entered its final stage, the stage of monopoly capitalism, of 
imperialism... Imperialism is a decaying and moribund capitalism; it is 
the eve of the Socialist revolution. The world capitalist system as a 
whole is ripe for the social revolution of the proletariat. 11)
In the section dealing with the victory of socialism in the USSR, the Programme points 
out:
/
"Socialism has done away forever with the supremacy of private 
ownership of the means of production, that source of the division of 
society into antagonistic classes. Socialist ownership of the means of 
production has become the solid economic foundation of society.
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Unlimited opportunities have been afforded for the development of 
the productive forces." 12)
In the section on The World Socialist System the Programme maintains:
"The development of the world Socialist system and of the world 
capitalist system is governed by diametrically opposed laws. The 
world capitalist system emerged and developed into fierce struggle 
between the countries composing it, through exploitation of the 
weaker countries by the strong, through the enslavement of hundreds 
of millions of people and the reduction of entire continents to the 
status of colonial appendages of the imperialist metropolitan 
countries. The formation and development of the world Socialist 
system, on the other hand, proceeds, on the basis of sovereignty and 
free will and in conformity with the fundamental interest of the 
working people of all the countries of that system... The cooperation 
of the Socialist countries enables each country to use its resources and 
develop its productive forces to the full and in the most rational 
manner." 13)
The point dealing with the national-liberation movement in the Programme states:
"The interest of a nation calls for the elimination of colonialism, the 
eradication of imperialist rule, the ousting of foreign monopolies, the 
foundation of national industry..." 14)
Chapter two of the Programme contains the famous vision of the Communist society:
"In the current decade (1961-70) the Soviet Union, in creating the 
material and technical basis of communism, will surpass the strongest 
and richest capitalist country, the USA, in production per head of 
population... In the next decade (1971-80) the material and technical 
basis of communism will be created and there will be an abundance of 
material and cultural benefit for the whole population... The 
construction of Communist Society will be fully completed in the 
subsequent period (1980s) 15)... It is necessary in Communist 
construction to make full use of commodity money relations in 
keeping with their new substance in the Socialist period. In this, such 
instruments of economic development as cost accounting, money, 
price, production cost, profit, trade, credit and finance play a big part.
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When the transition to a Communist form of people's property and the 
Communist system of distribution is completed, commodity -  money 
relations will become economically outdated and will wither 
away."16)
The predictions of the 1961 Programme and the reality of the late 1980s are almost 
diametrically opposed to each other. The economic division of the world (first 
quotation) has not yet happened in the 1960 between monopolies, because 
internationally mobile capital is still conquering certain areas, for example, socialist 
countries.
The second quotation from the Programme points out that private ownership of the 
means of production, and thus, class antagonisms have been abolished in socialism. In 
the 1980s, many kinds of ownership relations are coming up in CPEs, including 
Western FDIs.
The third quotation is the most important one. The socialist community has not been 
able to develop its productive forces to the full and in the most rational way, and thus, it 
has become necessary for CPEs to invite Western capital to participate in the socialist 
economic development. Following the logic of the third quotation from the programme, 
this is bound to lead to the exploitation of the work force in the capital-receiving 
country.
The fourth quotation illustrates the economic and verbal support of CPEs to the LDCs, 
demanding the ousting of foreign capital from the Third World. At present, CPEs 
compete with each other, as well as with LDCs on receiving Western FDIs. The 
difference between the theoretical -  ideological -  approach of the 1960s and actual 
situation at the end of the 1980s is fundamental.
This can very well be verified by the following quotation from Financial Times at the 
end of 1989:
"Mr. E. Sandiford, Prime Minister of Barbados, has welcomed the 
dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe. Behind this, however,
Mr. Sandiford and other leaders of economically embattled 
developing countries fear they will be left worse off. The concern, 
supported by statements from officials of industrialised states and 
investment bankers, is that the financial support for Eastern Europe 
will mean less for a developing world... Eastern Europe will be more 
attractive for direct investments and capital flows, which will mean
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the diversion of resources from developing countries, Mr. Sandiford 
concurred." 17)
The fifth and last quotation contains the points of the Programme which in the 1970s 
and in the 1980s have proved to be embarrassing for Soviet and Eastern European social 
scientists. Without discussing the timetable of the advancement of communism, it is of 
interest here to note, that the withering away of all economic categories in the 1980s 
was envisioned in the 1960s. In actual fact, intensification of money-commodity 
relations were widely demanded in the CPEs in the 1980s, with all of its consequences 
of reviving all economic levers in internal, as well as in external economic matters. 
Some details of external economics, like FDIs and Western management know-how, 
are applied in order to intensify the use of economic levers on the home market.
Although the socio-economic reality in the CPEs is strikingly different from that 
envisioned in the Programme of 1961, the ideology, on which the Programme was 
based, has not been altogether abandoned. Therefore, Western FDIs in the East and also 
Eastern investments in the West must still be brought into harmony with socialist 
political economy. This is a rather painful process.
It could naturally be assumed that Gorbachev’s perestroika has changed political 
economy in this respect. This was, however, not visible in the 27th CPSU Congress, 
where Gorbachev's speech contains the following:
"The transnational monopoly capital has gained strength rapidly. It is 
seizing control of and monopolizing whole branches or spheres of 
production both on the scale of individual countries and in the world 
economy as a whole. By the early 1980s, the transnational 
corporations accounted for more than one third of industrial 
production, more than one half of foreign trade, and nearly 80% of the 
patents in the capitalist world.
The core of MNCs is formed by US companies. This "second 
economy" of USA is two-three times bigger than national economies 
in such leading West-European powers like FRG, France and Great 
Britain... Presently US-transnational monopolies are real giants with 
economic activity which can be compared of GNPs of whole states...
Contradictions between MNCs and host countries have arisen and 
have been aggravated. The MNCs undermine the sovereignty of LDCs 
and also of developed capitalist countries. They favour state-
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monopolistic regulations, when it is advantageous to them, but they do 
not back off from conflicts with host country government when these 
try to put their profits in danger.” 18)
Just one year after this speech the Soviet Union invited the MNCs to make FDIs in the 
Soviet territory by issuing the JV decree. Obviously, the political rhetoric and the actual 
economy have diverging needs.
The anti-imperialistic rhetoric has continued in the Soviet Union during perestroika, but 
the terminology may be a little different. Instead of using "imperialism", for example 
"neoglobalism" is used. The USA is the target in these writings, in which it is 
maintained that Western countries reap extremely high profits from LDCs by using 
"price disparities". The USA is also profiting from the LDCs' huge external debt, 
according to Soviet sources. 19)
An excellent example of the old school is delivered by A. Kireyev, who raised the 
question of the nature of modem transnationals. They are imperialist monopolies which, 
to quote Lenin, have reached 'a new world stage concentrating on capital and 
production. They monopolize whole industries and whole spheres of activity, on the 
scale of individual countries and of the entire capitalist world economy... The expansion 
of transnational capital has conserved the developing countries' economic dependence 
on the former "parent states" going back to colonial times. Only the forms of this 
dependence have changed. By political manoeuvres, promises, bribes, military 
blackmail, and by direct interference in the developing countries' internal affairs 
imperialism has built up a new system of exploitation based on neocolonialism. MNCs 
employ various means of exploitation: non-equivalent trade exchange, manipulations 
with lending and dollar exchange rates, and various clever ploys... The MNCs have 
dumped most of their labour -  intensive and environment -  to the Third World 
polluting production processes, turning individual countries into their auxiliary factor 
shops... It is obvious, nevertheless, that such a system cannot exist forever. The MNCs 
will have to choose between daylight robbery and cooperation on the basis of equality 
with the Third World. After all, the developing countries have other foreign trade 
partners, too. 20)
The writer does not define what partners he means in the last sentence of his article, but 
it is clear that he is hinting in the direction of socialist countries. Why has this 
alternative been functioning so poorly, even if the possibilities for it have been apparent, 
is obvious: the CMEA countries have been economically too weak, in order to offer a 
real alternative to the Third World.
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Views represented by Kireyev have until recently hardly been criticized by Soviet 
scholars. However, in the perestroika period these anti-imperialist dogmas are no more 
accepted without discussion. This kind of discussion can be observed, for example, in a 
book review in the periodical "World Economy and International Relations". The book 
under review is called "MNCs and developing countries: deepening contradictions". The 
book describes the MNCs as the "force of the evil" in the sense of Kireyev's article.
The writer of the review, N. Karagodin, accuses the author of the book, A. Golikov, of 
an over-simplified view of a complicated topic. Karagodin asks why the cooperation of 
MNCs and developing countries is steadily increasing and why LDCs are so eagerly 
attracting FDIs, if there is a sharpening contradiction between the development needs of 
LDCs and MNCs especially in respect of the "class character" of the latter as Golikov 
maintains. In reality, there is virtually no LDC without a need for FDIs and technical 
and organizational know-how connected to MNC-operations. Long-standing relations 
between LDCs and MNCs allow the host countries of FDIs to elaborate organizations 
and create rules, which make the FDIs mutually beneficial. This statement by 
Karagodin, when he counters the general contradiction argument of the dogmatic school 
representative Golikov, is really unorthodox: mutual benefit between Western MNCs 
and LDCs cannot exist in Marxism-Leninism tradition.
At the end of his review Karagodin points out that less biased views than those given by 
Golikov’s book are presently needed on world economy, because perestroika in foreign 
economic relations also contains JVs between the Western MNCs and the Soviet Union. 
The old-fashioned cliches are no more convincing in his opinion.21)
The end of the book review is revealing: if the USSR with a long, verbal anti­
imperialist tradition is entering an economic alliance with MNCs in the form of JVs, the 
behaviour of the partner should not be critized in the traditional manner any more, 
because this may hinder the hopes for cooperation.
This is an understandable attitude. As F. Gomyunov stated in the autumn of 1988:
"There is no socio-economic task more important today than that of 
saturating the Soviet domestic market with goods and services. By 
attracting foreign capital and getting involved in joint business 
undertakings with foreign companies we can go a long way towards 
doing so. The appropriate laws, binding on all Soviet institutions and 
citizens, have been passed. Somehow, these laws haven't made foreign 
businessmen exactly thronging to make deals with Moscow. Many of
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them still have their doubts about our economy being restructured in 
earnest and our reforms being here to stay.” 22)
A comparison between credits and FDIs in the framework of political economy is 
naturally of special interest. It is a well-known fact that CPEs accepted Western credits 
on a large scale in the 1970s. It was thought in socialist countries that credit-taking was 
not dangerous in terms of Western economic influence. It was said that central planning 
could be maintained, and the use of credit could be used to strengthen the socialist 
economy. Western economic influence was regarded as minimal.
However, credits bear interest, which in turn, is a means of exploitation. In Eastern 
sources it is easy to find hints on the LDCs desire of liberalization from the dependence 
on imperialism. 23) At the UN General Assembly (1988) Mihail Gorbachev proposed 
to limit payments of LDCs debt or to reschedule a considerable part of them until much 
later. 24)
Some socialist economists consider the debt problem of socialist countries being made 
by the capitalist countries. They did so, among other things, by adopting discriminatory 
measures that blocked exports from socialist countries, thus denying them a source of 
CC earnings. 25)
In view of this, credit-taking is a serious point in political economy. Debt creates 
dependence and debt servicing includes interest payment, and thus, an element of * 
exploitation.
As far as JVs and FDIs in general are concerned, they certainly contain a higher degree 
of economic dependency than bank-to-bank credits. Western management is getting 
involved, and thus, direct influence on the socialist enterprise level is becoming a fact. 
In political economy terms this means that Western capital has been invited to socialist 
countries to exploit the local labour force on the spot.
In this context the same question as in the Soviet "concession period” arises: "we chased 
off our own capitalists, and now we call in foreign ones." In political economy this 
potential complaint is difficult to answer.
It is also relatively difficult to explain in political economy terms the exploitation in 
socialist JVs wirh Western capital participation. In Selectronic Ltd, which is a JV in 
Hungary producing consumer durables -  mainly colour TVs -  the worker on the 
assembly line gets wages which are equivalent of the salary of an engineer with 
university education with five years' work experience. 26)
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Off-shore JVs with special liberties to set wages and salaries of their personnel 
aggravates this ideological problem. How is it possible to explain to the local population 
that FDIs from the West are bringing about no exploitation, but higher pay than in the 
national economy in average? At the same time, it must be loudly announced that FDIs 
can be attracted only on the precondition that labour costs are relatively favourable.
According to the Soviet economist, S. Menshikov, private enterprises hiring people are 
not permitted in the Soviet Union. The only exception are JVs with foreign companies, 
but in them the state holds over half of the capital. 27)
I. Ivanov, who is the deputy chairman of the State committee of Foreign Economic 
Relations of the USSR (GVK), attempted to explain the situation. 28) He admits that 
his task -  explaining FDIs between socialism and capitalism in terms of political 
economy -  is a rather difficult one.
Ivanov states that socialist and capitalist properties are antipodes, but in the present 
world of economic interdependence there must be an interaction between these 
antipodes. Also in the traditional trade this interaction plays a role, even if it is indirect 
in its appearance.
Ivanov is obviously happy to be able to refer to Lenin's writings about the concession 
period, in which it is stated that involvement of Western capital does not pose any 
danger to socialism and does not lead to any denationalization of property. On the 
contrary, joint entrepreneurship leads to active and vigorous competition between two 
methods, two formations and two economies -  communist and capitalist. 29) This 
sounds like healthy competition between two team-mates in one and the same football 
team, struggling for the possession of the ball.
Ivanov points out in his reference to Lenin and the 1920s that the Soviet economy very 
much stronger is today than during the "concession period", and thus the danger of 
Western influence is smaller. 30)
It is clear that Ivanov must also ask himself the question, whether Western capital is 
able to exploit the labour force of the host country. Not surprisingly, his answer is 
negative. In the Soviet Union JVs are obliged to pay wages and social security payments 
according to local legislation. In addition, only a part of the surplus value flows into the 
pocket of the Western partner, because the USSR as a host country is able to tax the JV 
profit. 31) What Ivanov fails to say in this context, is that the same is true everywhere 
in the world, where FDIs are enacted.
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Ivanov admits that foreign capital also needs some incentives. Otherwise it will not be 
attracted into the country. He also states that FDIs would not be needed, if the domestic 
economy were able to cope with actual demand. Because the Ministry of Light Industry 
is unable to satisfy the need of footwear, the West German shoemaker "Salamander" is 
needed. 32)
Ivanov eloquently points out that Soviet direct investments in the West provide the basis 
of modem economic links. In this pragmatic point he explains how modem export 
activity cannot function without supplementary actions, after-sales services, crediting, 
etc. In developing countries, not surprisingly, Soviet FDIs are not exploitative in nature 
but on the contrary, they help the host countries to resist imperialist economic forces. 
33)
I. Ivanov is a typical technocrat of the perestroika era, who emphasises economics and 
pushes ideology into the background. This new technocracy looks for ways of 
integrating CPEs into the world economy.
The Canadian professor C. McMillan, who has for a long time investigated Eastern 
investments outside the CMEA, has summarized the present situation very well:
"The international socialist division of labour which previously had 
been given emphasis, is now subsumed under a broader concept. 
Relations with socialist and non-socialist partners and, within the 
latter category, with partners from the developed West and developing 
South, are increasingly approached in a' new global perspective, within 
the framework of a more general international division of labour. At 
the same time, this entails explicit recognition of the increased inter­
dependence inevitably involved in the pursuit of these goals. 
Spokesmen for this new orientation of economic policy stress the 
mutuality of interest involved, the acceptability of the level of inter­
dependence envisaged and the important benefits expected to ensue 
from the new relationships. "34)
Also in the new atmosphere the verbal emphasis is still on CMEA cooperation, but also 
in this sphere new methods, especially direct links between enterprises are desired. 
Mihail Gorbachev summarises this point as follows:
"We see direct links between companies and enterprises and 
specialization as the chief reserve and leverage for deepening our 
integration. It is exactly along these lines that we are restructuring our
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foreign economic activities and removing barriers preventing 
enterprises from finding appropriate partners in fraternal countries and 
deciding on their own how to cooperate with them. We are launching 
joint socialist companies, including those expected to meet our 
countries' needs for the most sophisticated goods more quickly. Such 
companies are being set up in services, construction and transport.
The Soviet Union is prepared to offer them some lucrative orders. We 
are also prepared to consider the possibility of involving Western 
businessmen in the activities of such companies."35)
This statement by Gorbachev contains the best-case scenario from the point of view of 
CPEs' technocrats. Enterprise-level cooperation between fraternal countries on the basis 
of market demand supplemented with Western know-how whenever needed is a 
convenient solution ideologically.
Technology exchange in general and FDIs in particular tend to influence the living 
habits and lifestyle in receiving countries. Communist ideology has traditionally 
maintained that it is creating a "new man", free of greed and consumerism. Now, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, it seems that the new socialist man is one, who wears Levi 
Strauss jeans, eats MacDonald's hamburgers and drives a Western car. It is becoming 
more and more difficult to know the country of origin of these products, but consumer 
habits are the same.
The spreading of products and services with capitalist brand names (trade marks) is an 
especially interesting point in this context. In Marxism it has been customary to make a 
distinction between use values and market values, which might differ from each other 
considerably. The market value may include certain monopoly elements, e.g. a firm has 
a well-established brand name, which allows it to charge a quasi-monopoly price. This 
intangible asset is maintained by influencing the client with advertising, which will be 
paid by the buyer for at the end. For example the client may not want to have just any 
kind of jogging shoes, only Adidas will do, although an equivalent pair of shoes without 
the name is probably available at half the price. Western firms with well-known 
intangible assets are making a clear breakthrough in socialist countries by producing 
more and more on the spot aiming at conquering the local market and finding adaptive 
customers. At the same time, the erosion or even withering away of Marxism-Leninism 
is a fact.
The new thinking with de-ideologization of international affairs is, as pointed out, an 
important precondition for FDI inflow. De-ideologization in internal economics is also 
helpful in improving the investment climate for FDIs.
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Allowing entrepreneurship in the form of cooperatives is undoubtedly one of the major 
achievements of perestroika. This new kind of activity, which has widened bottlenecks 
somewhat in certain areas, has been heavily attacked by various conservative elements 
of the' society. In one case in 1989, all local cooperatives (322) were suddenly closed 
down by sessions of the local Soviets in. the Krasnodar territory. 36)
When a journalist, A. Bekker from "Moscow News" investigated this local case, he was 
told that the drastic measures against cooperatives had been demanded by the 
population. "People's interests" are the authorities hobbyhorse, according to Bekker. 
Today they are trying to ride it again to assure people that once the trade-and- 
purchasing cooperatives are done away with, life will become prosperous, with plenty of 
goods in the shops. But, one may ask, as Bekker does, what stood in the way of 
prosperity at the time when cooperatives were not working. 37)
This serious incident described by a critical journalist shows clearly that de- 
ideologization of the Soviet society is not advancing in every sphere of economic life. If 
local initiative and entrepreneurship is harshly cut down by local authorities relying on 
the emotional support of the population, is it then not also possible that foreign 
enterprises will experience the same fate? Is profiteering allowed for Western business 
people, but prohibited for local cooperatives?
Answers to these questions are of vital importance when the investment climate in the 
1990s is judged. Soviet cooperatives are legally allowed to enter foreign trade 
operations and JVs with foreigners. If these potential and maybe even actual JV partners 
suddenly vanish by arbitrary actions of host country authorities, no firm confidence o n . 
long-term cooperation in the form of JVs can emerge.
In the perestroika era much attention has been paid to activating the human factor. In 
this discussion especially contributions by Tatyana Zaslavskaya are of interest. 38) She 
argues that under modem circumstances the role of the individual must be enhanced in 
the economy and also in the political process. It is self-evident that the human factor is 
one of the key issues also in JV activity. Viable and dynamic enterprises can only be 
created when the motivation of people is allowed.
Alongside with Zaslavskaya, there is another theorist, Aleksandr Tsipko, who is 
noteworthy in this context. Mr. Tsipko, who works for the CPSU Central Committee's 
International Department, argues that Soviet Marxism has neglected the true nature of a 
human being. The traditional system of Soviet communism has disregarded material 
incentives by underlining motivation via enthusiasm alone. Egalitarianism and 
ideological conformity have strangled initiatives and innovation. The result of this
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neglecting of common sense is that the Soviet Union has created a graveyard for new 
technology and moral infantilism. The latter result is due to false treatment of the 
masses by the leaders. On the one hand, it is said that man is bom good and pure and 
made to live in a collective, and that he can be corrupted only by evil circumstances and 
faulty economic relations; on the other hand, the citizens are not trusted, but are fenced 
in with bans and restrictions. 39)
It is clear that in JVs partly-owned by capitalist enterprises emphasis cannot be in 
socialist enthusiasm ("work hard for the JV, in order to build up socialism"), but on 
economic motivation. If, however, homo economicus has been killed by traditional 
communism, he must be reinvented by Western investors, before he can be made to 
function.
Recreating the Soviet man as an economic individual is probably a relatively easy task 
after all. If JVs are allowed to hire and fire local management and the labour force freely 
with much leeway in negotiating salaries and wages in terms of quantity and also quality 
(part-payment, for example, in hard currency), then the problem of inertia is highly 
likely to be overcome. Far-reaching freedom in these matters is likely to create social 
tensions of a macro-economic nature: in this case JVs are likely to attract the best parts 
of the labour force causing envy and dissatisfaction outside the JV-section.
Free economic zones (FEZ) can easily become Westernized economic enclaves in the 
Soviet Union with certain Western economic symbols and influence. This necessarily 
creates regional stratification in income structures. This may also cause political 
reaction: supporters of the orthodox Marxism-Leninism can point out that 
Westernization is spoiling whole regions of the first socialist state in the world.
If democratization and glasnost advance further in the Soviet Union during the 1990s, it 
is likely that environmentalist individuals and groups will gain ground. In this case the 
argument provided by the novelist Rasputin, that MNCs will turn the Soviet territory 
into a toilet of the industrialized world, must be taken seriously. Thus, there might come 
up popular protests especially against joint venturing in the most potential fields, in 
extracting industries and in the chemical industry, in which the Soviet Union obviously 
has comparative or even absolute advantage.
c
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4.2. Economic need for Western FDIs in CMEA countries
It is self-evident that the socialist countries under review have not allowed Western 
FDIs out of ideological considerations. The opposite is true: those countries need FDIs 
for economic reasons, and thus, are ready to make ideological compromises.
However, the ideological decay did not begin with JVs with Western companies. 
Accepting international rules for technology exchange (patents, trade marks, financial 
rules) has meant psychological integration into the global business environment. 
Accepting the international mobility of capital in the form of FDIs is the end of the long 
road.
Naturally, one can also argue, that taking credits from the West does not ideologically 
differ from accepting direct investments from the West: As pointed out in the first 
chapter, the theory of imperialism presupposes that financial capital and industrial 
capital will merge in the advanced phase of capitalism. It is, thus, the same whether a 
capitalist banker grants credits or an industrialist makes a FDI, because it is the one and 
the same person.
In economic terms there is a clear difference. In the CMEA finance capital started to shy 
away from the risks involved in the 1980s (though the country risks were remarkably 
different in various CMEA countries). Therefore, the point can be made that in the 
1980s there was an economic need to attract FDIs, because credit financing was 
growing more difficult.
It may also be argued that the development path taken in the CMEA countries is a 
natural one. Marx believed that the country that is more developed industrially only 
shows to the less developed the image of its own future. His pattern of development was 
intended to cover all cases, once certain preconditions had been fulfilled and primitive 
accumulation had taken place. 40)
The problem, however, in the socialist countries is that primitive accumulation has 
really taken place, mainly relying on local capital formation, but the use of capital has 
been extremely wasteful due to a centralized planning system which might be suitable 
from the point of view of capital formation, but unsuitable in allocating and maintaining 
capital in an optimal fashion. Therefore, market oriented reforms and learning Western 
management methods have become necessary. Ih is  need is also present in JV-activity.
The Polish economist, Jan Winiecki has described very well the CPEs failure in 
attempts to integrate themselves into the global economy by technology imports 
financed by CC credits. According to him it was expected that net additions to domestic
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resources increase investments by the whole amount of additions and, in consequence 
raise the rate of economic growth proportionately. The possibility of a disequilibrium 
threat to the consumer goods sector posed by the inflow of resources to the producer 
goods sector alone, was not considered. 41)
In addition, it was expected that additional investment-increasing resources not only 
raise the economic growth rate, but also raise efficiency, since they would be associated 
with more productive technologies using less input. The question of how CPEs were to 
accommodate to the inflow of a more sophisticated imported technology, when less 
sophisticated domestic technology had been accommodated to only with great delays 
and at higher costs than planned, was not seriously considered.42)
According to Winiecki this curious thinking generated a simplistic view that equated 
technology and the associated capital imports with a once-for-all shift to a higher level 
of efficiency. Due to the temporary inflow of additional resources, the distance between 
CPEs' and Western market economies was to be reduced for the indefinite period. The 
ability of the CPE system not only to absorb but to improve the imported technology 
was not considered. 43) Winiecki shows in his writing the utopian, nature of the CPEs 
economic thinking of the 1970s:
"Finally, no less simplistic were assessments of CPEs' ability to pay 
for imported technology and capital. Thus, a new foreign economic 
policy was to result in a significant increase in exports of more 
processed manufactured products, i.e. those manufactured using 
Western machinery according to Western licensed technology. These 
products were supposed to generate enough CC to pay back the 
licence royalties, the interest on capital and the capital itself. For 
some, the improved export performance was also expected to continue 
indefinitely on the world market; and, once again, issues like the 
ability to absorb (and improve) new technology, the place of imported 
technology along the technological life cycle, the ability to deliver 
licenced products on time and at the expected cost and quality on the 
world market, etc, were not considered."44)
The Soviet social scientist N. Shmelyov writes in his brilliant "Novy Mir" article, 
among otherthings, that "the Soviet light industry, trade and service sphere operating 
under intolerably favourable conditions which encourage lethargy. Nobody is competing 
with them. Imports of consumer goods are still too small to trouble them". He also states 
that according to the most "patriotic" assessment, only 17-18% of industrial output is up
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to world standards, while according to the most cautious and pessimistic assessments 
the figure is 7-8%. 45)
These points made by Shmelyov are of utmost importance in the evaluation of the 
influence of FDIs in CPEs. JVs are potentially extremely important engines of 
competition in reformed CPEs. All such economies have inherited a highly 
concentrated, monopolistic economic structure.
Thus, JVs are not only economically important as a means of importing capital, but also 
as a revitalizing factor of the whole business scene. If quality, and not quantity any 
longer is to be promoted, then this kind of competition is badly needed. N. Shmelyov is 
not too concerned with the set-backs in ideology, when he supports radical perestroika. 
He writes:
"Let us lose our ideological virginity, which in any case only exists in 
newspaper editorials, which are fairytales. Despite all this virginity, 
people are selling and getting rich more than ever before. And it is a 
question of people who earn money without creating anything and 
without even wanting or knowing how to create anything. ”46)
The author of these lines is trying to demystify social life in CPEs. In addition this 
method can be applied to analysing JVs between East and West. The East European 
countries may be seen as late-comers in the industrialized world though there are 
country differences: e.g. the CSSR is an old industrial country. Western FDI is a crucial 
part of this industrial strategy. Thus, ideology, in particular the theory of imperialism, is 
a mere fairytale.
As far as the FDIs of CMEA countries in the West are concerned, it may be said that 
their number is quite modest. Most of the CMEA JVs and wholly-owned subsidiaries 
are just marketing outlets for export products of CPEs. Manufacturing takes place only 
in a few exceptional cases.
Certainly the lack of money in CC form is one reason for the poor internationalization 
of CMEA enterprises. 47) Generally, the CPEs have performed modestly in their 
external economics, mainly due to the tendency towards self-sufficienCy inherent in 
CPEs. As to the volume of per capita exports, in the early eighties the index number of 
the CMEA member countries was 24.4% of that of the EEC, which is less than a fourth, 
58.8% of that of the US and 41.7% of that of Japan. These figures clearly show that the 
involvement of the countries of the socialist community in the international division of 
labour is suboptimal and that their role in world economic relations is low. 48)
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It is, however, worthwhile bearing in mind the unsuccessful Bulgarian bid for a French 
fork-lift truck factory, in which Bulgarian take-over was actually not allowed by local 
authorities. There are, thus, also other reasons than lack of CC for the low level 
internationalization of CMEA. countries.
Summing up, one may maintain that in the 1980s the CMEA countries have felt the 
economic pressure pushing them towards more intensive external economic links. This 
pressure has become visible also in the sense that new methods of international business 
are sought: internationalization is advancing, while ideological viewpoints moving into 
the background more and more. In the late 1980s the movement into this direction has 
been surprisingly fast in Eastern Europe.
In this rapid change there have been two important background factors linked to the 
failure of the traditional CPEs' external economic model.
-  the CPEs were unable to transplant Western technology into the inflexible, 
administrative economic system in an optimal way. The absorption problem 
concerning alien technology must be solved with the adding up of the management 
factor, with FDIs.
-  highly efficient, non-market CMEA cooperation has turned out to be a mere 
fairytale. Market methods with competition, and thus, also Western FDIs are 
needed in order to increase living standards in the 1990s.
4.3. The future of Western FDIs in the CMEA area
There are three extremely important background factors in the economic field which 
will to influence Western FDIs in the CMEA area during the 1990s:
-  The socio-economic and political change in every individual CPE.
-  The relationship of CPEs towards Western economic organizations, above all to the
EC and to the IMF.
-  The development of intra-CMEA affairs towards a "common market".
Naturally, other factors in addition to these three will also have influence on investment 
decisions made by W'estem companies operating in the CMEA-area. The legal 
framework for FDIs may change. Possible alterations in rules concerning FDIs can not, 
however, be predicted. It can only be assumed that legislation covering FDIs will 
become more liberal as the CPEs become more market oriented
The first point mentioned above -  the socio-economic and political change in every 
individual CPE -  is extremely complex. During the last few months of 1989
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considerable changes took place in the CMEA region. Only the essential features of 
these events can be covered here. Emphasis is put on the Soviet Union and Hungary, as 
these two countries are of special interest from the viewpoint of the present study.
In the Soviet Union pressure was mounting in the late 1980s to abolish the constitutional 
guarantee of the communist party's dominance. In December 1989 Mr. M. Gorbachev, 
the Soviet leader, was forced to use his full authority and powers of persuasion to 
prevent his new parliament from debating the monopoly rule of his Party. He only 
succeeded by a relatively narrow margin -  1,138 votes to 839, with 56 abstentions -  
after using his position as President to dominate the discussion. 49) However, in 
February 1990 the Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU paved the way for a multi­
party system.
In December 1989, the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. N. Ryzhkov, delivered a speech in 
Parliament, which was the Soviet leadership's vision of perestroika for the first half of 
the 1990s. It contains a sort of an emergency programme for the ailing Soviet economy 
with a huge switch of resources into consumer goods manufacture and food production 
and away from heavy industry. The Prime Minister opted for a version in which reform 
of the economy is supposed to come through the old central planning process. He 
rejected calls to introduce private property, wide-spread denationalization of state 
property or swift monetary reform to stop the accelating decline of the Soviet economy. 
50)
This programme stipulated by Ryzhkov and subsequently adopted by the Supreme 
Soviet (Parliament) 51) has been heavily critized by some Western business 
newspapers. The Financial Times writes in its editional among otherthings:
"His (Mr. Ryzhkov's) speech on Wednesday was presented as the 
official version of the perestroika process. Perestroika means 
restructuring: Mr. Ryzhkov's version is restructuring -  but backwards.
... He is seeking once more to link the economy to the levers which 
can be pulled from the men in the ministries and the state planning 
offices... As 23 of the peoples' deputies elected from the Komsomol 
youth organization wrote in the movement's newspaper, his report left 
unmentioned the true causes of the economic difficulties -  the non- 
market character of the economy and the lack of interest among 
workers and collectives in the results of their labour." 52)
"Business Week" writes in very much the same manner:
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"At the second session of the nation's (the USSR) Highest 
parliamentary body, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov 
unveiled a five-year economic plan that rejects private property and 
delays price reforms. More important, the heavy hand of state
planning will rule the economy for at least several more years...
Although Ryzhkov and his advisers insist that they are still on the path
to a socialist market economy, foreign investors are likely to lose 
confidence in any state run system that delays the tough steps. That 
was the big problem with the first five years of perestroika, when the 
government couldn't choose between more state planning and a 
radical freeing of the economy and so kept more planning in place,
Now "it seems we have chosen the plan again," says People's Deputy 
Pavel Bunich." 53)
These three quotations are of relevance in so far as they show that in the turn of the 
decade 1980-1990 the USSR is still a CPE, in which the democratisation process is 
advancing. Therefore, the Western investors, who want to enact FDIs in the Soviet 
territory must be aware of the system -  specific problems of a CPE.
It has often been mentioned in connection with East-West JVs that the Eastern side
needs management know-how, which is basically welcome. This intangible asset is,
however, not transferable like machines.
The main worry of a socialist manager is supply, while the Western manager's headache 
is demand. The enterprise directors in the CPEs are used to working under soft budget 
constraint, as Komai points out, while the Western counterpart has always had hard 
budget constraints. Entirely different management attitudes emerge in supply-led CPEs 
and demand-oriented Western economies.
The harmful lack of demand-orientation in CPEs and the passive role of money, which 
is hampering joint enterprise actions, can be demonstrated in the light of a case study. 
The Hungarian "Volanpak" and the Soviet "Littara" started a JV in Vilnius, in Soviet 
Lithuania, with the aim of producing packaging materials, which are in high demand on 
the Soviet market. This JV, which was established in May 1987, has experienced 
difficulties in getting supplies of raw materials, simple equipment and means of 
transport, as well as receiving office space, even if money for these purposes has been 
available. 54)
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Supply difficulties are not only the worry of East-East JVs, but of East-West JVs as 
well.
"To acquire raw materials and equipment from the Soviet market is 
very difficult. We are constantly in a seller's market. Unfortunately, 
some of our suppliers feel that quality plays no role. Yet they demand 
an international market price. You have to order certain things in 
advance -  to be certain you will get them",
states the managing director of EKE-Sadolin, the Finnish-Soviet JV. 55)
Obviously, an East-West JV is normally in a better position to overcome supply 
difficulties, than an East-East JV. The former is more likely to be in the possession of 
CC means, than the latter. With that medium of payment it is easier to get supplies on 
the internal market, or if not possible, to substitute the missing input by imports from 
the world market.
There are also difficulties in solving questions of JV personnel. Cost-benefit thinking 
and profitability are alien to managers in the CPEs. According to the Finnish company 
Nokia, the Eastern side is eager to promote JVs, because it is something new and 
fascinating, but in reality it is the Western partner, with his capital investment, who 
takes all the risks and bears the responsibility for solving any problem that might arise. 
56)
The problem of management has been acknowledged in CPEs in the period of economic 
reform, for example by the Soviet writer Yuri Shevchenko:
"The amateurs must be replaced by educated qualified specialists. And 
not just a handful, or even a few hundred, but thousands of captains of 
industry. Where are they to come from? The answer is education, but 
at present the inadequate, weak foundations of the economic 
education only fuels the national amateurism of management."57)
The whole economic culture must be changed.
JVs operating in the Soviet Union are not only confronted with supply, personnel and 
managerial problems, but also matters linked with the red tape. V. Mitrofanov, who 
heads the JV Association in Moscow, points out that administrators try to command 
JVs, as if they were subordinated to them. In one case local authorities ordered the work 
force of a JV to participate in potato harvesting on local fields. 58)
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Alongside with red tape there is also a jungle of administrative rules regulating 
enterprise activity. The prominent Soviet economist Nikolai Shmelyov wrote in 1988 
that there is the idea of scrapping all the rules and regulations that run counter to the law 
on state enterprises.
"Some 20,000 have been scrapped, but the remaining 180,000 are still 
in force. The law was hamstrung from the outset. How can one speak 
of the independence of enterprises when in most branches of industry 
state contracts account for 100 per cent (or even more) of their output.
In the country as a whole 82% of the output of industrial enterprises is 
planned from the top. Of course, the remaining 18% is better than 
nothing, but I am not at all certain that it will last until the end of the 
year ".59)
Mitrofanov also points out that there is no modem law on property in the Soviet Union. 
This fact is hampering JV activity. 60)
One Soviet observer states that his countrymen can endure everything -  inconveniences, 
shortages and poverty -  but there must be no private property, owners or exploitation. 
The same observer, Mr. M. Berger, writes:
"The bill on property rights represented by the government to the 
Supreme Soviet envisages a breathtaking plurality of types of 
property: that of the whole union, separate republics, municipal 
authorities, cooperatives, joint stock companies, individuals, etc. 
However, this diversity (in effect, all are varieties of state property) 
contains no mention of private property in any form whatsoever, 
leaving aside the individual ownership of the means of production."
61)
Another observer, A. Polyukhov, writes the following about the same topic:
"One also thinks of the clumsy experiments with the introduction of 
'shares' in some Soviet enterprises which are tired of begging for state 
funds for expansion and are trying to raise funds on their own. These 
'securities' are bought not by those who want to, but those who 'have 
the right' to buy them. It is unclear who has been authorized (and by 
whom) to grant or withhold this 'right'. The seal of an enterprise 
doesn't mean anything. The only authority recognised by the market is 
supply and demand. In addition to the right to buy, there should be the
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right to sell, and in both cases there should be freedom to instantly 
realize any share not at the nominal price, but at its real value... We 
need an organized Stock Market, we need a Stock Exchange. Without 
them there can be no commercial redistribution of resources between 
enterprises, the funds of the trade unions and industries, the state and 
the economy". 62)
These two quotations allow some extremely important conclusions. In the Soviet Union 
a bill on property is under preparation in the winter of 1989-90. The content of this bill 
is obviously conservative, taking the socialist ideology into consideration. No "market 
socialism" also containing real security markets and private property is in coming.
After about five years of perestroika in the Soviet Union the economic mechanism is 
still very much on the line with'the conventional CPE-system, which can be verified by 
a statement made by a Soviet economist:
"Lenin described the basic methods of exercising monopoly control of 
the market which include depriving competitors of raw materials, 
labour, marketing outlets and supply channels and beating down the 
prices. These and other methods are widely used in our economy as 
well -  not by enterprises, but by the central authorities like the State 
Planning Committee, the State Committee for Material and Technical 
Supply, the State Price Committee, ministries and other government 
bodies, They dictate to manufacturers what to produce and in what 
quantities, whom to sell their products to and at what prices. Beside 
that, they dictate wage levels and bond supplies to consumers."63)
Summing up, it can be maintained that joint ventures in the Soviet Union require the 
amalgamation of two business cultures which differ from each other in a variety of 
important points. Success cannot always be guaranteed in this difficult task. The first 
failure of a Soviet JV was announced by the newspaper "Moscow News" before the end 
of 1989:
"Fed up with its Soviet partner, a West German firm has decided to 
drop out a JV that only six weeks ago opened a popular CC store on 
the first floor of the Peking Hotel in Moscow. The president of the 
Koln-based (Cologne) company, International Processing System 
(IPS), accused his former partner in the venture, the Soviet 
cooperative group Farm, of mismanagement of the store, stealing
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goods and trying to control the business to their own personal 
benefit." 64)
The Soviet partner in this "Interfarm" JV lodged complaints against the supply system 
arranged by the Western side. The chief supplier of Interfarm, "Spar", a major 
supermarket chain in West Germany, charged Interfarm ridiculously high prices, 
according to Mr. Makharadze, general director of Farm. 65)
On the basis of this statement, it can be assumed that the Western side attempted to use 
transfer-pricing methods for repatriating profits by over-charging the JV for Western 
supplies. However, no exact evidence for that hypothesis is available.
"Est-Finn", the very first East-West JV in the Soviet Union ran into difficulties at the 
end of 1989. The Western party, the Finnish clothing factory "Kati-Myynti", has put its 
share in Est-Finn on sale. According to the Finnish press, Kati-Myynti is probably 
sueing the Estonian partner for causing delays in building the joint production facility in 
Tallinn and asking for a FIM 60 million (about USD 15 million) penalty payment for 
breaking the JV agreement. 66)
In spite of these negative examples and of difficulties in amalgamating the Soviet and 
Western business cultures described above, there are some vital incentives for Western- 
Soviet JVs in the 1990: the large Soviet market with some 280 million inhabitants 
fascinates many Western firms; huge natural riches of the Soviet territory form potential 
business opportunities for Western investors; in certain cases cost advantages -  
including labour costs -  can be achieved. Thus, it is not surprising that about a thousand 
JVs were established in the USSR at the end of the 1980s. 67)
When the future of Western FDIs in the Soviet Union is assessed, a new phenomenon 
must be taken into consideration: the possible independence of some Soviet republics. 
Especially in the Baltic area this option cannot be excluded any more in the 1990s.
Hungary, the other important object of the present study, offers in many senses entirely 
different starting points for FDIs at the beginning of the 1990s than the Soviet Union. 
Hungary cannot offer large markets or abundant natural riches. Incentives for Western 
investors can be found in the socio-economic and political environment, which showed 
remarkable changes in the late 1980s. These alterations include the renaming of the 
Hungarian People's Republic to the Republic of Hungary, cessation of party activities in 
enterprises, nomination of presidential candidates by the opposition, allowing of a 
multi -party system with free parliamentary elections, and disbanding the Hungarian 
Socialist Worker's Party; it was renamed the Hungarian Socialist Party. 68)
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If this list is supplemented with the economic reforms, which were described in Chapter 
3 bearing especially in mind the spirit of the new Enterprise Law of 1988, it can be 
maintained that Hungary is entering the 1990s as a Westem-style democracy with a 
mixed economy containing a variety of ownership forms and developing security 
markets. The socio-economic environment looks fundamentally -different from that in 
the Soviet Union. However, there is still one important similarity in the beginning of the 
1990s: the Soviet rouble and the Hungarian forint are both still inconvertible currencies.
Actually already in 1989 a new era of Western FDIs started in Hungary, the era of 
acquisitions. In July 1989 a new law on conversion was put into force. This law 
attempts to regulate the methods used to transform state enterprises into private 
companies. 69) After the enterprise has been incorporated, foreign and local investors 
can identify shareholders and begin negotiations with them. Thus, if Hungarian 
enterprises want to attract foreign capital, their first move must be privatisation.
This activity started to take shape already in 1989. Privatisation is followed by partial 
acquisition of foreign investors. The following case has been brought up in the Western 
press:
"IBUSZ, one of Hungary's largest travel agents, has been partially 
sold to an international consortium, headed by Girozentrale, Austria's 
second largest bank. The deal, which has proved controversial in 
Hungary, involves the sale of 40% of IBUSZ. It means the company 
will become one of the first East European companies to be listed on a 
Western stock exchange, possibly as early as next year (1990). It will 
also be listed on Budapest's fledgling stock exchange. IBUSZ, which 
is desperately trying to stave off mounting competition from 
Cooptourist, a travel company which started up over five years ago 
and which has since eroded IBUSZ's long monopoly over the tourist 
sector, will increase its share capital from its current 800 million 
forints to 1.2 billion forints (USD 10 million). The much needed 
capital will be earmarked for improving the company's services... The 
company intends to offer 30% of the registered shares to Western 
investors, while the remaining 10% will be offered to Hungarians, of 
which half will be kept aside for IBUSZ's 2000 employees.'' 70)
This quotation contains several revolutionary, or actually counter-revolutionary points. 
A previously state-owned company has been incorporated, and then, a stake of it sold to 
a foreign consortium, which is reselling shares to Western portfolio investors. In the 
background there is competition of various travel agencies, of which the previously
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state-owned monopoly intends to make small shareholders of its personnel. This is not 
a constellation which is typical for a traditional CPE.
Hungary is entering the 1990s equipped with a multitude of possibilities for Western 
investors, and can thus be called a mixed economy. Characteristics adhered to a CPE- 
model are weakening.
Poland is, alongside with Hungary, a special case among the countries under review. 
There is, however, a remarkable difference between these two countries in the turn of 
the decade 1980-90: the Polish economy is in a much more serious disequilibrium than 
that of Hungary.
In December 1989 Mr. L. Balcerowicz, the Polish Finance Minister, presented his 
economic package to the parliament. It aims to reduce subsidies, remove price controls, 
liberalize foreign exchange rules and introduce real interest rates. Mr. L. Walesa, the 
Solidarity leader, came out in favour of the plans, although he urged the Government to 
speed up the privatisation of industry, which for the moment has taken second place to 
the fight against economic imbalance.
Obviously, privatisation has not been advancing as rapidly in Poland as in Hungary. 
Thus, acquisitions as a new phenomenon can hardly take place in the Hungarian 
manner. However, newspapers have written about the possible takeover of the Lenin 
shipyards in Gdansk by Barbara Piasecka-Johnson, who is a US citizen. The US- 
partner, who is willing to invest about USD 100 million in the Gdansk unit, has been 
looking for guarantees against labour unrest. 71)
In Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania the old-guard leaders disappeared from the 
political scene in 1989. The dramatic events of autumn 1989 in these three countries are 
- likely to speed up economic reforms thus improving the investment climate for FDIs. It 
is, however, impossible to predict whether these countries will follow the Hungarian 
path towards mixed economy and Western type democracy, even if this option seems to 
be the most likely one.rln post-Ceausescu Romania it is highly probable that the 
dismantling of JVs will stop and new, more attractive rules for FDIs will be created.
The second point mentioned at the beginning of the present section (4.3) is the 
relationship of the CMEA-countries under review with Western economic 
organisations. This point is of utmost importance for the CMEA-countries seeking 
FDIs: if these countries are able to participate in the general tendency towards 
integration throughout Europe, and become members of the multilateral monetary
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system of the global economy, their attractiveness as host countries for FDIs will be 
enhanced fundamentally.
After the adoption of a common political declaration in June 1988 between the EC and 
the CMEA, four CMEA-countries (Hungary, the CSSR, Poland, the USSR) under 
review had signed trade pacts with the EC . 72) It was mentioned above that Romania 
signed an agreement with the EC as early as in 1980. Thus, by 1989 only Bulgaria was 
without an EC-trade pact among CPEs in the present study.
It is essential to realize that the trade pacts the EC has concluded with "state trading 
countries" (Hungary, the CSSR, Poland, the USSR, Romania) are not free trade 
agreements, similar to the pacts signed with all individual EFTA-countries (Sweden, 
Switzerland, Finland, Norway, Austria, Iceland). In the former case quantitative 
restrictions (quotas) have been abolished (with different timetables) and in the latter 
case customs tariffs have also been abolished. EC-agreements with various CMEA- 
countries are thus "non-preferential" in nature: the EC has not been ready to abolish 
customs tariffs with "state trading countries", because reciprocity cannot be achieved in 
this case: no equivalent move can be offered from the CPE's side.
In December 1989 it was decided to start negotiations between the EC and EFTA aimed 
at forging what has been dubbed the European Economic Space (EES). In the long run, 
this may provide one of the important means for redrawing the map of Europe with the 
eventual inclusion of Eastern European countries in a new economic and political order. 
73)
In 1989, Hungary was seeking a cooperation agreement with EFTA. even showing 
interest in eventual membership. EFTA has also been contacted by the USSR, the CSSR 
and Poland. However, there is particular resentment among some EFTA states that the 
free trade body should be regarded as an EC anteroom for the Eastern European 
economies as they become more market-oriented. 74)
It is self-evident that the CMEA countries have a vital interest in participating in the 
EES-process, as this process will be decisive for Western European economic 
development in the 1990s. If CMEA-countries fail to be a party of the EES process 
with or without EFTA, it will be a considerable blow for FDIs in Eastern Europe.
It has been pointed out above that several European CMEA countries are members of 
the IMF (Romania, Hungary, Poland). According to the IMF rules, all members must 
aim at convertibility of their currencies. Thus, membership of the IMF will advance 
factor mobility including FDIs in the long run. In December 1989 Czechoslovakia
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applied to rejoin the IMF, a move which may eventually end 35 years of economic 
isolation since the communist authorities severed links with the organization in 1954. 
75)
In the Soviet Union serious discussions about establishing links to the IMF started in the 
late 1980s. For example, professor Georgy Skorov brings about a whole range of 
arguments in favour of joining the IMF. 76)
Firstly, Skorov points out that the Soviet involvement in world economic processes lags 
seriously behind that of major Western countries. It is they and not us, he writes, that 
determinate value exchange rates -  which reflect the world prices -  the volume and 
direction of commodity flows, world bank interest rates, exchange rates, that is, the 
numerous conditions affecting the well-being of the participants in the international 
division of labour, the Soviet Union included.
Secondly, the same writer states that the USSR ought to have the strategic objective of 
taking an active part in working out and implementing the forthcoming reform of the 
monetary system, in particular in respect of the IMF, as well as playing a role in 
determining international monetary policy. The tactical aim is to ensure the opportunity 
to enlist, if need be, additional financial resources at a lower interest rate than if 
borrowed from a privately-owned bank. To work for the former objective outside the 
IMF is very difficult if not impossible.
Thirdly, professor Skorov points out that in recent years the impact of the capitalist 
monetary system on the foreign trade operations of the USSR and other socialist 
countries has substantially increased. The non-participation of the USSR in the 
regulation of international monetary ties is already causing certain problems in 
economic relations within the CMEA, as some of the CMEA countries (Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Vietnam) have been members of the IMF for years, unlike the Soviet 
Union.
It is remarkable, how openly Skorov underlines the positive factors of IMF- 
membership by writing that IMF credits could prove constructive in reorganizing the 
Soviet economic structure and raising the competiveness of Soviet products. Learning 
from the experience of the market economy which underlies the IMFs philosophy, the 
USSR could faster and more efficiently complete the development of the new monetary 
mechanism combining the principles of nationwide planning with a nationwide socialist 
market and the integrated market of the CMEA member states.
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Even if this remark by Skorov is a bit oddly formulated -  because the optimal mixture 
of market and plan is not known by anybody -  it is interesting: the Soviet Union and the 
CMEA have something to learn from the IMF, which is in traditional socialist language 
stamped as an imperialist organization. Therefore, these observations can be regarded as 
a valuable piece of glasnost.
Professor Shcnayev, who was interviewed by the West German periodical "Osteuropa- 
Wirtschaft", has similar attitudes favouring IMF-membership. In his opinion, 
preconditions for rouble convertibility must now be created, an in this the membership 
in the IMF is helpful. 77)
However, the Soviet discussion on joining the IMF has obviously only an academic 
dimension. Ivan Ivanov from the Soviet administration (GVK) states flatly:
"Some hotheads are proposing all but immediately knocking on its 
(IMF) doors. Such haste is unnecessary for, first of all, we would 
hardly be accepted, no one has yet given us sufficiently substantial 
calculations as to what we can realistically receive in exchange for our 
contribution to the IMF. A situation can result where we will share 
responsibility for IMF policies without being able to influence them".
78)
It is thus clear that the Soviet Union was not willing to join the IMF in the turn of the 
decade 1980-90. Obviously, external interference into Soviet economic affairs cannot 
be accepted.
In Hungary, which has been a member of the IMF from the early 1980s, the day of 
economic reckoning has arrived. In late 1989 the IMF issued its prescription for dealing 
with the country’s ills-namely soaring deficits on all fronts and a high foreign debt. An 
austerity programme for 1990, which includes the closure of 50 loss-making 
companies, a 20% cut in state subsidies and an almost balanced budget was announced. 
79) In London, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr. Nemeth warned that the IMF 
programme was not getting any applause from the people:
"There will be tension and I am not excluding the possibility of great 
resentment and opposition to these measures". 80)
In December 1989, Poland's negotiations with the IMF on an adjustment programme 
was delayed, putting into question the Government's ability to initiate its anti-inflation 
policies.81)
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These examples have been brought up in order to show, how difficult it is to establish 
economic equilibrium in the CPEs with Western "demand management" methods. It is 
not an easy task to create preconditions for convertibility of CPEs' monetary units with 
the help of the IMF advice based on austerity. If, however, the goal of convertibility is 
reached with the help of the IMF economic policy advice, the FDIs are likely to 
experience a remarkable boost.
The third point mentioned above -  the development of intra-CMEA affairs towards a 
"common market" -  is of vital importance for Western investors looking for 
opportunities in the East. If socialist integration methods become market oriented, there 
will be increasing interest among Western investors to be on the inside of this big 
market.
The decision to create "a common market in the CMEA" was taken at the 44th CMEA, 
Council meeting in Prague in the summer 1988. 82) This resolution has since been 
discussed by socialist specialists in international economics.
The Soviet economist Yury Shiryayev states, that any economist could list a sufficient 
number of arguments to demonstrate that an integrated market is a long way off. Before 
it materializes, the home markets of the member countries must be balanced, 
competitive enterprises must be formed in the CMEA's manufacturing industries, and 
mutual access to wholesale goods must be provided. That is no easy task, and dealing 
with it will take more than a decade. 83)
According to Alexei Antonov, Deputy Prime Minister and permanent Soviet 
representative in the CMEA, a great deal will depend on the renewal of the price and 
monetary mechanism of integration. The main aim of the price policy is to stimulate the 
production of articles that come up to international standards and help expand 
connections with the world market. This can only be achieved by reducing the 
difference between contract (CMEA) and world market prices and promoting the 
independent price formation activity of enterprises and economic organizations. The 
setting of real exchange values for CMEA currencies, the introduction of mutual 
convertibility on this basis, and the wide use of national currencies in trade between 
socialist countries are, according to AntonOv, the main ways of readjusting the monetary 
and financial system. 84)
The Soviet economist A. Nekipelov represents the optimistic view that direct links 
between CMEA production enterprises -  a topic widely discussed in CPEs in the second 
half of the 1980s -  are gradually leading to objective price reform, and to the 
possibilities of converting TR into commodities, and thus, to a multilateralization of
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payments in the CMEA-area. The precondition for that, however, is that enterprises will 
be transformed from units executing plan directives to "socialist commodity producers", 
which are led by their own economic interests. In foreign trade within the CMEA the 
client must have the right to choose the economically best offer. 85) .
A surprising turn to this discussion on the socialist common market came in December 
1989, when the Soviet Prime Minister, N. Ryzhkov took up the topic in his economic 
programme speech in the Supreme Soviet. He states the following:
"In the development of CMEA cooperation there are presently many 
difficulties, mainly due to incomplete cooperation mechanisms. We 
are now looking for solutions to this problem. The prospective aim is 
to create a common market in the CMEA. It is proposed to start 
applying current world market prices for the intra-CMEA in 1991 and 
to go over to CC payments." 86)
Mr. Ryzhkov is here proposing a truly revolutionary move for intra-CMEA trade deals, 
which will speed up the socialist common market idea in practice, if carried out as 
outlined by the Soviet head of the government. It means the scrapping of the whole TR 
system, which has been hampering the rationalisation of the socialist international 
division of labour.
This new "Ryzhkov model" is good news for Western investors interested in enacting 
FDIs in the CMEA countries. A FDI in Hungary, for example, can be used as a bridge­
head to conquer the Soviet market, or vice versa, and CC payments can be applied 
without any special arrangement.
If applied, the "Ryzhkov model" will have severe consequences for the whole CMEA 
area. "Soft" goods production within the bilateral socialist trading system is likely to 
wither away. Surplus capacities will then become manifest.
This Soviet proposal was discussed in the CMEA's 45th session held in January in 
Sofia. According to M. Calfa, the new Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, his country 
would be able to start the gradual transition toward the "Ryzhkov model" no sooner than 
in the mid-1990s. The crux of the matter is that the CSSR needs great amounts of 
Soviet oil and gas which it would have to pay in CC according to world market prices, 
while the competitiveness of Czechoslovak products is questionable. Cuba wanted no 
changes at all. 87) It can be assumed that Calfa’s pragmatic view is shared by most 
members of the CMEA. Thus, CMEA is returning to the centuries-old norms of 
civilized economic cooperation and is ready to bury the practice when the exchange of
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goods between member countries resembled the exchange of goods between tribes 
trading three axes for five sheep, as a Soviet observer puts it. 88)
The restructuring of the CMEA economies, in which competitiveness must be closely 
watched, will create new opportunities for Western investors. It is likely that more 
acquisition activity will develop when such activities become permissible to greater 
extent.
In the 1990s it is likely that there will be shifts in the relative wealth of the CMEA 
countries measured in CC purchasing power. It is highly likely that the Soviet Union 
will profit from the application of the "Ryzhkov model", if it sells the previous amounts 
of raw materials to her allies on the CC basis and refuses to buy any "soft" goods 
offered by them.
In this case the Soviet Union will become a more attractive trading partner for Western 
countries with more CC purchasing power. The small CMEA countries will need 
Western FDIs more than ever: their national economies must be made competitive with 
all the methods available.
Summing up all the three points brought up in this section (4.3.), it can be maintained 
that FDIs across ideological borders are in an extremely exciting phase at the beginning 
of the 1990s:
-  Political and thus also economic reforms are likely to experience a considerable 
-boost in the early years of the 1990s. This trend is highly likely to improve 
preconditions for Western FDIs in the East.
-  Country differences in the sphere of economic reforms are still obvious at the 
beginning of the 1 9 9 0 . S  Hungary is clearly in the lead by applying mixed economy 
methods with a variety of ownership rules. The Soviet Union is reluctant to follow 
suit, especially in respect of reforming property rights.
Differences in the size of the market and natural riches are also likely to affect 
investment decisions in the 1990s. The Soviet Union is an attractive target for FDIs 
as far as these two points are concerned. In this respect the other CMEA countries 
are unable to compete with the USSR.
-  All the socialist countries under review will obviously be interested in European 
economic integration in the 1990s. Participation in the EES-process is regarded as 
important. On the Western side ideological considerations are involved: the more 
democratic and market economy features are applied in the East European reforms,
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the more likely financial help and trade policy concessions by the West will be. 
Hungary and Poland are the favourite Eastern countries in this context. 89)
-  The ultimate goal of West European economic integration first in the framework of 
the EC and then also of the EES is the three-fold liberty of: free movement of 
goods and services, capital and labour. If these basic liberties are accepted by any 
CPE, it will mean the ultimate dismantling of "realsocialism" based on marxism- 
leninism.
-  From the point of view of attracting FDIs it is essential for CPEs to become 
involved in the EES process. Further de-ideologization in the CPEs is needed, if 
they are to be a party in the All-European integration process. Hungary and also 
Poland seem to be prepared for this process, while the Soviet Union is hardly ready 
to accept the three basic freedoms at once. All the other CMEA countries are 
somewhere in between at the beginning of the 1990s.
-  There is an obvious trend among CMEA countries towards accepting the IMF as an 
important institution and as an economic adviser. However, the Soviet Union as 
well as Bulgaria have as yet made no decision to join this organization in the 1990s.
-  The membership in the IMF does not, however, guarantee the immediate 
convertibility of a member. Romania has been a member already for about twenty 
years without achieving convertibility of the lei. In the post-Ceausescu era in 
Romania it is likely that contacts with the IMF will be revitalised and preconditions 
for convertibility evaluated in the future.
Economic links between the CPEs and the IMF seem to be painful. Stabilising 
austerity proposed by the IMF can hardly be popular and it can also cause revival of 
ideological arguments.
Economic stability and a multilateral monetary environment, which are of vital 
importance in attracting FDIs, cannot be achieved without economic austerity. 
Serious economic policy conflicts, which harm the investment atmosphere, cannot 
be excluded.
In intra-CMEA affairs modernisation seems to be advancing in the early 1990s. 
The likely abolishing of the TR-payment system in socialist foreign trade certainly 
will not harm international movement of capital.
Finally, a new special feature in FDIs across ideological border came up in the few last 
months of 1989. In a summit meeting with Mr. Hans Modrow, the East German Prime
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Minister, and Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, intensified economic 
cooperation between the two German states was discussed:
"The two sides agreed to set up joint Economic and Environment 
Commissions, as well as a study group to improve tourism exchanges.
West Germany is to increase credit lines to back cooperation by 
smaller industries from DEM 4.5 billion to DEM 6 billion. Another 
DEM 2 billion from budgetary funds is to be set for guarantees for 
other industrial projects. A key condition is the new East German law 
on JVs expected to be finalised next February (1990)". 90)
The FRG has so far been the most important Western investor in the CMEA area. One 
of the questions in the 1990s will be to what extent she will concentrate the FDIs on the 
neighbouring GDR. If capitalist investment activity in the CMEA area is a zero-sum 
game in the 1990s, it is possible that the lion's share of West German FDI-sum will be 
channelled into the GDR.
Already in January 1990 the GDR announced that a Decree on JVs has been passed. 
According to East German newspapers foreign partners are allowed to have a majority 
stake in JVs, when they are important from the point of view of the host country's 
national economy, or when they are small or medium sized enterprises. It is underlined 
that JVs must work in the framework of East German economic legislation. 91)
In sum, at the beginning of the 1990s the situation concerning Western FDIs in 
European CMEA-countries is fundamentally different from that in the two previous 
decades. The new situation is described very well by a Soviet historian,-V. Dashichev:
"Current tendencies (the USSR's perestroika and East European 
revolutionary changes) have introduced predictability into European 
and world politics. Today, one can confidently predict that unification 
and cooperation will supersede rifts and unity, that a balance of 
interest will replace the balance of fear, that the security of individual 
states will replace bloc security, while freedom of development and 
tolerance will supersede hegemony and ideological Messianism."92)
According to the same observer the old situation was characterized by structural 
incompatibility of the market economy with East Europe's bureaucratic command 
economy, which created almost insurmountable barriers for economic’ cooperation 
between the two systems.93) Compatibility of economic interests on the enterprise level
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requires, as we have seen, several preconditions in order to be successful. Political 
detente is only one of them.
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Conclusions
Marxism and marxism-leninism have been unable to develop a constructive and 
positive theory of foreign trade suitable to guide socialist international affairs. The 
theory of imperialism, which criticizes the capitalist development of the global 
economy, has been of very little help when external economic links between socialist 
countries of the CMEA have been created.
The socialist approach to international trade has often been called trade aversion. The 
basic socialist notion is that international trade should be employed to supply the 
domestic economy with certain necessary imports, the necessity of which is spelled out 
in the economic plan by the system's directors. The emphasis is on the use of 
international trade to acquire imports; exports serve only as the means for acquiring 
them.
This system which disregards the comparative cost advantages has been sub-optimal 
from the point of view of welfare maximisation. In addition, the socialist system of 
international payments based on the clumsy TR-clearing has formed an effective brake 
for advancing factor mobility among socialist countries.
Thus, it is actually natural that the CMEA countries have been unable to create "a 
parallel world market”, a closed community, which is independent from global markets 
with economic fluctuations and capitalist dominance. Links to that ideologically hostile 
global market have been sought and also established.
In the 1970s the CMEA countries attempted to integrate themselves into the global 
economy by heavy credit-financing. The basic strategy was to borrow money from the 
international market and import technology on a large scale from the West. It was 
assumed that no essential alteration in economic decision-making was needed.
This strategy failed badly.Competitive economic units on a large scale could not be 
created in an economic environment in which centralized management methods were 
largely kept in tact.
The alternative for credit financing, Western FDIs, emerged already in the 1970s. The 
first attempts to attract FDIs were half-hearted and full of ideological hesitations. 
Results in the 1970s Were bound to be extremely poor.
In the 1970s there were also serious attempts to revitalize the intra-CMEA co­
operation. Huge investment projects formed the method to advance the socialist
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international division of labour. Difficulties in calculating investment contributions, as 
well as results achieved by the investors became obvious thus soon bringing the boom 
of joint investments to an end.
Socialist ownership arrangements together with the outdated socialist currency system 
have kept intra-CMEA JVs at a minimum. Only a few cases have seen daylight. These 
modest economic outlets cannot be compared with MNCs, which form the most 
dynamic part of the capitalist global economy.
Thus, it is actually no wonder that CMEA countries started advancing the idea of FDIs 
between East and West in the 1980s, even if the results of the previous decade were not 
encouraging. Results, which differ from country to country, are interesting in many 
senses, even if they are economically not substantial.
From the ideological point of view permitting Western FDIs to operate in socialist 
societies can. be said to be absurd. The theory of imperialism has always been an 
absolute core point in marxism-leninism. Allowing MNCs to invest in socialism means 
economic alliance with the main agents of the monopoly capitalism. De-ideologisation 
of socialist societies is a conditio sine quo non when Western FDIs are attracted to the 
CPEs.
The ideological erosion of marxism-leninism experienced a stormy leap forward during 
the last moments of the 1980s. However, ideology did not wither away altogether, at 
least, not in the Soviet Union. Therefore, some special features in the host countries of 
FDIs must still be taken into consideration, when Western enterprises invest their risk 
capital into CMEA countries. Political risks in the form of a backlash toward Stalinism 
might be relatively small, but not altogether extinguished.
Originally, the 1980s were to have been a special -  a very special -  milestone in 
socialist development. According to the Party Programme of the CPSU of 1961, the 
1980s were supposed to be the first decade of full communism, during which all 
scarcities would have been overcome and the need of using economic levers would have 
become superfluous. After that all the nations of the world were supposed to follow the 
example given by "real socialism".
The reality of the 1980s differed fundamentally from that vision. Economic levers are 
badly needed in the CPEs, in order to help reestablish economic equilibrium, which is 
needed, among other things, in attracting Western FDIs. Socialist countries have been 
competing with LDCs in acquiring Western FDIs. The solidarity of the CMEA countries
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with the LDCs in the fight against international exploitation has lost meaning as a 
socialist slogan.
As far as the economic importance of Western FDIs is concerned the results were still 
relatively meagre in the 1980s, even if they improved somewhat in comparison to the 
1970s. Country differences are striking: the Soviet Union and Hungary have received 
the main part of the FDIs. Motives of the investors have, however, obviously not been 
the same in both cases: the Soviet Union attracts FDIs mainly with big internal markets 
and natural wealth, while Hungary offers a reformed market oriented economic 
environment.
In the future it is important that the economic reform process continues and intensifies 
when the CMEA countries seek for Western FDIs. In addition to the reforms on the 
national economy level it is important for the CPEs to participate in the integration 
process which is taking place in the global economy in the 1990s. Standing outside of 
these developments would mean serious set-backs in acquiring FDIs.
The atmosphere of political detente engendered by perestroika creates favourable 
preconditions for global economic integration. However, some dangers are also looming 
ahead for Western investors as well as for host countries receiving FDIs.
Direct investments bring up direct economic involvement. Western companies have 
started already in the 1980s not only in the form of JVs in the CPEs, but also by making 
acquisitions. What is the price of a socialist company or the value of a share in it when it 
is sold to Western investors? Is it not possible or even likely that the Western investor is 
only interested in the best pieces of the socialist economy? What will happen to the 
CPEs when JVs and wholly Western-owned companies become dominant in certain 
branches of the national economy causing disturbances for local competitors? Will it be 
accepted that Western companies come and make a quick profit and afterwards pull out? 
Many unanswered questions remain at a time when FDIs between different social 
systems are becoming more important.
If Western FDIs in the CMEA region grow rapidly, the result will be ihe neo- 
colonialisation of socialist countries via direct influence of MNCs. This process may 
lead to neo-stalinistic tendencies in CMEA countries with a revival of anti-imperialist 
feelings. If Western FDIs remain thin, there is a danger that the reform process in the 
CMEA countries will lack economic dynamism. In this case it is likely that mass 
movement of labour from the East to West will take place. In the optimal case Western 
FDis will be important but not dominant in the CMEA countries' national economies 
exercising indirect influence by forcing the local economic units to become fully
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competitive. Only the last scenario will guarantee harmonious transformation of CPEs 
toward mixed economies.
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Appendix 1 1)
Foreign Trade Decision-Making in the Soviet Union in the pre-perestroika period 
The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is the Soviet Union's highest executive and directive organ 
which is responsible to the Supreme Soviet. The Council of Ministers is responsible for 
the general management of foreign economic relations and for execution of international 
contracts through the agency of the state committees under its jurisdiction.
State Committees
The most important state committees in foreign trade are Gosplan, GKNT, Gossnab, 
Gosstroj and GKES.
Gosplan is the Planning Committee which is responsible for the preparation of plans 
concerning the whole Soviet economy. For the planning of international economic 
relations, Gosplan has three special departments of which two are responsible for trade 
with the West. Gosplan draws up foreign trade plans in close cooperation with 
representatives from other state committees and experts from the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade. Representatives of the latter organization in particular are in a key position in 
linking foreign trade agreements applying to individual countries to the general plan. 
Western exporters are unable to influence the activities of Gosplan very much.
GKNT is the State Committee for Science and Technology which is responsible for the 
direction and follow-up of technical development.
The active efforts of the Soviet Union after technological exchange have, in the last few 
years, increased the significance of GKNT in foreign trade. GKNT gives 
recommendations and instructions about the acquisition of foreign technology. During 
the last few years, these recommendations have particularly concentrated on improving 
production efficiency and such.
The important institute VINIT, the All-Union Institute of Scientific Technical 
Information operates in connection with GKNT in business marketing technology. 
Viniti's job is to follow technical development in the world. The information which it 
gathers has a considerable influence on decisions concerning Soviet technological 
imports.
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Foreign Trade Decision-Makers in the Soviet Union 
The following organizations participate in Soviet foreign trade decision-making:
Council of Ministers
G osbank
GosplanGossnabGosstrojGKNT
Vnesh­
torgbankMinistries
GKES I Ministry of
-> T r - .
Foreign Trade Associations
Purchaser Organizations
Industrial Groups
Users
G ossn ab  The State Committee 
of ihe USSR for Material 
and Technical Supplies
Council of Ministers
GKNT The State Committee fo the G osplan The State Planning 
USSR for S c ien ce  and Technology Committee of the USSR
Gosstroj The State Committee of The Ministry of Foreign Trade 
USSR for Construction Monitoring
GKES The Stale Committee of the G osbank The State Bank 
USSR for Foreign Economic Relations
Vneshtorgbank i he State 
Foreign Trade Bank
Production plants
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The Foreign Trade Association, Vneshtekhnika, which is responsible for product 
testing, is subordinate to GKNT. The suitability of machinery and equipment intended 
for the Soviet market are tested at Vneshtekhnika. Its report may even be an absolute 
requirement for continued negotiations.
Gossnab is the State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies. It maintains 
material stocks, and guides and supervises the flow of goods between enterprises. In 
foreign trade, the administrative branches of this committee, which are divided into 
product lines, are often the customers of foreign trade associations, especially when bulk 
goods are in question. Gossnab participates in the planning of material flows according 
to spheres of responsibility and its representatives are often present on the 
administrative board of the foreign trade associations.
Gosstroj is the State Committee for Construction Monitoring which handles the 
coordination and supervision of construction jobs under different ministries at a higher 
level. The increase in project imports has made Gosstroj a rather significant manager of 
foreign economic relations. From the point of view of Western business, Gosstroj is, 
however, chiefly a guiding force behind decisions made by the ministries.
GKES is the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations which is responsible for 
Soviet project exports. Its main form of activity is the supplying of complete production 
plants on a turnkey basis chiefly to developing and socialist countries. The nine foreign 
trade associations operating under GKES resemble engineering offices and carry out 
project and realization work connected with the building of production plants.
GKE's range of activities is quite comprehensive and it has agreements on cooperation 
with nearly one hundred countries. Finland is one of the most important Westerns 
partners in this cooperation and so GKES has its own representation in Finland, in the 
office of the Soviet economic counsellor in Helsinki.
In cooperating with the foreign trade associations under GKES, Finnish companies have 
carried out considerable projects in Finland and the Soviet Union. Cooperation in third 
countries -  principally in developing countries- offers significant potential 
opportunities to Finnish companies, especially in the fields controlled by GKES.
Ministries
In the Soviet planned economy the ministries listed below traditionally play an 
important role in decision-making. In the planning stage the different ministries inform 
Gosplan of their own import requirements and export possibilities. The high level 
organs participating in planning perform a levelling out coordination of import
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requirements and apportion means for payment for the use of the ministries, taking the 
priorities of the national economy into consideration.
Ministries of Industry
The industrial branch ministries have an important position in foreign trade decision­
making. Each one of them if interested in the increasing of the capacity of their own line 
of activities and in making the operations of existing production plants more effective. 
Consequently these ministries related to particular lines of activity are important contact 
points for the exporter.
The planning organs have to trim the import wishes of the ministries. After this, the 
approved projects become a part of the foreign trade plan and means for payment are 
granted to the ministry concerned.
On the basis of the approved plan, the ministry gives the foreign trade associations the 
work of realizing concrete purchases. Thus an intent to purchase entered in the 
ministry's plan is a vital impulse for the materialization of trade.
These regional ministries are also interested in the new products which have not yet 
been included in the import plans. The presentation of new products to representatives at 
ministerial level is also extremely important because in this way the acquisition in 
question can be included in the next important plans.
Over the last few years, foreign trade departments (zagranspostavka) have been formed 
within the ministries of industry. Nowadays, this kind of department, which helps the 
ministry in the planning, .realization and control of import and export operations, is to be 
found at virtually all the ministries of industry.
The purpose of forming the zagranpostavkas was to bring the foreign trade purchaser 
and consumer organizations closer to one another. The formation of foreign trade 
departments has helped Western importers in creating relations with decision-makers at 
a ministerial level.
Immediately under the ministries of industry there is an administrative intermediate 
authority, the so-called "obedinenie" or association level. These large units direct the 
operations of the actual production plants under them. The development of this authority 
over the last few years has not, however, led to the granting of direct foreign trade rights 
to production associations.
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The Ministry of Foreign Trade
The real administrative central organization for the foreign trade of the Soviet Union is 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade. It is responsible for the management, regulations and 
control of Soviet foreign trade. At this moment its range of duties include:
preparation for the development of commercial relations between the Soviet Union 
and other countries and general measures connected with it
preparation, negotiating, signing and supervision of the execution of inter­
governmental trade agreements
the drawing-up of import and export plans, the planning of measures aimed at 
improving the quality of export and import goods
the regulation and supervision of the operations of the foreign trade associations 
functioning under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Soviet trade representatives 
and commercial counsellors
tasks connected with the administration of customs affairs 
the granting of import and export licences 
-  tasks connected with currency and matters affairs and with foreign trade 
transportation
the selection, training and placing of personnel working in foreign trade.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is headed by the Minister of Foreign Trade and his 
deputy vice-ministers of foreign trade, of which there are several. The board working 
under the Minister of Foreign Trade is an advisory body whose decisions are effected 
after the Minister has confirmed them.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is divided into the following administrative offices or 
departments:
commercial policy or regional departments 
departments according to product lines 
departments formed on a functional basis.
The main function of the departments according to product line is the supervision of the 
realization of import and export plans. In practice they check delivery agreements made 
by the foreign trade associations and grant import and export licences. These 
departments also control the term of the agreements and see to it that the state of the 
market is properly taken into consideration when entering into business. The 
departments are also actively involved in the drawing-up of foreign trade plans, and 
they follow the commercial goods structure and look for new export products. The 
departments are contact points for the ministries divided into product lines in foreign 
trade.
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The functional departments of the Ministry of Foreign Trade manage the special tasks of 
foreign trade, such as: transport, currency and law of contract questions, customs affairs 
etc.
A network of representatives authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Trade operates in 
the country's various Soviet Republics and economic regions. They are contacts 
between the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the foreign trade associations, ministries and 
central administrative boards and the various officials of regional administration. In 
addition to this, they supervise the realization of virtually all the tasks connected with 
foreign trade in their region, among other things the acceptance of imported goods and 
their use. The actual inspection of goods lies with the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry.
All-Union Foreign Trade Associations -  The Practical Trade Partners 
Principles of Operation
The state's monopoly in foreign trade can be seen in practice in the centralization of 
import and export activities in special All-Union foreign trade associations. These 
associations are juridically independent state organizations operating on the principle of 
profitability. Regulations have been established for the associations in which their rights 
and duties are defined as well as their trading goods and regions.
The foreign trade associations are, as their name implies, specialized in foreign trade 
tasks, they do not practise productional activities. They operate as agents between 
Soviet production plants and other organizations and foreign business. The majority of 
the associations is based on the line of business. There are also associations whose 
operations are regionally demarcated or who manage certain special tasks (e.g. 
insurance, advertising, transportation, licence trade etc.)
The foreign trade associations are, apart from a few regionally limited associations (e.g. 
Lenfintorg/Leningrad), situated in Moscow. Representatives of the foreign trade 
associations work at Soviet Trade Representations abroad, one person may represent 
several associations.
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The number of foreign trade associations has varied with economic reforms and the 
pursuit of efficiency. Nowadays there are approximately seventy groups. Of these the 
great majority work under the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
The Organization of the Foreign Trade Association
The organizations of the foreign trade associations are generally similar, even if the 
economic reforms carried out in 1978 affected their internal structure to some extent.
The leading people of the foreign trade associations are experienced and high level 
foreign trade experts. In staff training much stress is put on the developing buying skills, 
in addition to a general knowledge of foreign trade.
A council, which meets quarterly, is as the highest organ in the association, of which 
half represents the association's personnel and the other half the organizations (e.g. 
Gossnab, GKNT, industrial associations etc.) which the association serves. The number 
of members on the council is always even. In an equally divided vote the chairman 
(group leader) has the casting vote.
In the Soviet Union the formation of these councils is considered a significant reform, 
which is aimed at improving cooperation between the buyer and end user.
The leader of an association is appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade if the foreign 
association in question comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
The leader has two deputies, one of whom is a representative of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and the other of the Ministry of Industry.
Actual operational activities are realized in the firms of the foreign trade associations. 
Usually there are 5-10 of these firms which are divided according to product 
groups.They are independent profit centres, but not juridical entities. Thus contracts are 
signed in the name of the association although executives of the firms can appear as the 
signatory party. Earlier only the association's executives were authorized to sign on 
behalf of the association.
In addition to the firms, several departments formed on a functional basis work within 
the foreign trade association. They attend to routine matters and the production of the 
data needed to back up decision-making.
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Appendix 2 
The Joint-S tock Company "Haldex" 2)
When in April, 1959 Hungary and Poland founded Haldex with a 50-50 per cent 
participation as a joint stock company, the legal form was inherited from the capitalist 
practice was applied in such a way that each country designed one of its enterprises as a 
"shareholder", and the shares were made out in the names of the two holders. The 
company was formed and operates according to the rules of Polish civil law. Its 
supervision, however, is exercised by the two competent ministries of Hungary and 
Poland.
The accounting of investments and current outlays had to be fitted into the system of 
bilateral payments as it was practiced between CMEA countries. Thus, Haldex 
shareholders settle their mutual accounts in terms of clearing roubles.
At the same time, formally the registered capital of Haldex consists of zlotys. Such 
commodity supplies of the Hungarian party as were considered advanced capital were 
taken into account in a highly complicated manner.
The exchange rate between the zloty and the clearing rouble is the basis of calculating 
investments and current outlays between the two shareholders of Haldex. But, for this 
purpose, neither the official exchange rate between the clearing rouble and the zloty, nor 
the rate between clearing rouble and the zloty prevailing in Soviet-Polish trade could be 
applied. Instead, starting from the clearing-rouble prices (and in the absence of such 
from prices prevailing in other foreign trade relations) special clearing-rouble/zloty 
coefficients were agreed on for each cost type. The "investment coefficient" was 
obtained as a weighted average of all these. The following table shows the coefficients 
3) (The coefficient still expresses the rate between the "old" clearing rouble and the 
zloty.) by major cost types that had been applied when calculating the investment 
outlays connected with the first Haldex plant located in Michal, Poland. Similar 
methods were applied also in connection with the second plant constructed in 
Szombierk.
The table clearly illustrates the vast work connected with this type of conversion and 
bookkeeping, due to the lack of a currency able to function as genuine money.
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The component applied in calculating the "investment coefficient" for the purpose of the Polish- 
Hungarian common investments in Michal, Poland.
Denomination Prices in Coefficient
(zloty/roub
le)
zloty/kg rouble/kg*
Technological machines and equipment:
Iron construction elements 6.30 1.35 4.667
Machines 20.70 4.55 4.55
Conveyor belts 21.00 3.60 5.834
Runways 12.00 1.80 6.66
Pipe ducts 6.60 1.90 3.474
Pumps 12.60 4.20 3.00
Dust extractor 16.00 4.00 4.00
Average coefficient 5.482
Power supply and electrical equipment:
Central costs (60 per cent) 9.3x0.6 = 5.58
Electrical equipment
(40 per cent) . • 4.7x0.4 = 1.88
Coefficient of overhead costs 7.46
Power supply • • 2.54
Average coefficient 5.527
Construction works:
Wages** 12.9
Materials*** 5.22
Services:
performed by machines (9.8)
transport services (16.9)
average coefficient of services (12.9) 5.97
Overhead costs:
Wages (46.3 per cent) 12.9
Services: (13.0 per cent): (9.88 = 0.64)
of machines (6-5 per cent) (16.9 = 1.10)
average coeff.of services (1.74)
Other costs (40.7 per cent) (3.05)
Average coefficient of overhead costs •• 10.76
Average coefficient 8.448
Costs of railway construction****
Average coefficient 8.003
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Costs of transports and storage
a) Costs emerged up to Dec.31,1960:
Storage and custody . . 11.67
Railway transport . . 6.8
Other transport costs***** . . 6.809
b) Costs emerged in 1961:
Wages . . 12.99
Railway transports . . 6.8
transport by trucks . . 16.9
Average coefficient_____________________________.___________ .________________________8.195
Projecting costs: average coefficient . 12.9
GENERAL AVERAGE FOR INVESTMENTS 6.424
(Old) clearing rouble
According to the Polish Hungarian bilateral agreement of 1957 concerning payments, this was 
the general coefficient, to be applied also to wage payments. Later, a general agreement of 
CMEA countries (Prague 1963) established uniform multipliers for application in non­
commercial payments and since then the uniform multiplier is being applied also in the Haldex 
account concerning current wage outlays.
Since it was. not possible to establish comparable prices for some of the materials used, these 
coefficient was calculated from prices covering about 90 per cent of the materials used, this 
coefficients were assessed for each construction object and for each type of operation; the final 
average resulted from these
Similar to construction costs, also the costs of railway construction comprise of partial 
coefficients for wages, materials, services and overhead costs. They arre identical with those 
applied for the construction costs, with the exception of the one regarding the materials.
This average results from five partial coefficients calculated on the basis of the balance sheet,
namely:
Railway costs 6.8
Truck transports 1.9
Business trips abroad 3.159
Telegraph costs 1.78
Also the summing up and accounting of current (operational) costs takes place on the 
basis of similar methods. In order to illustrate this, let us here present the coefficients 
applied to the costs of laboratory researches and of overhead costs which had emerged 
at the time of constructing the Michal plant, but were entered as current costs.
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Laboratory costs:
Wages, social assurance 
Materials and fuels 
Office requisites 
Laboratory materials 
Transport services 
Repair of offices 
Travel costs, 
taxes and duties 
Average coefficient
Costs of the central office:
Wages, fees, social
assurance
Amortizations
Fuels
Office requisites
Wear and tear by machines 
equipment in offices and 
official quarters 
Services performed by 
machines 
Transport costs 
Repair of motor cars 
Repair of office premises 
performed by outsiders
Costs of business trips abroad: 
Emerging in home currency
Emerging in foreign currency 
Others
Other costs, taxes and duties: 
General coefficient
12.9 
43.46 
10.00
24.45
24.45
12.9
7.5
12.777
12.9. According to interstate agreement 
13.6999According to the zloty and rouble values in the 
inventory of Dec.31,1960 
43.36 From zloty and rouble prices of petrol and oil
10.0 From documents of the Polish foreign trade
enterprise PAGED
11.58 From zloty and rouble values in the 1960-inventory
7.5
16.9 Appendix of the balance sheet of 1960
12.9 The wage coefficient
8.517 Equals the investment coefficient regarding offices 
and warehouses
1.0025 Zloty/rouble rate at which the Ministry of Finance 
allocates roubles to the enterprise for travelling 
purposes
3.159 Appendix of the 1960 balance
7.5 Inland fares and other material expenditure
according to the general coefficient of "other costs"
7.5 Most of these costs consisted of notarial fees 
involved by the foundation. As a matter of fact, the 
"investment coefficient" should have been applied 
but this was not yet known at the time, so the 
somewhat higher coefficient of "other costs" was 
accepted.
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Postal and telephone costs:
General coefficient 1.78 Appendix of the 1960 balance (in conformity with
Poland’s international postal accountancy in gold
francs)
Funds for representation purposes’.
General coefficient 7.5 As for "other costs"
Other costs'.
General coefficient 7.5
The weighted average obtained from these coefficients amounted to 9.289 -  regarding 
the two-year period form July 1st, 1959 to June 30th, 1961, that is, according to the 
proportions between cost types prevailing in that period.
According to the accountancy based on these coefficients of investment and current 
costs, Haldex has proved a lucrative undertaking.
For the investment costs of the first plant (in Michal) the Hungarian shareholder was 
charged 566,000 clearing roubles. Against this stands the net gain determined by (a) the 
difference between the production (and transport) costs of the coal obtained and the 
world market price of a similar quality (b) the difference between this world market 
price and the Hungarian inland price based on the production costs of Hungarian coal 
mines.
In 1963 the average production costs of Haldex coal amounted to 5.20 clearing roubles 
per ton, to which transport costs amounting to 0.46 rouble had to be added in order to 
make it comparable with the average world market price of the same coal quality; the 
latter was about 11.30 clearing rouble per ton in 1963. An additional gain (in forints) 
was derived from the fact that the Hungarian inland price was higher than the forint 
equivalent of the world market price. Thus, the inland sales of this coal ensure a 
considerable net gain for the Hungarian shareholder -  most of this, however, is 
"skimmed off’ by the Hungarian Ministry of Finance.
If we take into consideration (a) the natural advantages of open-cast mining against 
deep working, (b) the difference in the quality of this coal in comparison to the home- 
produced one, (c) the relatively short distance of transport *, it is likely that the 
advantages demonstrated by this exceedingly sophisticated and laborious method of 
accounting do really exist- No doubt, in this special case the accounting was much 
simplified since, at least, the product of the process was homogeneous and easy to 
valuate; moreover, the Hungarian shareholder could transfer his gain in the form of coal.
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The difficulties of accounting techniques would grow immensely (under the conditions 
of the present international mechanism), if also the products of the common venture 
were of a complex nature.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the "gain" of the Hungarian shareholder deriving from 
the joint venture is skimmed off by the Hungarian Ministry of Finance, so that his 
concern is purely formal.
’•'Transport costs are borne by the Haldex.
Appendices
Source: Soviet Trade Guide. Skopbank Group. Vammala (Finland) 1986. pp.14-22. The 
original text in Finnish language by T. Tiusanen, in: Neuvostoliiton kaupan opas. Skopbank, 
1985.
S. Ausch: Theory and Practice... op.cit. Appendix 14, pp. 276-279.
The coefficient still expresses the rate between the "old" clearing rouble and the zloty.
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